



THE FLOWER-SPRAY  
OF THE QUODAMMODO DOCTRINE

ŚRĪ MALLIṢEṆASURI

SYĀD-VĀDA-MAÑJARĪ

TRANSLATED AND ANNOTATED

BY

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## PREFATORY NOTE

The *Syādvādamañjari* is a commentary by Malliṣeṇa, completed in A. D. 1292, on Hemacandra's (1088-1172) *Anyayoga-nyāyacchedikā*. It not only throws much light on the philosophical views of the Jains themselves, but also on the philosophical debates so popular in the Indian Middle Ages. Prof. Thomas planned this work as a sequel and complement to the *Pravacanasastra*, published by the Jain Literary Society in Cambridge in 1935, and he devoted so much of his time to it because he had a high opinion of the intrinsic value of the Jain position, which in his view compared favourably with the so much better known tenets of the Vedānta and the Mādhyamikas.

The translation is based on the edition of Sheth Motilal Ladhaji, *Sri-Hemacandrācārya-ricaritā Anyayogyaracchedikā ca Śrī-Malliṣeṇa-Sūri-praṇīta Syādvādamañjarī*. Arhatamata-prabhākara. Mayukha 3. Jaina Printing Works. Poona. 2452 (1926). The pages of this edition have been inserted into the translation, its variant readings are quoted as AMP, and the Notes refer to it frequently as M. L.

In addition the following editions were consulted: An oblong Jain *poṭhi*, edited by Har Gobind Das and Bechar Das. Benares. Vīra Samvat 2438 (1912). No. 30 of Śrī Yasovijaya Jaina Granthamālā Series (Quoted as Das). - A. B. Dhruva's edition, with Introduction, Notes and Appendices, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, no. LXXXIII, Bombay and Poona, 1933. - Sri Damodar Lal Goswami's edition in the Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series, 1900.

Prof. Thomas dictated this translation to me in his house at Bodicote in 1946. My own contribution consisted in taking down what he said, typing it out, comparing it with the text, keeping an eye on the consistency of his English terminology as well as on the often long and involved Sanskrit compounds, and volunteering a few opinions on the contents where they touched Buddhist philosophy. After the translation was completed, Prof. Thomas made some efforts to have it printed, first in England, then in India. These led to no tangible results, and Prof. Thomas continued to revise the translation until the year of his death in 1956.

Hemacandra's verses are printed in heavy type, and where a word from them is explained in Malliṣeṇa's commentary, it is again shown in heavy type. The reader will notice some slight discrepancies in the rendering of some words, first in the verse itself and then in the commentary. It would have been easy to remove these, but that would have been against the express wishes of Prof. Thomas. The typescript has been edited exactly as I found it, with all later corrections duly noted, and I have kept my editorial corrections to the bare minimum. Of the planned 'Introduction of about 10 pages' nothing could be found. It remains to me to thank the Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin for having made available to scholars this posthumous work of their Corresponding Member, which exhibits not only his mastery in unravelling the most complicated constructions of Sanskrit syntax, but also shows that earnest preoccupation with the problems of human existence which gave an additional dimension to the breadth and austerity of his scholarship.



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Om.

Homage to the Omniscient!

## 'THE RESCINDER OF OTHER SYSTEMS')

a work of the Teacher Śrī-Hemacandra, the omniscient of the Kali Age<sup>1)</sup>

and its commentary

"The Flower-spray of the Quodammodo doctrine"<sup>2)</sup>

composed by Śrī Mallisēṇa-sūri

<sup>1)</sup> 'Systems'. In this sense the word *yoga* seems to have been a speciality of the Jains, who also use it to denote 'activity' of mind, body, or speech (see *Outlines of Jainism*, p. 38, and *Pravacana-sāra*, trans. Faddegon, p. 156). The sense of 'activity' probably belongs to the early period: the thence derived notion of 'procedure', 'system', may perhaps be recognized also in the terms *samkhyā-yoga* and *dhyāna-yoga*, as used in the *Bhagavad-gītā*, and, more widely, in the word *yukti*, 'reasoning'. The special Yoga philosophy, has the name in a perhaps somewhat older sense, but as designation of the Nyāya or the Vaiśeṣika schools (*infra* pp. 57, 88, etc.), an use found also, sometimes, outside Jainism (see Randle, *Indian logic in the early schools*, p. 3, n. 4), its implication may again have been that of 'system'.

<sup>2)</sup> Hemacandra was *Acarya*, 'spiritual Director', and, while not actually *Siddha* or *Arhat*, had the complimentary title 'Omniscient of the (present debased) Kali Age'. Mallisēṇa's title, *Sūri*, is of general application to leading Jain scholars, especially as heads of *Caṇḍas*, schools of teaching.

<sup>3)</sup> The term 'quodammodo', commonly in mediæval philosophy denoting what is only 'in a sense' correct, is fairly equivalent to the Jain *syād*, 'may be', 'would be', Optative of 'be': it implies not doubt, but discrimination of 'aspects'. The Quodammodo doctrine, *Syād-vāda*, affirms the un-one-sidedness, *anekānta*, which we shall render by 'equivocality', of all ordinary statements, as expressing mere aspects of a total reality. Elaboration of the doctrine will be found under vv. XXIII-V, pp. 134-146.

## PREFACE

1. That Creator<sup>1)</sup> whose cognition embraces an infinity of objects; who is honoured by divinities, whose eternal word is not interrupted by the hubbubs of Wrong Methods; and who in a moment brushed aside that conclave of enemies headed by passion and aversion, — may be, the Glorious Vira, create for me a turbidness-purged understanding!

2. The glorious Lord Hemacandra<sup>2)</sup>, who, through the mass of merits of all terrestrial beings incorporating in his own person Sarasvatī and the-Guru of the Gods, with boundless power of conception as their united life, established, after the exemplar of his own body, the Quodammodo doctrine, may he be to me a 'Lord' to make awakening in the ocean of right intelligence!

3. Those who to Hemacandra, the Sage, resort from a glimpse of service to the meaning of the books set forth by him, they, having obtained respect, become a proper base for brilliant accomplishments.

4. O Mother Bhārati<sup>3)</sup>, be present in my heart, so that this idea of essaying an exposition of the 'Laudation of the authority' may promptly succeed, or that day and night on my lips may quiver unforgettingly a perpetual Sarasvatī spell, delightful in the form 'Sri-Udaya-prabha'. (2)

Now by Sri-Hemacandra-sūri, — imitator of the sun in banishing the darkness of night due to the evil Duṣṣama wheel-spoke<sup>4)</sup>, the single Brahmā for the creation of the faultless four-fold knowledge<sup>5)</sup>, whose pure fame abides to the aeon's end<sup>6)</sup> through the grandeur of the blessings bestowed by the various souls recalled to life by the elixir termed 'gift of security'<sup>7)</sup>,

<sup>1)</sup> Mahāvira is compared to the world-creator god, Brāhmā, of Hinduism. The 'wrong methods' are mistaken philosophical approaches, and the '(six)enemies' are the oft-mentioned group of passions and weaknesses.

<sup>2)</sup> The comparison of Hemacandra is perhaps rather to the composite Nara-nārī, Siva-Durgā, divinity than to Harihara, Viṣṇu-śiva or to Viṣṇu alone, whose awakening, however, from his sleep on the ocean is also envisaged. Sarasvatī is the Minerva of Indian intellectuality and art; and the Guru of the gods, Brhaṣpati or else Nārada, is embodiment of wisdom.

<sup>3)</sup> Bhārati = Sarasvatī, and 'Udayaprabha', the name of Mallikena's teacher, is a spell, *Sarasvatī-mātra*, securing her inspiration.

<sup>4)</sup> Duṣṣama is the fifth, i. e. all but worst, 'spoke', — aeon, of the descending half of the wheel of time: see *Outline of Jainism*, p. xxvi.

<sup>5)</sup> The 'fourfold knowledge' (*caturvidyā*), explained by M. L. as Grammar, Scripture (*āgama*), Poetics and Logic, by no means comprises all Hemacandra's surviving works, and other departments, e. g. Lexicography and Metrics might have been selected. Possibly religious writings, even the *Yoga-sāstra*, may have been excluded, as not being mere mundane sciences (*vidyā*). The original 'four Vidyās' had been the four Vedas; but subsequently other groups and large numbers of Vidyās came to be mentioned (see *Nyāya-kōśa*, s. v.). In any case the number 'four' here alludes to the Creator Brahmā's four faces.

<sup>6)</sup> Fame, has, according to a current Indian saying, that duration.

<sup>7)</sup> Hemacandra's conversion of Kumārāpāla (Chaulukya king, ruling A. D. 1145-1166 at Anahilapāṭaka, Gujarat) set above the head of that king an imperial canopy of doctrines and procured from him a proclamation prohibiting slaughter of animals.

ordained by the glorious king Kumārapāla, who by a canopy of teachings describable as an ambrosial stream descended upon the earth was made the supreme Jain, — was composed, in the form of a laudation of Jina Śrī-Vardhamāna<sup>\*)</sup>), following the thirty-two 'Thirty-two's' composed by the world-famous Siddhasena-divākara<sup>\*)</sup>), a pair of 'Thirty-two's' called "Rescinding of non-system", and „Rescinding of other systems", requisite for truth-discernment in the minds of learned people. Commentary on the first 'Thirty-two' of these being, because of easy comprehension, eschewed, — here, by expounding some topics of the second (Thirty-two), which is well adapted for refuting the whole company of wrong disputants, is essayed a method of awakening the seed of my own memory. And thereof the first verse is this, —

---

<sup>\*)</sup> Personal name of Mahāvīra.

<sup>\*)</sup> Author (VIIth-VIIIth century A. D.) of a great controversial work, *Sammata-tarka*, on reasoning, of a manual of Logic, *Nyāyasastra*, and other Jain texts of Logic and edification.

## I. THE SUPERIOR QUALITIES OF ŚRĪ VARDHAMĀNA THE LAST TĪRTHAMKARA

**1. Of infinite knowledge (*viññāna*), with failings outgone,  
of tenets irrefutable, to be worshipped by immortals; (3)  
glorious Vardhamāna, the Jina, the chief of authorities,  
the self-originated, I shall endeavour to praise.**

The procedure-connection is, "I shall essay to praise Śrī-Vardhamāna, the Jina". How qualified? **Infinite**, indestructable, *vi-*, superior, that is, pre-eminent as having for object all substances and (their) states (*pariyāya*)<sup>1</sup>; **knowledge** is the cognition (*jñāna*) termed 'absolute': so 'one who has infinite cognition', one of infinite cognition. Furthermore **failings outgone**, – because the 'defects', i. e. passions, etc., are transcended through being reduced to a state of non-existence; him who is so. Furthermore, **not refutable**, incapable of being refuted by others; **tenets**, – defined as the Scriptures of the Syādvāda: one who has them, is so. Furthermore, **immortals**, i. e. gods; by them also **to be worshipped**, i. e. to be conciliated.

Here, by means of epithets, four fundamental superiorities of Śrī Vardhamāna-svāmin are declared. These are, 1. superiority of cognition, because by **infinite knowledge** is established the Lord's infinity of cognition, qualified by its mark as absolute cognition; 2. superiority in avoidance of evil states, because by **failings outgone** is stated a complete destruction of the 18 defects; 3. superiority of teaching, because by **of irrefutable tenets** is stated the working out and preaching of the Syādvāda tenets, irrefutable by the group of bad arguments propounded by worthless heretics; 4. superiority of worship, because by **worthy of honour by immortals** is recognized the service by great miracles created by the leaders of the groups of gods and demons, full of unfeigned devotion. (4)

At this point an opponent says: 'Let merely 'infinite knowledge' be said, and not 'with failings outgone', because that is implied. For without the transcending of faults a possession of infinite knowledge is unaccountable'. Here we say, 'This is to exclude authorities imagined by the followers of the views of false systems. So, in fact', the followers of the Ajīvika system<sup>2</sup>):

"Knowers, makers of the lord of dharma<sup>3</sup>), are the highest station:  
Having gone, they come again into existence for the overthrow of heresies".

<sup>1</sup> A 'State' is a form assumed by a substance (*drauṇa*) e. g. a ring made of gold – in comparison with substance it is transient.

<sup>2</sup> Concerning the Ajīvika sect, of which the reputed founder, Goṣāla Maskarin, is named in Jain and Buddhist canonical texts, as a contemporary of Mahāvīra and of the Buddha, reference may be made to Hoernle's article on that topic in the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* (I, pp. 259–66), supplemented by Professor Benimādhav Barua's valuable paper on the subject in the *Journal of the Department of Letters, University of Calcutta*, vol. II (1920), pp. 1–80. The doctrine cited in the text may be connected with the tenet concerning reanimation, which figures prominently in these accounts. It is discussed by Malliṣeṇa *infra*, under verse XXIX, pp. 161 sq. The verse, presumably of Ajīvika origin, is quoted also in Mañibhadra's commentary on Haribhadra's *Śod-darśana-samuccaya*, v. 6.

<sup>3</sup> A crossing over the stream of mundane existence. The expression 'lord-maker' (*tīrthamkara*), or 'Saviour', appears to have been used by Goṣāla in reference to himself.

Surely, now, those have not outgone defects. How otherwise could they, even if they look for the destruction of heresies, descend into existence?

Says one: 'If so, let us have only "failings outgone"; "with infinite knowledge" is superfluous: because upon transcending of defects the possession of infinite knowledge is inevitably realized'. ~ Not so, because some do not admit that, even when there are no defects. So, in fact, the text of the *Vaiśeṣika*<sup>4)</sup>:

"Let him see everything or let him not: but let him see the approved Truth.  
What use to us his complete knowledge of the number of insects?"<sup>5)</sup>

Further:

"Therefore let his rightly placed cognition be considered.  
If authority belongs to the far-seeing, let us here worship vultures"<sup>6)</sup>.

For the purpose of excluding these views, the expression "infinite knowledge" is quite faultless: because without infinity of knowledge (Ś) there is no correct complete knowledge of even a single thing. And so the Scripture (*Ārṣa*)<sup>7)</sup>:

"Whoso knows a single thing, knows everything. Whoso knows everything, knows the single thing".

And also:

"By whomsoever has been seen in all ways a single existence,  
By him have been seen in all ways all existences:  
By whomsoever all existences have in all ways been seen,  
By him one particular existence has in all ways been seen"<sup>8)</sup>.

'Surely, then, 'of tenets irrefutable' is meaningless: because, as one equipped with the said quality is infallible in his statements, the tenets stated by him are insusceptible of refutation'. ~ Not because you do not realize what is intended. Only if worked out by a faultless person is a tenet irrefutable. Not other tenets, those which are without personal author, etc.: because they are infected by the fault of impossibility, etc.: it is in order to hint at this. Or the epithet 'all else' is in order to preclude a shaveling Kevalin<sup>9)</sup> whose absolute knowledge takes the form of making an end, dumbly saving only himself, and who is incapable of working out such tenets.

<sup>4)</sup> The Vaiśeṣika philosophy, which probably owed its name to its recognition of 'particularity' (*viśeṣa*) as a category, was one of the oldest of the 'six systems'. Having been expounded in Colebrooke's *Essay* and Max Müller's *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* and in several histories of Indian Philosophy, as well as in editions of texts and other special works, it may here be taken as known. But among fairly recent treatments reference may be made to Professor Faddegon's *The V* system described with the help of the oldest texts and Professor A. B. Keith's *Indian Logic and Atomism*. In Malliṅga's time the system may have been best known as expounded in the commentary of Praśastapāda and its sub-commentaries. It is elaborately discussed in *Saṃmatī-tarka* pp. 657-700, and *Pramāṇa-kamala-māṇḍa* c. IV. The particular doctrines discussed *infra* (vv. IV-IX), pp. 49-57, will be authenticated by references there.

<sup>5)</sup> Source of quotation untraced: with 'far' in place of 'everything' it is v. 441 in Haribhadra's *Yoga-bindu*.

<sup>6)</sup> v. 439 in *Yoga-bindu*.

<sup>7)</sup> *Īśādhya*, l. iii. iv. 122 (M. L.). In Jain Sanskrit the term *ārṣa*, originally referring to Vedic *ṛṣi*, was used as designation of the (Prākṛit) language and content of the Jain Canon: see also p. 166.

<sup>8)</sup> Quoted also in Siddhasena's *Saṃmatī-tarka* (p. 63 of the edition by Sukh Lal and Pehar Das, who note the variant *īśvarataḥ* for the first and last *sarvataḥ* of the text); also in Mañjūbhadrā's commentary on Haribhadra's *Nad-darśana-samuccaya*, v. 46.

<sup>9)</sup> The *munda-kevalin*, like the Buddhist *pratyeka-buddha*, saves only himself. On *kevalin*, possessor of complete knowledge, see *Outlines of Jainism*, p. xxvi. *Pravacana-sāra*, tr. Faddegon, pp. 19-20.

But another says: 'To be worshipped by immortals' should not be stated, insofar as on the part of the Lord of the Triple World, who is most graced by the stated qualities, a being fit to be worshipped by immortals is never (in no wise) wanting'. – True: whereas to the people of the world the immortals are familiar as deserving to be worshipped, by them also the Bhagavat is to be worshipped – thus hinting by the epithet, the Teacher declares the highest Lord to be a God above Gods.

So in the first half of the verse four superiorities are stated.

(6) And since for even ordinary Kevalins possession of infinite knowledge is inevitable, in order to exclude them, the expression Śrī-Vardhamāna also, though a Noun, is expounded as forming an attribute. In *grandeur* (*śrīyā*), in the form of Arbatahip, as a state consisting in the experience of the full attainment of the 34 superior qualities (*atīśaya*)<sup>10</sup>. Increasing, growing. – 'Surely, how can we account for being an increaser (*vardhamāna*), since in the doctrine the superiorities are well known to be limited in number?' – If this is said, no! Just as in the *Niśīthā-cūṛṇī*<sup>11</sup>, by implication in the number of 108,000 external marks of the Glorious Arbata, an infinity of internal marks, such as goodness, etc., is stated, likewise there is no contradiction in the superiorities being unlimited in number, even if they are unsuitable for inclusion in the calculation in hand. Hence a being an increaser in the glory of these superiorities is not faulty.

"Again, the state of having outgone defects is possible also in the case of those who are at the stage of 'delusion-calmed'". Hence, in order to apprehend attainment of the irreversible stage called 'delusion waned'<sup>12</sup>, we have the epithet *Jina*. Through being victor over passion, etc., he is Jina, that is, 'one with the faults of passion, etc., radically crushed'. (7) Also, the state of being 'of tenets irrefutable' is observed also in Śruta-kevalins<sup>13</sup> and so forth. Hence, in order to exclude these, we have the epithet *chief of authorities* (*āpta*)<sup>14</sup>. For authoritativeness is the absolute and final waning of faults of passion, hate and delusion: those who have that, they surely are authorities. Since the word *āpta* belongs to the group *abhra*, etc.<sup>15</sup>, the suffix *ac* has the sense of 'possessed of'. Among these the 'chief', as being the principal, as the face is of all the members. According to the rule, "After *sākha*, etc., the suffix *ya*"<sup>16</sup>, *ya* (in *mukha-ya*) has the sense of 'equal to'. Again, the state of being worshipped by immortals is not a difficulty on the part of sages in general, possessed of adequate knowledge and conduct through attending to the instructions of such *gurus*. Hence, in order to put them aside, the epithet *self-originated*. "Self", by oneself alone: he is one who of himself without requiring instruction from others has reached the Truth. Such a person is "self-originated", self-enlightened. To praise, i. e. to make object of laudation, such a last (latest) Lord of Jinas, I shall endeavour, I shall make an effort.

<sup>10</sup> These canonical *atīśayas* (particularised by M. L. in a note on pp. 22-3 of his edition of the *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*) are 4 connate, 11 due to riddance of *karma*, and 19 of divine origin. See *Outline of Jainism*, p. 78.

<sup>11</sup> Jinādāsa's commentary on the *Niśīthā*, which is a *Cheda-sūtra* of the Jain Canon, Uddesā 17 (M. L.).

<sup>12</sup> 'Delusion-calmed' (*upaśānta-moha*), 'delusion-waned' (*āśīva-moha*), 'stage' (*guṇa-sthāna*): On these doctrinal terms see *Outline of Jainism* (Index).

<sup>13</sup> The first propagators of Mahāvīra's teachings: see *Outline*, pp. xxxvi-vii.

<sup>14</sup> The *āpta* (cf. the 'wise man' in Stoicism), one whose statements are authoritative, and his qualifications were a subject of discussion in Indian philosophies: see the article *Īpta* in Jhalakīkar-Abhyankar's *Nyāya-kosa*. In the *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra and the *Āpta-parīkṣā* of Vidyānanda the topic receives full Jain treatment.

<sup>15</sup> The passage (Hemacandra's *Grammar*, VII. ii. 48 (M. L.)) authorizes the suffix *ac*, i. e. *a*, in *āpta*, with the meaning 'possessed of'.

<sup>16</sup> The rule (Hemacandra, VII. i. 114 (M. L.)) justifies the form *mukhya*, 'chief', as derived from *mukha*, 'face'.

And here, by the use of the future tense, the teacher, deeming that to praise the qualities of the Bhagavat<sup>12)</sup> is even by Yogins unachievable, implying that faith itself is the unique means of making laudation, intimates that 'only making an effort is within my competence, and not success in praising the qualities of the Bhagavat as they really are'. And "I", although self-vident<sup>13)</sup>, is for the sake of hinting that the effort to praise is due simply to his own faith, without dependence on instruction by others, or in following others, etc.

Or else the four epithets „Śrī-Vardhamāna", etc., in conjunction with the four terms "infinite knowledge", etc., are expounded in the relation of (bādhena) cause and effect. Simply because Śrī-Vardhamāna, therefore 'of infinite knowledge'. In grandeur, – that is, in the shape of the perfection of the Four Infinitudes<sup>14)</sup>, become manifest through the waning of all karma growing. (8) Although in the case of the Śrī-Vardhamāna, who is the highest Lord, the perfection of the Four Infinitudes is at once upon its arising at all times equal, and therefore without increase and decrease, nevertheless, by reason of eternal persistence without decrease, increase is metonymously said. And, although by the epithet Śrī-Vardhamāna the state of infinite knowledge is established, as included in the Four Infinitudes, nevertheless, because infinite knowledge alone is the supreme means for rendering service to others, and because the action of the Bhagavat is conditioned solely by rendering service to others, the state of infinite knowledge is by the teacher mentioned separately from the remaining three (infinitudes).

'Surely, just as the infinite knowledge of the world-Lord is for the sake of others, likewise infinite vision (darśana)<sup>15)</sup>, which is a synonym for absolute vision, is without question altruistic. For simply through absolute knowledge and absolute vision does the Svāmīn<sup>16)</sup> expound for others the mass of categories (padārtha), consisting of generalities and particularities, learned through them in their succession. So why was that not brought in? – if this is said, we say: There is no fault, because by the word 'knowledge' that also is comprised: since mere cognition is common to both. For the same things (artha) which by cognition are understood as having dharmas (attributes) with names comprising sameness, but specified by dharmas of difference are by vision<sup>17)</sup> understood as having dharmas comprising difference, but specified by dharmas of sameness because that is the own-nature of the living soul. Apprehension of things with generality as principal and speciality as accessory is what is called vision. And similarly cognition has speciality for principal, and generality for accessory.

Furthermore, simply because Jina, therefore with faults outgone, since one is Jina through being victor over passion, etc. And on the part of one who is not a Jina there is no state of having outgone faults. Furthermore, simply because chief of authorities, therefore of irrefutable tenets. For it is one in whom we have confidence that is called an authority. So among authorities the chief, that is the best, is 'chief of authorities'. And the state of being chief of authorities belongs to the Lord; because, as his statements are infallible, he is the subject of universal confidence. Hence simply 'of irrefutable tenets'. For the tenet which states things (vastu) observed (avalakṣita) by correct cognition cannot be refuted by false reasonings.

<sup>12)</sup> 'Lord', 'Blessed', etc., a term common to Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism.

<sup>13)</sup> The Pronoun 'I' (aham), when unemphatic, is omisable in Sanskrit.

<sup>14)</sup> Sc. of (1) cognition (jñāna), (2) vision (darśana), (3) happiness (sukha), (4) energy (virya) – see *Outline*, p. 1.

<sup>15)</sup> Darśana is distinguished by the Jains from cognition (jñāna) by reason of its wide, intuitive, character. It is often equated to 'faith'. See *Outline*, p. 68, and *Pravacana-sūtra*, trans. Faddegon (Index), also *Tattvārthasūtra-sūtra*, I. 8-9, *Saṃmatī-tarka*, pp. 596, 617-8.

<sup>16)</sup> Lord

<sup>17)</sup> The omniscient, whose vision of each thing is direct and total, has also a cognition which regards it under all its particular, variant, aspects.



(9) Simply because **self-originated**, therefore **to be worshipped by Immortals**. For the God of Gods, through his quality of being self-illuminated, a mark distinct from the Three Worlds, is worshipped by the Gods, by Indra and his paradise. And the 'Sri-Vardhamāna', here expounded as an epithet, is to be understood with contemplation of its recurrence again as a Noun in 'the self-form called Vardhamāna' in the third quarter of the first 'Thirty-two', entitled 'Exclusion of non-system'. For there 'self-form' is a substantive word. A 'superior' self is 'the self-form', - the highest Self. That is what it amounts to.

And inversely the epithet also is to be expounded as a noun. Thus the meaning of the first verse.

## II. ŚRĪ VARDHAMĀNA HAS STATED THINGS AS THEY REALLY ARE

And in this Laudation the subject is the exclusion of other systems (*yoga*); and of this the characteristic is, by rejection of the pretences to truth formulated by the followers of other doctrines, the exclusion of their authoritativeness. And that reaches certainty simply by making known that the Bhagavat is an announcer of the Truth (*tattva*) of things as they are. Hence the author of the Laudation, although eager to laud all the qualities of the Lord of the Three Worlds, nevertheless declaring his intention of describing simply the special quality termed the being a stater of things as they really are, makes plain his intention, saying:

II. This person, o Lord, for thy praise,  
though zealous for other qualities,  
nevertheless let plunge into 'statement according to fact',  
(that) one, being slightly expert in critical method.

O Lord! This, the person defined as I: for (thine) other qualities, i. e. those different from that of being a stater of the truth, bodily marks not shared with others, and so on; though zealous, though eager for. For what object? For praise, for making laudation. This is a Dative case in the sense of 'having that for object'<sup>1</sup>; whereas previously we have the Dative defined by 'After *sph* optionally the thing to be comprised'. (10) The sense is: 'this person has zeal for praising also your other qualities'.

'Surely, if he has zeal also for praising the other qualities, will he then praise these also, or not?' - in apprehension of this he speaks the second half (of the verse). Nevertheless, - this particle signifies a distinction preceded by an admission, one, one only; statement according to fact, namely thy quality called announcing the reality (*tattva*) of things as they are. Let this person plunge into, let him embrace it completely in the action of praising. For, if only that single quality is described, in reality (*rasutak*) there is an effecting of the praise of all the qualities by way of stating a distinction above the divinities of the other doctrines.

'Well, the praise of the quality in question has propriety only in those who, having the divine eye, are capable of correct scrutiny, and not in persons like yourself with inferior vision'. This doubt he puts aside by way of specification, 'this person slightly expert in critical method', - in regard to the critique of the particular quality in view, 'slightly expert', - thinking himself learned. That is what it comes to.

This is the notion: although the critique of the World-Lord's quality of stating things as they are is not within the range of the intellect of people like me, nevertheless through excess (*atidhaya*) of devotion and faith I consider myself expert therein: because praise is in its essential nature merely a manifestation of pure faith and devotion. This is the meaning of the verse.

<sup>1</sup> Hemacandra's Grammar, II, li. 34 and 26 (M. L.).

### III. ADMONITION TO THE READER

Now, as to those followers of false doctrines who, having minds (*tvāntata*) suffused (*vāṣṭa*) with the influence of bad scriptures, do not adopt as Lord the Lord of the Three Worlds, for instruction of them also in consideration of the truth, he says:

**III. Those others who resent (Thy) qualities,**

**let them not indeed repair to your worship, as the Lord;**

**nevertheless with closed eyes,**

**let them consider the true course of method.**

(11) **Those**, - "Of *adas* in the sense of what is distant"<sup>1</sup>), in virtue of this statement 'to note', because, as outsiders to the reflection on truth and non truth, they deserve to be put far away; **others**, - followers of bad systems **To your worship**, to Thee, although an abode of qualities all not common to others, **let them not repair as to the Lord**, let them not accept (*pṛatipadyantām*) Thee as master. Since they **resent (Thy) qualities**, they are grudging (*maṣarīṇi*) of the qualities; the disclosing of defects in qualities is resentment, for whoever is covetous of anything does not tolerate (*anurudhyate*) its bearer, just as a young elephant, who is covetous of sweetness, (breaks) a branch of sugar cane. And you are a bearer of the (resented) qualities. So, having ruled out acceptance, by the followers of other doctrines, of the Bhagavat's precepts, the author of the Laudation in the second half, as if taking an attitude of impartiality, proffers for them beneficial instruction **nevertheless**, even without acceptance of Thy precepts, **eyes**, organs of vision; **closed**, i. e. with closed lids, **the true**, the rational argued; **course of method**, path of reasoning (*nyāya*), **let them consider**, let them make object of reflection.

And here by the Middle Voice in *vicārayantām* the teacher signifies that it contemplates an agent who obtains a fruit for himself. We are merely expounders of what for them only is, through reflection on the lines of true Method (*nyaya*), fruit. If one asks, 'What is the fruit?' it is, we say, that of being spectators (having a spectacle). And when he says, **with closed eyes**, the intent is that it is well known in the world that in general reflection on the Truth is preceded by the closing of the eyes for the sake of concentration. Or else, the hint is that this teaching, even though not to their taste, is bestowed by the teacher; hence, although not relished, nevertheless, on the principle of swallowing a sharp medicine, this is to be swallowed by Your Honours with closed eyes, because of the satisfaction to follow.

'Surely, if through excessive lack of discrimination they have no taste even for the words of the supreme Lord, then why trouble to teach them?' - Not so! Because we see that the Mahātmas, whose action is essentially for the benefit of others, act in the way of teaching what is beneficial, without considering taste or distaste for the things to be proved, for by them the welfare of others is regarded as their own welfare, and other than teaching what is beneficial there is no absolutely real service to others. And so the inspired text: (12)

<sup>1</sup>) The quotation is from a verse (M. I.), defining the use of the Pronouns 'this' and 'that'.

"Let the other like it or not, or let him treat it as poison;  
Benevolent speech must be spoken, accrediting one's own side"<sup>2</sup>).

And said the Chief of Expositors<sup>3</sup>):

"There is no merit on the part of the hearer, since everyone unquestionably listens to  
what is beneficial;

But on the speaker's part it is unquestionable, since he speaks with a view to be-  
friending".

This is the meaning of the third verse.

<sup>2</sup>) A Sanskrit equivalent of the Prakrit verse is cited (M. L.) from Hemacandra's (Dharmavardhana's?) *Śreṇika-śāstra*, II. 32

<sup>3</sup>) Umāsvāti (cf. p. 22), the verse being no. 29 of the *sambandha-kārikās* to his *Tattvārthadhigama-śāstra* (M. L.).

#### IV. THE VAIŚEṢIKA DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSALITY AND PARTICULARITY

Next, in order to elaborate just this reflection upon the methods of a correct system, and putting aside the validity of the truths approved by others, he now, with a view to refuting in the first 6 verses, the truths adopted in the Aulūkyā doctrine<sup>1</sup>), confutes first of all the therein comprised universality (*sāmānya*) and particularity (*vaiśeṣa*)<sup>2</sup>).

**IV. Existences, possessing of themselves conformity and difference,  
are not of a form to be deduced from other existences:  
by asserting on ground of a distinct self-reality,  
on ground of a self-reality which is not so, a duality, the unskilful trip up.**

'Did exist, do exist, will exist'. - (that means) existences, things denoted (*padārtha*), namely self, matter, etc.; those: of themselves, means 'of themselves only', because of the maxim: "Every statement indeed they record as with restriction"<sup>3</sup>) (see, with *eva*, 'only');

<sup>1</sup>) The Vaiśeṣika philosophy, said to have been founded by a Kanāda, of whose problematic name Ulika was a likewise much discussed variant. In the present context there is no sign of a derogatory intention in the choice of the name, which folk-etymology derives from *ulika*, 'owl'. The priority assigned to the system among the views selected for criticism may have been due to its status as a general exponent of physical and, in combination with the Nyāya, of logical conceptions, here it was at variance with some leading principles of Jainism. In the *Saṁ-darśana-samuccaya* of Haribhadra, which is a succinct non-controversial summary, the order is (1) Buddhism, (2) Nyāya, (3) Sāṅkhya, (4) J-ism, (5) Vaiśeṣika, (6) Mīmāṃsā, (7., extra) Cārvāka.

It may not be superfluous to mention that in consequence of frequent intercourse and debate the Indian schools of philosophy have always been familiarly acquainted with each other's tenets and arguments. The problems and arguments, and also the illustrations, tended to become stereotyped and classical, and from a certain period onwards the larger works (e.g. the *Nyāya-mūlī* of Juvanta and the *Tattva-saṁgraha* of Śāntirakṣita and Kamaṭhāla) systematically refute the rival doctrines. But perhaps the Jain authors are more apt, as was natural, to include in their polemics the whole group of orthodox systems *seriatim*. At any rate it seems that in the procedure followed by the present text and commentary and in the argumentation there is practically nothing that had not been adduced with greater fulness in Jain writings of an earlier date, e.g. the *Sammati-tarka* of Siddhasena Divākara.

<sup>2</sup>) Two of the six seven Vaiśeṣika categories (see *V.-sūtra*, I t. 31, and Colebrooke's *Essays*, ed. Cowell, II, pp. 308-9). They are regarded as roots and as the basis of genera, and individualities. They are attached to things by a relation termed *samānyā*, 'inherence', which differs from *saṁyoga*, 'conjunction', by being actual without a process of joining (*a-yuta-siddha*), and which is also the connection between substances (*dravya*) and their qualities (*guṇa*) and actions. The universals, or genera, differ in range, from 'existence', the most extensive, through the intermediate 'universality-particularities' (*sāmānya-vaiśeṣa*), down to 'potness', etc.; particularity exists absolutely in atoms only, differentiating them from one another, but thus serves as basis for all degrees of difference in things. The universals and particularities are held to be eternal and to have a distinct own-nature; but they are not credited with 'existence' (*satā*), which is confined to substances, qualities and actions. For full Jain discussions of *sāmānya* and *vaiśeṣa* see *Sammati-tarka*, pp. 587-599, and *Prameyakaṁala-mārtanda*, fol. 136-155.

The gist of the Jain argument, which will explain itself, is that universality and particularity are involved in the nature of everything and not imposed from outside by virtue of a relation of 'inherence'.

<sup>3</sup>) This is a maxim (no. 58, p. 103 in Hemachandra Gaṇin's *Nyāyasamgraha*), or principle (*nyāya*), of interpretation, such as are apt to be quoted, as also are practical proverbs (*laukika-nyāya*), in Sanskrit discussions.

'on account of their own nature only' possess **conformity and difference**. 'Conformity' is uniform presentation, and it is expressed by the term 'one' (*eka*); 'difference', divergence. (13) complete discrimination from things of the same and other classes. Both these combined they 'possess', hold on to, 'they possess conformity and difference', they have the nature of both generality and particularity. That is the meaning.

He states a default of this very thing: **not of a form to be deduced from other existences**. **Not** has the effect of denial; **from other existences**, from the two other categories (*padārtha*), approved by the opponent as other than substance, quality, action and inherence, i. e. generality and particularity as distinct from existence; **to be deduced from**, conveyed as an object of presentation; **form**. Those things which have a form of their own, marked by conformity and difference in order, are as stated. It is the very own-nature of all positive existences that of themselves they beget the ideas of conformity and difference. For instance, a pot, to begin with, having the form of a broad bottom and belly, and so on, becoming the object of a presentation, and bringing about the presentation of other objects of the same form, as pots, and as being denotable by the same word 'pot', receives the designation 'universal'. And the same also, separating itself, in respect of substance, place, time, and being, from things of the same and other classes, enjoyed the designation 'particular'. And so to suppose that universality and particularity are things apart is not logical, since they are presented only as attributes of things. And attributes are not absolutely differentiated from the bearer of the attributes; because if they were altogether distinct, the relation of attributes and subject would be unaccountable, and because it would follow that a young elephant and a donkey could be designated attribute and subject (respectively). And, if it were supposed that attributes also are things apart, an infinite number of things even in one single entity would be the consequence, since an entity has an infinite number of attributes.

Not discerning correctly this proper truth of universality and particularity, the unskillful, the followers of other beliefs who have their views obsessed by unreality, trip up, fall from the path of logical reasoning; the meaning is, they become unable to reply; and here by 'tripping' a ridiculousness in the eyes of competent persons is suggested. By doing what? **By asserting a duality**, i. e. of presentations defined as conformity and difference. (14) For what reason asserting that duality of presentation? He states: **on ground of a distinct self-reality**<sup>2</sup>; the distinct self-reality, own form, of universality and particularity, different, because of distinction from the things and also mutually independent, of these 'the self-reality' own nature, defined as conformity and difference; on that ground: 'relying on that' is the meaning. The Ablative (*an* *parāntarātrāṭ*) in virtue of (the *sūtra* which says), "After *gam*, *api*, etc., the Ablative of the base of action"<sup>3</sup>). 'Because of having in what way a distinct self-reality?' he states: **on ground of a self-reality which is not so**<sup>4</sup>. This qualification is in order to deny the opponent's distinct self-reality being true. 'Not so', as invented by the opponent with the aspect defined as complete distinction. What with a particular aspect has its own self-reality, its own nature, is 'so'; because of that, because in the things universality and particularity occur as inseparable and by them those two are supposed to be different

<sup>2</sup> So a case which fails to accord with the truth which he has just announced. Besides this sense of 'something wanting', *svaccekā* has frequently in Indian logic the sense of going beyond, as when a Middle Term includes instances not covered by the Major or an effect occurs in the absence of its supposed cause (cf. Varma *op. cit.* p. 3).

<sup>3</sup> The universal, 'man', etc., being essentially different from the particular man, etc.

<sup>4</sup> The grammatical rule (Dhamendra, II ii 74 (M. L.)) merely states that, where no verb of motion occurs, the Ablative denotes not a starting-point but; a base (here a logical ground).

<sup>5</sup> A mistaken self-reality.

therefrom. And being-different is being-other, and for that a complete distinction is indispensable.

If, however, we adopt an unequivocal difference of universality and particularity from the things denoted, then a duality of presentation in the shape of conformity and difference, relating to the single substance, would be unaccountable. And, if there is unequivocal difference, it follows that one or the other of them is non-existent. And there would be no use of the expressions 'universality' and 'particularity', because an entity is presented by its evidence always with an essential nature compounded of both universality and particularity – and the alternative of mutual independence (of the two) will be disposed of later<sup>4</sup>). For this very reason he intimates by the action of tripping the ridiculousness of those disputants. For whose accepts in one way an own-nature of something which is actually otherwise, and so communicates to others, is himself lost and destroys others; certainly no other than he is a vessel for ridicule. That is the meaning of the fourth verse.

<sup>4</sup>) see v. VIII, pp. 40 sqq

## V. THE VAIŚEṢIKA DOCTRINE OF ETERNITY AND NON-ETERNITY

Now, denouncing the alternatives, unequivocally eternal or non-eternal<sup>1</sup>), approved by them, he says -

V. Entity which down to the lamp, up to ether, is of the same nature,  
without breaking away from the seal of the *Syādvāda*,  
that, they say, is in one case simply eternal, in another simply non-eternal.  
Thus the chatterings of the foes of Thy precepts. (15)

Down to the lamp, beginning with a lamp; up to ether, with the ether for limit; each entity, the essential nature of everything; of the same nature: 'the same', like, 'own-nature', own-form; that which has this is so.

Furthermore: The own form of a thing is, we say, the consisting of substance and State. And so the (Chief of Expositors (said)<sup>2</sup>): "That which is possessed of origination, destruction and permanence, is existent (*sat*)". How is there a possession of the same nature? He gives the reason by way of a specification, **without breaking away from the seal of the *Syādvāda***: '*syād*' is a particle signifying 'not unequivocally'; and so '*Syād*-doctrine' is the doctrine of non-unequivocality. And that is the acceptance of a single entity variegated by a plurality of attributes, namely eternal, non-eternal, etc.: that is what it comes to. **Thereof the seal**, i. e. the limitations. That which does not break through, does not transcend, that, is "not breaking away from the seal of the *Syādvāda*". For, as a king, while relying simply upon rule (true policy), holds his royal authority, and all people are unable to transgress his seal, because on transgressing it they lose all their goods, so, while the great *Syādvāda* monarch is victorious and free from rebels, all the things do not transgress his seal, because, on violating it, they would lose the consistency of their own nature.

The statement of the same-naturedness of all entities is the ground for rejecting the contention approved by others, that one (kind of) entity, ether (space), etc., is simply eternal, and another (kind of) entity, lamp, etc., is simply non-eternal. For all positive existences are, when viewed as substances, eternal, but, when the view of them as states is substituted, they are non-eternal.

Then, to begin with the lamp (light) accepted by the opponent as altogether non-eternal, he points the way to an explanation of its eternality and non-eternality, thus: the atoms of light, which have taken on the state of a lamp, when, - of themselves from failure of oil, or through the impact of the wind, - they relinquish their state as light, are not altogether non-eternal, although passing into another state in the form of darkness, (16) because in the form of the substance, matter, they persist. For their non-eternality is not proved simply by the fact of the destruction of their former state and the origination of their new state. The sub-

<sup>1</sup>) In the Vaiśeṣika system some things, e. g. God, selves, space, atoms, inherence, are eternal, others, e. g. things compounded of atoms, are non-eternal 'products' (*kārya*); see *V.-sūtra*, II. 1. 13, 28; II. 7. 11; III. 6. 2, 5; IV. 1. 1, 4 etc. The Jain view, here expounded, is to the effect that everything is in one aspect eternal, in another non-eternal.

<sup>2</sup>) Uṃbavāti (cf. p. 18) in *Tatpārāthadhigama-sūtra*, V. 29 (M. L.).



stance earth, of course, is not altogether destroyed even when assuming the different states of bubble-shaped ornament, box, cupboard, tier, gutter, pot, etc.: because in them the continuance of the earth-substance is a presentation common to children and cowmen (caveṇ). Nor is the materiality of darkness<sup>3</sup>) undemonstrated: because otherwise its visibility (ocularity), like that of the light of a lamp, would not be accounted for.

"Well then, all that is ocularly visible depends upon light for its manifestation; but it is not so with darkness; so how is that ocularly visible?" – Not so! because it does appear to owls, etc., even without light. And even to those, i. e. to ourselves and to others, by whom some ocularly visible things, such as pots, etc., are not apprehended without light, even to them darkness will be ocularly present, because of the variety of existences (experiences). How otherwise would you have gold, pearls, etc., though yellow, white, etc., dependent upon light for being seen, and, on the other hand, lamps and the moon, etc., not dependent on any other illumination? So it is demonstrated that darkness is ocularly visible.

And in consequence of having colour it is apprehended also as tangible, because it produces the presentation of a cold feel. Its having no compact parts, its being not impenetrable, its not having an appreciable<sup>4</sup>) feel, its not being presented as sub-divided into parts which are substances and wholes, etc., those Middle Terms propounded by others for the negation of its materiality are to be refuted simply by the example of lamp-light, etc., because having the same force and virtue.

Nor should it be said, 'How do the heat atoms<sup>5</sup>) develop into darkness?'; because we see that material things, when accompanied by such and such a totality (of conditions), have also the power to produce dissimilar effects. For we see that fire, though of a shining nature, produces through the force of connection with wet fuel an effect in the non-shining form of smoke. Thus is the lamp proved to be both eternal and non-eternal. But, even when in consequence of being extinguished the lamp is glowing, even then it is both eternal and non-eternal, because it has origination and destruction of continually new modifications, and because it continues in its nature as lamp. (17)

Similarly, ether (space) also is both eternal and non-eternal, because of consisting essentially of origination, destruction and persistence. As thus: its (ether's) mark is simply that it admits penetration by souls and matter, which penetrate into it: because it is said, "What gives room is ether"<sup>6</sup>). And, when the penetrating souls and parts of matter, through either effort or giving way, go from one portion of ether into another, then that ether is separated, along with those penetrating things, from one place, and conjoined with a subsequent place; conjunction and separation are, however, mutually repugnant attributes, and with difference of them there is necessarily difference of their bearer. And to this effect they say: "For only this is difference or cause of difference, viz. imposition of repugnant attributes, and difference of causes (material)"<sup>7</sup>). And hence that ether is by undergoing an evolution defined as the

<sup>3</sup>) An oft-discussed subject. The Vaiśeṣika, which denied the reality of negations, held that darkness was adequately explained as absence of light: see *V.-sūtra*, I. i. 5, Colebrooke's *Essays*, II, p. 292, and *Prakāśapada-bhāṣya* with *Nyāya-kandallī*, trans. Ganganāth Jhā, pp. 19-22. For Jain views see *Saṃmatarka*, pp. 542-5.

<sup>4</sup>) *Uddhāna* is what is 'above the threshold' of awareness, not latent or negatable.

<sup>5</sup>) Indian philosophy identifies heat and light as forms of 'fire' *V.-sūtra*, II. i. 2, II. 4, Colebrooke's *Essays*, II, p. 294.

<sup>6</sup>) *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*, XXVIII. 29 (M. L.), *Outlines of Jainism*, p. 85. In Indian philosophy ether and space are not distinguished, though 'direction' (*idā*) is a separate substance: *V.-sūtra*, II. ii. 10, Colebrooke's *Essays*, II, p. 297.

<sup>7</sup>) Quoted as a *nyāya* in Mādheva's *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* XVI (Sāṃkhya system), and in *Saṃmatarka*, pp. 2, 327.

destruction of a former conjunction destroyed, and through experiencing the evolution termed origination of a subsequent conjunction is originated. And, since in both situations the substance of ether persists, it has collocality<sup>9</sup>) with origination and destruction.

And so, what they call the definition of 'eternal', - i. e. "Eternal is what is unlost, unoriginated, permanent, of one form"<sup>10</sup>) - that is rejected, because there is no such entity. But the true definition of 'eternal' is, - "Eternal is that which does not lose its 'being that'"; for, because the 'being that', despite the actuality of origination and destruction, is in the form of a continuant, its meaning 'what does not pass away is eternal' fits. For, if we approve of 'unlost, etc.', as marks of the eternal, then it would follow that origination and destruction have nothing to rest on. Nor is there through connection with those two defeasance of eternality: because it is said - (18)

"Substance apart from states, states abandoned by substance;

Where, when, by whom, in what form have they been seen, or by what proof?"<sup>11</sup>).

Nor is ether not a substance.

Ether is both eternal and non-eternal because even to ordinary people the expression 'ether (space) of the pot', 'ether of the cloth' is familiar. For even when on the removal of the pot the ether of the pot is occupied by a cloth we have the expression 'ether (space) of the pot'. Nor should it be said that this is figurative, and hence unauthoritative (no proof), because even a metaphor by way of some community of attribute touches also the main sense. For in the ether, of which all-embracingness is the primary extension, parts are conceived, in consequence of the limited extension connected with the pot, cloth, etc., which are deposited in it; and, being spoken of as embracing the limited space in each case, it becomes conditioned by such and such designations, 'the ether of the pot', 'the ether of the cloth' etc. And, when it is connected with such and such a pot, etc., the ether, which persists as all-embracing, assumes a different (state). And hence with difference of state there is also difference of what has the state, because those (states) do not exist apart from it (the thing in space). Thus it is proved that ether (space) is both eternal and non-eternal.

For even the 'Self-originates' (Svāyambhuva)<sup>12</sup>) accept only entities which are both eternal and non-eternal. Thus they say, "Triple is this development of the subject of attributes: by way of *dharma* (character), by way of *laksana* (date as present, etc.), by way of *avasthā* (stage). Take gold as the subject of attributes; its 'character' development is as dish, ornament, etc.; the character's development in 'date', again, is futurity, etc. When in fact this gold-worker, having broken up a dish, makes an ornament, then the dish, having abandoned the mark of presentness, assumes the mark of pastness, whereas the ornament, having abandoned the mark of futurity, assumes the mark of presentness. But only while in the condition of presentness has the ornament an evolution of 'stages', assuming the 'stages' of new and old (19) This is the triple development of the subject of attributes. And the 'characters', 'dates', and 'stages' are different and non-different from the bearer of those

<sup>9</sup>) *Pādādhikaravāta* and *samānādhikaravāta* 'samānādhikaravāta' are technical terms, signifying residence in a single or common locus.

<sup>10</sup>) This definition is untraced in the *Nyāya-kōśa*, s. v., some others are cited.

<sup>11</sup>) In the *Sammata-tarka* (M. I.) a partly identical verse is given in Prakṛt form. Māhīṣa's reading corresponds to Haribhadra's *Anekānta-yoga-pīṭakā*, p. 302.

<sup>12</sup>) M. I. understands by the name Svāyambhuva the adherents of the Pātāñjali Yoga-system, which should be correct, since the cited opinion corresponds to *Yogas. s. v.* III 13 (M. I.), and the terminology accords. The word *laksana*, however, in the sense of time-stage (as Past, Present or Future) was much handled in discussions with and between Buddhist sects. 'Self-originates' might be a scoffing substitute for 'Brahmans', understood as 'adherents of Brāhmin Svāyambhū'.

attributes. And so these, being non-different from their bearer, are through its eternity eternal, and through their difference they are spheres of origination and destruction. And so both are accounted for.

Now he expounds the second half. Although it is thus proved that all existences have origination, destruction and permanence for their self-essence, nevertheless they say: that, i. e. entity, in one case, as ether, the self, etc., is simply eternal, and in another, a lamp, pot, etc., it is simply non-eternal: in this way the word 'simply' (*eva*) is supplied here also. Now so a wrong-Method contention is the result. For it is the mark of wrong Method<sup>12</sup>) that, while prone to justify the attributes of eternity, etc., of which they approve in regard to entities which in their essence have an infinite number of attributes, they proceed to ignore the remaining attributes. Thus, on these lines, - of the foes of Thy precepts, i. e. of the opponents of the doctrines developed by Thee, - the chattering, the babbling, disorderly sentences, That is what it comes to.

And here, despite the first mentioning, 'Down to the lamp', etc., of the non-eternity alternative as familiar with the opponents, subsequently, when with disregard to order 'in one simply eternal' was put first, that intimates as follows: what is non-eternal, that also is actually in a way eternal, and what is eternal, that is also actually in a way non-eternal; because even advanced disputants admit in regard to earth, although it is actually one, both eternity and non-eternity. And so says Praśastakāra: "And this is twofold eternal and non-eternal; defined as atoms eternal, but defined as products non-eternal"<sup>13</sup>).

Nor should it be said that here, because of the difference of the two objects (*trisaṃ*), defined as atoms and produced substances, eternity and non-eternity are not collocated (*naikādhikaranam*): because earthiness in both cases is not wanting. This also they stated: in ether also, because of admitting conjunction and separation, these people logically accepted non-eternity. And to this effect the same person (20) said, "Through the statement of its being cause of sound it has conjunctions and separations"<sup>14</sup>); and so we have a combination of the alternative of eternity and non-eternity. And this was even in part realized.

And that the doctrines of the other schools are mainly chatterings is to be justified as follows: To begin with, the mark of an entity is production of a result (*artha-kriyā-kāritra*)<sup>15</sup>). And, on the alternative of complete eternity, or complete non-eternity, that does not fit. For the eternal is what is unchanging (unlost), unoriginated, permanent, uniform. And this would produce results either by stages, or all at once; because as to things which have the form of mutual exclusion there is no possibility of any other mode (*prakāra*).

And here, to begin with, not by stages. For it would perforce perform at the time of the first action, the actions which are to be at another time, since it is illogical for what is capable to postpone the time. Or, if postponing in time it is chargeable with incapability. If it is said that even the capable effects such and such a thing upon intervention of such and such accessories, then it is not capable, because its functioning requires another co-operant. For the logical maxim is, "what requires is not capable"<sup>16</sup>).

<sup>12</sup>) The *nayas* as one-sided methods of approach and the wrong-*nayas*, those which also overlook their one-sidedness, see the full statement *infra* vv. XXVII-VIII, pp. 149 sq.

<sup>13</sup>) Praśastakāra (more usually cited as Praśastapāda, on which matter see Gaṅgādhara Jhā, *Intro. of his bhāṣya*, introd. p. 11), in his *bhāṣya* on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, trans. p. 66.

<sup>14</sup>) Praśastapāda's *bhāṣya*, trans. p. 129.

<sup>15</sup>) Practical efficacy (*artha-kriyā-kāritra*), a criterion of existence specially upheld by Buddhists, but accepted by the Jains also: see *infra* p. 155. Professor Dhruva points out (*Notes*, p. 48) that this whole passage (pp. 25-26) on *artha-kriyā* is based upon Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā*, I, i. 32 (Comm. pp. 40-2).

<sup>16</sup>) No. 23 (p. 77) in Hemachandra Gaṇin's collection from Hemacandra's Grammar (M. L.).

If it is said: 'Not by it are the co-operants required, but the effect itself, non-existent so long as the co-operants do not exist, requires them', then is that existent incapable or capable? If capable, why does it tolerate their humble looking to co-operants, and not immediately bring them to pass? "Surely, though capable, the seed produces the shoot only when accompanied by the co-operants, such as earth, water, wind, etc., and not otherwise". Well then, would it be helped at all by the co-operants, or not? If it would not be helped, then why is it not then also, just as before the presence of the co-operants, indifferent to producing the effect? If it would be helped, then it should be stated whether the help rendered by them is non-separate or separate. If non-separate, it is that itself (21) that is rendered. And so, while wishing for profit, you lose your capital, because as being a product it incurs non-eternity. If separate, however, how is there a helping of it? Why not also on the part of the Sahya and Vindhya mountains? If it is said that in consequence of connection with it, the one belongs to the other, what is the connection (*sambandha*) between the assisted and the assistance? It is not, to begin with, conjunction (*samyoga*), because that exists only in the case of two substances, and in the present case the thing to be assisted is a substance, and the assistance is an action, so there is no conjunction. Nor is it inherence (*śamarāya*); because, as that is single and all embracing and, being without nearness and distance, equivalent everywhere, a connection of it with specific connecteds is not logical. And, if we agree to a connection with specific connecteds, then the assistance rendered to it must be admitted to be on the part of inherence. And, that being so, the hypothesis of the separation and non-separation of the assistance is in the same position as before. And, if there is no separation of the inherence from the assistance, the inherence itself would be a product. And in case of separation, once more we have not inherence as connection with specific connecteds. So then an unequivocally eternal existent does not produce results by stages.

Nor, again, not by stages. For it is obvious that a single existent thing does not all at once perform all actions which belong to the mass of all particles of time. Or let it do so; all the same what is it to do in the second instant? If it does, there is the fault which arises on the alternative of successive production; if, however, it does not, then, because of the negation of efficacy, it follows that it is a non entity. And so, as comprised by successiveness or non-successiveness, an efficacy on the part of the unequivocally eternal being, by force of the non-existence of the compriser, dismissed with the dismissal of its compriser, dismisses the 'efficacy' comprised by it. And the efficacy, being dismissed, dismisses the existence (*sattva*), as comprised by it, and so the alternative of unequivocal eternity cannot bear arguing.

The alternative of unequivocal non eternity also does not deserve to be adopted (literally 'pocketed'). For the non-eternal perishes moment by moment (22), and it is not capable of efficacy in succession, because it also has no succession due to space and time. For succession is before-and-after-ness, and in the case of the momentary that is impossible. For only on the part of the abiding is there a comprehension of different spaces and times, and successive spaces and times are spoken of. And in the unequivocally perishing that is not found. As is said

"What is anywhere, that is there only; what is anywhen, that is then only;  
There is in the world no comprehension of space and time by existences" (1).

Nor is succession of earlier and later instants possible in consideration of series: because a series is not an entity, and, even if it were an entity, then, if it is momentary, it is no different

<sup>1)</sup> Quoted also in Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā*, I, 33, and in Manibhadra's comm. on Haribhadra's *Śat-darśana-samuccaya*, v. 46. Acc. to M. L. it is an Ajīvika saying.

from the moments: or, if it is not momentary, then the doctrine of momentary destruction is finished.

Nor is efficacy without succession possible in the momentary. For, if a single moment of the colour, time, etc., in a seed-case, etc., beget all at once a plurality of moments of savour, etc., it would beget them either by means of one single own-nature, or by various own-natures. If by one, then there would be unity (*ekatva*) on the part of those moments of savour, etc., because beget by one single own-nature. But, if it is said that it begets by various own natures, - one thing, colour, etc. by its nature as material, another, savour, etc., by its nature as co-operant, - then those own-natures are either identical with itself, or not identical with itself. If not identical with itself, there is default of their being (its) own-nature. If identical with itself, then it is a plurality (*anekatva*) because of having a plurality of own-natures. Or else an unity of different own-natures would follow, because of their being not distinct from it, and because of its unity.

Or if, on the ground that what in one case is the being a material is identical with its elsewhere being a co-operant, we do not approve of a separation of own natures, then how can the upholder of momentariness approve of the separation of own-natures in the eternal, which, though having one single form, produces in succession diverse effects, and the mixing up of effects? Or else, if it is said that 'The eternal, as being of one single form, has no succession, and how from what is without succession is there origination of diverse effects in succession?' (23). Behold! the partiality of the blessed man!, who, although himself accepting a plurality of simultaneous effects effectable, by a plurality of causes, from a single part-less moment of colour, etc., as cause, raises opposition even to successive production, on the opponent's alternative, of diverse effects even on the part of an eternal substance! Therefore on the part of a momentary existence also efficacy in succession is hard to make out. Thus from the unequivocally non-eternal also efficacy is excluded because of the dismissal of succession and non-succession, which are its comprehenders. On the exclusion of that the existence also, simply by force of the undiscoverability of the comprehender, is dismissed. And so the thesis of the unequivocally non-eternal is not satisfactory.

But in the Quodammodo-theory the adoption of efficacy on the part of existences by way of an evolution, marked by the abandoning of former, and the acceptance of later, forms (*akāra*), and by permanence, is unobjectionable. Nor should it be said that, because the super-imposition of mutually repugnant attributes upon a single thing is illogical, the Quodammodo-theory is wrong; for what is accepted is a different alternative, distinct from the alternatives of eternal and non-eternal, and just in this way is everybody's experience. For they quote as follows<sup>19</sup>) -

"What consists of two parts, in one part a lion, in one part a man,  
That partless one they call, with partition, "man-lion" ("19).

Because the Vaiśeṣikas also admit a single whole with variegated colour<sup>20</sup>); and the Buddhists also, because on the part of a single cloth, etc., they observe (*upalabdheh*) contradictory attributes, moving and non-moving, red and non-red, covered and non-covered, etc., do not accept contradiction of blue and non-blue in a single cognition of a variegated cloth.

And here, although the disputants in question<sup>21</sup>) do not regard a lamp (light), etc., as

<sup>19</sup>) Quoted also in Manibhadra's comm. on *Śaṅkaraśāstra-sūtravākyam*, v. 46.

<sup>20</sup>) Here the term *anurūpa*, which can signify 'hero', evidently refers to Viṣṇu's 'Man-lion' incarnation.

<sup>21</sup>) A type recurrent in Indian philosophical discussions: see the commentaries on *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, VIII, 1. 6, and *Prasastapada's bhāṣya*, trans. Gangānāth Jhā, pp. 70-2.

<sup>22</sup>) The Vaiśeṣikas do not approve the doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*), which as a Buddhist tenet is mentioned at note xv (16), and discussed v. XVIII, pp. 119sq.

momentary, because of persisting into another time – since in their view the non-eternal is defined as simply existence (*sattā*) limited by prior and posterior ending. – nevertheless they also adopt awareness, pleasure, etc., as really momentary<sup>23</sup>: so that even in dealing with them (these disputants) a discussion of the doctrine of momentariness is not out of place. And as for an entity which persists into another time, even that is both eternal and non-eternal. (24) Nor is there any moment even in which an entity is not of the nature of origination, destruction and permanence. This is the sense of verse 5.

<sup>23</sup> Concerning the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of 'momentary special qualities of the self' (*ātma-viśeṣa-guṇa*) see Prakāśtapāda, trans. Gangānāth Jhā, pp. 39–40.

## VI. THE VAISEṢIKA DOCTRINE OF A WORLD-CREATOR GOD

Now, describing as a false prepossession the admission, by them approved, of God's creation of the world<sup>1</sup>), he says:

**VI. There is a maker of the world, and he is one.  
he is omnipresent, he is self-dependent, he is eternal —  
these would be pretences of mere assurancees  
on the part of those whose teacher Thou art not.**

Of the world, of the Triple Universe, in the form of the movable and immovable, observed by the evidence of perception; **a**, a particular person of indescribable own form: **maker, creator; there is, there exists.** For they advance this proof: "Everything, — earth, mountains, trees, etc., has an intelligent maker, as being a product. Whatever is a product has an intelligent maker, like a pot; and this (the world) is so (a product); therefore it is so (has an intelligent maker), for exception ether, etc. And the intelligent maker thereof is the Lord, God.

"And this Middle Term (*hetu*) is not unestablished (unverified, *andāha*)<sup>2</sup>); for that the earth, mountains, etc., are products<sup>3</sup>), as being produced by several groups of causes, or as being wholes, is obvious to all disputants. Nor is it (the Middle Term) equivocal (*anaiikāntika*) or repugnant (*viruddha*); because it is absolutely non-occurrent in contradictory instances<sup>4</sup>). Nor is it belated (*kāḍītyagopalīṣṭa*); because it is immediately demonstrated with attribute and bearer of attribute, not vetoed by perception, inference or scripture. Nor is it tautological

<sup>1</sup>) A world-creator God, ignored by the Sāṃkhya and denied by the Uṛva-mīmāṃsā when regards both the world and the Veda as eternal, is a tenet of the Nyāya (*Nyāya-sūtra*, IV 1-19, *Nyāya-mahatī*, pp. 190-204, which has even a text (Udayana's *Akṣamaṇḍali*, see Cowell's translation), and of the Vaiśeṣika (*V-sūtra*, II, 1-18-19, and *Prasastapāda*, trans. Gangādhara Paṇḍita, pp. 198-199). It characterizes the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava religions, though in some cases they may recognize, as does the Advaita-Vedānta, an intermediate *īvara*, 'Lord', as creator and ruler of the universe. The Brahmā of ancient, and common, Hinduism, is departmental. The Jains, regarding the cosmos as strictly increase and everlasting, polemize against the tenet on the grounds here shown. See *Sammattīarā*, pp. 69-106, *Pratyakṣa-kamala-māṇḍana*, fol. 23-80.

<sup>2</sup>) 'Unestablished', 'equivocal', 'repugnant', 'belated', 'tautological'. These are the chief 'vices of Middle' commonly recognized in Indian logic: see *Nyāya-sūtra*, I ii 4sq., and cf. Bhande, *Indian Logic in the early Schools*, pp. 182sq.). The 'unestablished' is not actually verified in the Minor and its congeners: the 'equivocal' occurs beyond, as well as within, the Major, the 'repugnant' actually conflicts with the Major, the 'belated' is one propounded when the matter is already decided by perception or implication or scripture (but on a certain obscurity in regard to this see Goldstuecker in Bhande's *Sanskrit Texts*, III, pp. 24, 290, 312, and Bhande, *op. cit.*, p. 192, also the various statements in the *Nyāya-mahatī* (ed. pp. 611-2); the 'tautological' virtually assumes one or other solution of the matter under debate and so is *petitio principii*.

<sup>3</sup>) The argument is that to be a product (*kārya*) is a valid attribute of anything having causes or parts, even if the making of them is not evidenced.

<sup>4</sup>) Nothing perceived in the world is not a product.

(*prakaraṇa-sama*), because there is no counter-inference<sup>3</sup>) capable of justifying an attribute waylaying (*pratipanthi*) it (25)

"Nor should it be said that 'A Lord, creator of earth, mountains, etc., does not exist, because he has no body like a soul at rest', is a vetoing counter-inference. For here the bearer of attributes, in the form of God, is either known, or not-known. First, he is not not-known; because it would follow that the Middle Term has no basis (*tāśraya*)<sup>4</sup>. And, if he is known, then why is he not by the very evidence which makes him known known as having a body of his own, created by himself? Hence, how is he bodyless? Therefore this Middle Term is faultless

"And he is one. 'and' is in the sense of 'again' (*pranah*); 'he', again, that particular person; 'one', without a second. For, if we admit the creation of the universe by a many, then, since the possibility of their mutual disagreement (*trivāda*) cannot be ruled out, there would be creation of each single entity with other and other forms, and everything would be in disorder. Furthermore, he is omnipresent, 'goes everywhere', so present everywhere, all-embracing. For, if he occupied a particular fixed (*pratiniyata*) place, the proper creation of the masses of things in the Triple Universe with their unfixed locations would be unaccountable, for in the case of potters, etc., it is so seen. Or else, 'omnipresent' means 'he goes to, or knows everything', omniscient. Because it is said, "All (words) with the meaning of 'going' have the meaning of 'knowing'"<sup>5</sup>). For in the absence of omniscience there would be no origination of suitable products, because of his being unacquainted with proper material causes, etc.

"Furthermore, he is self-dependent, self-governed, he cause of ability to make all living beings experience pleasures and pains at his will. And to this effect it is said:

"By God impelled either to heaven or to the pit would go

These other beings, not master of their own pleasure and pain"<sup>6</sup>)

"If, however, he were governed by others, then a lack of Lordship would follow, because of contradiction in his being the chief maker, as having to look to the face of another."

"Further, he is eternal, unfailing, unoriginated, permanent, uniform (26). For if, as being non-eternal, he had to be created by others, he would be a created thing; for an existent which for the realisation of its own nature depends on the operation of another is said to be a created thing. And another supposed as his creator would be either eternal or non-eternal. If eternal, what is wrong with the Lord already contemplated? And, if non-eternal, he also must have another creator. And, supposing on his part also eternity or non-eternity, there is the difficulty of a *regressus ad infinitum*"

Having thus exhibited the opponent's affirmation of a Lord God, distinguished by the attributes unity, etc., as maker of the Triple Universe, in the second part of the verse he states the falsity of it. These, the just stated; pretences of mere assurance, despoised assurances, sort of assertions, are mere assurances, pret assertions—that is the meaning. These same are pretences, modes of evasion, being in the form of relations, while foreign to expertise in

<sup>3</sup> There is no discoverable attribute of things in general admissible as proving that they have not an intelligent maker, hence the Middle product is not voluntarily assumed.

<sup>4</sup> If God is not known, it is not possible to say that he has no body.

<sup>5</sup> A grammatical maxim (No. 43, p. 94, in Hemachandra's *Amṛta-syādvāda-śāstra* (M. I. 3), to some extent justified by certain Sanskrit idioms, e.g. *gaurāṅgāḥ*, 'make understood' *prāṇi* or *pratyūṣa*, 'idea', 'presentation', etc.

<sup>6</sup> The verse occurs in Mallinātha's *comment*, to H's *Saṅgādhāraṇa-samuccaya*, x. 13, in *Nyāya-nīrṇaya*, IV. c. 21 and in *Śaṅkarācārya's* *Advaita-samuccaya*, vol. p. 203, in the Sanskrit chapter of the *Saṅgādhāraṇa-samuccaya* and in the *Prasāda-śāstra-samuccaya* of Prabhacandra (IV, fol. 174b of the edition). In Mallinātha's *Saṅgādhāraṇa-samuccaya*, 137-138 the two lines are inverted and *anya*, 'other', is replaced by *anā*, 'unknowing', which agrees with our original *Mahā-Bhāṣya* text, III. 51. 2."



reflection; would be, would be; of those, logical outcasts; of whom. O Lord, Thou art not the teacher, not the giver of teaching

Just in order to intimate that such prepossessions are of the form of pretences, the hymner has openly, in regard to each of the several qualifications of the person approved by the opponent, made use of the word 'that' ('he'), implying scorn, and it is just in such a way that speakers speak with regard to a single individual who deserves rebuke, as in, - 'that fool, that villain, that pauper', etc. "Thou". By the use of the term 'you' in the singular is suggested the unique good counselling on the part of the supreme Lord - which through supreme compassionateness disregards the distinction of one's own and opposite parties.

Here accordingly the notion is as follows: Although the Lord pronounces to all the word of teaching, which without distinction brings benefit to all the mass of beings in the world, nevertheless that (word of teaching) does not turn out to be to the taste of some, whose souls are defiled by accumulated and deeply ingrained evil acts (27): because of unfitness, they being different from those who are not bound again (*a-punar-bandhaka*)<sup>11</sup>. And so in the *Kādambarī*<sup>12</sup> Bāṇa also has said, "For unto a mind freed from pollution, like the rays of the moon into a crystal jewel, the qualities of teaching enter easily. For an unsuitable person even the spotless words of a Guru, like water, beget a great pain in the ear". And so naturally the Lord is not for them a teacher.

Nor does that suggest incompetence in the world teacher. For a poison-doctor, who does not revive a fatally bitten man, although he has revived other bitten persons, is not to be blamed, because that goes too far. For that is their own fault. Certainly, the rays of the sun, though they illuminate the whole round of the universe, are not subject to a supposition of reproach just because they do not enjoy the power of causing light in the congregation of owls. And to that effect says Śrī Siddhasena

"That even to Thee with Thy spotless skill in sowing the seeds of the good law,  
There were, O kinsman of the world, barren ground -  
Is not surprising; here in the bedarkened tribes of birds  
The rays of the sun are as bright as the feet of bees!"<sup>13</sup>.

How, however, do then 'mere assurances' have the form of pretences? (28) We state: Whereas, first of all, it is said by the opponent that earth, etc., have an intelligent maker, because they are products, like a pot, etc., that is unproved, because there is no apprehension of a comprehension. For it is agreed by all the disputants that "only in the case of comprehensions well established by proof will the Middle Term prove the Major Term"<sup>14</sup>. And here, in creating the worlds he would be either with a body or without a body. And, even if with a body, is he qualified by a visible body, like ourselves, or qualified by an invisible body, like a ghost (Pśācav, etc.)? On the first alternative, there is contradiction by perception, and - since even in grass, trees, rainbows, clouds, etc., which are begot even without that, we observe the fact that they are product, the Middle Term is equivocal and 'common'<sup>15</sup>, like 'probability'.

On the second alternative, again, is the cause of his having an invisible body a special greatness on his part, or is it a difference of fate from people like us? The first course requires a convincing by ordeal<sup>16</sup>; because there is no proof to establish it, and because the fault of

<sup>11</sup> This class of persons (not deeply involved in sin and karma) is defined in Māṇvīṣya's *Dharmasamgraha* II (M. I.), it is mentioned in Haribhadra's *Yoga-bindu*, v, 98, 251, 369.

<sup>12</sup> At p. 403, ll. 10-1, of Peterson's edition of Bāṇa's so-named work (M. I.).

<sup>13</sup> From Siddhasena's *Second Thirty-two*, v. 13 (M. I.). The feet of bees are notoriously black.

<sup>14</sup> Source of quotation untraced.

<sup>15</sup> See an universal predicate.

<sup>16</sup> Because there is no attestation.

reciprocal dependence is incurred. For, proven a special greatness, his having an invisible body is to be believed, and, this proven, there is proof of a special greatness.

But the *second course* simply does not enter into the field of consideration: because doubt is not stopped. For whether his body is invisible because of non-existence, like that of the son of a barren woman, or because of a difference of fate from us, etc., as in the case of a ghost, etc., there is nothing to decide.

And, if he is without a body, then there is disagreement between example and exemplified. For forms of products, pot, etc. are seen to have makers with bodies; and if without a body, how can he have a capacity for producing a product, just as in the case of ether (space)? And so on both alternatives, whether defined as with body or without body, the Middle Term, 'being a product', is not proved to be comprehended. (29)

Moreover, on your view this Middle Term is 'belated'. For, since parts of the Minor Term, namely tree, lightning, cloud, etc., originating even now, have no observed creator, the Middle Term as stated after the Minor Term has been disproved by perception. Thus there is no maker of the world.

But unity, etc., the marks of him adduced to establish his being maker of the world, are like the descriptions, to an impotent man, of a woman's perfect beauty. Nevertheless, so as to make known that they (the marks) cannot bear consideration, something is said.

Here, first of all discussion of unity. To say that, where a plurality of makers makes one thing, there is presumption of disagreement, is not unequivocal: because we see without objection a single appearance in an ant hill, although it has to be made by many hundreds of insects, and in mansions, etc., although made by many artisans, and in bee-hives, although they are brought about by many bees; or do you say that in these also the one Lord is the maker? If so, Your Worship shows an unexampled obsession in regard to Bhavānī's Lord!<sup>15</sup> Then why do you not suppose him likewise the maker of cloth, pot, etc., disregarding the weaver and potter? Or, if it is asked how can they be makers, established by perception, he denied? Very well then, what have the ants, etc., done to offend you, so that their makership, attained by such unequalled exertions, is denied by a single flourish? Therefore, to suppose, for fear of disagreement, unity on the part of the great Lord is like a poor man, for fear of the expense of food, etc., taking to an empty forest—abandoning his dearly loved sons, wife, etc.

Further, his omnipresence also is not justified: for that would be with his bodily self, or with his cognitor self. On the first alternative, since the Three Worlds are comprehended simply by his body, (30) there is no room for any support (*tīrāma*) for the other things to be created. On the second alternative, however, we have an establishing of what is already established: because we also admit that the highest person, with his self of unsurpassable cognition, embraces the Three Worlds. Furthermore, if it is so, there is conflict with the Veda, which Your Worship make authoritative; for there his omnipresence with his bodily self is stated: Because of such texts as, "With eye everywhere, with face everywhere, with hand everywhere, with foot everywhere"<sup>16</sup>.

As for its being said, if he occupied a specified (particular) place, his proper creation of the objects in the Three Worlds, which occupy unspecified (indefinite) places, would be unaccountable, in regard to that we ask as follows: "When engaged in creating the Three Worlds, does he create, like a carpenter, with direct operation of his body, or else merely by thought? On the first alternative, since there is in the creation of a single (thing), earth, mountains,

<sup>15</sup> *śiva*, the god, here somewhat scornfully mentioned as 'Bhṛgū's husband'.

<sup>16</sup> see *Saṁhitā, āraṇyaka*, III, 2.

etc., – the possibility of a considerable waste of time, there may be non-completion even with a substantial time. On the second alternative, we do not see the slightest objection even to his occupying a specified place, while contriving the products merely by thought, because even with ordinary divinities occupying definite places we accept the creation of such and such products simply by thought.

Moreover, if his omnipresence is agreed, it follows that he occupies even impure places, hells, etc., with deep darkness: and so an undesired consequence. And, if it is said that, 'On your alternative also, when it is said that with his cognition-self he comprehends the whole Three Worlds, then, since we presume that he perceives the taste of impure savours, and since it follows that he has himself experience in the form of pains of hell, etc., the undesired consequence is the same (for both of us): – then that is like one unable to rejoin by arguments sprinkling dust on you. For cognition, which acts without reaching (*a-prāpya-kīri*), outlines (*paricchinnate*) its object (*viṣaya*) even while remaining in its own place, and not by going to it; (31) so how is Your Honour's criticism right? For on Your Honour's part also there is not through the mere cognition of an impure thing, experience of the flavour of its taste: because, if it were so, since enjoyment would be effected merely by the thinking of sandal wood, women, wine (*rasarati*), superfluity of the effort to get them would follow.

With regard, however, to what was said previously, i. e. that, if his omnipresence is with his cognition-self, we have an establishing of what is already established, that must be meant only potentially. And it is thus that speakers say, "His mind flows through all the *sāstras*". And cognition acts without reaching, because, being an attribute of the self, it does not issue outside. And, if it did issue outside, then, since the self would be without intelligence, absence of soul would result: for an attribute has never been seen anywhere by itself, extending beyond its bearer. As for the example adduced by the opponents (the other side), i. e. just as the sun's rays, though of the form of qualities, come forth from the sun and illuminate the world, so cognition also, issuing forth from the soul, outlines the object (*prameya*), to this the reply is, 'That the rays are qualities is unproved, because, as consisting of the matter of light, they are substances: and, as for their quality – consisting of illumination, that exists never apart from them'. And so in the *Dharma-samgrahani* Śrī Haribhadra, the revered *ācārya*<sup>17)</sup>, says –

"Rays are qualities, not substances – their illumination is a quality, not substance.

Cognition, which is a quality of the self – how is that, not being a substance, elsewhere? (370)

Cognition, without going out, outlines the thing to be cognized in the place where it is:

Though abiding in the self, it must none the less be understood to have infinite potencies. (371)

The potency of the magnet, even while residing in itself,

Is visible in its effects, attracting the iron, though in another place. (372)

If similarly here also the potency of cognition, even while residing in the self,

Rightly outlines, mark me, the ends of the universe, what contradiction should there be here?" (373), and so on. (32)

And, if 'omnipresent' has been explained as 'all-knowing', in regard to that also there is a rejoinder: 'Surely, by what proof is his omniscience apprehended? By direct perception, or indirectly? Not by perception, to begin with, because that, as arising from contact of sense-organ and thing (*artha*), is incapable of apprehending the supersensory. Nor again indirectly:

<sup>17)</sup> *Dharma-samgrahani*, vv. 370-3 (M. L.).

for that would be inference or verbal communication. Not inference, to begin with, since that is preceded by the recollection of the connection of a thing marked with the mark (*lūga*): and in regard to his omniscience as the thing to be inferred, we do not see any unfailing mark, since owing to his infinite distance there can be no apprehension of connection with a mark attached to him<sup>1</sup>.

And, if it is said: 'The diversity of the world, unaccountable without omniscience on his part, is a practical proof of his omniscience'. - Not so: because there is no indispensability, since the diversity of the world is not unaccountable without his omniscience. For the world is twofold, (33) because of the difference between stationary and mobile. Among these, the diversity in the mobile is due simply to the force of the maturing of self-accumulated, pure and soiled, action (*karma*); in the stationary, however, as regards creatures with mentality the same is the case; while the diversity of those without mentality<sup>12</sup>) is established since beginningless time as means to their suitability for being experienced by the former.

Nor is Scripture proof of it (omniscience). For this would be composed either by him, or by others. And if, while composed by him, it proves his omniscience, then there is a weak point in his greatness: for proclaiming by oneself of one's own qualities is not contemplated (*adhyakṛta*) of the great. And another thing: it is not even logical that he should compose a *sāstra*; for a *sāstra* consists of sounds; now these are produced by the operation of the palate, etc., and that is possible only in a body; and on the supposition of his having a body there are the previously stated faults. If it (the Scripture) is composed by another, that other is either omniscient or not omniscient. If omniscient, then through the resultant duality, the previously stated supposition of his unity is put out of court; and in the discussion of the proof which establishes his existence there is the objection of a *regressus ad infinitum*. And, if he is not omniscient, what trust is there in his teaching?

And another thing: the Scripture approved by Your Worship, actually establishes its author's non-omniscience, because it contains contradictions between former and later statements. For example, having first said, "He should not hurt any living beings"<sup>13</sup>), afterwards, in the same work, it is read,

"six hundred animals on the middle day of the Horse-sacrifice<sup>14</sup>) are scripturally enjoined, less three animals".

And further, "Let him lay hands on an animal for the Agnisoma"<sup>15</sup>), "Let him lay hands on seventeen animals for Prajapati"<sup>16</sup>), etc., - how possibly do these and the like passages not carry contradiction between former and later? Further having first by, "Let him not speak what is untrue"<sup>17</sup>), etc., prohibited false speaking, (34) afterwards we have, "For the sake of a Brāhman he may speak what is untrue"<sup>18</sup>), etc. Also.

<sup>11</sup>) According to a prevalent Hindu notion the material cosmos is so ordained as to provide recompense for the actions of living beings. In the case of theism this may be regarded as 'providential', while for dualists who conceived of self-imagined hell, etc., there was no difficulty. The Jains, who admit no deity, and for whom merit and demerit are material conditions, do not seem to have dwelt upon the idea of retribution.

<sup>12</sup>) *Chandogya-upanishad*, VIII (M. I.).

<sup>13</sup>) A verse quoted in Gaṇḍapāda's commentary on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, and in *Mahidhara-Bhāṣya* on *Yajus Samhitā* Adh. 24.

<sup>14</sup>) *Āitareya-brāhmaṇa*, VI. 3 (M. L.). (Agnisoma ritual connected with the divinities Agni and Soma.)

<sup>15</sup>) *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*, V. i. 3. 7. *Taittiriya Samhitā* I 4. (M. L.).

<sup>16</sup>) Untraced.

<sup>17</sup>) *Ṣpaṇḍa*, (Dhruva).

"A speech used in jest does no harm,  
nor what is said among women, O king, nor at the time of marriage, in peril of life,  
or in complete loss of goods, -  
these five untruths are, they say, no sin"<sup>25</sup>.

Furthermore, having, by such statements as, "Other people's goods like a clod of earth"<sup>26</sup>), once many times repudiated taking what is not given, afterwards it is said, "Even if a Brāhman by violence appropriates another's goods, or by ruse, nevertheless there is on his part no taking of what is not given; for all this (world) was given to the Brāhmins, but through the weakness of the Brāhmins outcasts enjoy it. And therefore a Brāhman, taking it away, appropriates his own, a Brāhman enjoys simply his own, he dresses himself in his own, he gives away his own"<sup>27</sup>. Furthermore, after remarking that "For one sonless there is no good future"<sup>28</sup>, we have:

"Many thousands of Brāhmins, student-celebrates from boyhood,

Have gone to heaven, without having secured a continuance of their families"<sup>29</sup>),

and so on. Oh! how many wretches are cut off from the eating of curds and beans!

Thus even Scripture does not speak of his omniscience. Furthermore, if, being omniscient, he creates the moving and motionless world, then why does he create enemies who cause world-disasters, enemies of the Gods whose subsequent punishment has to be arranged for, and ourselves and others who make these reproaches? So he is not omniscient.

Furthermore, his being self-controlled, - self-dependent -, that also is not able to bear discussion. For, if indeed, being self-governed, he creates everything, and if he is described by you as supremely compassionate, then how does he form it uneven with a lot of different states, - happy, miserable, etc. -, and not a world (35) desirable from the plenitude of absolute blessedness? Or, if he does so, being moved by their such and such good and bad actions, accumulated in other births, then that is the funeral of his self-controlledness.

But, if the diversity of the universe results from action, then, since the supposition that the creation of the world is caused by Sṛiṣṭa (Viṣṇu)<sup>30</sup> is fruitful only of trouble, our view is accepted by the discerning. And so the maxim, "dawn at the toll-house"<sup>31</sup>), is in place. Furthermore, if he creates with respect to the merit and demerit of the living creatures then it is a case of 'what this person looks for, that he does not make'; for the potter does not make his staff, etc. Similarly, if looking to action the Lord should be cause of the world, then action would be the Lord; the Lord would be non-Lord.

Further, his eternity also is acceptable only if gossiped about in his own house. Being, of course, in virtue of his eternity of one form only (*eka-rūpa*), is it his own-nature (*sva-bhāva*) to create the universe, or not? On the first alternative, he would never stop creating universes; if he ceased to do so, there would be a loss of his own-nature; and so, since there would be no conclusion to the act of creation, there would be no creation even of a single product; for a pot, from the moment of its commencement to the moment just preceding its completion, does not, in the sense of certain method, attain the designation 'pot'; because in the action of bringing water, and so on, it has not full efficacy.

<sup>25</sup> *Mahā-Bhārata*, I 77. 46 *Vaiṣeṣika Dharma Sūtra* XVI 36 (M. I.).

<sup>26</sup> Untranslated.

<sup>27</sup> *Manusmṛiti* I 101b (M. I.).

<sup>28</sup> *Devi Bhāgavata* (Dhruva).

<sup>29</sup> *Āpastamba* (Dhruva).

<sup>30</sup> A Vedic epithet (here derisively chosen) of Viṣṇu, later of Śiva also.

<sup>31</sup> The maxim supposes a smuggler who, taking a by-road, loses his way in the dark and at dawn finds himself close to the toll-house. see Col. Jacob, *A Handful of Popular Maxims*, I, p. 26.

And on the 'own-nature not that' alternative he would never create worlds, because it is not consistent with his own-nature, as in the case of ether. Furthermore, if he has an unequivocally eternal own-form, destruction also, like creation, does not fit: (36) because, in the case of his producing results of diverse form, there is the consequence of his non-eternity; for he would destroy the worlds either with the same own-nature wherewith he creates them, or with a different own-nature. If with the same, a simultaneity of creation and destruction results; because of the non-distinction of his own-natures, since to originate products of more than one own-nature from a cause having one single own-nature is a contradiction. If with a different own-nature, there is defeasance of his eternity; for difference of own-nature is actually the mark of non-eternity; just as in an earthen body, which is accompanied by food atoms, there is non-eternity because of difference of own-natures owing to the daily origination of what did not exist before. And Your Worshipships accept a difference of own-natures in Sambu (Śiva) in his creating and destroying, since you accept his operation in creating as in virtue of the passion-quality (*rajo guṇāmakatā*), in destroying in virtue of his darkness-quality, and in preserving as due to his goodness (*sāttvikatā*). And so there is a difference of state, and with difference of that there is difference in the thing which has the state; whence an infraction of this eternity.

Or else, let him be eternal, all the same, why is he not continuously active in creating? If it is said, because of desire (*icchā-rasāt*), surely those desires also depend for their realisation merely on his own existence; why do they not always move him? So we have the same objection as before. Also, as Sambu is an abode (*adhikarana*) of eight qualities<sup>22</sup>, what prevents a defeasance of his eternity, because of diversity in his desires also, as inferred from difference in the results?

Moreover, the actions of judicious people are covered either by self-interest, or by compassion. And so he is engaged in world-creation either from self-interest, or from compassion. Not from self-interest, to begin with, because all his ends are accomplished. Nor from compassion; for compassion is the desire for removal of the suffering of others. Then, since prior to creation, owing to the non-origination of sense-organs, bodies, objects there is no suffering of souls, — for the removal of what is the compassion a desire? But, if we admit compassion from beholding the suffering creatures in the period after creation, the charge of a circular argument is unanswerable, through compassion creation, and through creation compassion. And so his being creator of the universe is not in any way established (37)

And so their claim (*heṭvāka*) of service to a special person who is made turbid by such defects is surely a mere outcome of pretence (*vidambanā*) due to strong delusion. And here, although by reason of the construction of the "not" in the middle, "like the clanging of a bell"<sup>23</sup>, an opposite sense occurs to mind, as: 'these pretences of mere assurance would not be found in those whose teacher Thou art', nevertheless, that sense cannot be retained in the judgment (*hṛdaya*) of intelligent people, because the subject in hand is the rescinding of other systems. This is the sense of the verse.

<sup>22</sup> Śiva's eight forms are Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Sun, Moon, and the sacrificer

<sup>23</sup> The bell's tongue strikes both sides

## VII. THE VAIŚEṢIKA DOCTRINE OF 'INHERENCE'

And now, refuting their view that, although intelligence (*caitanya*), etc., colour, etc., and bearers of attributes, the self, etc., and the pot, etc., are completely (*atyantam*) different, yet, being connected by the connection 'inherence''), they attain the designations attribute and bearer of attributes, he says:

**VII. There is no relation of attribute and bearer of attribute, if utterly different;**

**If it is by occurrence, no triad appears.**

'In this this' is the notion (*mati*) also (*ca*) in occurrence;

there is not a metonymous distinction, and moreover there is violation of world experience.

If attribute and bearer of attribute are utterly different - 'utterly' (*atira*), in this word *ira* is merely rhetorical; and that is employed by grammarians regularly after *ati*, and after forms of *kim*; as, for instance, "Bent down a little (*kiñcid-ira*) by her breasts"'), "what ever (*ka iva*) conceited person gives pleasure to others?"'), and so on. (38) And so, if complete difference were adopted, there would be from defenceance of own being no attribute and bearer of attribute. The universally established usage of the term attribute and bearer of attribute, as in 'of this bearer of attributes these attributes', and 'of these attributes this subject, the bearer', is not provided for. And, if that (usage) is supposed in spite of absolute difference between the two, then in regard to the attributes of other things also') there is the consequence of the relation of attribute and bearer of attributes in the intended sense.

This being so stated, the opponent demurs: "It is by occurrence (*vytti*)"). In the case of inseparables'), which act as things supported and their supports, the connection which is the cause of the presentation (in this') is inherence; and it is "inherence" because it weaves together'). And because it occurs in the five categories, substance, quality, action, universality, particularity, it is also styled "occurrence". Through that occurrence, the inherence-connection, the designation 'attribute and bearer of attributes' is approved, although those two, i. e. attribute and bearer of attributes, have been completely torn apart. And so there is not the just stated fault."

Here the teacher interposes: - If (*ced*) - if so is your notion (*mati*), that is refuted by perception: for no triad appears. This bearer of attributes, and these attributes of it, and this

1) On this leading Vaiśeṣika tenet see note IV 2. For Jain discussions of *samavāya* see *Sammatī-tarka*, pp. 200-2, and *Prameya-kamala-māhāṇḍa*, fol. 182-4.

2) From Kālidāsa's *Kumāra-sambhava*, III, v. 56.

3) From Māgha's *Śiṣupāla-vadha* (M. L.), VIII, 18.

4) On the supposition of absolute difference of the thing and its attributes the attributes of *x* are not more foreign to *x* than are those of *y*.

5) I. e. having instances

6) On *a-guṇa-siddha* see note IV 2.

7) The regular Vaiśeṣika statement, e. g. in *V.-sūtra*, VII, ii. 26, 'That because of which in regard to product (*kārya*) and its cause (substrate) there is (the notion) 'in this this' is Inherence (*samavāya*).

8) A (mistaken) etymology, deriving *samavāya* from *av*, 'weave'.

inherence, the bond of their connection, this 'tried', that triplicity of entities, 'does not appear', does not present itself as object of cognition. As, for example, in the case of a couple of pieces of stone the substance of resin, etc., joining them together, appears as a third, apart from them; we have not here similarly the presentation of inherence, but only of two, the attribute and the bearer of attributes. And so of this inherence we have to be convinced by *nāth*<sup>9</sup>). That is the sense.

However, by that disputant this (inherence) is worked out as single, eternal, all-embracing, and incorporeal. And so, just as the attributes of colour due to heat, etc., are inherent in the pot by the connection 'inherence', why not also in the cloth? Because that (i. e. inherence) is in virtue of its unity, eternity, all-embracingness alike everywhere? (39) As ether (space), being one, eternal, all-embracing, and incorporeal, is connected with all connected things at once, without distinction, why is it not so with this? And on the absence of inherence in one entity, when perishing, there follows the absence of inherence in all entities. If it is said that "Because of distinction by such and such delimitants (*avacchedaka*)<sup>10</sup> there is not this fault", in that case there is the consequence of its non-eternity; because of distinction of own-nature in the case of each entity<sup>11</sup>).

"Well, how does inherence not present itself in cognition? For the presentation (*pratyaṅ*) 'here (in this)' is the pointed (emphatic) proof of it, and the presentation 'here' is actually established by experience, e. g. "in these (*īha*) threads cloth", "in this (*īha*) self cognition", "in this (*īha*) pot colour", etc., this presentation (*pratīti*) is apprehended. And because this presentation ('here') has no basis in the attribute and its bearer merely, there is another category, called inherence, which is the cause thereof". Presuming such a suggestion of the opponent, he says further, 'In this this' is the notion also in occurrence; 'in this this' 'in this this', a presentation 'in this', which gives rise to the relation of support and thing supported, 'is also in occurrence', is to be found also in the inherence-connection. The word 'and' (*ca*) has the sense of the word 'also' (*apī*). And that can be construed with a non-adjacent word; and just so it has been expounded.

This here is the gist: as on your view (*matī*) earth is through connection with earthness, and here earthness is the own-form of earth itself, called *is-ness* (*astitva*), and not a separate entity, and that very connection of earth with that own-form itself is what is called 'inherence', because it is stated that "The coming together only of what has come together is inherence"<sup>12</sup>); similarly, why do you not suppose also that inherence is through connectedness with inherence-ness? For that also has connection with its own-form, which is inherence-ness; because otherwise, through being void of an own-nature, it would be a non-entity, like hare's horns, etc. And therefore, through the clear recognition that 'in this inherence is inherenceness', the presentation 'in this' is logically justified in regard to inherence also. Therefore, just as in earth earthness is inherent through inherence, so in inherence also is inherence-ness (40) likewise to be connected by another inherence, and that by another; and thus you have a great flood of *regressus* impossible to cross.

<sup>9</sup>) Because there is no evidence

<sup>10</sup>) The inherence being supposed to be differentiated by what it occurs in, as if an omnipresent, eternal something could be regarded as sharing the fate of something in which its presence is noted. On *avacchedaka*, 'limit-defining factor', which in Indian logic plays a great part, see Cowell's note on his translation of the *Kuśumāñjali*, p. 26, and the *Nyāya-kosa*, s. v.

<sup>11</sup>) Each instance must have its special character

<sup>12</sup>) Sc. of inseparables. The quotation contrasts 'inherence' with conjunction, which is coming together of what has not come together



Whereas a connection of inherence with inherence-ness is thus logically justified, the disputant on the preliminary side, taking refuge in audacity, says again: "Surely, we have a primary inherence as the bond of the connection of earth, etc. with earthness, etc.<sup>14)</sup>; but, since there comes to light a class, embracing all the differences of instance (of earth) marked as intermediate species, which class is suggested by the presentations *atala* ('one of the earths'), etc., while in the present case, because of the unity of inherence, there is no difference of particular instances and therefore a class does not come to light, the connection with inherence-ness, propounded by you as to be proved by the presentation 'in this', is metonymous, and so is the inherence demonstrated by it".

For the discerning this is not very thrilling. For what prevents a class from coming to light here also? If it is said, - 'because of non-distinction of instance', - not so! Because a distinction between particulars of it is justified in virtue of such and such delimitants, the supposition of a distinction of instance is hard to get rid of. For in: 'inherence in a pot is one, inherence in a cloth another', a distinction of instances of inherence also is patent; and, that being established, the coming to light of a class is absolutely proved. Therefore in other cases also we have simply the primary inherence, since the presentation 'in this' does not fail in either case.

Having in mind all this solution, along with the opponents' case, the defender of the final conclusion says, - **there is not a metonymous distinction**, - this distinction which is called 'metonymous' does not exist. Because it lacks the marks of the metonymous; and the mark thereof they state as follows:

"The primary is never absent, not incomplete, non-common, essential;

Contrary is the metonymous meaning; while the primary meaning avails, how is there thought of the metonymous?"<sup>15)</sup> And so there is not this 'distinction', diversity, stated in saying that "in the connection of the attribute with the bearer of attributes there is primary inherence, and in the further connection of inherence-ness with inherence metonymous"; that is the sense. (41)

And, as for the wish to prove inherence from the presentation 'in these threads the cloth', etc., that imitates a wish to beget offspring from an eunuch; because the usage 'in these threads the cloth', etc., is not known in the world (paradoxical), since even with tirok it is seen only in the form 'in this cloth the threads', and since it would follow that there was inherence also in 'on this piece of ground the negation of pot'<sup>16)</sup>.

This is why he says: **and, moreover, there is violation of world experience** (*loka-bādha*), 'moreover' is used in the accumulation of refutations; 'world' (*loka*) means authoritative people (*pramāṇika-loka*) and ordinary people, thereby 'violation' (veto), opposition, 'violation of ordinary experience', because it establishes a usage which is not obvious to anybody. The word 'violation' (*bādha*) has both masculine and feminine gender: "Itā, etc., when used to distinguish presentations"<sup>17)</sup> (can be of two genders). Therefore the connection between attribute and the bearer of attributes is to be adopted only as defined by non-separate existence, and not something other, such as inherence, etc. This is the meaning of the verse.

<sup>14)</sup> The argument here is that inherence of 'earthness', etc., in 'earth', etc., gives rise to a class of 'earths', with various species, which is not the case with 'Inherence' as an independent factor.

<sup>15)</sup> A linguistic maxim to the effect that where an expression has both literal and metonymous uses the literal is never obliterated and has the first claim.

<sup>16)</sup> According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views negations do not inhere: see *Nyāya-mañjarī*, ed. p. 49.

<sup>17)</sup> From Hemacandra's *Gender* (*Liṅga*) *śūtra*, v. 5 (M. L.)

## VIII. THE CATEGORIES OF THE VAIŚEŚIKAS

Then, mocking the opponents, who from want of cognition have accepted an extra category called 'existence', and the quality called 'cognition' as distinct from the self, and *Mokṣa* in the form of the cutting off of the special qualities of the self, he says -

VIII. Of existents even there would be existence only in some case;

Intelligence would be conditioned and other than the self;

and *Mokṣa* would not be composed of consciousness and bliss:

fine sūtras satirized by those who are not Thine!

(On the part of the Vaiśeṣikas six categories<sup>1)</sup> called substance, quality, action, universality, particularity and inherence are understood as real. (42) Here "earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, direction, self, intellect (*manas*)" are the nine substances<sup>2)</sup>. Qualities are 24; thus, "colour, savour, odour, touch, number, size, severalty, conjunction and separation, priority and posteriority, awareness (*buddhi*), pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, and effort<sup>3)</sup>", are the 17 mentioned in the *sūtra*. And there are 7 included by the word 'and': fluidity, gravity, momentum, viscosity, merit and demerit, and sound. Thus we have 24 qualities. Since impression (*samskāra*)<sup>4)</sup>, though triple as velocity, imagination and elasticity, is single in consequence of the class 'impression-ness', and since heroism, nobility, etc., are here included, these are not extras. Actions are five, as: 'elevation, depressing, bending, putting forth (projecting), going'<sup>5)</sup>. Because 'going' is included, there is no incongruity in 'shaking', 'emptying', 'flowing', and so forth<sup>6)</sup>).

That from which as cause (*kāraṇa*) a mutual accordance of own-form is presented with reference to absolutely separate bodies (*pinḍa*), that is universality, the cause (*hetu*) of the presentation of their conformity. And that (universality) is of two kinds, prior and posterior<sup>7)</sup>. And of these the prior is called 'existence' (*sattā*), 'being' (*bhāva*), and 'the great universal'; because in comparison with intermediate universals, substance etc., it has a great sphere. And posterior universals are substance, etc., and these are also designated 'universal special'; as thus, substance, from occurring in the 9 substances, is an universal, and through disseverance from qualities and action it is a difference (*viśeṣa*). Hence as a *Karma-dhāraya*-compound<sup>8)</sup> you have 'universality-difference'. Similarly, in comparison with 'substance', etc., 'earthiness', etc., are posterior, and in comparison with these 'potness', etc. Similarly, from occurrence in the 24 qualities, quality is an universal, but from severance from substance and action it is a difference; similarly, in comparison with 'qualityness', 'colour-ness', etc.,

<sup>1)</sup> *V.-sūtra*, I. i. 4: subsequently there was addition of 'Negation' as a seventh.

<sup>2)</sup> *V.-sūtra*, I. i. 5.

<sup>3)</sup> *V.-sūtra*, I. i. 6.

<sup>4)</sup> On *samskāra* in relation to motion see *V.-sūtra*, V. i. 17.

<sup>5)</sup> *V.-sūtra*, IX. i. 7.

<sup>6)</sup> Included in 'going', on such extra 'actions' see the commentaries on *V.-sūtra*, I. i. 7.

<sup>7)</sup> So wider and narrower, *V.-sūtra*, I. ii. 3-6.

<sup>8)</sup> A grammatical compound in which the prior member is an attribute of the posterior.

and in comparison with that 'blueness', etc.; similarly, from occurrence in (43) the five actions, 'action' is an universal, and as separate from substance and qualities it is a difference; similarly, in comparison with 'action-ness', should 'elevation', etc., be understood.

'As to these, on what reasoning is 'existence' a thing (*artha*) other than substance, quality, action (?) – if that is asked, it is said: "Existence is not substance, is different from substance" is the meaning; 'because of belonging to the single substance'<sup>10</sup>), – because of 'occurring in each several substance' is the meaning; like substance-ness. As substance-ness, occurring in the 9 substances severally, is not a substance, but substance-ness simply, defined as 'universality-difference', so also 'existence'. For to the Vaiśeṣikas what has no substance (parts) is a substance, or what has plural substance (parts) is a substance. Of these the substances which have not substances<sup>11</sup>) are ether, time, direction, self, intellect, atoms; but plural substance is masses (*skandha*), from diatoms upwards. Again, what has one substance is not substance at all; and existence has one substance, and so, from having a mark different from the mark of substance, it is not substance. And similarly 'existence' is not quality, because it is found (*bhāvād*) in qualities, like quality-ness. For, if 'existence' were a quality, then it would not occur in qualities, because qualities are without quality<sup>12</sup>); but 'existence' does occur in qualities, because of the presentation 'existent quality'. Furthermore, 'existence' is not action; because it is in actions, like action-ness. And, if 'existence' were action, then it would not occur in actions, because actions are without action<sup>13</sup>); but 'existence' does occur in actions, because of the presentation 'existent action'. Therefore 'existence' is a separate category".

"Likewise, the differences, ultimate (*antya*) as occurring in the eternal substances, are the causes of absolute (*atyanta*) separateness. These (i.e. the differences), because of their dissimilarity (*vaiśakṣya*) from substance, etc., are a separate category, and to this effect *Prāśastakāra* says<sup>14</sup>)

"As found (*bhāvā*) in the ultimates they are ultimate, because they differentiate their locus, they are difference. Occurring in eternal substances, which are without destruction or composition, namely atoms, ether, time, direction, self and intellect singly, in each several substance, they are the causes of the awareness of absolute separateness. (44) As for us and the like, a separation of presentation from horses, etc., is exemplified in regard to oxen, etc., caused by (*nimitta*) equivalent shape, quality, action, growth of parts, difference of parts and union of parts, – (and we have this presentation) ox, white, swiftly moving, stout, humped, with a large bell. -- likewise to Yogins, our superiors, in regard to the eternal atoms, equal in shape, quality and action, and in regard to liberated selves and intellects, the means (indications) whereby, because of the impossibility of other means, there is separateness of presentation with respect to every instance (bearer), to the effect that 'this one is different, this one is

<sup>10</sup>) *V.-sūtra*, I. ii. 10. This peculiarity of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of 'Existence' (*satta*) has the effect of excluding Universals, Particularities, and Inherence, which nevertheless are regarded as *realis*. Possibly the basic idea was that of 'practical efficacy' (*artha kriya kārta*), which was the Buddhist conception and was also in a way acceptable to the Jains (see *infra* p. 155): *satta* is discussed in *Sammatī-tarka*, pp. 110-1. It will be observed, further, that 'relation' is in Indian logic not a category, most physical relations being included in 'Quality'.

<sup>11</sup>) The reference may be to *V.-sūtra*, I. ii. 27.

<sup>12</sup>) I. e. may have no parts: *V.-sūtra*.

<sup>13</sup>) This (highly questionable!) Vaiśeṣika doctrine (*V.-sūtra* VII. ii. 25) is perhaps partly explicable by the character and limited number of the qualities (*guṇa*): Attributes in general are designated by a different term (*dharma*).

<sup>14</sup>) *V.-sūtra*, VII. ii. 24. The Indians do not seem to have had the notion of 'acceleration'.

<sup>15</sup>) In his *Bhāṣya* on the *V.-sūtra*, c. VIII, text p. 156, trans. Ganghānāth Jhā, p. 671.

different', and whereby in regard to an atom remote in place and time there is the recognition, 'this is the same', -- is the ultimate differences'.

"And these have the form of differences only<sup>13</sup>, and are not, like substance-ness, and so on, of the form of both universal and difference, because they are causes of separation only.

"Further, inherence is 'the connection which is the cause of the presentation' here 'in regard to inseparables (a-yuta-siddha), which are respectively locus and thing located.' Between two inseparables which have not with mutual avoidance location in separate locuses, this status of locus and thing located, which is the non-common (special) cause<sup>14</sup> of the presentation 'in these threads the cloth', etc., is inherence. That in virtue whereof a located thing, such as cloth, etc., when coming into existence by the force of its own causes (kāraṇa), is united with its locus, i. e. the threads, etc., like the action of cutting with the thing to be cut, that also, because of difference (vaidharmya) of mark from substance, etc., is a separate category. And so there are six categories.

"Now the syllabic (verbal) sense is expounded: 'Of existents even', etc.; of existents even, -- i. e. among the six categories also which are common insofar as knowable by awareness of 'existent'; only in some case, only in some categories; existence, the use of the universal; there would be, would have place, not in all. To those (cases, categories) applies the linguistic expression 'existent' (sad); for, since it is stated that 'in substance, quality and action is that, existence (satā)<sup>15</sup>', wherever there is the presentation 'existent', there only is there 'existence'. And the presentation 'existent' applies only to substance, quality, and action; hence only to those does 'existence' apply, and not to the triad of categories, universality, etc.; because that (expression 'existent') is (in their case) lacking. What is asserted is this: Although is-ness (astitva)<sup>16</sup>, which is the own form of an entity, is found also in the triad universality, etc.; nevertheless it does not cause a presentation of their conformity (anuvṛtti), only what is presentation of conform recurrence, (46) is presentation of 'existent'; and because of absence of that there is no application of 'existence' to those (three). But in the triad, substance, etc., on the other hand, both 'is-ness', as the own form of an entity, common to the six categories, is found, and also there is connection with existence, as cause of the presentation of conformity; for in 'horse's horn', which has no own-form, there is no inherence of existence.

"If it is asked, 'How is there no presentation of conform recurrence in regard to the triad, universal, etc.?', we reply: Because of the existence (sad bhāva) of precluding circumstances. As thus: if we agree to the application of existence to 'existence', we have regressus ad infinitum, if, again, we accept it in regard to 'differences', there is defeasance of their own-form, which is marked (defined) as 'being cause of separation'; if we suppose it in regard to inherence, there is no connection, for by what connection is existence connected therewith? since there is no other inherence. And to this effect Udayana, the prince of logicians.

"Non-extinction of instance, equivalence, confusion (anātura), then regressus ad infinitum,

Defeasance of character (rūpa), non-connection, sum up what vetoes genus"<sup>17</sup>.

"So it stands fast that of existents even there would be existence only in some cases".

<sup>13</sup> They are strictly individual and do not constitute a class: P-sūtra, I 11 6.

<sup>14</sup> The Adjective has the object of excluding causes, such as God's cognition, which are common to all effects.

<sup>15</sup> On the restriction of existence (satā) to these see note 9.

<sup>16</sup> This, defined in the Nyāya-kōśa as 'connector with time', may perhaps be rendered by 'actuality'; it may serve to exclude the merely possible, the future, etc.

<sup>17</sup> From Udayana's Kirāṇodah, Dravya section, p. 161 (M. L.).

"Further, 'intelligence, etc.', **intelligence** (*caitanya*), cognition; **than the self**, than the embodied soul; **other, absolutely (other)<sup>20</sup>**. In order to clear away the opponent's query, 'If there is absolute distinction, how have we the expression' cognition connected with the self'? - the Middle Term is stated by means of the epithet 'conditioned' **Conditioned** (*aupādhikam*) is 'resulting from a condition' (*upādher āgatam*); inherent in the self through the condition defined as connected by inherence, a gift bestowed by the inherence-connection, since in itself the self is of an unthinking (*jada*) form<sup>21</sup>, - that is what it comes to. If non-separation of the self from cognition is approved, then, since on the successive withdrawal of pain, birth, activity, fault, wrong cognition there is absence of the immediately preceding, (46) at the time of annihilation of the nine special qualities of the self, awareness etc.<sup>22</sup>, there would be annihilation of the self also, because of its non-separation therefrom; therefore cognition separate from the Self is logical.

"Furthermore, "not composed of consciousness", etc. **Mokṣa** (*mukṣa*), liberation (*mokṣa*); **not consciousness and bliss<sup>23</sup>**, not in the form of cognition and pleasure. 'Consciousness' (*samvid*), cognition; 'bliss', happiness; therefore a Dyandva compound. That in which are involved consciousness and bliss, that is composed of consciousness and bliss'; such it (i. e. *mokṣa*) is not. For it is said that absolute annihilation of the nine special qualities of the self, in the form of awareness, happiness, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, impression, is *Mokṣa*: the word **and** takes in the previously mentioned two assumptions. For cognition, as being momentary, is non-eternal, and happiness, in view of decline and excess, is not distinct from the state of worldly existence; and so the abiding in the self's own-form upon their annihilation is *Mokṣa*. And the formal argument here is: 'The succession of the self's nine special qualities is absolutely annihilated, because it is succession. Whatever is a succession, is absolutely annihilated: as with the succession of a lamp-light; so in this case; therefore this is absolutely annihilated. And upon its annihilation simply there is glorification, not defused as waning of all *karma*'. "For, surely, on the part of one with a body there is no casting away of things liked and disliked; one surely who is without a body liking and dislike touch not"<sup>24</sup>. - such Vedānta-passages also ordain just such a *Mokṣa*. For here (in this world) the 'liked and disliked' are pleasure and pain, and they do not touch the disembodied, liberated, (soul) Moreover<sup>25</sup>:

- "As long as the self's qualities, suffusion etc., are not all annihilated,  
So long does not absolute separation from pain enter into consideration. (1)  
Caused by merit and demerit is the possibility of pleasure and pain,  
And these very two are basic pillars of the abode of worldly existence. (2) (47)  
And since upon the annihilation thereof (of merit and demerit) there is no trouble  
from their products,  
The body, etc., the self is without pleasure and pain; and so it is called liberated. (3)  
Desire, aversion and effort are the tie to the field of enjoyment;  
When the field of enjoyment is annihilated, the self is not joined to them. (4)  
So the basic disappearance of all the self's nine qualities, desire etc.,

<sup>20</sup> In a grammatical Compound 'other' would not mean 'absolutely other'.

<sup>21</sup> In the Vaiśeṣika system the soul is infinite, but void of cognition, which takes place only through connection with a 'mind-organ' (*manas*), which is atomic: see *V-sūtra*, III. c. 18, d. 1-21, VIII. c. 1-2.

<sup>22</sup> These are cognition, desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, merit, demerit, and impression.

<sup>23</sup> *Mokṣa* is described in *V-sūtra* V. 18, VI. ii. 16 as disjunction of the self from body and mind, wherefore it ceases to cognize.

<sup>24</sup> *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, VIII. xii. 1 (M. L.).

<sup>25</sup> Vv. 1-4 are quoted in *Nyāya-mañjarī* p. 508 (M. L.).

Is established as paradise (final release). (5)  
 Surely, in that state what sort of a self is left:  
 With only its own form for its abode (basis) abandoned of all its qualities? (6)  
 That form of it the wise call transcendent of the six waves,  
 Uninvited by views and pain, which depend upon the bonds of worldly existence. (4)  
 The six waves are - desire (*kāma*), anger, greed, pride, deceit and exultation". (8)

Then by those thus justifying these three statements, by those who are not Thine, those who are outside Thy precepts, the followers of the Kapāda-doctrine, fine sūtras sūtrified, the correct doctrine worked out. Or else, 'finely sūtrified' is an adverb; so sūtrified that there is a fine (*sobhana*) sūtra, discriminating cognition in the composition of an arrangement of the matter (*rasa*). There has been made a composition of the sense of such and such a sūtra - that is the gist. Because of the *Anekārtha* statement<sup>25</sup>, 'Sūtra, ag in, making 'sewing' (*sūcanā-kāra*), is applied to a book and to an arrangement of threads'.

And here 'finely sūtrified' is an expression of praise which by contrary (*aparita*) indication contains (implied) ridicule, as in

'Much obliged; what can be said of it ?

Your Worship has long manifested your good nature!"<sup>26</sup>.

and so on; and the ridiculousness is because of the illogicality of those views. As thus: although all the categories without distinction are to be known by awareness of existence, to adopt connection of existence only with the three, substance, etc., and not with the triad, universal, etc., (48) is a great open robbery. For consider the verbal meaning of the word 'existence'. That of which we say 'it is', is existent, and the status (*bhāva*) of the existent is existence; that oneness is the own form of entities; and that is by you also stated with regard to all the categories, without distinction. What is this 'half-old lady' business<sup>27</sup>, that only in regard to the triad, substance, etc., there is application of existence, and not in regard to the other three?

If it is said that 'By reason of the non-existence of the presentation of coniform recurrence<sup>28</sup> there is no application of existence to the triad, universal, etc.' - Not so; because in regard to these also a presentation of recurrence cannot be ruled out. In regard to the universals, earthness, cowness, potness, etc. - an uniform presentation, 'universal', 'universal' is experienced, in regard to differences also, because of their plurality, 'this difference also', 'this difference also' - and in regard to inherence by reason of the distinction of such and such determinants according to the above stated argument.

If it is said that 'It is because of (false) attribution of existence due to its similarity to the having an own form, that in regard to universals, etc., also we have the recurrence of 'existent, existent"', then this becomes an illusory presentation. Or if it is said that 'The recurrence of one (*eka*) notion in regard to things of separate own-nature is in fact illusory (*mithyā*); in the case of substance, etc., also let the recurrence of the presentation be due to false attribution of existence' If that is said, Not so; because, when the primary (sense) is non-existent, superimposition of it is impossible; the presentation of recurrence is primary in the case of

<sup>25</sup> From Hemacandra's *Anekārtha samgraha* (Collection of words with more than one meaning), II, 475 (M. L.).

<sup>26</sup> An ironical verse. M. L.

<sup>27</sup> A well-known maxim regarding capricious distinctions - see Col. Jacob's *A Handful of Popular Maxims*, I, pp. 7-8.

<sup>28</sup> The non application of 'existence' to Universals, Particularities and Inherence (by reason of lack of subsequence) is partly discussed under *Ā-sūtra*, I, n. 10sq.

substance, etc., but in the case of the universal, etc., it is metonymous' No!, because the opposite also is a plausible supposition.

It is said, 'In the case of universal, etc., because of the possibility of a veto the recurrent presentation is not primary; but in the case of substance, etc., because of absence thereof (i. e. of the veto), it is primary', what is this vetoing circumstance? If it is said, 'The vetoing circumstances are, in the case of the universal if there also existence is admitted, *regressus ad infinitum*<sup>20</sup>; in the case of the differences, again, if there is an universal, defeasance of their own nature; in the case of inherence, if existence is (there) also posited, the lack of another connection for the purpose of its occurrence', - No! If on the supposition of 'existence' in the universal there is *regressus ad infinitum*, (49) then why not the same with substance, etc., since they also exist (*vidyamānāḥ*) even prior to the existence (*sattā*) of their own-form? And in the case of differences, on the other hand, there is not, upon admission of 'existence', defeasance of their form (character), because it is rather an accentuation of their own-form, since a difference without an universal is not apprehended. In the case of inherence also, upon admission of an existence of its own nature, defined as inherence now, a connection consisting of not being everywhere actually agrees, since otherwise there is the consequence of non-existence of a form of its own. Thus in them also, as there is no veto, the connection with 'existence' is actually, as in regard to substance, the primary one; so that the supposition of 'existence' only in substance, quality and action is purposeless.

Furthermore, as to the primary connection with 'existence'<sup>21</sup>), adopted (pocketed) by those disputants in regard to the triad, substance, etc., that also would dissolve upon examination, as thus: If 'existence' is absolutely distinct (*vilakṣaṇa*) from substance, etc., then substance, etc., would be of non-existent form. If it is said that 'Because of the junction (*yoga*) of 'existence' there is in them existent-ness (*sattva*)', how is there even upon junction with 'existence' existent-ness of non-existents? To existents, on the other hand, the junction with 'existence' is fruitless. If it is said that 'Positive existents (*bhāva*) have in fact the existent-ness of their own form'<sup>22</sup>) what avails the *Sikhaṇḍin*<sup>23</sup>) of a 'connection with existence'? If it is said that 'Before junction with existence a positive existent is neither existent, nor non-existent, but through junction with 'existence' it is existent', that is mere words, because an extra mode, distinct (*vilakṣaṇa*) from existent and non-existent, is impossible. Therefore this statement of theirs that 'even of existents there would be existence only in some case', how can it not meet with derision in a learned company?

Also, if cognition be approved as unequivocally separate from the self<sup>24</sup>), then for the self there would not be thereby (i. e. by cognition) an outthrust of the object at all, just as Mantra has not by the cognition of Caitra. (50) If it is said that 'In whatever self there is cognition inherent by the inherence-connection<sup>25</sup>), there it creates a manifestation of a positive thing (*bhāva*)', - No! because of the everywhere undifferentiated occurrence of inherence, by reason of its unity, eternality and comprehensiveness, also because of the comprehensiveness of the selves<sup>26</sup>) in which the inherence is, it follows that through the cognition of one of them all of

<sup>20</sup>) If Substanteness is real in its occurrences, this must be due to a substanteness-ness in it and no on, - the τὸν δὲ ὄντων; of Plato.

<sup>21</sup>) See *V.-sūtra*, I, ii, 7 ff., where, however, there is no mention of *upacāra*, 'metonymy'.

<sup>22</sup>) Because the 'own-form' is not merely 'existence', but a definite something.

<sup>23</sup>) A woman transformed into the man S. in order to fill the part of slayer of the mighty hero--commander Bhīṣma (*Mahā-Bhārata*, *Udyogaparva*, cLxxvi, etc.); similarly cited in Jayanāṭh's *Nyāya-mañjarī* (ed. p. 68).

<sup>24</sup>) See note 21

<sup>25</sup>) The cognition is in soul A, and so its object is presented to soul A.

<sup>26</sup>) Each soul being infinite and omnipresent.

them have awareness (*avasthā*) of the object. And, as in a pot the colours, etc., are inherent by the inherence-connection, and upon their destruction there is destruction also of their support, the pot, similarly cognition also is inherent in the self; and that (cognition) is momentary<sup>37</sup>; hence upon its destruction the self's destruction results; so its non-eternality is the result.

Or else let there be connection of cognition and self by inherence; but that same inherence, whereby it is connected with them? If it is said 'by another inherence', *regressus ad infinitum*. If it is said, 'of itself simply', why is it not so as regards cognition and the self? Or, if it is said that 'Just as a lamp, through that being its own-nature, illuminates itself and others, so the own-nature of inherence is such that it conjoins itself, and also cognition and self', why have not cognition and self also a suchwise own-naturedness that simply of themselves the two are connected? Furthermore, the example of the lamp also does not fit in with Your Worship's alternative; for a lamp, to begin with, is a substance, and illumination is an attribute of it, and by you an absolute separation of attribute and bearer of attributes is approved; so how has a lamp the own nature (*ātma-katā*) of illumination? And in the absence thereof the talk of its having the own-nature of illuminating itself and others is simply baseless.

And, if, even with absolute separation of the illumination from the lamp, the lamp's illuminating itself and others is agreed to, then that applies also to the pot, etc.; because there is no difference in the separateness. Moreover, those two own-natures of combining self and other, would they be different from inherence, or not different? If different, then how can there be the connection 'that has these two own natures', since, from fear of *regressus ad infinitum*, another inherence as a bond of the connection is not accepted? But, if not different, then we have inherence merely, and not those two, because, like its own-nature, they are not separate from it. Furthermore, if it is said, 'As the thought (*mati*), "in these inherence-bearers there is inherence" is justified (51) even without (another) inherence, so is also the presentation "in this self is cognition", even without that (*i.e.* inherence)', - we say: then what fault is there?

Then, if it is said 'The self is an agent, cognition an instrument<sup>38</sup>'; difference of agent and instrument is patent, like that of carpenter and axe; so how can there be non-distinction of cognition and self? Not so! Because of dissimilarity of example. For an axe is an external instrument, and cognition internal; so how can there be similarity of the two? Nor is such a twofoldness of instruments unestablished. As the *Lākṣaṇikas*<sup>39</sup> say,

"Instrument is to be understood, by the wise, as twofold, external and internal;

As 'he mows with a sickle, he goes to Meru by thought'"<sup>40</sup>

For, if some internal instrument, unequivocally distinct (from the self), is shown, then there might be similarity between the example and the thing exemplified; but there is no such. Nor can every attribute found in external instruments be associated with an internal one, otherwise also in 'Devadatta sees with lamp for eye' there would be unequivocal difference of Devadatta from his eye, as from the lamp, and, that being so, there would be contradiction of world wide presentation.

<sup>37</sup> As are all the special qualities of the soul: see note VIII 22.

<sup>38</sup> In the *U. sūtra* the conception of cognition as an instrument is not apparent; but in the *Prāśastapāda* *Adva* (p. 44, trans. p. 152) this is said of the sense-organs and the mind-organ (*manas*), and the axe also is mentioned.

<sup>39</sup> Apparently only 'external', i.e. distinct group being intended. The doctrine of the two kinds of *Paras* (instrument) is ascribed in the *Nyāya-kāṇva* to the Sāṃkhya.

<sup>40</sup> Source of quotation untraced.



Also, the example of the axe and the carpenter lacks the Major Term. As thus: This carpenter, when not developed in the development of taking the axe, - 'I will fashion this log with this axe' - i. e. not having taken it, does not fashion (it); but when so developed by taking it does. And in this development the axe too is employed in the fashioning of that log, and the person also; and so, because of being effective of one result so defined, non-distinction of the axe and the carpenter is justified; how then is it said that there is only distinction of the two? Similarly the self also, - having the development of taking the cognition 'By this cognition I will know the desired object', takes the cognition and ascertains the object. (52) And therefore there is non-distinction of the two, cognition and self, through being effective of a single result defined as being conscious. Non-distinction of agent and instrument being thus established, is the effect, defined as consciousness, to be described as resident in the self, or rather in the object? If in the self, what we desire is established. If in the object, how does experience by the self present itself? But, if from the presence of consciousness residing in the object there is experience by the self, then why is there not also experience by some other person? Because there is no difference in their distinction (from it).

But, if it is said 'On the alternative of the non-distinction of cognition and self, how is there the status (*bhāva*) of agent and instrument?' - Surely, just as in 'the serpent coils himself by himself'<sup>41</sup> there is with non-distinction the status of agent and instrument, so here also. Or, if it is said that 'Here the relation (*bhāva*) of agent and instrument is imagined', - how is there imagination since in the state of coiling we see production of a result, defined as a stopping of movement, different from its previous state? For it is not possible even by a hundred imaginations to say 'a stone pillar coils itself by itself'. Therefore even with non distinction a relation of agent and instrument is established. Moreover, let us reflect upon the appropriate meaning of the word 'intelligence': the status of an intelligent being (*cetana*) is 'intelligence' (*caitanya*); and by you also the self is proclaimed intelligent<sup>42</sup>, of that the status, the own-form, is 'intelligence'. And what is a thing's own-form, that should not be separate therefrom; as from a tree the own-form of tree.

Or, if it is said, 'The self is intelligent; but that is in consequence of inherence-connection with intelligence, not of itself, because the presentation is so', - that is illogical. For, if the presentation is made into a proof, then unobjectionably the self is established as simply consisting of attention (*upayoga*)<sup>43</sup>. For we never have the presentation 'I of myself unintelligent, am through junction with intelligence intelligent', or 'In me who am unintelligent there is inherence of intelligence'; for in 'I am a knower', the presentation is by way of collocation. (53) If it is said that 'In case of difference (also) there is presentation in that way', - No! Because in no way is presentation of collocation seen in the absence of identity. But presentations such as 'the man is a stick', etc., where there is a difference, are seen (to occur) through metonymy, but not as real; and the source of this metonymy is the man's non-distinction from the qualities, stiffness, etc., which are in the stick, since metonymy touches on the primary sense. And so in regard to the self the presentation 'I am a knower' conveys in a certain way the self's being intelligence, because without that the presentation 'I am a knower' is not justified; as in the case of a pot, etc. For a pot, etc., which is not in itself intelligence, has not the presentation 'I am a knower'. If it is said that 'it is because of the

<sup>41</sup> Cf. the *akṣi-kundala-nyāya* in Got. Jacob's *A Handful of Popular Maxims*, I, p. 11. In the text M. L.'s edition omits the following words, 'there is . . . instrument'.

<sup>42</sup> This is not apparent in the P.-sūtra, unless it is to be seen in the comm. on VIII 1 1, where the Sāṃkhya *cit* is considered, but it is manifest in the *Pratītyasūtra bhāṣya*, *trava*, p. 152-4.

<sup>43</sup> On this, according to the Jains, fundamental faculty of soul see the Introduction (p. xxiii) to Professor Faddegon's translation of the *Pravacana-sāra* of Kunda-kupḍa, and *Sammattī-tarka*, pp. 552-8.

absence of the junction with intelligent-ness (*caitanya*) that it (i. e. the pot) has not that presentation'. - No! Because that even an unintelligent thing, through union with intelligent-ness, can believe (*pralipati*) 'I am intelligent' has just been rejected; thus the being non-intelligent, when established, does away with outlining of objects by the self, if unthinking (*jada*). And one who approves of that (i. e. outlining, etc.), must accept its having intelligent-ness for own-form.

"Surely, because of the presentation 'I am possessed of cognition' there is distinction of self and cognition, because otherwise from the presentation 'I am possessed of wealth' also a non-distinction of wealth and wealths would follow". That is wrong. For, on your view, the self does not have the presentation 'I am possessed of cognition', because its nature is unequivocally non-thinking, like a pot. But do not infer that 'the self might be altogether unthinking, and yet have the presentation 'I am possessed of cognition', as there is no contradiction' since that cannot possibly arise so. For the presentation 'I am possessed of cognition' never arises in regard to the quality called cognition if unapprehended, and in regard to self as bearer of the quality because of contradiction to your own view: for it is stated that 'without apprehension of the quality there is no awareness of the thing qualified'<sup>44</sup>).

If it is said, 'It does arise in regard to the two when apprehended'<sup>45</sup>), whence is the apprehension of them? Not, to begin with, from (the cognition) itself (*svataḥ*), because self-consciousness (*sva samvedanā*) is not admitted<sup>46</sup>). In regard to the self-known self, and in regard to the cognition, that apprehension is logically from itself: not otherwise, as in the case of a different series (*santāna*).<sup>47</sup> And, if from another (cognition), that other cognition also, as a thing qualified, cannot be apprehended without apprehension of the quality, cognition-ness (*ghanatva*), (54). For, if after apprehension of pot-ness apprehension of the pot is to be realized by apprehension thereof from another cognition, there is *regressus ad infinitum*, and how do we have the proposed presentation? Therefore, the self's being of a non-intelligent form does not fit, and as that does not fit, 'intelligentness dependent on conditions and other than the self' is mere words.

Further, as to the inference stated<sup>48</sup> to prove that *Mokṣa* is not composed of consciousness and bliss, 'because of (these) being a series'<sup>49</sup>), in regard to that we say, 'Surely, is this 'being a series' something independent, or merely origination of objects in succession, or origination in succession on one single basis? Of these the first alternative has exceptions, because things which arise in succession, like pots, cloths, mats, etc., even if they are serial, are not absolutely annihilated<sup>50</sup>; but, if the second alternative, then, since 'such a seriality'<sup>51</sup> is lacking in lamp-light', we have, in example wanting the Middle Term<sup>52</sup>). And the Middle Term has deviation<sup>53</sup>), because of the colour of atoms due to heat, etc., because despite the existence (*sambhāva*) therein of such a seriality (i. e. a series on the same basis) there is no absolute annihilation. Moreover, there may be both seriality, and also no absolute annihilation, because there is no *neti* proof to the contrary; and so this (Middle Term) is 'equivocal'

<sup>44</sup> Quoted in *Nāgamaśāstra*, pp. 84, 554, etc.

<sup>45</sup> So, the self and cognition.

<sup>46</sup> So, by the *Sāṃkhya* as a factor in all cognition. On this much discussed topic see *infra*, p. 73 sq.

<sup>47</sup> The word *santāna* is here used in the Buddhist sense, which substitutes for a permanent Ego a series of thoughts. The meaning here is 'some other person'.

<sup>48</sup> See p. 43.

<sup>49</sup> And therefore having no end.

<sup>50</sup> See p. 43.

<sup>51</sup> A series which comes to a real end.

<sup>52</sup> See 'coming to an end'. The lamp-light was instance on p. 43.

<sup>53</sup> A *quibbling* of a Middle Term is its occurrence in instances lacking the Major (*Vyāpaka-sūtra*, I, ii, 4-5).

(dubious) also, because absent from a doubtful contrary instance. Moreover, it is also 'repugnant'<sup>64</sup>, because for the followers of the Quodammodo-doctrine there is nowhere absolute annihilation, since it is only as permanent through having the form of substance that existents are associated with origination and destruction. Consequently from the inference in question the conclusion in the form of annihilation of the qualities of awareness, etc., is not established.

Nor from Scripture such as "For not, surely, of one with a body", etc.<sup>65</sup>, because that is laid down with reference to successively linked mundane likings and dislikings, generated by the maturation of good and bad destiny. And in the state of *Mokṣa* there is only perfect liking, unequivocal and absolute, caused by the decline of all destiny; how is that precluded? (55) And of the Scripture the sense is as follows: - 'To one with a body, the self, which is in one or other position of the four states, there is not the destruction (*apahati*), the non-existence, of things liked and disliked, namely pleasure and pain, which are mutually linked together. For certainly pleasure and pain must be therein; and their close mutual relation is inferred from the making a (verbal) compound<sup>66</sup>. 'One without a body', one with self released; because of the word *vā* (surely) having the meaning of *eva* ('only'), 'only one without a body', 'dwelling'<sup>67</sup>, occupying a sphere of realisation: 'liked and disliked', mutually linked pleasure and pain, do not touch.

Here the gist is this: As, of course, in the worldly (*samsārin*) self there would be pleasure and pain mutually linked, not so in the liberated self; but only absolute (pure) (*kevala*) pleasure, simply from the non-existence of the body, which is the root of pain. But pleasure, as the own-nature of the self, abides; for the abiding of one's own own-form is *Mokṣa*. And it is for this reason that 'without a body' is stated. And the meaning of this Scripture should only so be substantiated (*samarthanīya*); since concurring in this (same) sense (*artha*) we find also a *Smṛti*-text:

"Where there is absolute pleasure, apprehended by awareness, beyond the senses.

That one should know as *Mokṣa*, hard to be obtained by those of unperfected (*akṛta*) selves"<sup>68</sup>.

Nor is this word 'pleasure' applied simply to absence of pain; because there is nothing to veto the primary pleasure being what is spoken of, and because in such statements as 'This person, freed from disease, is become happy', etc., it would follow that the use of the word 'pleased' (*sukhīna*) would be tautological; since simply by saying 'freed from disease' the mere absence of pain is given.

Nor is the *Mokṣa* set forth by Your Worship approved as acceptable to men, for whoever would endeavour to render himself, like a stone, bereft of all consciousness of pleasure? (56) For that has the form of consciousness of pain, since in the absence of one of the two, pleasure or pain, the other is inevitable. This is why in the *Śruti* we have ridicule of you

"Better it were to desire the state of a jackal in the lovely Vṛndavana;

Not the Vaiśeṣika *Mokṣa* does Gautama wish to go to"<sup>69</sup>.

But as superior to Heaven, with its conditional, terminable, limited flow of bliss, and as with bliss the contrary of that, and with cognition unfading, the wise tell of *Mokṣa*. But, if the

<sup>64</sup>: See note VI 2, and A-*sūtra*, I. ii 6.

<sup>65</sup>: Quoted *supra*, p. 43.

<sup>66</sup>: In the Sanskrit passage 'things liked and disliked' is one compound word.

<sup>67</sup>: The author understood *nāva santam* in the text as *va vasantam*, 'or dwelling'.

<sup>68</sup>: Quoted also in Hhāsarvajña's *Yoga-sāra* (ed. A. P. Nandy, p. 21). The first line is also seen in *Bhagavad-gītā*, V. 20 (Dhṛva).

<sup>69</sup>: Cited in Haribhadra's *Yoga-bindu*, x. 128, as uttered by Gīlāva to his pupil Gautama.

self should in that state be unthinking, not different from a stone, then enough of release (*apavarga*); rather let us have mundane life, where at any rate some pleasure is experienced, though at intervals and rendered turbid by pain, – just think! Is experience of a little pleasure worth while, or simply annihilation of all pleasure?

Or, 'There is in such a *Mokṣa* superior gain for people capable of taking a right view; for they distinguish thus: In mundane existence, first of all, pleasure untouched by pain is not possible; but pain is certainly to be avoided, and discriminatory avoidance of those two, as of poison and honey placed in a single vessel, is hardly possible; for this reason both of them are abandoned; and therefore *Mokṣa* is more blessed than mundane existence, seeing that pain at any rate would not there be: better abandon such a measure of occasional pleasure, and not support its so great load of pain.'

Here this is the truth: Seeing that mundane pleasure has actually the form of pain, like swallowing a jagged scimitar with its edge smeared with honey, it is reasonable for those who seek *Mokṣa* to desire to abandon it; but only if desiring to get an absolute kind of happiness. For even here (in this world) pleasure springing from cessation of objects (*viśaya-nivṛtti*) is actually guaranteed by experience (57); and, if that is not pre-eminent (*viśiṣṭa*) in *Mokṣa*, then *Mokṣa* turns out to be actually of the form of pain, – that is the meaning. As for the poison and honey, mixed in one, which are abandoned, they also (are abandoned) simply through a desire to obtain distinct pleasure. Moreover, just as by living beings in the mundane state pleasure is desired, and pain undesired, so for the state of *Mokṣa* cessation of pain is desired, but cessation of pleasure is really undesired. So, if there should be *Mokṣa* according to your view, then discerning persons would not take steps towards it; but this is done. Hence it is proved that *Mokṣa* is by own nature consciousness of pleasure, because the action (*praytti*) of the discerning is not otherwise accountable.

Or, 'If *Mokṣa* should have the sole nature of consciousness of pleasure, then, proceeding (*pravartamāna*) through passion for it, the *Mokṣa*-seeker would never get *Mokṣa*. For to the impassioned there is no *Mokṣa*, passion being essentially bondage'. Not so! Only passion for mundane pleasure is essentially bondage, because cause of action (*praytti*) in regard to objects, etc., but passion for the happiness of *Mokṣa*, because cause of cessation (*nivṛtti*) of that, is not essentially bondage; and in one who has mounted to the highest peak, it ceases even in the form of mere aspiration. For it is stated:

"For *Mokṣa* and for life (*bhava*) altogether the best of Muns is without aspiration"<sup>60</sup>.

Otherwise, on your alternative also, with acceptance of a *Mokṣa* consisting of cessation of pain, what is to prevent a turbidity through infection (anxiety) in regard to pain? Thus it is established that *Mokṣa* consists in consciousness of supreme pleasure through extinction of all *karma*, and is not in the form of annihilation of the special qualities, awareness, etc.

Moreover, (i) Ascetic<sup>61</sup>: Do not distort your mind by thinking that annihilation of these some way or other is approved by us also. For as follows. By the word 'awareness' cognition is stated, and that is fivefold according to the distinction of the five, thought (*mati*) cognition, scriptural, cognition of distant things, state-cognition, perfect cognition<sup>62</sup>. And of these the first tetrad of cognitions (58), because they belong to extinction and alleviation (of *karma*), disappear at the very moment of the manifestation of perfect cognition; because of the Scripture: "When the two knowledge is ended"<sup>63</sup>. But perfect (cognition), which covers all

<sup>60</sup>: The verse, quoted also in *Saṃmatī-turka*, p. 163, is not otherwise traced.

<sup>61</sup>: Ascetic. According to Guṇaratna's Guṇa, on Haribhadra's *Śaṅḍarāsa-samuccaya* (Dhruva, p. 117) the Nāyāyikas and carkeṣṭakas were both devotees of Śiva and were known as 'ascetics' (*tapasvin*).

<sup>62</sup>: On these Jain terms see *Outline of Jainism*, pp. 59–60, 109–10.

<sup>63</sup>: *Abhyasaṅga*, I. 539 (M. L.). The *śādhmatā*, 'Viro', is defined in *Thaṇḍaga-sūtra*, 209 a.

substances and states, being, through extinctness (*kṣāyikātvena*) of *karma*, of spotless form, in fact, in the state of *Mokṣa*, pleasure relating to objects is not there, because of absence of its cause, the emotional *karma*<sup>64</sup>; but the pleasure which is unsurpassable, imperishable, independent, and without end, that verily there is: while of pain, because rooted in demerit, there is annihilation through annihilation of the latter.

'Surely, likewise, since pleasure also is rooted in merit, and merit is annihilated, that also is inappropriate; for the Scripture states: "*Mokṣa* is the extinction of good and evil"<sup>65</sup>'. - Not so! Since only pleasure relating to objects is rooted in merit, let there be annihilation of that, but not also annihilation of pleasure which is irrespective. Desire and aversion, again, are divisions of delusion, and, that being radically crushed, are non-existent. And effort, which relates to the operating of actions (*kriyā-ryāpāra-gocara*) is simply not there (in *Mokṣa*), because all objects are accomplished (*kṛta-kṛtyatvāt*). But effort there is, brought about by the extinction of impediments to vigour, like getting a gift, etc.<sup>66</sup>; yet it is not applied to anything, because all objects are accomplished. But of merit and demerit, which are only synonyms of good and evil, there is annihilation; because in the absence thereof (annihilation) *Mokṣa* also is illogical. Impression (*samskāra*)<sup>67</sup> is simply a kind of mental (*mati*) cognition, and of that there is non-existence, because it has disappeared immediately after the extinction of delusion. Accordingly the saying that '*Mokṣa* would not be composed of consciousness and bliss' is void of logic. This is the meaning of the verse

<sup>64</sup>) On *vedanīya karma* see *Outline of Jainism*, Index.

<sup>65</sup>) *Mokṣa* is defined in *V.-sūtra*, V. n. 18.

<sup>66</sup>) M. L. points out that in Jainism 'getting' is strictly limited (*Tattvārthasamgrahasūtra*).

<sup>67</sup>) 'Latent mental habit' (*Pravacana-sāra*, trans. Faddeson, I 58 and 86; 'engram', due to past experience. The term, familiar in all Indian philosophies, especially as accounting for memory, is by the *Vaiśeṣika* (*V.-sūtra* I. i 47-18) brought into the discussion of motion.

## IX. THE VAIŚEṢIKA VIEWS ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE ĀTMAN

Now those disputants, denying the self's having the size of the body, although self-revealed by consciousness, (59) with their vision lost (destroyed) through contact with the knives of such bad Śāstras, suppose its omnipresence<sup>1</sup>; therefore he says in criticism of that -

**IX. Only where a thing has its qualities observed, there is it;**  
**like a jar etc., this is incontestable:**  
**nevertheless, a reality of the self outside the body**  
**propound those maimed by mistruth doctrines.**

**Only where**, in whatever place, **a thing**, any object, **its qualities observed**: 'observed', experienced by the proof of perception, etc., 'qualities', attributes, what has that, is so. **It**, the object; **there only**, only in the place meant. The supplying of the verb's 'accountable' is obvious. Inasmuch as the previous 'only', which means limitation, is construed here also, 'there only', not elsewhere, is to exclude connection with something else. This same sense he confirms by an example, **like a jar, etc.,** like a pot. As the *is-ness* (actuality) of a jar is presented only in the place where its qualities, colour, etc., are observed, and not elsewhere, similarly also the self's qualities, intelligence, etc., are observed only in the body, not outside, therefore it (the self) has only the size of that same. Although the qualities, odour, etc., of flowers, etc., are observed also in places other than where they (the flowers, etc.) are, nevertheless this makes no exception; because the atoms of odour, etc., are their (the qualities') basis, and these, having the power of moving, by an (involuntary or voluntary) motion of falling or manipulating, can be supposed to reach as far as the place of the nose, etc., which apprehend them. This is why he says, **this is incontestable**, this is incontestable, with nothing to veto it 'because of the rule that<sup>2</sup> In an observed fact there is no incongruity'.

Nor should it be said that 'Surely the qualities of *mantras*, etc., even in different places, namely those of attracting and extorting, (60) are observed even from a distance of a hundred leagues, etc.; so that there is a vetoing circumstance'. Say not so! For that is not, of course, a quality of the *mantras*, etc., but of the divinities presiding over them; and to their going to the place of the thing to be attracted or extorted, so why on earth this objection? Never do qualities occur beyond the possessor of the qualities.

Next the second half is expounded. **Nevertheless**, though this truth stands fast without contention, **those maimed by mistruth** (*a-tatva*) **doctrines**; since, as in 'misconduct' (*anācāra*) the negative has the sense of contempt, 'sham-truth doctrines', that is, by describing semblances of truths, worked out by certain persons having in their opinion the semblance of authorities, 'manned', deluded; **outside the body**, even in places separate from the body, **a reality of the self** (*ātma tatva*), self-form (*ātma-rūpa*), **propound**, work out in the form of a *śāstra*. This is the verbal meaning.

<sup>1</sup> On limited 'size' (*parimāṇa*) of the soul see *Sammata-tarka*, pp. 123-6.

<sup>2</sup> Source untraced, quoted in *Sammata-tarka*, p. 75.

But the sense-meaning is this: The self is not omnipresent<sup>2</sup>); because its qualities are not observed everywhere. Of whatever the qualities are not observed everywhere, that is not omnipresent, - like a pot; and so in this case; therefore it is so; to the contrary, ether, etc. Nor is this Middle Term unestablished; because in places separate from the body its (the self's) qualities, awareness, etc., are not by the disputant, or by his opponents, admitted. And to this effect Bhaṭṭa Śrīdhara<sup>3</sup>): "Despite the omnipresence of the self, the being a cognizer is in the space of the body, and not elsewhere; since the body is the field of enjoyment, because of its purposelessness otherwise".

Or, "A self has a special quality, destiny<sup>4</sup>); and that is to all things (that originate, a cause (*niṣṭhā*), and all-embracing. How otherwise are by it produced<sup>5</sup>) even in other continents, etc., things, gold, jewels, sandal, women, etc., to be enjoyed by a person who is in a definite place? And a quality does not occur away from the possessor of the quality; (61) hence it is inferred that the self is omnipresent". - Not so! Because there is no proof establishing the omnipresence of destiny. If it is said, 'There is a proof, namely the upward flaming of fire, and the sideways movement of wind, caused by destiny'. Not, because that is effected simply through the own-nature of those two, like the potency of burning in fire. And, if that also is caused by destiny, then in the string-dangling of the manifoldness of the Triple Universe let that alone be the string-puller (*sūtradhārayatām*), why suppose a God? So this Middle Term<sup>6</sup>) is not unestablished, nor is it 'equivocal'; since between Major and Middle Term comprehension is apprehended, there is no divergence (exception). Nor is it 'repugnant'; because it is absolutely alien to contrary instances<sup>7</sup>). And the qualities of the self, awareness, etc., are observed in the body only; hence the possessor of the qualities must be there only, thus is the self established as having the size of the body.

And another thing: You agree to a plurality of selves; because of the text, "There are different selves, because of their situations"<sup>8</sup>); and they are pervasive. Therefore, if, like the light spheres of lamps, they interpenetrate, the good and bad actions also belonging to them (the souls) would be intermixed. And so through the good action of one another would be happy, and through the bad action of a second another unhappy; and so the result would be unsystematic. And another thing: Even a single self would through the maturation of his own accumulated good action be happy, and through connection with the maturation of the bad actions acquired by another would be unhappy; and so a simultaneous consciousness of pleasure and pain would follow. Or, if there is enjoyment of good and evil only when resident in a field of enjoyment occupied by oneself, then how does the destiny, though acquired by the self, go outside the field of enjoyment and bring about the upward flaming of fire, etc.?, this requires consideration.

And, if the selves are omnipresent, it follows that each of them is agent of creation; because, as they are omnipresent, their penetration within God is to be conceived as possible; or, if God penetrates within them, he also is consequently not a creator; for it is not reasonable, when there is a mutual combination (62) of milk and water, to say that the action of drinking one of them does not apply to the other. Moreover, if the self is omnipresent, there is the

<sup>2</sup>) Acc. to the *V.-sūtra*, VII. 1. 22, and the commentaries the selves are each all-pervading (*sarvagata, vibhu*).

<sup>3</sup>) In his *Nyāya-kandallī*, see translation by Gaṅgānāth Jhā, *Pratīti-pada-bhāṣya*, p. 140.

<sup>4</sup>) An effect of past lives. *Adṛṣṭa* is in the *Nyāya-kandallī*, trans. pp. 195-7, brought into the present discussion. - "To all things that originate": See for fulfilment of the soul's 'destiny' see note VI, 18.

<sup>5</sup>) Instances of non-presence of the self.

<sup>6</sup>) The fact that the qualities of the self are evidenced only within the limits of the body.

<sup>7</sup>) *atyantaṁ vipakṣa vyāvṛttau*

<sup>8</sup>) *V.-sūtra*, III. n. 20, slightly shortened.

consequence of simultaneous experience of developments as man, inhabitant of hell, etc. If it is said that 'Because of the acceptance of fields of enjoyment there is not this fault', - Would he (the self) occupy his field of enjoyment with his whole self, or with one part of it? If with his whole self, this is admission of our view; if with one part of it, it follows that it would have parts; and there would be no enjoyment by him as a whole.

Or, 'If the self is without pervasiveness, then, since there cannot be simultaneous conjunction with atoms which are in other regions of space<sup>10</sup>), there can be no initial action (*ādya-karma*)<sup>11</sup>); and in its absence there is no terminal conjunction, no body thereby created, and no connection of him therewith - the liberation of all would at all times be established without any device'. - Not so! Because there is no rule to the effect that 'what is conjoined with anything, that only comes to it'; because to a magnet attraction of iron, even if not conjoined with it, is observed. Or, if it is said, 'If there is attraction on the part of what is not even conjoined, it follows that (any) atoms which are in the interior of the Triple Universe with one accord approach for the constitution of its (the self's) body, and I do not know of what size that body should be'. - If even of that which is in conjunction there is attraction, how would that same fault not be? Because through the pervasiveness of the self all atoms are in conjunction with it. Or, if by virtue of destiny, despite the non-difference in being so (conjoined), only definite atoms, suitable for the creation of the body in question, approach him, that is the same elsewhere also<sup>12</sup>).

'Or let there be somehow or other origination of a body; all the same, the self in entering, part by part, a body with parts, would be possessed of parts; and consequently it would be, like cloth, etc., a product; and, if a product, it would be constituted by causes (sc. materials) heterogeneous or homogeneous. Not, to begin with, by heterogeneous ones, since those would be not constitutive, for threads do not constitute a pot. Nor by homogeneous ones, for only in consequence (63) of connection with selfhood is there homogeneity of those causes, because the atoms of earth, etc., are heterogeneous; and as a result the self would be constituted by selves; and that is illogical, because of the impossibility of a plurality of selves being constitutive of a self in a single body. And, if it were possible, there is no accounting for their being complementary to each other (*pratisandhāna*), for what has been seen by one should not be supplemented (*pratisandhātum*) by another; because that carries us too far. And, if it were constituted of them, then, as in the case of the pot, there would be, through separation due to action of the parts, destruction of conjunction<sup>13</sup>, and so destruction (of the self). Therefore only a pervasive self is logical, because, if it has the size of the body, the stated fault exists'. No! Because the consisting of parts and the being a product are in a way admitted of the self. And of these the possession of parts, to begin with, is from its consisting of countless space atoms (*pradeśa*). And so say the two authors of the *Dravyasāṅkṣa*<sup>14</sup>): 'Either, even, has parts (*sadeśa*)<sup>15</sup>), because it must be simultaneously connected with all finites'. Or, even if, in the *Scent elephant*, etc.<sup>16</sup>), there is a distinction between part and space-atom nevertheless we should not think here of looking too closely; because with regard to

<sup>10</sup> The argument is used in commentaries on *V-sūtra*, VII : 2.

<sup>11</sup> A reference to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine (see Vasvanātha's *Abhāṣapariśeḍha*: that action starts from 'prior conjunction' and results in 'posterior conjunction'.

<sup>12</sup> Perhaps because he is everywhere.

<sup>13</sup> This is, in Vaiśeṣika doctrine, the first effect of Action.

<sup>14</sup> A Jain work on logic, by Hāmaṇdra and Guṇacandra, both probably pupils of Hemacandra: see *Jaina Granthakāśa* (Bombay 1908), p. 7.

<sup>15</sup> On these 'space points' see *Outlines of Jainism* (Index).

<sup>16</sup> Title of a commentary on Mahāvīra's *Latthodhādāhigoma-sūtra* (M. I., cf. *Jaina Granthakāśa*, p. 88, and *infra*, p. 159).



space-atoms (also) the term 'parts' is used, but as to being a product we shall (now) speak.

If it is said, 'Surely, if the selves are products, like pot, etc., there is the consequence of their being constituted of previously actual homogeneous (congeneric) parts, for parts constitute the thing with parts, just as threads a cloth'. This should not be said. Even in products such as pots, etc., we do not see a being constituted by conjunction of previously actual congeneric potsherds; since what is presented is its origination, in the first instance, in the form of something with a broad bottom and belly, from a lump of clay invested with the operation (*vyāpāra*) of the potter, etc. For being a product is the development of a later aspect in a substance with abandonment of a former aspect, and that (64) is actually experienced internally as well as externally, and in that way the self also may be a product. Nor from the observation, in regard to a cloth that it is a product preceded by conjunction of its parts is the so being (*tathābhāva*) everywhere logical, for it would follow from the observation of an iron mark on wood that it should be just so (*tathā bhāva*) with adamant, the vetting by proof is in both cases alike. Nor, even if productness, with the stated definition, is admitted, is there, from the consequent non-eternality of the self, the consequence of default of recollection (*pratisandhāna*); because, even if there is in some way non-eternality, this is accountable. For recollecting is in the form 'whom I saw, him I remember', etc. and how, in case of unequivocal eternality, is that accountable? Because of difference of state, for the state of experience is one, and the state of recollection is another; and, when there is difference of state, from the difference also of what is in the state, the singleness of form is impaired. Non-eternality in some way, which logically presents itself, what is to bar?

If it is said, 'Well then, if the self is of the size of the body, then, because of the consequence of finitude, it could not penetrate the body because of the contradiction in penetration of a finite by a finite; so it results (*prāptoty*) that the whole body is without a self (*nirātmanā*)'. What is this finitude, forsooth? Is it having the size of a non-omnipresent substance, or is it having colour, etc.? Of these the first alternative is not an objection, because a matter of consent. The second, however, is illogical, because there is no comprehension (*vyāpti*)<sup>17</sup>. For there is no inseparability such that 'what is not omnipresent is by rule (*nyamena*) possessed of colour, etc.' because in regard to the intellect (*manas*)<sup>18</sup>, though not omnipresent, that is, in your opinion, not the case. Since it is stated that ether, time, direction and self<sup>19</sup>, have omnipresence, supreme magnitude, and collocality with all things which have conjunction, intellect, as being differently qualified, is denied omnipresence. Hence it is not unaccountable that the self should penetrate the body, so that that should be without a self, since finitude, defined as non-omnipresent-substance size, is no obstacle to its penetrating, like intellect (*manas*). Water, etc., though possessed of finitude defined as having colour, etc., are not forbidden to penetrate into sand, etc. (65) and that the self, though without that (finitude), should be prevented therefrom, is very surprising.

'Well, if the self has the size of the body, how could it, when of the size of a child's body, take on the size of a young man's body? Is it by abandonment of that size, or by not abandoning the same? If by abandonment, then in consequence of its being non-eternal, like the body, there is the consequence of its having no other (future) world. If by non-abandonment, that does not do, because, with the non-abandonment of the earlier size, there is, as in the case of the body, no accounting for origination in it of the later size'—that is illogical, because

<sup>17</sup> Inclusion of a Multiple Term in the Major.

<sup>18</sup> In the *Ācāra* see III n. 1. To this category, not omnipresent, it is, of course, colourless.

<sup>19</sup> See *Prasastapāda's bhāṣya*, trans. Gangādhara Pañc., p. 55.

at the stage of the size of the young man's body the self may possibly not upon abandoning the size of the child's body be completely destroyed: just as in the case of a snake, when the stage of having no hood arises. And so how is there the consequence of having no other world? Because, though as a state non-eternal, it is as a substance eternal.

If it is said, 'Well, if the self has the size of the body, then, when that is maimed, its maiming results', who says what? Because maiming of it to some extent upon maiming of the body is approved, since of the parts of the self conjoined with the body some parts of the self remain in the maimed body-parts, there is maiming of the self. And this is here actually found: Otherwise there would not be observation of quivering in the part separated from the body. Nor does it follow that there is a separate selfhood of the parts of the self which have penetrated into the maimed part, because they have penetrated only there. Nor is there in a single continuum a plurality of selves: for, as the cognitions which envisage a plurality of objects have for support a single judge (observer), non-existence of envisaging would follow, like consciousness of objects to be ascertained by a plurality of cognitions disposed in different bodies<sup>20</sup>). If it is said, 'How is there a subsequent rejoining of two severed parts?' — A cutting is not unequivocally admitted, since a cutting too is taken to be as in the case of the threads of a lotus stalk<sup>21</sup>): the rejoining is simply non-contradictory because of there being a destiny to that effect<sup>22</sup>).

Thus a self simply of the size of the body is to be admitted, not a pervasive one. Accordingly the self is not pervasive: because it is intelligent, (66) and what is pervasive is not intelligent, like ether: and the self is intelligent, therefore it is not pervasive; and, as it is not pervasive, it is established that it is of the size of the body, since there only are its qualities observed. Even in the case of the Arhats, again, at the stage of Kevalin *samudghāta*<sup>23</sup>) attained in the eighth instant, the all-pervasiveness of the self, as pervading a world consisting of 14 *Rajjuz*<sup>24</sup>), (67) is occasional, and so it does not constitute an exception, and those who are armoured with the breast-plate of the *Śvādvāda-mantras* are not alarmed by such utterations. This is the meaning of the verse

<sup>20</sup>) The separate notions of A and B do not combine into one notion of A or B.

<sup>21</sup>) Some are left projecting.

<sup>22</sup>) So a consequence of the law of *karma* — see note V i 181 and IX 5).

<sup>23</sup>) A condition when some particles (*pradesa*) of the soul expand and issue from the body and then return — see *Outlines of Jainism*, p. 20.

<sup>24</sup>) On the *rajjuz*, which measure the extent of the cosmos, see *Outlines*, pp. 119–120. The detail of the eighth instant, a doctrine expounded in M. L.'s note on this passage, may be neglected.

## X. CRITICISM OF THE NAIYĀYIKAS

Since the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas have in general a common system, with the refutation of the Aulūkya-view the Yoga view<sup>1</sup> also should be deemed refuted. But, because in regard to the categories even those two have not a similar understanding, now, seeing that, whereas all the categories laid down by Aksapada<sup>2</sup> must be described as not very effective for the fourth human object<sup>3</sup>, the therein included sophistry (*chala*), vagueness (*jāti*) and censure-situation (*nigraha-sithāna*)<sup>4</sup>, which have for their fruit only the rejection of opposing propositions, are absolutely unacceptable, he ridicules the dispassionateness of one who gives instruction in these saying:

X. Among this people, itself obsessed by opposing contentions,  
their mouths itching with learnedness in pointless talk;  
cutting the opponent's vital point through delusion teaching,  
Ho! the dispassioned sage of other groups!

Other, opponents whose names are not to be cited because they have not understood the essence of Thy precepts, to them belonging, in virtue of his being teacher, of other groups: sage, the *Ho! Aksapāda*. **Ho! the dispassioned**, ho! the dispassionate 'Ho!', involving ridicule, signifies strangeness, of other groups' (*anyadīya*), in this the termination *dand* "is that authorized with *īya* and *-karaṇa*"<sup>5</sup>). Doing what? as to this he says: **cutting the opponent's vital point**; the singular being used in the generic sense, 'aggravating the opponent's weak point', this is a technical term according to the commentatorial explication: "Parts of the body occupied by many atoms of the self are vulnerable points"<sup>6</sup>), hence metonymously the propounding of a Middle Term, as being the life, since it is unfailing means of establishing one's own truth to be demonstrated, is actually a vital point. **Wherethrough cutting them?** **Through delusion teaching**, the cause, 'delusion', cheating the opponent; thereof 'teaching', (68) demonstration to disciples by way of describing the triad of categories defined as sophistry, vagueness, censure-situation, therethrough an Ablative (*-daśāt*), whereas an instrumental of the cause results from the *sūtra* "of a quality except with the Feminine, or not"<sup>7</sup>).

In what sphere does this man teach delusion? As to this he says: **among this**, visibly perceived **people**<sup>8</sup>), folk, mostly ordinary, because having their regard turned outwards, away

<sup>1</sup>) Here, as supra (p. 71) Yoga denotes not the well-known Yoga system, but the Nyāya, cf. also note XIV 15).

<sup>2</sup>) The reputed founder of the Nyāya-system. Aksapāda's compassionate intent was proverbial in the system: see p. 58.

<sup>3</sup>) *Mokṣa*, the first three being *dharma* (duty), *artha* (practical advantage), and *kāma* (satisfaction of desires).

<sup>4</sup>) The main opening feature of the Nyāya-system: see *N.-sūtra* I : 1. On 'sophistry', 'vagueness' and 'censure-situation' see *infra*, pp. 80 sq.

<sup>5</sup>) The *d* in *anyad*, here authenticated from Hemacandra's Grammar III, ii 121 (M. L.)

<sup>6</sup>) Introduced.

<sup>7</sup>) Hemacandra's Grammar, II ii 27 (M. L.): "With the Feminine" refers to words of that grammatical Gender, and "or not" means 'optionally'. The 'quality' here is 'teaching'.

<sup>8</sup>) Mankind in general (rather than Indian people particularly).

from reflection on truths and non-truths. How-natured? - **Itself**, of itself, even without dependence upon teaching by others; **obsessed by opposing contentions** (*nivāda*), at variance (*viruddha*), clever in attacking each other's adopted alternatives; contention (*vāda*), statement propounded. 'opposing contention'. And thus His Holiness Haribhadrasūri<sup>9</sup>:

"What, however, mainly sophistry<sup>10</sup> and vagueness is (put forward) that is recorded as an opposing contention

(On the part of one desiring gain and fame, a not-great-souled man in difficulty"<sup>11</sup>).

By that 'obsessed', as it were, demon seized, as it were; among that (people). As a person besides himself through epilepsy due to possession, etc., might babble anything, so this people also. This is the sense

Further: **pointless talk**<sup>12</sup>, statement without propounding a counter-view; the etymology being, 'by it is 'beaten away' (*ritandya*), i. e. hindered, a counter Middle Term'. "He who, having accepted a Minor Term, does not state a proposition, is called a pointless talker", so says the *Nyāya vārtika*<sup>13</sup>. But properly (*vastuśa*) chatter (*maukharya*) which does not touch the consideration of truth and non-truth, is pointless talk. In that, **learnedness**, non-defective skill; therewith **itching** (*kandāla*), as it were itching<sup>14</sup>; **mouth**, organ of speech; he who is so; in him 'Itch', skin-irritation: 'this man has an itch', so 'itching': because it (the word) belongs to the group *sūtra*, etc.<sup>15</sup>, it has the suffix *-la* with the sense of *-mant* ('having'). As a person unable to stop the itching produced by a family of worms born inside a callosity (*kila*) (60) manifests distraction, so here the mouth also, manifesting recklessness of disconnected babble through learnedness in pointless talk, is metaphorically described as itching

And so the pointless talkers are even by their own propensity vacillating in the exposition of the views severally approved by them; and if among them an ally was born, an instruction in the composition of statements rich in deception of others, composed by a particular person who was their highest authority, then there took place - as it were, a casting of an oblation of ghee upon a fire of itself ablaze, bedressed with masses of flames. And by those disputants, delighting in worldly existence (*bhava*), even the gift of such instruction was heaped on the scale of that sage's compassionateness. And so they say:

"With faces set chattering by a fragment of bits of badly learned wrong logic,  
how else can they be conquered, adorned with the arrogance of pointless talk."  
'Let not the precedent following world, thereby seduced, go on a bad road',  
with this view the compassionate sage expounded 'sophistry', etc."<sup>16</sup>).

And compassionateness is not distinguished from dispassion, therefore it is properly said: 'Not the dispassioned!', a mocking expression by the author of the Laudation.

\* *kandālam* *iva*, add *ka*, *kha* *gha*, *ha*

<sup>9</sup> The famous Jain polygraph

<sup>10</sup> See *Nyāya-sūtra*, I n 10 "it is intentional perversion of an opponent's statement, whereas 'vagueness' (*vāda*, 'generality'). *Nyāya-sūtra*, I n 11-8) is statement of some analogy or contrary which does not affect the proposition. On these and the other technicalities here adduced reference may be made to Dr. Randle's clear exposition in *Indian Logic in the early schools*, pp 339sq. also *infra* p 60

<sup>11</sup> From Haribhadra's *Aṣṭaka-sūtra*, XII, 4 (M I.)

<sup>12</sup> *Nyāya-sūtra*, I n 3

<sup>13</sup> Uddvotakara's sub-commentary (I n 1) (M L.) on the *Nyāya-sūtra*

<sup>14</sup> Hemacandra's Grammar, VII n 21 (M I.)

<sup>15</sup> Two verses of the passage cited in *Nyāya-mahārjī* (ed. p. 11) (M I.), quoted also in *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, II n 70, and in Haribhadra's comm. on Haribhadra's *Śaṅkara-darśana-samuccaya*, v 30.

Now, in 'through delusion teaching' (the indication (introductory)<sup>14</sup>) -sūtra is dwelt upon. In the *Akṣapāda*-system, of course, there are 16 categories; because of the statement, "Demonstrant (Means of knowledge, *pramāṇa*), Demonstrand (subject of knowledge, *prameya*), doubt, purpose, example, tenet, member of syllogism, deduction, conclusion, contention (*ēdda*), dilatation (*jalpa*), pointless talk, fallacies (resemblances of Middle), sophistry, vagueness, censure-situation, from cognition of the truth of these things is acquisition of beatification". The acquisition of those, severally or all, is, however, not a cause of attainment of beatification. (70) For *Mokṣa* by means of a single mere cognition void of acting (*kriyā*) is not arguable; because it is an incomplete apparatus, like reaching a desired town with a carriage having one wheel detached.

Nor should it be said, "We, of course, do not reject acting; but, in order to intimate that it is cause of *Mokṣa* only when preceded by cognition of truth, we say 'from cognition of truth acquisition of beatification'". - No! For not even in combination are their cognition and acting cause of reaching *Mokṣa*; because of the falsity of that cognition and acting. Nor is their falsity unestablished, because all sixteen, upon consideration, are resemblances of truth. As thus: Those people give, to begin with, in a sūtra a definition of the Demonstrant, thus: "Cause of apprehension of object is Demonstrant"<sup>15</sup>. And that will not bear consideration, since, if causality in regard to the apprehension of an object is merely the occasioning of it, that is common to all the causal things (*kāraṇa*)<sup>16</sup>; so that it follows that agent and act also, and so on, are means of knowledge. If by the word 'cause' (*hetu*) is meant simply an instrument (*karana*) by definition different from agent and act, then it is cognition there of that is logical, and not contact with sense-organs, etc. For that which being given the object is apprehended is the instrument thereof. And, even given the apparatus of contact with the sense-organs, etc., there is not, in absence of cognition, apprehension of the object. For instrument is that which is the most effective<sup>17</sup>, and that is taken as having nothing interposed between it and the result; whereas, if there is instrumentality even where something does interpose, it would follow that milk drinking, etc.<sup>18</sup>, would do so. Therefore, except in cognition there is no being a Demonstrant, because anywhere else it is metonymous. Although by the author of the *Nyāya bhāṣana*<sup>19</sup> it is said: "What is effective (*sādhana*) of correct experience is the Demonstrant", even there the mention of effective (*sādhana*) shows (proves) that simply the instrument, with rejection of agent and act, is the Demonstrant. Even so, to be the most effective as having nothing interposing between itself and the proof belongs to cognition only. And so that definition is not correct; the real definition is, "The Demonstrant is cognition having certainty for self and others". (71)

Subjects of knowledge (Demonstrands) again are stated by them as of 12 kinds, self, body, sense-organs, objects, awareness, intellect, activity (*pravṛtti*), fault, future-life, fruition, pain, release (*apararga*)<sup>20</sup>. And that is not correct, for body, sense organs, awareness, intellect, activity, fault, fruition, pain should properly be included under self, since a self in mundane existence is not in any way separated from them. And self is not even a subject (topic) of

<sup>14</sup> *Nyāya-sūtra* I : 1 (M. I.)

<sup>15</sup> This is not in the sūtra, but in the *bhāṣya* on II : 11 (M. I.)

<sup>16</sup> *Kāraṇa* in Sanskrit Grammar includes all the Cause-functions connected with the Verb-action: see *Nyāya-kāṇḍa*, s. v.

<sup>17</sup> This is the grammatical definition of instrument (Pāṇini, I : 32)

<sup>18</sup> I e. any irrelevant prior proceeding.

<sup>19</sup> The phrase quoted is from the beginning of Bhaṭṭarvajña's *Nyāya-sūtra* (M. I.), quoted also in *Pramana-mimamsa*, I : 8. The *Nyāya-bhāṣana* was a commentary on Bhaṭṭarvajña's work: see *History of Indian Logic*, by S. Vidyābhāṣana, p. 371.

<sup>20</sup> *N.-sūtra*, I. I. 9.

knowledge, since it is the knower. And sense-organs, awareness and intellect, as being instruments, are not subjects of knowledge. Faults, again, are passion, aversion, delusion; and these cannot be apart from activity<sup>22</sup>, since operation of voice<sup>23</sup>, intellect and body, of 20 kinds<sup>24</sup>, with fruit good and bad, are in their view to be designated by the word 'activity'<sup>25</sup> and since faults, passion, etc., are essentially operations of intellect.

As to pain, and sound, etc., the objects of the senses, there is inclusion in fruit: because of the statement by Jayanta that "Begotten by activity and fault<sup>27</sup>", and consisting of pleasure and pain, is the primary fruit; but the means (*sādhana*) thereto are metonymously so". State after death and beatitude again, being of the form of assumption (*āpatti*) by the self simply of another development, cannot properly be mentioned separately from the self. And so the statement that subjects of knowledge are of 12 kinds is merely expansion in speech, while the proper definition is: "Entities, consisting of substance and states, are the subject of knowledge", because it comprises all. Likewise that doubt, etc.<sup>28</sup>, are semblances of truth, should not be overlooked by discerning persons: but here, because of familiarity (*pratilatva*) and from fear of longwindedness, it is not worked out. For in this connection the *Nyāyākāśītra* would have to be introduced entire, and, if introduced, that embarks upon another book separately, so let that pass.

While so the 16 categories, means of knowledge, etc., are without distinction semblances of truth, only the three, sophistry, vagueness, and censure-situation, which work the puppets in the play of open cheating, have been adduced in the expression "through delusion teaching". As regards these: attack on the statement of an opponent by supporting an alternative meaning is sophistry. This is of three kinds<sup>29</sup>, verbal sophistry, sophistry of the universal, metonymy sophistry. (22) Of these, when a common word has been used, denial of it by supposing something other than the speaker's intent is verbal sophistry. For example, when it is said, 'This boy has a new (*nara*) blanket', the opponent attributes number, and denies it, saying: 'How has he nine (*nara*) blankets?' When an universal, although conceivably going too far, is proffered, a denial of it by attributing to it the status of Middle Term is the sophistry of the universal. As, in a context of praising a Brāhman, saying: 'Ah! surely that Brāhman perfect in knowledge and conduct', someone says, 'In a Brāhman perfection of knowledge and conduct is presumed', then the sophistical disputant in regard to it, attributing to Brāhmanhood the value of a Middle Term, rejoins in refutation: 'If in a Brāhman there is perfection, of knowledge and conduct, let that be the case with a Vratya, even a Vratya is actually a Brāhman' In case of a metonymous use of countering by denying the primary meaning is metonymy sophistry. As, when it is said, 'The benches cry out', the opponent counters with 'How can the unthinking benches cry out?' It is the people on the benches who cry out!"

Again, when a correct Middle Term, or a semblance of a Middle Term, has been used by a disputant, immediately, without it being realized whether it is faulty or real, some counter statement or other, generally involving a reflex (*pratibimba*) of the Middle Term<sup>30</sup>, that is vagueness, semblance of refutation, that is the meaning. And that is, through the distinction

<sup>22</sup> In A. sūtra, I. 1. 17, *pravṛtti* is defined as emerging (*drambha*) with voice, mind or body in Indian philosophy it seems always to connote will.

<sup>23</sup> N. sūtra, I. 1. 17.

<sup>24</sup> See 10 good and 10 evil see *Nyāyavādaśāstra* on sūtra I. 1. 17. <sup>25</sup> See note 24.

<sup>27</sup> From Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* (ed. pp. 504-5) (M. L.), based on N. sūtra I. 1. 20.

<sup>28</sup> This may allude to the discussion of doubt in N. sūtra, II. 1. 18.

<sup>29</sup> Expanded in A. sūtra, I. 1. 18-17.

<sup>30</sup> 'Reflex of the Middle Term' The counter-proposition is in form a copy of that which it opposes.

of the counter-statement by similarity, etc., of 24 forms<sup>23</sup>). As, 'resemblance of similarity, dissimilarity, addition (*utkāraṇa*), subtraction (*apakāraṇa*), evidential (*parāṇa*), non-evidential (*avaraṇa*), corresponding multifariousness, what is to be proved (*sādhya*), combination, non-combination, further consequence, counter-instance, non origination, antimony (*spekārāṇa*), not a Middle Term, practical consequence, non difference, apportionness, observation, non-observation, eternal, non eternal, product"<sup>24</sup>).

Of these, counter statement by similarity is the similarity semblance vagueness. If it is argued, 'Sound is non-eternal, because a made thing, like a pot', then you reply with the counter-statement, making use (73) just of similarity. 'Sound is eternal, because without parts, like ether'. Not is there a specific Middle Term<sup>25</sup>). 'Through similarity to a pot, through being a made thing, sound is non-eternal, but not through being without parts, through similarity to ether, eternal'. A counter statement by dissimilarity is dissimilarity semblance vagueness. If we use here also the proposition 'Sound is non-eternal because a made thing, like a pot', we have the same counter Middle Term used by way of dissimilarity. 'Sound is eternal because without parts; for what has parts is seen to be non-eternal: pot, etc.' Nor is there a special Middle Term. 'Through similarity to a pot, through being a made thing, sound is non-eternal, but not, through dissimilarity thereto, through being without parts, eternal'. Counter statement by way of addition and subtraction are the addition and subtraction semblance vagueness. In the same instance, adding some attribute of the example as found in what has the Major Term for attribute, he employs the addition-semblance vagueness. 'If, because of being a made thing, like a pot, sound is non-eternal, just like a pot, let it be also finite. And, if not finite, like a pot, let it also not be non-eternal'. In this way he adds with regard to sound excess (4) of another attribute (3) (*idharmāntar-utkāraṇam*). But subtraction is. 'Pot, being a made thing is seen to be not audible, so let sound also be, if not, let it also not be, like a pot, non-eternal'. In this way he takes away (withdraws) from sound the attribute of audibility. These four vaguenesses we have cited for the sake of more attention. Likewise, the remaining 20 are to be ascertained from Akṣapada's treatise<sup>26</sup>. But here because of pointlessness they are not set down.

Furthermore, wrong understanding (*vipratipatti*) and failure to understand (*apratipatti*), are censure situation<sup>27</sup>. Of these, wrong understanding is thought of a reason in regard to the semblance of a reason, or thought of a refutation in regard to the semblance of a refutation. Failure to understand is non refutation of a Middle Term, and non removal of a refutation. And this censure-situation is in 22 ways<sup>28</sup>): as follows: 1. relinquishment of proposition, 2. alteration of proposition, 3. contradiction of proposition, 4. surrender of proposition, 5. a different Middle Term, 6. a different meaning, (74) 7. meaningless, 8. failure to understand meaning, 9. void of meaning, 10. untimely, 11. defective; 12. excessive, 13. repetition, 14. not replying, 15. failure of cognition, 16. lack of ideas, 17. postponement (*atikepa*), 18. revocation of view, 19. disregard of further questioning, 20. questioning of what should not be questioned; 21. conflict with tenet, and 22. semblances of Middle Term.

Of these, when a Middle Term has been made equivocal, relinquishment of proposition on the part of one who with regard to his own example admits an attribute of a counter-example,

<sup>23</sup>) This list of nuances of 'vagueness' (*ṣaṭi*) is from *Nyāya-sūtra*, V. 1, where it is followed by explanations of the several items as stated here *infra*. For a Jain exposition see *Prameya-kamala-m.*, fol. 198-200.

<sup>24</sup>) *Nyāya-sūtra*, V. 1. 5.

<sup>25</sup>) The counter-statement is 'vague' because its bearing upon the original proposition is not shown.

<sup>26</sup>) *Nyāya-sūtra*, V. 1. 4, and *bhāṣya*.

<sup>27</sup>) i.e. disqualification or definite defeat consequent upon misunderstanding or failure to understand something which to the audience is patent (*Nyāya-sūtra*, I. n. 19-20) see also *Prameya-kamala-m.*, fol. 200-4.

<sup>28</sup>) *Nyāya-sūtra*, V. n. 1, where explanations follow.

is censure-situation. For instance, one who, in order to establish the proposition 'sound is non-eternal, because sense-perceived, like a pot', should, when the opponent has shown the Middle Term to be equivocal, by saying: 'Universality even if sense-perceived is seen to be eternal', say, 'Let pot also, like universal, be eternal', would, in saying so, abandon his proposition of non-eternality in regard to sound. When a denial of something propounded has been made by the opponent, then, on the part of one who in regard to the same bearer of attributes names another attribute to be established, the alteration of proposition is censure-situation. If it has been said, 'Sound is non-eternal, because sensible', and in the same way as before an exception has been raised with regard to the universal, should he say: 'It is logical that the sensible universal is eternal; for that is omnipresent; but sound is not omnipresent', the proposition altered from the previous proposition, defined as the non-eternality of sound, is censure situation. In this way should be understood also the remaining twenty; but here they are not set down, simply for the reason previously given.

Thus by the word 'delusion' the three, sophistry, etc., are indicated. Accordingly to depict the dispassionateness of the sage Akṣapāda, who teaches as truths sophistry, vagueness, censure-situation, though they are in essence deception of others, - how is it not ridiculous, like proclaiming that darkness consists of light? This is the meaning of the verse.



## XI. THE PŪRVA-MIMĀMSĀ DOCTRINE ENJOINING HIMSĀ

Now, rejecting with preliminary affirmation a causality of *dharma* as approved in regard to Veda-ordained killing by a section of the *Mīmāṃsakas*<sup>1</sup>, he says: (7E)

**XI. Hurt, though ordained, is not a cause of merit;  
and a general rule has not a non-pertinent exception.**

**School-Fellow of a desire to obtain sovereignty through the killing of one's own son  
is the wild flight of the opponents.**

Here, of course, the Jainum philosophers, who have taken to the path of smoke<sup>2</sup>, at variance (*pratipakṣa*) with the path of light, say as follows: 'Hurt, which is done through greed, or through being vicious, that alone is cause of consequent demerit; because it is

<sup>1</sup> The *Pūrvamīmāṃsaka* system, expounded in the sūtra and the vast and very ancient *bhāṣya* of Sabara svāmīn. Its most general theme is *dharma*, i. e. the system of religious duties and observances ordained by the Veda and the merit resulting therefrom. In the main it is an exegesis of interpretation applicable to the Vedic texts and of the consequent classification of the significations and values of particular rites and ritual acts. But it opens with sections explaining how *dharma* rests exclusively upon the authority of the Veda, asserting the eternal existence of the texts and of the connection of words with their significations: the Veda is accordingly *apauruṣeya*, i. e. without a divine or other author. The sūtras are difficult and for their interpretation depend largely upon ancient tradition elaborated in the *bhāṣya*, which is rich in linguistic asumen, and, so far as the matter and doctrines allow, of solid judgment.

It is not likely that Mallabena had bestowed much attention upon *sūtra* or *bhāṣya*. In his time, and in that of Hemacandra, the *Mīmāṃsaka* doctrine had long been represented by two schools, that of Prabhākara (the 'Guru') and that of Kumārila, the 'Bhāṭṭa' school. These entered largely into the philosophical questions which during the V-IX centuries were deeply debated in controversies with the Buddhists, the criteria of truth (*pramāṇa*), the nature of cognition and of language, the syllogism, and so forth. The original text of Prabhākara is not available in translation, and for a knowledge of his views a thesis (1911) by the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Śrī Gaṅgānāth Jhā must be invoked. Kumārila's commentaries on the system, and especially the *Sloka-varttika*, which has been translated by that scholar, who has also accomplished the gigantic task of translating the *Sabara-bhāṣya*, enters into all the matters and controversies with an acuteness and solidity and originality of judgment which renders his writings in no way inferior to any of the other important literary productions of the great, many-sided, debate. It is likely that for Hemacandra and Mallabena the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* doctrine was represented by the writings of Prabhākara and Kumārila.

The matter selected for attack in verse XI is the sacrificial slaughter of animals, an ancient practice which the *Mīmāṃsā* continued to defend on the ground of Vedic injunction, and which is discussed at length in *Sloka-varttika*, trans. pp. 50-56. To the Jains the practice was beyond everything abhorrent, and the text enters lengthily into the arguments and special pleas urged by the *Mīmāṃsakas*, the alleged merit and benefits resulting to the performers and their belongings, and the observed failure or irrationality of these many testimonies to the horror of the practice are cited from Sanskrit literature in general. Incidentally the authority of the Veda is derided on ground of inconsistencies and absurdities, and an exegeric use of the relation of 'rule' and 'exception' is criticised as mistaken.

<sup>2</sup> The terms (cited from *Bhagavad-gītā*, VIII 24-5 (M. L.), based on Upanadic ideas, e. g. *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, VI ii. 15-6, *Chāndogya*, V 19) are here perhaps satirical in view of the smoke of the sacrifices countenanced by the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*.

produced by heedlessness<sup>4</sup>, as on the part of butchers, hunters, etc. But hurt ordained by the Vedas<sup>5</sup> is, on the contrary, cause of merit, because it produces satisfaction (*prīti*) on the part of gods, guests, and ancestors, like the attention of worshipping such. Nor is the production of this satisfaction unestablished (the non failure, of course, of the fruit, namely rain, etc., to be accomplished by the *Kartu*<sup>6</sup>), etc., sacrificers, has for it cause the favour of the particular deities thereby satisfied. Like wise also the mastering of foreign kingdoms through the *Chagala-Jugala*<sup>7</sup>, sacrifice described in the *Tripurāṇavara* is to be produced by the favour of deities made well inclined thereby. As for the satisfaction of guests, arising from the taste of the preparation of honey-mixture, etc., that is patently observable. (76) On the part of ancestors also, whose soul are pleased by the carrying out of such and such *Śrāddha*<sup>8</sup>, etc., brought by them, it is seen manifestly that they cause aggrandisement of their posterity. And Scripture is here a proof, and that this states the carrying out of horse-sacrifice, ox-sacrifice, man sacrifice for the satisfaction of the gods is quite familiar. As regards guests we have "Let him prepare for a learned Brahman a great ox, or a great goat, etc."<sup>9</sup>, while for the sake of the satisfaction of ancestors,

"Two months with fish-flesh, three months with that of deer,

Four months with that of sheep, five months with that of birds"<sup>10</sup>, and so forth.

Having thus in his heart reflected upon the opponent's intent, the teacher rejoins: "Not merit, etc.". **Though ordained**, although justified by the Veda, to say nothing of the not ordained, **hurt**, in the form of taking the lives of living beings, **not a cause of merit**, not a condition of the consequence of merit. Because here there is manifest conflict with one's own statements, as thus: 'if hurt, how cause of merit?', 'if cause of merit, how hurt?' "Hear the sum total of merit, and, having heard, ponder upon it"<sup>11</sup>, etc., for we do not say that 'she is both a mother and barren'. The opponent's intent is: Hurt is a cause (*kāraṇa*); while merit is effect of it<sup>12</sup>. Nor is this without a drawback, for what follows the presence and absence of anything is effect thereof, is the pot, etc., following the lump of clay. And that merit does not come only from hurt is obvious, since it would follow that observance of austerities, giving, concentrated contemplation and the like would not be causes thereof. (77) If it is said:

We do not say that hurt universally is cause of merit, but only if special; and special is that only which is ordained by the Veda<sup>13</sup>. Surely, it is cause of merit because the living beings to be killed do not die, or because even if they do die, they have no painful thoughts, or through their obtaining a happy destiny. Not the first alternative, because their loss of life is directly beheld. Nor the second, because, as the mind-movements of others are hard to detect, the absence of painful thoughts is more veridical. On the contrary, when they in their own speech disagreeably call out, "O Misery! is there no compassionate person for refuge?", since we see

<sup>4</sup> This *pramāda* is defined as thought of doing something known to be a thing not to be done, or carelessly of not doing what should be done. It is a sinning against the light.

<sup>5</sup> See the clear declaration by Kumārila in the *Śloka-varttika*, II vs. 261-5, trans. p. 62.

<sup>6</sup> This *ritu* (or rain), or which were used shoots of the *Kartu* shrub (see Hillebrand, *Himalayan literature*, v. 179) is discussed by Kumārila in *Śloka-varttika*, XVII v. 26, trans. p. 381; in later texts it becomes a stick-like tree.

<sup>7</sup> With rain and deer-horn, but the reference *agra*, p. 69, seems to indicate rather a goat and a piglet than the *Tripurāṇavara* seems to be a Saiva (Śākta) Tantra work.

<sup>8</sup> Rules for the Manes, detained in numerous *śrāddha* on household usage (*śrāddha-nūta*) and general duties (*śrāddha-nūta* and *śrāddha*).

<sup>9</sup> *Yajñavalkya-smṛti*, I. 109-111, M. I.

<sup>10</sup> *Manu-smṛiti*, III. 208-211, M. I.

<sup>11</sup> *Śāstrāśāstramūlart*, I. 5, M. I.

<sup>12</sup> The distinction is made by Kumārila in *Śloka-varttika*, II vs. 243sq.

the marks of downcastness of look, trembling of eyes, etc., their sad thoughts are patently engraven.

Or you might say as follows: 'As a lump of iron, though through weight liable of itself to sink, when prepared by being made into thin leaves, etc., floats on the water; and as poison, though of itself a cause of death, when specially prepared by a *mantra*, etc., becomes a good thing (*guṇa*); and as fire, though having the own nature of burning, when its potency is nullified by the power of Truth, and so on, does not burn; similarly, because of preparation by the ritual of a *mantra*, etc., hurt ordained by the Veda does not, of course, nourish faults. Nor should a contemning of it be apprehended: because we see that the sacrificers who carry it out are in the world objects of honour'. No, this does not bear examination by discerning persons; since the examples, because of their dissimilarity\*) are not very conclusive. For a lump of iron, etc., when they have taken another state, as thin leaves, etc., are capable of the action of floating upon water; but, on the part of the animals which are being cut, even by the process (*vidhi*) of preparing with Vedic *mantras*, any reaching of another state in the form of non-origination of pain, etc., is not observed. Or, if it is said, 'For them immediately after they are killed, another state, the reaching of divinity, is actual (*asti eva*)', what is the proof of this? Not, to begin with, sense-perception: (78) since that gives apprehension of a conjoined present (*variamāna*) object; because of the saying that "What is conjoined and present (in time) is apprehended by the eye, etc."†). Nor inference, because we observe no mark (*lāga*) belonging thereto. Nor Scripture: because that is even to-day subject of dispute. Practical consequence (*arthāpatti*) and analogy (*upamāna*), again, are, as included in inference, simply by the refutation of that disposed of.

"Well, as Your Worship also suppose that in the building of Jain temples, etc., even the killing of masses of beings in earth, etc.‡), through a special development, turns into (*kal pyak*) merit (*puṇya*); why is it not so approved in our case also? Since there is also, without dispute, a special development in the form of the carrying out of the Veda stated rite", Not so! For to have good fruit belongs only to that special development in which, though through failure of other means, there be, with care, killing of souls in earth, etc., having but undeveloped and slight intelligence; there is, with expenditure of a little merit, attainment of unlimited good action; but not any other. But on your view, although there exist, expounded in such and such *Śrutis*, *Smṛtis*, *Purāṇas*, *Itihāsas*, means for attaining heaven, such as restraints and restrictions etc. for those worse than butchers who with reference to such and such gods kill creatures all whose sense-organs are in misery, scurrying, through cutting and misuse, in all directions, and who by the expenditure of all their good deeds facilitate actually a bad destiny, a special development of good is hardly obtainable. And similarly, whatsoever Your Worship simply by means of some analogy of attributes make into an example proves to be too far-reaching.

Nor is there not a virtue (*guṇa*) even in the killing of souls in earth, etc., on the building of Jain temples, etc. (79) As thus: from seeing these (temples, etc.) fortunate people through enthusiasm for virtue obtain enlightenment, and by beholding the superiority (*atikaṃya*) of worship, etc., (they gain) serenity of mind, and therefrom trance (*samādhi*)§), and therefrom

\* ) *saṁdharmaṃ, varāṃya, gha rā ha. Das*

† ) One of the distinctive definitions of direct sense-perception: see *Nyāya-sūtra* IV. 1. 84 (M. L.); and the citations in Abhayadeva's comm. on the *Sammat-tarka* loc. cit. p. 561, Ratnaprabhā's comm. on *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvakośa*, IV. 7, and Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I. 1. 17, and I. 1. 4.

‡ ) On the Jain doctrine of minute living beings (*giguda*, also in masses, *gola*: in particles of earth, water, etc. see *Outline of Jainism*, p. 8.

§ ) *Samādhi* is completely absorbed meditation.

in due course attainment of beatitude. And to this effect His Holiness, the author of the *Pañca-lāgi*<sup>15</sup>:

"Even if for the building of a Jain temple there takes place destruction of souls in earth, particles, etc. (80)

In regard to them also there is inevitably compassion in a person of right views! Sinner, thereby enlightened, people freed from passion protect earth (-souls), etc.,

Thence attaining Nirvāṇa through not having harmed the future lives of those.

Like the skilled acts of a good physician, such as cutting the veins of a sick man,

The operation, although involving hurt, is, as it were, blessed in its result."

But in the carrying out of Vedic killing we see no virtue conducive to acquisition of merit. But, if it is said, 'There actually is a special virtue, with consequent merit, through giving sacrificial cakes, etc., to Brāhmins'. No! There can be acquisition of merit only by giving pure gold, etc.; gift of flesh resulting from disposing of a throng of wretched animals manifests merely want of feeling. Or, if (we say), the fruit of the act of slaughtering the animals is not the mere donating, but good fortune, etc., as the *Śruti* says: "Let one who desires good fortune lay hands on a white goat dedicated to Vāyu"<sup>16</sup>, etc., this also is simply without authority, because devoured by the exception demon; and because good fortune is attainable by other devices also. Or, if it is said that 'To the goats, etc., which are slain at that *Sattra*-sacrifice there is actually benefit in the form of attaining a good destiny after death', that is mere verbiage, because of lack of proof. For those slain animals do not, with minds delighted by attaining a good state of existence, come and report to anyone that they are in such a condition.

Well—there is the means of proof called Scripture, as, "Herbs, domestic animals, trees, lower creatures, also birds, who have for the sake of the sacrifice gone to death attain again elevation"<sup>17</sup>, etc.'. Not so! because that will be refuted by the question as to personal or non-personal (authorship). (81)

Nor should it be said: 'For those who carry out the cutting up of the animals with *Śruti* ritual there is benefit'<sup>18</sup>, namely attainment of heaven. For, if by hurt also there should be attainment of heaven, then for very certain the arched petals of the city of hell are closed since attainment of heaven by butchers, etc., would follow. And thus reads the great *Ṛsi*.

"If, having cut a sacrificial post, having slain animals, and made a puddle of blood, Thus one gets to heaven, whereby does one go to hell?"<sup>19</sup>

Moreover, if even by the hurting of animals, unknown, of unclear intelligence, and unserviceable, there is attainment of the station of the Third Heaven, then it follows that by killing mother and father, well known, clearly intelligent, in the highest degree beneficial, sacrificers would attain a still higher station. But, if it is said, 'Because of the statement, "inconceivably indeed is the potency of jewels, *mantras*, herbs, etc."<sup>20</sup>, the Vedic *mantras* are of inconceivable potency, and so on the slaughter of animals thereby consecrated attainment of heaven is a possibility'. No! Since in this world we observe the failure of those *mantras* in the case of rites of marriage, conception, birth, etc., their failure in regard also to heaven, etc., which are

<sup>15</sup> A work by Jinavarasāhī in Gāthā verse, with commentary by Jinapāti-sūri, cv, 58-60 (M. L.)

<sup>16</sup> *Tattvārtha-samhitā*, II : 1

<sup>17</sup> Included in Hemacandra's *Yoga-sāstra* (M. L.)

<sup>18</sup> The matter of benefit, in present or future lives, from offering sacrifices, etc., is treated by Kumārila in *Niśka-vṛttika*, XVII, trans. pp. 375-89

<sup>19</sup> The passage, quoted in the *Mādhava-pani* on the *Samkhyā-karika*

<sup>20</sup> Source of quotation untraced

invisible, is inferred. For after marriages, etc., though distinguished by *mantras* stated in the Vedas, we see hundreds and more of people distressed by calamities, such as widowhood, shortness of life, poverty, etc.; and others the opposite thereof, after those same made without consecration by *mantras*. And, if it is said, 'In those cases an imperfection of the act (of sacrifice) is the cause of the disappointment', - No! because doubt is not at an end: In those cases is the disappointment in the fruit due to imperfection in the act, or to want of potency in the *mantras*? And so there is no certainty, since it is not established that these are never devoid of the fruit.

Or, if it is said, 'As on your view statements such as "Good health, attainment of enlightenment, the supreme boon of trance let them give"<sup>81</sup>) are held to bear fruit only in another world, so also the Veda-statements approved by us have not their fruit in this birth. Why not accept that? (82) And so<sup>82</sup>) there is no room for criticism in regard to marriage etc.'. - Ah! the complications of the texts (*vacana*)! As through the *mantra*-consecrations used in marriage, etc., in the present birth there is fruit thereof in the coming birth, similarly, if we accept as cause of merit the religious activities, marriages, etc., in other, the second, etc., lives, there results a continuity of this through countless births. And so there would never be a final completion of mundane existence; and that being so, no one attains beatification, and so we get, in the Veda approved by you, a bulb-formation on the root of the shoot of (otherwise) finished mundane existence. But the prayer for health, etc., as being through speech neither true nor false<sup>83</sup>) cause of purity of development, is not an objection: for here is meant mental health, etc., and that is the highest fruit, since its characteristic is the waning of the diseased state defined as mundane existence in its four conditions<sup>84</sup>). And how possibly can prayer, with that for object (*visaya*), not be respected by persons of discretion? Nor is it a fact that that fruit of a thereby produced purity of development is not obtained. Because on the part of all disputants there is no disagreement as to mental purity being productive of the fruit of beatification.

Nor is the hurt described in the Vedas not contemned, because it is reproached by those who are perfect in correct outlook and cognition, and by the Vedānta disputants: who have taken to the path of light. And so the truth seems read

"Those who on pretence of offering to the Gods, or on pretence of sacrifice,

Without compassion slay living beings, go to an awful destiny"<sup>85</sup>).

The Vedāntists also say:

"In blind darkness sink we who make sacrifice with animals

That hurt, forsooth, should be a duty has not been nor will it be"<sup>86</sup>).

Likewise,

"From this sin done by killing let Agni release (*mūṇcatu*) me"<sup>87</sup>);

meaning, 'let him cause my release (*mooṇyatu*)', because the word is Vedic' (88)

Vyāsa also says<sup>87</sup>) -

"In the water of *brahma-carya* and compassion, surrounded by the terrace of cognition

Having bathed at a very pure sacred place which carries away the mud of sin. (1)

<sup>81</sup>) *śāśa, śāśa, kha ka ha ra, Das*

<sup>82</sup>) *Ānasyaka-sūtra*, XXIV § (M. L.)

<sup>83</sup>) Being not affirmation, but wish or prayer

<sup>84</sup>) Sc. as god, man, lower animal or denizen of hell (M. L.).

<sup>85</sup>) Untraced.

<sup>86</sup>) Untraced

<sup>87</sup>) Untraced. *Pāraskara* (7).

<sup>88</sup>) Untraced. (*Mahā-Bhārata*.)

Make the highest Agni-hotra sacrifice with casting of fuel and evil deeds upon the fire  
of meditation,  
Placed in the fire-pit of the soul, made to blaze up by the wind of self-restraint. (2)  
With view for victims, loathed, destructive of merit, desire, and gain,  
(Offered with the *mantras* of quietude, perform a sacrifice performed by the wise. (3)  
Whoso with infatuated intellect expects merit from the slaughter of living beings,  
Hopes for a rain of ambrosia from the mouth-cavity of a black snake". (4)

And so on.

As for it having been said, 'Because it is observed that sacrificers are honoured in the world', - that also is unsound. For only the unintelligent honour them, and not people of clarified intellect - and being honoured by the unintelligent is no proof; because that is observed in dogs, and so on. As for the statement that 'Veda ordained hurt is not faulty, because it is productive of satisfaction in gods, guests, and ancestors', - that also is false. Because gods, who, through having a supernatural body<sup>20</sup>, are satisfied by the taste of the savour of approved food matter made available by merely thinking of it, cannot have even a desire to accept the loathsome oblation of animal flesh, etc., proffered by you; since only those with gross bodies are fit for the acceptance thereof. And in case of accepting oblation-food, there is violation of the supposition that the Devas have bodies composed of *mantras*. Nor is their having *mantra* composed bodies on your view unestablished, because of the authority of the Jaimini text: "Only words ending in the fourth case are divinites"<sup>21</sup>. And likewise *Megadha*<sup>22</sup>. (84)

"If different from sound<sup>23</sup>, it does not with sacrificers simultaneously occupying different places

Come into proximity, because of being finite, like ourselves, etc."

'It' means divinity

And because the substance offered in sacrifice is observed to be merely turned into ashes, satisfaction of the gods due to enjoyment thereof is mere babble. Moreover, the Tretā-fire<sup>24</sup> here is the mouth of 33 crores of gods, because of the *Sruti*: "the gods have fire for mouth"<sup>25</sup>. And so on the part of the gods, highest, middle and lowest, who feed with a single mouth, there would be in consequence a feeding on each other's leavings. And so they outgo even Turks, these also eat indeed from a single dish, but not with a single mouth. Moreover, a plurality of mouths in a single body is somewhere heard of; but that - on the contrary, there should be in a plurality of bodies a single mouth is a great wonder! And, if we admit only one mouth for all the gods, when by some person one god is gratified by worship, etc., and another god offended by reproaches, etc., then there would<sup>26</sup> result confusion in the simultaneous utterance of expressions of favour and rebuke by a single mouth. And another thing: the mouth is the ninth part of the body, to those in whom that also is of the nature of burning. to them severally there would be a fire-nature in their whole body; and we can imagine its ending with the turning of the Triple Universe to ashes. And so enough of excessive discursion.

<sup>20</sup> *śaśvata* *ekena* Thomas, *śaśvata* *ekena* ed.

<sup>21</sup> On *śaśvata* bodies see *Outline of Jaimini*, pp. 33, 43.

<sup>22</sup> So the Dative - on this rule for settling what divinity is invoked in a scriptural text see *Nyāya-kōśa*, v. Devatā.

<sup>23</sup> Probably the Sāiva teacher mentioned in the *Sarva-dāśana-saṃgraha*, VII (Śaiva) chapter.

<sup>24</sup> This exception (in the style of the later Nyāya) is to exclude sound, as being perceptible in many places simultaneously.

<sup>25</sup> The three fires - southern, household, and 'sacrificial', required for Vedic rites.

<sup>26</sup> *Ācārya-saṃgraha-sūtra*, IV. 1. 22 (M. L.), but this is not *Śruti*, 'revealed text'; cf. *Rig-veda*, II. 1. 13-4.

As for the unfailfulness of the fruit, rain, etc., in the case of the Kāriri sacrifice<sup>21</sup>, etc., stated as having for cause the favour of the thereby pleased gods, this also is not unequivocal, because in some cases a failure also is seen. Even where there is no failure, these also their favour is not born of eating the oblation presented by you; rather, when that particular deity supreme in awareness is, while abiding in his own place, aware of the service of worship started with reference to him, (86) then with a movement of mind pleased with the performer of it, he effects by the force of wish such and such results. When on the other hand through non-attention he is not aware, or, though aware, is in co-operation with an evil destiny of the worshipper, he does not effect it; since we observe origination of effects only as dependent upon the ministration of co-operants, namely substance, places, times, states of mind (*bhāva*), etc. And that service of worship is easily accomplished by other methods also, beside the cutting up of animals; then what is the use of this butcher's proceeding, the only fruit of which is sin?

As for inference of satisfaction of Devī (Durgā) from success in mastering other kingdoms through the sacrifice of a goat or jungleman<sup>22</sup>, in regard to that who says what? Because quite similarly there is an admission respectively of certain minor divinities, only in them also the satisfaction (*paritosa*) is merely by seeing and cognizing those entities, and not, on the other hand, by eating them, since it would follow that also the sacrificial substances of Nimb leaves, acid oil, sour gruel, smoke particles, etc., are to be eaten by them. But in final truth it is merely the devotion of the worshippers, seconded by the intervention of such and such co-operants, that generates such and such fruit; since in the case of non-intelligent things, wishing gems, etc., it is seen to be so. And satisfaction (*priti*) of guests, etc., is to be produced also by cooked food perfected by proper preparation, and the operation (*pratikalpana*) with a great ox, a great goat, etc., for that purpose proclaims simply lack of mental clarity.

The pleasing of ancestors, again, is not unequivocal, since even through the performance of the *Śrāddha*, etc., increase of posterity is in the case of most people not found, and because in the case of some, as in that of donkeys, pigs, goats, etc., even without performance thereof we see it still more. And so the performance of the *Śrāddha*, etc., has for fruit only the deception of innocent people. As for those who have reached another world, they, to be sure, abide experiencing in the states of god, inhabitant of hell, etc., happiness or unhappiness, in accordance with the good and bad deeds they have done. How ever could they be eager to enjoy the (sacrificial) lump proffered by their children, etc.? And so tend the people who belong to your flock! (86)

"If even to dead beings the *Śrāddha* is cause of satisfaction.

Then oil might increase the flame of an extinguished lamp!"<sup>23</sup>)

And how could merit acquired by performance of the *Śrāddha*, etc., approach near to them? Since that is done by others<sup>24</sup>), is unintelligent and has no *foet*

Or, if it is said, "Though the performance of *Śrāddha*, etc., is with regard to them, the merit might belong simply to the giver, son, etc.", that is not the case, since the merit produced thereby is by him (the giver) through his own intention bestowed, and thus the merit of it belongs to neither of the two, and thus it dissolves in the interval, a relative of *Trisāṅku*<sup>25</sup>).

<sup>21</sup>) See notes 5) and 6).

<sup>22</sup>) See notes 5) and 6).

<sup>23</sup>) This is clearly in the style of *Uṛvaka* comments; but in the *Sarva-dāśāna-saṃgraha*, where the first line is given as such, the second line differs.

<sup>24</sup>) 'Merit' is not transferable.

<sup>25</sup>) *Trisāṅku*, raised by *Vaiśāṃitra* to heaven and not admitted by the gods, had to remain in the interspace (as a constellation in the southern hemisphere). See Muir's *Sanskrit Texts*.

may more, since it is a merit involving a sin, it is essentially (*tattvataḥ*) simply sin. If it is said that 'What is enjoyed by the Brāhman accrues to them (i.e. the ancestors)', – whoever is to agree to that? Since only in the Brāhman do we see the fattened bellies; and transference of these into their (the ancestors') cannot even be believed; since at the time of feeding no single sign of such transference is espied, and because only on the part of the Brāhman is satisfaction witnessed. And furthermore, if even they by large mouthfuls eating hastily through excessive greediness, are as good as dead, the performance of the *Śrāddha*, etc., is all in vain. And, even if we observe a supplication for a *Gayā śrāddha*<sup>43</sup>), that also must be held as made by similar deceivers, people who have perverted knowledge, *tyāntaras*<sup>44</sup>), etc.

As for the pronouncement that 'Scripture is the proof of this', that also is no proof. For that would either have an author, or be without an author. If it has an author, was it made by an omniscient, (87) or by one other than that? On the first alternative, it is fatal to your view. And to this effect is Your Worship's tenet

"Of suprasensory objects there is no direct beholder,

It is from the eternal texts of the Veda that there is ascertainment of accordance with fact"<sup>45</sup>).

But on the second alternative there is the consequence of want of confidence in it, as having been made by one faulty. But, if without author, that is an impossibility, since that *abolishes* its own character, like the horn of a horse. As thus: A text is a saying, and from 'is said' its character as the action of a person is maintained, in the absence of his action how can it occur? Nor is this sometimes observed sounding by itself, since, even if it is observed, there is the possibility of a suspicion of an invisible speaker; therefore that text is actually by an author, because it is composed of syllables, like the texts of the *Kumira-sambhara*<sup>46</sup>) and so on. And the *Veda* is composed of texts. And thus they say --<sup>47</sup>)

"Surely, it is plain to you that the Veda, as a group of syllables produced by the palate, is composed of syllables, etc."

And palate, etc. belong to a person, so how should there be the presentation that 'this has no author'?"

Now, even after accepting the non authorship of the Veda, Your Worship also accept the expounding of its meaning as actually the work of an author. Otherwise of "Let one desirous of heaven sacrifice the Agni hotra"<sup>48</sup>), why should not the meaning be, "Let him eat dog's flesh"? Since there is nothing to restrict. Preferable to this to admit that the *sūtra* also has an author. Or let it (the Veda) be without an author, nevertheless it has no authority (*prāmānya*), for the authority of statements depends upon a reliable person. And thus, as that (the Veda) is without authoritativeness, the hurt involving injunction (*vidhā*) of sacrifice and *Śrāddha*, stated by it and worked out in the *Smṛti*-texts following it, is simply void of authoritativeness.

<sup>43</sup>) A special *śrāddha* which every Hindu should perform at Gayā once in his life: a stock topic in discussions of merit.

<sup>44</sup>) Demons of the nether world: see H. von Glasenapp, *Der Jainismus*, p. 235.

<sup>45</sup>) The verse is from the summary of Mīmāṃsaka doctrine in Haribhadra's *Śaṅkara-darśana-samuccaya*, v. 69 (M. L.). The topic is elaborated in *Purva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, I 1-4, and the commentaries thereon.

<sup>46</sup>) Kālidāsa's famous poem.

<sup>47</sup>) Quotation untraced, the impersonal (*apauruṣeya*) eternity of the Veda is a Mīmāṃsaka doctrine (*Sūtra*, I 27-32), and a stock topic in Hindu (*Śloka-vārttika*, trans. pp. 551-5, *Nyāya-mañjarī*, pp. 232-8) and in Jain (*Sammattī-tarku*, pp. 29-43, *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*, fol. 113 B) treatises.

<sup>48</sup>) *Taittiriya-samhita* quoted in the commentary on *N.-sūtra* II 1-5 and frequently cited in Mīmāṃsaka texts.



'Well, as to the prohibition of hurt by "Let him not hurt any being", etc., (86): that is a procedure by general rule, meaning an universal ordinance (*vidhi*); but the killing ordained by the Veda is a case of exception (*apavāda*), meaning an ordinance in a particular (case). And, since a general rule (*utsarga*) is vetoed by an exception, the ordinance of hurt in the *Śruti* is not a fault; because of the principle that "Of general rule and exception the exception-ordinance is the stronger"<sup>45</sup>. For Your Worship also do not prohibit killing unequivocally; because you allow the making use (*pratisecana*) of earth, etc., when such and such a cause has arisen; and because you preach the taking of *Ādhā-karma*<sup>46</sup> (charitable action) for spreading a table for a sick person, etc. And the case for exception is 'hurt in sacrifice', because there is laying hands on a well-fed animal for pleasing divinites, etc.', - suspecting a retort to this effect the author of the Laudation says: "and a general rule, etc.".

The middle expression '*anyārham*' (not pertinent) is to be joined with both (the preceding and the following) according to the principle of "the jewel (fastened) in a hand-drum"<sup>47</sup>. **Non-pertinent general rule**, statement of a general rule used for one purpose; by a statement employed for another matter, has not an exception, is not liable to exception. With reference to whatever matter a general rule is started in the *Sāstras*, with reference to that same matter is the exception also started; because these two, as in the expressions 'low-lying and high-lying', have the object (*viśaya*) of establishing a single matter with mutual dependence. Just as for the Jains with a view (*artha*) to maintaining their self-restraints (*ramyama*) the taking of food (89) pure in the nine points<sup>48</sup> is the general rule, while the taking, in the absence of any other possible course (*catā*), of things undesirable in respect of the five, etc., *yaśanās* (restrictions)<sup>49</sup>, on the part of someone who has fallen into difficulties in regard to such substances, places, times, conditions, is the exception. And even that is merely for the sake of maintaining his self-restraint. Nor should it be said, 'For one who has the refuge of dying the absence of any other possible course is unestablished', because of the Scripture:

"In all cases let him guard his self-restraint, and through self-restraint guard himself.

From the transgression he is released, purity comes again, there is no failure of renunciation"<sup>50</sup>.

Similarly, in the *Āgur-veda* also, in the case of one disease at a certain stage some substance is unwholesome, and that very same substance is in the case of that same disease at another stage wholesome, because of the text

"There arises with regard to place, time and disease a stage

Wherein should be done a thing not usually done, and the usual operation should be avoided"<sup>51</sup>;

As for a strong, etc., person with fever running; but for one whose bodily elements are exhausted the opposite thereof. Also upon consideration of place, etc., the swallowing of curds, etc., is even for a fevered person applicable. And to this effect say the physicians: (90)

<sup>45</sup> A maxim going back to Patañjali's *Mahā-bhāṣya* see Col. Jacob's *A third handful of popular Marims*, p. 10. M. L. states that it is given in Hemachandra's list of Nyāyas in Hemachandra's Grammar.

<sup>46</sup> *Ādhā karma* (Prākṛt *ādhā-karma*): This involves some relaxations in regard to cooking and using food on behalf of Śāsthus see Schubring, *Die Lehre der Jainas*, p. 172.

<sup>47</sup> The *damaru* is in the form of two saucers back to back, and the clapper on a string strikes both membranes see Col. Jacob's *Third handful of popular Marims*, p. 50.

<sup>48</sup> For a specification of the nine points see M. L.'s citation of Muṇḍagiri's commentary on the *Pṛaṇa-niryukti*, I digama-Jvāra, v. 462.

<sup>49</sup> The *yaśanās* (Prākṛt *yaśana*), explained in the Lexica as preservation of living creatures, *pramāṇikāya* are restrictions upon lodging, etc. M. L. cites Kṛṣṇakṛti-ācārya's commentary on *Bṛhad-Ālpaśastra*, Uddesa I.

<sup>50</sup> Source of quotation untraced.

<sup>51</sup> Source of quotation untraced.

"Ordered without contravention of time, running is good in fever, etc.,  
Except for fevers due to wind, exhaustion, anger, grief, love"<sup>40</sup>).

And similarly, the original avoidance of the customary diet, and at another stage of the same (disease) the consuming of the same are, of course, in both cases with a view to relief from that same disease. Thus it is established that general rule and exception have the same range (*viśaya*).

But Your Worship's general rule has one field, and the exception another field. For the general rule, 'let him not kill any creature', is for the object of preventing a bad destiny; but the exception, that is the ordinance of Vedic 'hurt', is for the object of creating satisfaction in gods, guests and ancestors. And so, as these are mutually irrespective, how is the general rule vetoed by the exception? Because of the principle, "Conflict is between two things of like force"<sup>41</sup>. For, if even in the case of a distinct field there is a vetoing thereby, that carries too far. Nor should it be said that 'The ordinance of Vedic hurt also has, as being a cause of heavenly existence, actually the object of preventing a bad destiny'; for by the previously stated argument the being the cause of heaven is wiped out; since even without that there is attainment thereof by other procedures (*prakāra*) also. For the adoption of an exception-alternative is in the absence of any other course.

Nor do only we refuse to admit that the ordinance of sacrifice is with the object of a good destiny, but Your Worship's authorities also. As said the great Rsi Vyasa -

"By worship an extensive sovereignty, by maintaining the fires successes,

Austerity is for the sake of purification from sins, but cognition and meditation give *Mukti*"<sup>42</sup>).

Here the teacher, mentioning the ritual of sacrifice, etc., denoted by the expression 'maintaining the fires' as cause only of successes attainable also by other means, has actually in effect repudiated its being cause of a good destiny. And likewise the same authority has, in the verses: "In the water of *brahma-ras* ya, etc."<sup>43</sup>, set up the spiritual (*bhāra*) Agnihotra. (91)

The position being thus, he condemns the procedures of these disputants by a simile. School fellow<sup>44</sup> of etc. **Of the opponents**, of the persons averse to the texts composed by Your Worship, the wild flight, the (hasty) procedure, school-fellow of a desire to obtain sovereignty through the killing of one's own sons; like a desire to attain a kingdom through the killing of one's own sons. As suppose some undiscerning person, through a cruel disposition, wishes by slaying his own offspring to obtain royal glory; and, even if he does obtain it, the mud of the blot of the sin of killing his own sons never leaves him. Similarly, even if by Veda-ordained hurt one effects satisfaction in divinities, etc., the evil arising from hurt would certainly not be averted. And here by employing the expression "desire to obtain" the author of the Laudation hints that, just as that evilly-disposed person, whose good acts are uprooted by bringing about such an unparalleled evil deed, has in regard to that obtaining of sovereignty only the mere aspiration, and the effecting thereof, similarly those bad disputants, though they carry out the Veda-ordained hurt, have as regards the satisfying of gods, etc., simply an imaginary royalty, but not the respect of exalted persons and the satisfaction of Indra and other heaven-dwellers, since that is refuted by the previously stated argument. This is the meaning of the verse.

<sup>40</sup>) Source of quotation untraced.

<sup>41</sup>) Source of quotation untraced.

<sup>42</sup>) Untraced (*Mahā-Bhārata*).

<sup>43</sup>) See *supra*, p. 67.

<sup>44</sup>) *sa brahmacari*, 'co-student'.

## XII. KUMĀRILA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Now, pulverizing the view of the Bhāṭṭa division of the Mīmāṃsakas<sup>1)</sup>, who maintain an eternal transcendental (*parokṣa*) cognition<sup>2)</sup>, and of the Yogas, who maintain a cognition to be known by another cognition inherent in one same self<sup>3)</sup>, he says:

**XII. Awareness shines out actually able to reveal self and object;**

**otherwise there is no talk of an object at all.**

**Others from fear of others nevertheless**

**Adopted a cognition not residing in the self.**

**Awareness, cognition, and that shines out, capable of awareness of self and object—self (AI) the own-form of the self, and the object, the thing<sup>4)</sup>, and thereof awareness, outlining in regard thereto, actually able, actually competent; manifests itself (*pratibhāskate*). So far then the cutting off of non reasoning. Inasmuch as by the verb 'shines out' (*prakāśate*) the fact is established that awareness is in the form of illumination (*prakāśan*), and, as all illuminations reveal themselves and their object, that is established in regard to awareness also. He states a confutation of the opposite: "Otherwise there is no talk of an object at all" **Otherwise**, because, there being no dispute as regards the illumination of an object, if of the cognition self-consciousness is not admitted, there would not be any talk of an object. **Talk of an object**, i. e. conversation connected with any thing, that is to say, own character as consisting of an existent or non-existent form, that is what it comes to. The word **at all** (*tu*) is for precision, and it is out of order; and it is construed with 'talk of an object'. For, if a cognition**

<sup>1)</sup> *padārthavya*, ka, kha, gha, Daś, sm. AMF

<sup>2)</sup> The Kumārila school: see note XI 1)

<sup>3)</sup> According to Kumārila's fundamental doctrine cognition is *parokṣa* i. e. not directly perceived, because void of self-consciousness. A cognition does not envelope itself along with its content. The cognition AB can indeed be followed by the complex cognition 'I cognize AB', but this is a different cognition from the original cognition AB and is again in its turn unconscious of itself. In this second cognition the 'I' is indeed a part of the content, but it is not the mere ego, but a person. Thus a cognition is never simultaneously aware of its own activity, and when it contemplates such an activity at another moment it is by inference from the cognizedness (*anātata*) of the content. Although it is possible to say, 'I often cognize', with out specification of contents, this is merely an ordinary example of generalization.

Kumārila's view of this fundamental psychological-philosophic question may have resulted from the common practical experience of objective thinking, in which the thinking self is entirely out of view. But in the *Mohā-vārttika* the long exposition (IV, *Sūnyavāda*, trans. pp. 168-182) is controversial, directed against the Buddhists, for whom the self-consciousness of thought was vital. The Jain author argues against Kumārila's view. The questions of *regressus ad infinitum* and the analogies of lamp light, which are prominent in the debate, are usual in Indian discussions of this topic: the comparison of consciousness to light is indeed ancient and inevitable, and it was adduced also in ancient Greek philosophy.

<sup>4)</sup> These Yogas are the 'others' mentioned here in verse XII, sc. the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, as in pp. 2, 57. The Vaiśeṣika view is that cognition occurs by way of conjunction (*samyoga*) of the omnipresent self with the (atomic) mind-organ (*manas*): it therefore does not 'reside in the self'. It is not self-conscious, but can be, and is, when occasion invites, known by a succeeding act of 'apperception' (*anuvyaśaya*) in the form 'I cognize AB', which is again an operation of the mind-organ. This view is contested in *Sammata-tarka*, pp. 575-9, and *Prameya-kamala-māṇḍa*, fol. 34-8.

is not accepted as self-conscious, then it must demand another cognition for the cognition of itself, and that also another, and so there is a *regressus ad infinitum*. Therefore the cognition, to begin with, is absorbed in concentration or awareness itself, and the object, being unintelligent, is incapable of noting its own-form - so who, pray, could even talk any talk of the object?

Nevertheless, though the self-consciousness of cognition is thus logically appropriate; others, followers of other sects, adopted, took to; a cognition, as an Accusative (*karmatā*); not residing in the self, that which has not a residence, an ascertainment, of itself, of its own being, that is 'not residing in the self'. 'not self-conscious' is the meaning. Why? He proceeds to say, from fear of others; 'others', the disputants for the first alternative; on their part the self as self-cognized is not approved, from the fear, namely, arising from imagination of criticism on the ground of the contradiction in action upon oneself; from that they had recourse thereto.

Having thus laid down a verbal explanation, we develop the sense-meaning: The Bhāṭṭas<sup>4</sup> to begin with, say thus. "Cognition is not self-conscious", (P3) because of the contradiction in action on oneself. For not even a well-trained actor boy is clever enough to mount on his own shoulder, nor has even a very sharp sword edge an operation suitable for cutting itself. And therefore cognition is simply transcendental" - Now this is not correct: for is it the origination (of the cognition) in itself that is contradictory, or the knowing (of it)? If it is the origination, let that be contradictory, for we also do not hold that a cognition originates itself. Or, if the knowing of it, this is not contradictory in regard to itself, since that, the cognition, arises from its own causes, just as the light of a lamp with its illumination-self. Or, if it is said, "Let the light of the lamp, as originated with an illumination-self, be illuminant of others, what is this principle that merely for that reason it illuminates also itself?", is that unfortunate to stand itself unilluminated altogether, or is its illumination to be from another light? In the first case there is veiling by direct perception; in the second also there is the same, and the consequence of *regressus ad infinitum*.

Or, if it is said, 'As not appearing as object (*karmatā*) in reference to itself, it is accepted as not self-illuminating, that is, does not illuminate its self (*ātmānam*), but as originated in the form of illumination, it is actually luminous of itself (*svayam*)', - long may you live! For we also do not say that cognition is self-conscious as appearing (*pratibhāsa*) simply as an object; for in the cognition of itself shines out' (*pratibhāsate*), etc., it shines out not as an object (*karmaka*); but, just as in 'I cognize cognition itself' it appears (*bhāu*) also as object (*karmatā*), just so in 'a lamp illuminates itself' it (the lamp) also is actually proclaimed an object.

As for the contradiction of action on one's own self, broached as an objection, that also is illogical, because in a matter established by experience contradiction is unestablished; for in 'I cognize pot', etc., the cognizing also, like doer and the deed (object), appears (*ava-bhāsa*), (P4) nor is seeing of the object acknowledged in the case of a non-perceived observation<sup>5</sup>. Nor can it be supposed to be observed through another cognition, since that also, if not observed, does not make directly known to perception the observation in question. And, if another observation is supposed, there is *regressus ad infinitum*; if the observation of it is through observation of the object<sup>6</sup>, there is the fault of mutual dependence.

<sup>4</sup> The discussion (pp. 74-75) of the Bhāṭṭa view closely follows Ratnākara's comm. on *Pramāṇa-sau-mānta* I. 17 (Dhruva, Notes, p. 339).

<sup>5</sup> See as sub-liminal, sub-conscious or absent-minded observation.

<sup>6</sup> See as in the view of Kūṭarāṇḍī that the cognizing is inferred from the cognizedness (*grāhata*) of its content.

Or, if it is said, 'The outstandingness (*prākāṣya*) of the object is otherwise unaccountable, if the cognition should not be; so that the observation thereof is through practical consequence'<sup>7</sup>). - No! That also, being not cognized as an indication (*jñāpaka*)<sup>8</sup>, cannot function as an indication. If the cognition thereof is through another practical consequence, then, because of the resulting fault of the mutual dependence among the *regressus ad infinitum*, defeat is as before. Therefore, since the cognition shines out in regard to itself, just as in regard to the object, there is self-consciousness.

'Surely, if an experiencing (*anubhūti*) is experientable (*anubhārya*), like a pot, etc., it follows that it is not an experiencing; and the working out is as follows: cognition, though in the form of experience (*anubhava*), is not an experiencing, because it is experientable, like a pot; and cognition is agreed by Your Worship to be experientable, because self-conceived'. Say not so, since, like the knower as a knower, the experiencing is experienced as experiencing. Nor is the experientability of experiencing a fault, since it is experiencing with reference to the object, and it is experientable with reference to itself; there being no contradiction as in the case of the sonhood and fatherhood of a single person, with reference to his own father and son.

And from inference also self-consciousness is established. As thus: only as self-illuminating does cognition illuminate the object, because it is illuminant like a lamp. If it is said, 'If self-consciousness is something to be illuminated'<sup>9</sup>, its being illuminant is unestablished', No! Because by way of repelling non-cognition<sup>10</sup> its being illuminant fits (05).

If it is said, 'Surely, the eye, etc., though illuminants, do not illuminate themselves, so that the Middle Term, i. e. 'being an illuminant', is equivocal'<sup>11</sup>). - Not so! We have not here equivocation because of eye, etc., since only in the form of the inner senses, defined as receptivity and attention<sup>12</sup>, are these illuminants; and the inner senses have the form of self-consciousness, so that there is no divergence. Therefore consciousness is self-illuminant, because of the presentation of an object: what is not self-illuminant, is not presentation of an object, like a pot.

So the self-conceivedness of cognition being established by perception and inference, the Bhāṭṭa supposition of perception in three stages results in trouble. (They say:) "On contact with an existent thing there is cognition, defined as 'produced by the organ and awareness'; then outstandingness of the object, therefrom practical consequence, and therethrough observation of the (activity) stimulating cognition"<sup>13</sup>). But the Yogins say<sup>14</sup>: 'Cognition is to be illuminated by something other than itself because, if other than God's cognition, it is a subject of knowledge (knowable), like a pot, for a cognition, when (already) originated, is discerned only by a mental perception arising next inherent in the same self, not by itself (i. e. the original perception). And there is not in this way *regressus ad infinitum*, because the

<sup>7</sup> *Ārādhapāṇi*, which applies when a fact is otherwise inexplicable, the stock example being 'That Devadatta does not eat in the daytime: ergo he eats at night'. Here the outstandingness of the object proves that it has been cognized.

<sup>8</sup> It is not present in mind at all, and so does not operate.

<sup>9</sup> So to be revealed by the cognition as part of its content.

<sup>10</sup> I. e., as a positive something which conceivably might not have been there, it makes an assertion of itself.

<sup>11</sup> So subject to exception, since the mentioned illuminants do not illuminate, i. e. reveal, themselves.

<sup>12</sup> 'Receptivity' (*śabdān*) and attention (*upayoga*). These are discussed in Umayācāri's *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra*, II 18-4, the former being the general faculty of sense-awareness of objects and the latter the actual attention and response (M. L.). See also note VIII 63.

<sup>13</sup> The first part of the quotation is from *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* I 1. 4, which is correctly quoted in Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I c. 30 and several times in the *Tattva-saṃgraha*.

<sup>14</sup> This Yoga, i. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Here again the argument (pp. 76-77) follows Ratnākera on *Pramāṇa-naya-m.* I. 17 (see Dhruva, notes, p. 349, who also cites, pp. 341-2, parallels from Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I 1-2).

knower's aim (*artha*) is satisfied upon the establishment of the object (*artha*) by the mere originating of the cognition ascertaining the object; and, if there is a desire to know the cognition of the object, a cognition does arise in regard to that also<sup>17</sup>.

This is illogical, because, as the (alleged) Minor<sup>18</sup> (*pakṣa*) is refuted by a contrary inference, the Middle Term comes too late<sup>19</sup>. As thus: The cognition which is the subject of dispute is self-conceived: because it is a cognition, like God's cognition. Nor is this example unaccepted by disputants, because, as the Jains also admit a special person as a God, his cognitions are to them a well-established thing.

And also your Middle Term here has a purposeless (*vyartha*) noun (*viśeṣya*)<sup>20</sup>; because, the Major Term being established simply by the assumption of a meaningful (*samartha*) attribute (*viśeṣana*), (96) as in the establishment of fire because, given the having smoke, there is a being substance, the case is satisfied simply through (this Middle Term) 'being other than God's cognition'. For other than God's cognition, there is no cognition self-conceived and not a subject of knowledge, for the exclusion of which 'through being a subject of knowledge' should be said: because on Your Worship's view all cognition other than that is a subject of knowledge (knowable).

Also this Middle Term is non-conclusive, because it is subject to a condition (*upādhi*)<sup>21</sup>; for of course what is termed a condition is that which does not comprehend the Minor Term and has equal comprehension with the Major Term; as in the case of the being a development of a vegetarian diet, when dark complexion is to be proved by being the son of so and so, etc.; (because the sons of Mitrā if they feed [in the womb] on vegetables, are dark; so that his 'being son of Mitrā' is not a proof that he is dark.) And the condition in the present case is 'being not intelligent' as thus: Only that which, being also other than God's cognition and subject of knowledge, is unintelligent, i. e. a pillar, etc., that alone is illuminated by something other than itself. For dependence upon another for own-illumination is the definition of 'non-intelligent' and a cognition is not of a non-intelligent own-form. Hence the being non-intelligent is not comprehensive of the Middle Term<sup>22</sup>; and its having the same extension as the Major Term is patent; because we nowhere see the absence of self-illumination except in non-intelligence, or non-intelligence apart from that (i. e. absence of illumination).

As for it having been said 'For a cognition (already) originated, inherent in the same self'<sup>23</sup>, and so on, that also is not true. Since we do not see that the cognition of the object, and the cognition of that cognition, when they originate, have such order of succession. If it is said, 'The non-observation of order is due to rapid originating, like the opening of the hundred leaves of a blue lotus', this is not so, since one propounds the originating of the cognition of the object as after interposition of a desire to cognize<sup>24</sup>. Nor does the production of cognitions by a desire to cognize fit: because in regard to objects suitably placed, even if there is no desire to cognize them, we have a presentation of the originating thereof (i. e. the cognitions). Nor has the cognition of the object an unsuitable location: (97) since it is produced as inherent

<sup>17</sup> The supposed un-self-conscious cognition.

<sup>18</sup> On 'related' Middle Terms see note XI 2.

<sup>19</sup> 'Subject of knowledge' this is superfluous for the reason to be stated, just as in the case of fire a being substance' is superfluous.

<sup>20</sup> Condition is something which restricts the extension of the Middle Term so far as this is covered by the Major, so that there are outside occurrences which may not fall under the Major: hence the Middle Term does not prove the Major. This topic and the example of Mitrā's sons are commonplace in Indian logic: see *Syādvakosa*, s. v. 1 padh.

<sup>21</sup> So 'being non-intelligent' some objects of cognition are not non-intelligent.

<sup>22</sup> See p. 75 below.

<sup>23</sup> There is therefore an interval.

in the self. Thus there is the consequence of the originating of cognition of the cognition of the object even without desire to cognize. Or, if it is said, 'Let this originate if you like: what is the fault?', Surely, even so we have in regard to the cognition of that cognition the consequence of origination of another cognition. And in regard to that similarly the same (consequence); and so, because of the preoccupation of the self simply in a series of originatings of cognitions one after another, it would not move on to other objects (*iragya*). Therefore what is cognition has with reference to awareness by the self no respect to the operation of another cognition; just as the final cognition of a series of identical cascade cognitions<sup>31</sup>) apprehending one object (*gora*) antecedent to a cognition apprehending another object, and just as cognition subjected to dispute, cognition of colour, etc., so that the cognizability of cognition by another cognition does not bear argument. This is the meaning of the verse:

<sup>31</sup>) E. g. 'this pot', 'this pot', and so on (M. I.). They are all the same and do not affect a new cognition having a different object.

### XIII. THE VEDĀNTA DOCTRINE OF BRAHMA AS THE SOLE REALITY

Now, as regards the maintainers of the non-duality (*advaita*) of Brahma<sup>1</sup>, who justify an ultimate non-reality of the world of things (*vastu prapañca*) found in the Triple Universe, as being appearances (*pratibhāsa*), through the power of Māyā, otherwise termed ignorance (*avidyā*),<sup>2</sup> articulating their views he says:

**XIII. If Māyā is existent, then establishment of reality as double;  
or if non-existent, pray, whence the world?  
If Māyā verily, and also capable of effect,  
then have Your Worship's opponents one who is both mother and barren?**

The **Māyā**, i. e. ignorance, which, distinct from the real (*tātteika*) Self-Brahma, is by those disputants invented as the cause of the world, that is in the form of an existent or the form of a non-existent, a two-way course. **If existent**, in the form of an existent, **then establishment of reality as double**; what has two parts, that is double, a suchlike reality (*tatva*), ultimately, the establishment thereof. This is the meaning. Now there is one real (98), Self-Brahma, approved by you, and a second, Māyā, having the form of a reality because it is adopted as being in the form of an existent. And thus an axe is set at the root of the Advaita-doctrine. **Or**: this is to signify another alternative: **If non-existent**, in the form of a non-entity; like a sky lotus, etc., i. e. **that**, Māyā. Then, **pray** : 'Pray' is used in calling attention, or in surprise, **whence the world?** Whence comes this world in the form of the group of things which are in the interior of the womb of the Triple Universe? It does not arise from anything, is the meaning, because Māyā is accepted as a non-entity; and because a non-entity, like a horse's horn, void of every designation (*upāhkhya*), is incapable of begetting such an appearance as is witnessed. Assuredly in the case of a phantasmagoria, etc., or a mirage the incapacity of illusorily shown objects to produce effects is seen; and in the present case since that effect is observed, how is the term (*vyapadesa*) 'Māyā' to be credited?

Or if it is said, 'It will be both Māyā, and also able to manifest (*upadarsana*) things capable of practical efficacy'<sup>3</sup>), then there is contradiction of one's own statement. For one is not both a mother and barren. With just this meaning in mind, he states the second half: **If Māyā verily**; (here the word 'verily' (*eva*) has the meaning 'even' (*apu*); and 'even' has the sense 'also') of an addition, and the following word **and** likewise. And the fact that both, meaning addition, indicate simultaneity, is familiar. As in the *Raghu samśa*<sup>4</sup>: "And they reached the ..."

<sup>1</sup>) In this verse we come to the Advaita Vedānta doctrine, which holds that Brahma, often described as 'Existence thought-bliss' (*nir-rod ānanda*) is the sole reality, the world being product of 'Illusion' (*māyā*) or 'Ignorance' (*avidyā*). This doctrine, subtly expounded in a vast literature, culminates in a declared 'infallibility' (*anavacanyatā*) from Buddhism, which in some forms has a like experience, it differs in its positive assurance that Brahma is at any rate the ground of all and in the practical conviction that amid all change and illusion 'I', when stripped of all particularity, 'am Brahma'.

<sup>2</sup>) Possibly the notion is that 'practical efficacy' is itself comprised in the illusion.

<sup>3</sup>) Kātibhāṣa: *Raghu samśa*, X 6 (M 1).



oceans and (at that very time) the primeval person awoke". So the sense of the saying is this, 'both will be *Māyā*, and will be capable of effect', **capable of effect** (*arthā sāha*, able to manifest things capable of producing effects. The word 'if' (*et*) is construed here, 'if it is said'. Suspecting a retort thus, he calls attention to its contradiction with their own statement, in these words: **then have Your Worship's opponents one who is both mother and barren?** '*Kim*' expresses a supposition (*sambhāvana*); the supposition is this: Your Worship's opponents, i. e. antagonists, of those, 'Your Worship's opponents', those different from Your Worship, those disputants, as being averse to Your Worship's pronouncements, that to them one should be a mother and should be 'barren' is ridicule. (99) For it is a woman who can give birth that is called mother; and 'barren' is the opposite thereof. And so, if mother—how barren? If barren, how mother? So, if thus *Māyā*, which is a non-entity, is accepted as capable of producing effects, the contradiction with one's own statement, as in the statement adduced, is patent. This is the general meaning.

But the detailed meaning is this. Those disputants cite as follows: 'Real is the Self *Brahma* alone, according to the principle

"All this assuredly is *Brahma*; diversity here there is none.

Its playground they behold, it no man beholds" (1)

This world, on the other hand, is of illusory (*mithyā*) form; because it is presented. What is so (so presented) is so (so illusory); as the silver in a bit of shell. And so (presented) is this; therefore so (illusory).'

Now this is mere gossip, as thus: the having an illusory form, in what way is it meant by them? Is it absolute non-existence, or the presentedness of one thing under the aspect of another, or else perhaps inexpressibility? On the first alternative we have the consequence of the appearance (*ākhyāti*)<sup>2</sup> of the non-existent; on the second, the adoption of wrong appearance; but on the third, what is this inexpressibility? If it is being without own-nature (*nirsvabhāvatva*), then, as 'without' has the sense of negation, and the word 'own-nature' further has the sense of either positivity (*bhāva*) or negativity (*abhāva*), there is the consequence of adopting appearance of the non-existent, or appearance of the existent. In case of negation of positivity, it (inexpressibility) is appearance of the non-existent, in case of negation of negativity it is appearance of the existent.

If it is said, 'Being without own-nature is not coming within the range of presentation', here there is contradiction; this world, if it is not presented, how is it taken as being a subject of attributes? And how is the state of being presented taken as a Middle Term? Or, if it is so taken, how is it not presented? If it is said, 'It is not so as it is presented', then this would be adoption by you of 'wrong appearance'<sup>3</sup>. Moreover, this inexpressibility of the world is vetoed by perception. For perception, which is in the mode of 'this pot', etc., (100) certifies actually the truth (*satyā*) of the world; since it originates with the character of outlining definite things, such as pot, etc.; and since only mutually distinct entities are designated by the word 'world' (*prapañca*)<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The quotation seems to be composite, 'All this . . . *Brahma*' being from *Chāndogya-upanishad* 4.11.1, 'Diversity . . . none' from *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upanishad*, IV. 6. 19, 'Its playground . . . from the same, IV. 2. 14. But on p. 82 the whole is quoted as from Scripture having an author!

<sup>2</sup> On the five *ākhyāti*, views concerning 'appearance': (1) *ātma-kh.* appearance based on the absolute Self; (2) *asat-kh.* appearance of what is non-existent; (3) *anyaikā-kh.* appearance of an existent as it is not; (4) *akh.* non-appearance of an existent, (5) *anirvacanīyakh.* appearance inexpressible; see Randle, *Indian Logic in the early schools*, pp. 59 sq., Dasgupta, H. N., *History of Indian Philosophy*, II, 87, n., III, 183-4.

<sup>3</sup> I. e. *anyathu-khyāti* (3) instead of your *anirvacanīya-khyāti* (5).

<sup>4</sup> As a system of differing things.

Or, if it is said, 'Since perception is affirmative, how has it the power of negation? For perception apprehends the own-form of an entity as 'this', and does not deny any other own-form, because of this text -

'The wise declare perception affirmative, not negative;

Tradition (*āgama*, orthodox view) as to unity is therefore not vetoed by perception'<sup>1</sup>).

Not without denial of any other form<sup>2</sup>) the outlining of the thing's own-form also is impossible; for blue, distinguished from yellow, etc., is that which is apprehended as 'blue', not otherwise, because the very notion (*pratipatti*) of the own-form of an entity as (in) itself (*kevala*) is in the form of the notion of denial of any other; like the apprehension of negation of pot in the apprehension of the bare earth-surface<sup>3</sup>). Therefore, just as perception is admitted as affirmative, so it must be admitted as negative also.

Furthermore, if it is agreed that perception is only affirmative, why is not ignorance affirmed, just as knowledge is affirmed, by perception?<sup>4</sup> - and so there is the consequence of duality<sup>5</sup>), and then the world is well founded<sup>6</sup>). And so how are those disputants not insane who, though adopting from perception only the existent as distinct from 'ignorance', say that it (perception) is not negative? And thus is established that the view is vetoed by perception.

And it is vetoed by inference, 'the world is not illusory, because it is different from the non-existent, like the self'. And the Middle Term<sup>7</sup>, the 'being (merely) presented', is divergent by reason of the Brahman Self; for that is presented, and yet not illusory. While, if it is not presented, then because of the want of use for the words applying to it, the best thing for them is dumbness. And the example<sup>8</sup>) is deficient in the Major Term, because in regard also to the silver in a bit of shell (inexpressibility<sup>9</sup>) is established through its being included in the world.

Moreover, is this inference distinct from the world<sup>10</sup>), or non-distinct? If distinct, then is it true or untrue? If true, then, just like it, the world also may be true, (101) because in the rampart of the Advaita doctrine there is a breach. Or, if untrue, then nothing can be established by it, because it is a non-entity. If non-distinct, then it follows that it also, having the own-nature of the world, is of illusory form; and, being of illusory form, how is it competent for the establishing of what it has to establish? And as thus the 'being of illusory form' is in regard to the world unestablished, how should there be reality of the supreme Brahman, so that there should be non-existence of external objects?

Or (else) in another way there is establishment of the supreme Brahman, defined as existent only (*sat* *mātra*); and a refutation is propounded, "Surely<sup>11</sup>), as the supreme Brahman alone exists as ultimately real in the form of affirmation, it is the object of knowledge, because there

<sup>1</sup> Quoted also in *Sammatī tārka* (ed. p. 273) and *Prameya-kamala-māṇḍana* (ed. 17 b); also in *Nyāya-mañjarī* p. 526. Absolute positivity of fundamental perception is a feature common to Vedānta and Buddhism.

<sup>2</sup> This is not the Buddhist doctrine of *apoka*, which makes all names to signify negation of everything else, but the Jain notion of positivity combined with negativity, on which see *infra*, v. XIV, pp. 85 sq.

<sup>3</sup> Where there is no pot. The perceptibility of negations or the alternative 'non-perception of something expected' was a standing theme of Nyāya-discussions.

<sup>4</sup> Since absence of 'pot' is perceived.

<sup>5</sup> Of existent and non-existents.

<sup>6</sup> I.e. not an illusion.

<sup>7</sup> The reference is to the syllogism on p. 79. This Middle is 'divergent' because it disregards the instance of the Brahman-self.

<sup>8</sup> I.e. the silver in the shell (p. 79).

<sup>9</sup> *Khyāti* no. 5.

<sup>10</sup> I.e. is it a part of the world-illusion?

<sup>11</sup> Here commences a long statement, extending as far as p. 82.



And lord over immortality (ambrosia) which (when ?) by food it grows exceedingly"<sup>20</sup>).

"What moves, what does not move, what is far, what near;

What is inside of all this, and what is outside of all this",

etc.<sup>21</sup>). And because it is established also by Veda sentences such as: "To be heard, to be thought of, to be undivided upon"<sup>22</sup>). (103) Because the same is demonstrated also by Scripture which has an author<sup>23</sup>), and it is said -

"All this assuredly is Brahmat; diversely here there is none.

His playground they behold; him no man beholds". (cf. p. 74).

"For there is establishment of the same from Demonstration also. 'The supreme person, one alone, is reality, because all different things are manifestations of him. As thus, all positive existents are manifestations of Brahmas, because they are all invested with the one form of existence, whatever is invested with the form of something, consists in fact thereof: as pot, cup, saucer, pail, etc., invested with one form, namely earth, are manifestations of earth. And every entity is invested with the single form, 'existence'; thus it is established that 'all different things are manifestations of Brahmas'".

Now all this is fallacious, like what is uttered stammering through tasting wine-juice, because it does not stand consideration. For every (real) entity is established by Demonstration, and not by mere words. And on the Advaita view a Demonstrant does not exist, since, if it were existent, duality would follow, because of the existence as a second of the Demonstrant establishing the Advaita. Or is it thought that a Demonstrant also in regard thereto is admitted in order to convince (worldly) people? That is not so: for on their view the people also cannot exist, because only the one eternally undivided supreme Brahmas exists.

Or let a Demonstrant also somehow or other exist. Then, is perception, inference or Scripture adopted as the Demonstrant establishing that (Advaita doctrine)? Not perception, to begin with; since that reveals simply the differences found in the whole mass of entities; because only so does it appear to all, down to children and herdsmen. As for it having been said that 'unquestioning perception reports it', that also is not correct. For the validity thereof as a proof is not admitted, because of every real means of proof the validity is justified only when in the form of certitude (*vyavasāya*)<sup>24</sup>) it does not lead to disappointment. By questioning (*samkalpaka*)<sup>25</sup>) perception, on the other hand, as a means of proof, there is not, even in dream, appearance of a single supreme Brahmas in the form of affirmation.

As for it having been said that "They declare perception affirmative", and so on, that also is not (104) satisfactory, for by perception there is diminution only of entities consisting of aspects recurrent and discriminative<sup>26</sup>). And that has already been dealt with. For no single indivisible universal, purely existence, irrespective of differences, appears as running all through, so that (the saying) "What is non-duality, that is the form of Brahmas"<sup>27</sup>), etc., should seem good<sup>28</sup>); because no universal, irrespective of differences, is, like an ass's horn, non-apparent. Thus it is said:

<sup>20</sup>) *anumānānga* add Das.

<sup>21</sup>) *sobhita cā ka kha gha ha*, Das; *sobhita* AMP.

<sup>22</sup>) *Rig-veda*, A. 90. 2 (M. 1.).

<sup>23</sup>) *śaṅkṣāya upanīṣad*, v. 5 (M. 1.).

<sup>24</sup>) *Brhad āraṅyaka upanīṣad*, II. 4. 3.

<sup>25</sup>) Who is the eternal Veda has not. (On the quotation see note 4).

<sup>26</sup>) The unquestioning has not the nature of apprehension.

<sup>27</sup>) For such perception as involves a judgment, e.g. 'cow'.

<sup>28</sup>) In class-aspects and individual aspects.

<sup>29</sup>) Source untraced.

"Universal without differentia would be like an ass's horn,  
And differentiae, from being without universal, would be just likewise"<sup>39</sup>.

Since therefore objects consisting of universal and differentia are established as the range of Demonstration, however can one supreme Brahmo be within the range of the Demonstration? As for the stated inference, 'because of being object of knowledge', (cf. p. 80), that also should be understood as refuted by this same; because the Minor Term being vetoed by perception, the Middle Term is belated<sup>40</sup>. As for 'being appearance', mentioned as Middle Term in the establishment thereof, that also, being a fallacious Middle Term, is not competent to demonstrate the Major Term in question. For is the appearance nature of all positive existents of itself (*svataḥ*) or from others? Not of itself, to begin with, because pot, cloth, diadem, cart, etc., are not of themselves established as being appearances; and from others a being appearance is, in default of the others, not justified.

As for all different things being said to occur as illusory appearance of the supreme Brahmo, that also, inasmuch as it cannot occur without a pair, a corresponding thing in place of the thing to which it corresponds, actually prohibits a non-duality of a primeval Person. Nor are pot, etc., constantly accompanied by intelligence; since we see them constantly accompanied by earth, etc., only. Therefore this also is nothing. Hence from inference also there is no establishment of it.

Moreover, Minor Term, Middle Term, and example, which are the means of inference, are they mutually different, or non-different? In case of difference, there is establishment of duality; in the case of non-difference, on the other hand, there is the consequence of their being of one form (105). Hence how does inference from these bring home the self? And, if even without a Middle Term there should be establishment of a Major Term, then how should there not be simply from words establishment of duality also? Thus it is said<sup>41</sup>:

"If from a Middle Term there should be establishment of non-duality, there would be duality of the Middle and Major Terms;

If without a Middle Term there is establishment, why have we not simply from words duality?"

From Scripture, etc., also, — such as "All this is the primeval Person"<sup>42</sup>, and "All this surely in truth is Brahman"<sup>43</sup>, — there is no establishment thereof. For that also, as it does not exist without duality, cannot be valid proof in regard to non-duality; because in it also we see only duality — defined as the relation of things stated and stated. Thus it is said:

"Duality of deed, duality of fruition, duality of world, are contradicted;

There the part of knowledge and ignorance would not be, likewise the pair of bondage and liberation"<sup>44</sup>.

Hence, how is there even from Scripture establishment thereof? Therefore an entity defined as non-dual Person is not within the range of Demonstration. Thus a world is fully demonstrated. This is the meaning of the verse

<sup>39</sup> Kumārila's *Śloka vārttika*, XIII, v. 10 (slightly altered) (M. L., trans. p. 283).

<sup>40</sup> On this term see note VI 2c.

<sup>41</sup> From Śaṅkara's *Brahma-sūtra*, v. 26 (M. L.).

<sup>42</sup> *Rig-veda*, X. 90. 2 (M. L.).

<sup>43</sup> *Chāndogya-upanishad*, III. 14. 1 (M. L.).

<sup>44</sup> *Āpā-mīmāṃsā*, v. 25 (M. L.).

## XIV. THE VEDĀNTA THEORIES OF THE DENOTATION OF TERMS

Now, beginning with a particle of one of a class of denotand and denotant, as consisting, according to the own view of many, a single differential both, here by way of a rejection of a relation of denotand and denotant, as appearing according to those of other sects, to the same single, by later the same, by the exception.

XIV The denotand is plural, it *essence* is not one;  
the denotant also is necessarily an essence dual.  
In otherwise herefrom supposing a denotant and denotand  
there is, on the part of those who are not Thine, error of conception.

**Denotand**, thing named, verily is to be said *denotand*, and non intelligent, because the word verily (*evam*) has the sense of 'of all things'. This is enough in **essence one**, in its form as universal, through distinction by inflection into *one* and *plural*, of plural form. Or else, even what is of plural form is in essence one, since the two are essentially involved; so, with such interpretation also, there is no fault. Further, the denotant, the denoter, in the form of a word (*ishāda*); that also necessarily, certainly, in essence dual, because it consists of both universal and difference. 'In essence one and plural' is the meaning, in both cases, although both (words) should have 'the gender of the thing stated' (see Note 1) since that is undetermined, a neuter is used. The word 'necessarily', certifying the essential singular and plural nature of the denotant and the denotant both end, now that they are made. Herefrom, from the stated method, otherwise, by a method formed with an error, is a participation, singly; in supposing a denotant and denotand, in the supposition of a dual, of a denotant and denotant, on the part of those not Thine, of those who belong to these groups, error of conception, intellectual (*prajñā*) tripping up. So the verbal meaning. And this is, although the term 'denotant' (*pratyak*), as being the shorter, should be put in first, *pratyak* *evam* *pratyak* *evam* *pratyak*, that is in order to hunt that

[illegible]<sup>2)</sup> This refers to a linguistic theory as it is used by many linguists.

the place of honour belongs to the denotant, since in general the demonstrating of meaning depends upon the (use of) words. And so the grammarians?)

'There is no notion in the world which is without verbal accompaniment.  
All cognition seems to be, as it were, permeated by (speech-sound)'

The sense-meaning is as follow: some heretics approve only of what has the form of an universal as being the denotand. And these followers of the 'substance-existent Method'\*) are a branch of the Mīmāṃsikas, the Advaita disputants and the Sāṃkhya's. And some also expound the denotand as merely of the form of a particular, and these, following 'the state-existent Method'\*\*), are Buddhists, and others make out as the denotand an entity possessed of universality and particularity as mutually independent separate categories, and these conforming to 'the practical Method', are the followers of Kāṇḍa, and the followers of Akṣapada\*) (107)

And this triad of alternatives is discussed a little. As thus, those disputants who cling to the generality Method (*sāṃgraha naya*) expound: 'The universal alone is real because we do not see differentiae apart from it, so all is one because indistinguishably it has existence, inferred through the mark of regular presence called the cognition 'existent'. Thus substance-ness alone is reality, because the substances, mind, element, ether, time, matter, soul, are not observed as objects different from it. Moreover, the differentiae which are supposed to be separate from the universal, and have for essence a mutual exclusion: is there in them differentiation-ness, or not? If not, it follows that they have no own nature, since they have, not even an own form. If there is, then that itself is an universal; because universality is the status of things similar (*śamāna*), and a presentation of all of them indistinguishably, as having the form of differentia, is actually established.

Moreover, the mark of a differentia is its being cause of the presentation of distinction. And the presentation of distinction itself, upon consideration, does not fail. For distinction is negation of another thing in regard to a meant thing. And a meant thing stops at (*paryaya* *sāya*) the mere setting forth of its own form in each instance: how has it authority for the negation of another thing? Nor is there in it, other than the existence of its own form, anything wherethrough the denial thereof takes place. And if an exclusion in regard thereto (to other things) takes place, then there should be excluded from it all the things different from itself, past, present, and future, in the Triple Universe. And they cannot be excluded while their own-form is not cognized. And therefore on the fact cognition of even a single differentia there should be omniscience in the knower, and that is neither so presented, nor logically proved. Further, exclusion is denied, and that is: having the form of non-existence, is nothing, how does it come within the range of presentation, like a flower in the sky? (108)

Furthermore, the things from which there is distinction, are they in the form (aspect) of existent, or of non-existent? If in the form (aspect) of non-existent, then why is there not distinction from ass's horn? But, if of existent, there is merely the universal. And as for this distinction effected by the differentiae, is it in all the particular differentiae one or plural? If plural, it follows that that also is a differentia; since the differentiae have for their sole substance the being of plural form, and so that (distinction) also, since its being differentia is otherwise unaccountable, must have distinction-ness. And if distinction-ness also

\*) From Bhartṛhari's *Vākya-pāṇīya*, I 124 (M. I. 1) quoted in *Sammatī tārka*, p. 380 and *Nyāya-mañjari*, p. 532.

\*\*) See note 5).

\*) On these 'Methods' (*naya*) see *infra*, vv. XXIV (pp. 142sq.), XXVII (pp. 152sq.).

\*) The Vaiśeṣikas and Sāṃkhyaikas.

has distinctionness, then there will be simply non-existence of the differentiae; because the distinctionness which their own form is negated, and because of the consequence of *regressus ad infinitum*. If one, the universal simply would be agreed to under another term; because its characteristic, the presentation of regular presence, is not lacking. Furthermore, these differentiae, are they distinct from the universal, or non distinct? If distinct, they imitate the frog's top-knot<sup>1</sup>; and, if non distinct, they are identical therewith, like its own-form.<sup>2</sup> Thus the contention of the universal solely.

Those, again, who follow the State Method principle state: 'Separate, momentarily perishing, differentiae alone are the ultimate reality; because an universal apart therefrom is not presented. For at the time of experiencing a particular ox, etc., nothing apart from the form of the particular, consisting of colour and configuration, shines out in the perception as one recurrent thing, because there is no experience of such. And thus they read:

"Whoso in these five fingers which appear clearly in perceptual awareness,  
Detects a common form, sees on his own head a horn"<sup>3</sup>).

'But the presentation of glimpsing (*parāmarsa*) one single shape (*ākāra*) arises simply from the particulars, which have a potency bestowed by their own causes. And so an establishment thereby of an universal is not reasonable.

'Furthermore, this universal which is formulated, is it single or plural? Even if single, is it omnipresent, or not omnipresent? If omnipresent, why is it not observed in the interspaces of the particulars? (109) And, if its omnipresent unity is accepted, then, just as the universal cow-ness embraces the particular cows, why does it not similarly also the pot, cloth and other particulars? Because there is no difference. If not omnipresent, it is consequently of the form of a differentia, and the adopted view is vetoed.

'But, if plural, because differentiated by the differences cow-ness, horse-ness, pot-ness, cloth-ness, etc., then it is differentiae that are adopted, because they are causes of mutual exclusion: for that which is cow-ness is not of the essence of horse-ness. And practical efficiency is the mark of entity; and that is clearly presented only in differentiae: for by the universal no practical efficiency is exercised, because it is without action, save in the practical actions of riding, walking, etc., only the differentiae are of service. Also, is this universal distinct from the differentiae, or non distinct? If distinct, it is non-entity, because, when it is detached from the differentiae, it has no practical efficiency; and, if non-distinct, it is only the differences, like their own form.<sup>4</sup> So the doctrine of differentia only.

But the followers of the practical (*Naiyama*)<sup>5</sup> Method say: 'Universal and differentia are independent; since only as such are they presented through Demonstration. As thus: universal and differentia are absolutely distinct, because they are residence of contradictory attributes, when two things are so, they are so, as water and fire, and so are these two, therefore so are they. Now the universal, ox-ness, etc., is omnipresent, and opposite thereto are the differentiae, 'brindled', 'spotted', and so forth. Hence how is their oneness logical?

'If it is said, the differentia is not to be observed apart from the universal'; how then is it stated that there is observation of it? If it is said, 'as comprised by the universal'; then that is not observation of the differentia; since it apprehends also the universal. And therefore, as by that awareness there is no apprehension of the differentia as separate, the sounds stating it, and the business thereby to be effected, would not be activated by the knower;

<sup>1</sup> *śyādvādamūlī*, p. 109.

<sup>2</sup> Is a non-entity.

<sup>3</sup> From *Asoka's Sarvaṃga-dāna-dīk-prasāritā* (M. I.), concerning which work see Vidyābhūṣaṇa, *History of Indian Logic*, pp. 332-3, Haraprasād Shāstri, *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, pp. 91-102.

<sup>4</sup> On this see *infra*, pp. 154, 156.



and that is not the fact, because we see him acting in the naming of the differentia and in the business. (110) Therefore for one who aims at the differentia, and activates the business, a separate awareness apprehending it must be admitted.

Similarly one who employs the word for a differentia in the case of an universal and a word for an universal in the case of a differentia must admit in regard to the universal also a single separate awareness apprehending it. Therefore from separately shining out in a cognition apprehending each its own, both of them are mutilated. Hence, that an entity consists of universal and differentia does not fit. Thus the doctrine of independent universal and differentia.

Now this whole triad of alternatives does not bear pressing; because it is vetoed by Demonstration<sup>10</sup>, since only an entity consisting of both universal and differentia is indisputably the thing experienced. For the mark of entity is practical efficacy, and only in the 'not unequivocal'<sup>11</sup> view do critical persons find this unimpaired. As thus: just as, when 'cow' is said, there is presented a form of entity common to all the instances, provided with hoof, hump, dewlap, tail, horn, and other parts, similarly also exclusion of buffalo, etc., is presented.

And also, where 'spotted (cow)' is said, there also, just as there is a shining forth of the differentia, so the shining forth of cow-ness also is patent. Although in 'spotted' only the differentia is uttered, through the circumstances or through the context cow-ness recurs. Moreover, spottedness also is of various colours, since we see it so. Hence, when by the speaker 'spotted' is uttered, a spottedness embracing all the universal of spotted things is laid down, simply as found in the intended particular cow. While thus the fact that an entity consists of both universal and particular is familiar in presentation, down to children and herdsmen, the doctrine of both singly is mere babble. For nowhere, never, by no one is an universal deprived of the differentia experienced, or differentiae deprived of it. (111) Merely through confusion of mind arising from wrong Method<sup>12</sup>, do foolish people, denying one, affirm one or other. This is the proverb of the blind men and the elephant<sup>13</sup>. As for the faults mentioned above as befalling these alternatives separately, these also, being smashed to atoms by the violent stroke of the hammer of the non-equivocal doctrine, are not able even to draw a breath.

Now the maintainers of independent universal and differentia are to be refuted as follows. The universal is in the several particulars in a way distinct, in a way non distinct, because in a way it consists of them, like dissimilar developments (*pariṇāman*)<sup>14</sup>. For just as a certain particular stands there, differentiated from an observed other particular, because we see a dissimilar development, so it stands out as like, because we see an universal consisting in a similar development; because of the presentation 'this ox is like that one' 'that is like this'. Nor is there by reason of its non distinction from the own-form of the particular a conflict with its having the form of an universal, because colours, etc., also are non distinct from the own-form of the particular, and there is no conflict with their being of the form of qualities. But a divergence in some respect actually exists in the similar developments, as in the case of colour, etc., because they possess separate designations, etc.

<sup>10</sup> *Factual experience*.

<sup>11</sup> See the Jaina view, which does not absolutely distinguish the universal from the particular.

<sup>12</sup> On this see *infra*, pp. 152 sq.

<sup>13</sup> The blind men, touching severally different parts of the elephant, describe the animal variously. On this well-known simile see Col. Jacob's *A handful of popular Maxims*, I, p. 3.

<sup>14</sup> *Pariṇāma* is understood to be a change of state in an un-changed substrate, as when milk becomes curd. The notion was variously defined. see *Āyāya-kāśa*, I, v.

The differentiae also should be absolutely apart from the universal; for, if the universal should be established as omnipresent, then, as they are not omnipresent, there would be imposition of contradictory attributes. And that is not established in regard thereto, since it has been refuted by the previously stated reasoning. For universal and differentia are affirmed as in a way mutually non-divergent in having a form: single and plural. For through being non-distinct from the particulars the universal also is agreed to be plural. (112) And through non-separation from the universal the differentiae are themselves also of singular form.

And the unity of the universal is everywhere to be recognized because of its supplying the generality Method; because of its supplying the full means of proof it is in a way repository of contradictory attributes, for of colour in similar developments, as in dissimilar developments, there is in a way distinction, particular by particular. And so it is not established that in all ways universal and difference are repository of contradictory attributes. If being in a way repository of contradictory attributes is meant, then there is a coming over into our enclosure; because being in a way repository of contradictory attributes is inseparable from distinction in any way. And the example of water and fire is imperfect in Major and Middle; because they also are taken as only in a way repository of contradictory attributes, and as distinct. For *qua* water-ness and fire-ness they are repository of contradictory attributes, and distinct; but *qua* substance-ness, on the contrary, the opposite thereof. And so how does it not fit that an entity consists of universal and differentia? Therefore it is well said, 'the denotand stated is single, of plural form'.

Likewise, the denotant also, called word, consists of a duality, consists of universal and differentia. In all particular words (sounds) there is a single recurrent 'sound-ness'; it is plural because of the distinction of cunch-produced, horn produced, sharp, low, acute, grave, circumflex, etc. For that sound consists of universal and differentia is patent because of its materiality; as thus: 'Sound is material because it is object of the senses, like colour, etc.'

As for the five Middle Terms, adduced by the Yogas<sup>14</sup> for denying its materiality, because its basis (ether) is intangible, because of non resistance to its entry and exit in a tightly closed place, because of non observation of prior and posterior parts, because of not moving other small finite substances, and because of being quality of ether, these are semblances of Middle Term: as follows, the basis of the sound (word, speech)-particular (113) is the phoneme-classes, and not the ether. And in regard to them contact is actually ascertained, thus 'the basis of sound (speech) has contact, because it is object of sense, observed or not observed by an embodied person, when distant or near, on the windward or the leeward side, just like the atoms of substance, which are the support of scent in the same way'. So the first is unestablished. But the second is equivocal, because of divergence<sup>15</sup> on the part of the scent-substance: for a scent-substance, nāsk, etc., of a circulating kind (*rastyamāna jātvyā*) enters within an apartment with closed doors, and issues forth from it, and yet is not non-material.

Or, if it is said, 'In that case the closure is not very complete, because of the possibility of minute apertures, and so there is there entrance and exit of it; how otherwise does it not, as at the stage when the door is open, enter in one flood? But in a place altogether without apertures they (the entrance and exit) are not possible', then the Middle Term is unestablished<sup>17</sup>, because is sound also that is common. But as for the third, it is equivocal because of lightning flash, firebrand, etc.<sup>16</sup>. And the fourth is the same, because of divergence in regard

<sup>14</sup> The five are not apparent in the Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika sūtras or bhāṣyas. On Yoga = Nyāya see pp. 7, 52.

<sup>15</sup> The scent-substance is an exception in respect of entry and exit.

<sup>17</sup> The sound is not in fact entering a tightly closed place.

<sup>16</sup> As being without prior and posterior parts, though material.

to the varieties of odorous substance, fine, dust, smoke, etc.; for odour-substances, etc., also in entering the nose are not seen to move the beard, grown at the portal of its cavities. The fifth, again, is unestablished; as thus: 'sound is not a quality of ether, because it is perceptible to ourselves, etc., like colour'. Thus it is established that on ground of materiality sound consists of universal and difference.

Nor should it be said, 'In regard to the self, although non-material, how is a consisting of universal and differentia incontrovertibly experienced?' For in regard to the mundane self, which along with infinitely infinite atoms of *karma*<sup>19)</sup> in their several places has fallen into an agitated state, like a mass of needles, become an undivided mass when pounded by a fire-heated hammer, materiality in a way is recognized. Although to the Syād-vāda-disputants every entity, material and non-material, is composed of universal and difference, nevertheless in regard to non-materials, namely support of motion<sup>20)</sup> and rest, ether and time, the consisting of them (of universal and particular) does not to people of ordinary vision come within the sphere of such presentation; but with regard to material things that, when being argued, (114) is to them easily credible. So the materiality of sound, though beside the question, has here been adduced as a means of establishing its consisting of universal and difference.

Here also the unequivocal unity of sound, approved by the maintainers of sound as eternal, and the unequivocal plurality, adopted by the maintainers of sound as non-eternal, are to be rejected on the lines previously shown. Or else, as the denotand, pot, etc., consist of universal and differentia, the same is true of the sound (*dhvani*) denoting them. For an identity, in a way, of sound and object is accepted: as says Bhadrabāhu-svāmī<sup>21)</sup> -

"The name (*abhidhāna*) is both distinct and non-distinct from the thing named:  
Since on the enunciation or hearing of razor, fire, sweetmeats,  
There is in the mouth and the ear of the one who speaks and who hears neither cutting,  
nor burning, nor filth; therefore distinct.  
And because on the enunciation of 'sweets' there is the presentation of that only,  
And not of anything else, therefore it is non-distinct from its object"<sup>22)</sup>

Hereby we have replied to -

"Sounds (words) have their source in propositions (*vikalpa*), the propositions have their source in sounds;  
Between them is a relation of effect and cause: the sounds do not even touch the objects"<sup>23)</sup>.

Because of the text: "the notions designating things have equivalent names"<sup>24)</sup> For of a word the real fact is this, it makes plain in its real character the thing named. And this (sound), thus making that plain, can be spoken only when developed in a development having the own-form of the thing to be named, not otherwise, because that would go too far: for at the time of mentioning a pot a mention of cloth, etc., also would come about

<sup>19)</sup> In Jainism *karma*, in contrast to *jīva*, 'soul', is composed of matter (*padgala*), which has been attracted by the soul and is the cause of the latter's 'bound', mundane, state.

<sup>20)</sup> On *dharmas* as an eternal, ubiquitous, entity, correlate with *adharma*, support of rest, see *Outline of Jainism*, pp. 13, 12-3, 85 and Index.

<sup>21)</sup> The celebrated, early, author of commentaries (*śrīyukti*) on Jain canonical works and of hymns (*stotra*).

<sup>22)</sup> Quotation not traced.

<sup>23)</sup> Quoted in Devasūtri's commentary on *Pramāṇa-naya-tustvāloka* I, 1.

<sup>24)</sup> This quotation is given only in some MSS.

Or else this whole verse is expounded in another fashion. The denotand, (115) entity, pot, etc.; in essence verily one, though of one single own-form; plural, of a plural own-form. The meaning is this: The knower, to begin with, discerns by a mark the own-form of the object of knowledge, and that realizes itself through exclusion of the congeneric and the heterogenic. For example: congeneric with pot are objects made of earth; and heterogenic are cloth, etc. Exclusion of these is the mark thereof. A particular thing with a wide-bottomed and -bellied, etc., form, tortoise-necked, adapted to the actions of carrying and bringing, etc., water, is called a pot. And the own-form of those congeneric and heterogenic ones is in thought both superimposed upon it and excluded: because otherwise there is no accounting for the outlining of the definite own-form of it.

For the own-form of all existences consists of positivity and negativity. An entity consisting of positivity alone would be omniform; and consisting of negativity alone, it would be without own-nature. Hence an entity, through existence in its own-form and through non-existence in the form of others consists of positivity and negativity: as it is said –

"Everything is in its own-form existent, and in the form of others non-existent;  
Otherwise there would be a being everything (*sarva-sattu*), and impossibility even of  
own-form"<sup>25</sup>).

And therefore, as in a single pot all things distinct from pot occur in the form of negativity, the fact that a pot consists of plurality is easily accountable. And thus, when one object is cognized, there is cognition of all objects; because without an outlining of all things there is impossibility of outlining separately one single entity consisting of their negations. And the Scripture also is exactly so disposed –

"Whoso knows one single thing, knows everything.  
Whoso knows everything, knows one thing"<sup>26</sup>).

Further –

"He who has seen one single existence in all ways,  
By him have been seen all existences in all ways.  
By whom all existences have been seen in all ways,  
By him one particular existence has been seen in all ways"<sup>27</sup>).

(116) But for those Buddhists who do not accept the not-being-other (*parāsattu*)<sup>28</sup>, it follows that pot, etc., consist of everything. As thus: If a pot, as it has existence by its own-form etc., should be so also by the form, etc., of other, which being so, there would result, on a par with existence in its own-form, etc., existence with other form, etc., how would it not have for essence everything? But through not-being-other that (sc. the pot) is established as definite. Or, if it is said, 'The not-being-other, so far from being non-existent, is really the own-existence (of everything)', – O cleverness! Certainly that same which is existence should

<sup>25</sup>) Quoted in *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I. i. 16, and in the commentary on Haribhadra's *Śaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*, v. 46.

<sup>26</sup>) Quoted *supra*, p. 12.

<sup>27</sup>) Quoted *supra*, p. 12.

<sup>28</sup>) The reference is to the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha*, according to which names signify not an essence, but difference from other things: see Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, II, p. 401 and Index. *Apoha* is criticized by Kumārila in a whole section, XIV, of the *Śloka-vārttika* and by Jayanta in *Nyāya-mañjarī*, pp. 303–6; for long Jain discussion see *Saṃmatī-tarka*, pp. 173, 185–223, *Prameya-kamala-o*, foli. 124–9. Cf. note XVI 14): In Haraprasād Shāstri's *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts* (pp. 1–19) is an *Apoha-siddhi* by Ratnakīrti.

not be non-existence; because, as there is imposition of contradictory attributes in the form of affirmation and negation, the two cannot logically be identical.

Or, if it is said, 'On your alternative also the contradiction is just the same', - O the chattering of the heaven-beloved<sup>22</sup>)! For we do not admit non-existence under the very same aspect as existence, or existence under the very same aspect as non-existence; but existence with own-form, substance, place, time and status, and non-existence with other form, substance, place, time and status. Then where is the room for contradiction?

But the Yogas are bold: 'Since by mere acceptance of a separate mutual negation<sup>23</sup>) there is in all ways establishment of the delimitation of things, wherefore the supposition that they consist of negations?' That is wrong. For when a pot is not of the form of negation of cloth, etc., then a pot would actually be a cloth, etc. And, as a pot has the form of pot because of being distinct from negation of pot, so might cloth, etc.<sup>24</sup>), also simply through being distinct from negation of pot. So enough of disquisition.

Similarly the denotant also, in the form of a sound (word), is of dual essence; - 'though of single essence is plural', that is the meaning: because sound also, on the principles stated in regard to the object (meaning), consists of positivity and negativity. Or because the denotant, though having a single object, is agreed to have a plurality of objects: as, of course, the word 'pot' is used as denotant by virtue of linguistic convention<sup>25</sup>) in regard to an object with a broad-bottomed-and-bellied, etc., form; similarly, when so applied, in virtue of the same, to other objects, in dependence upon place, time, etc., whereby is it prevented? For there are Yogis who say, 'because to linguistic conventions, 'pot' used in regard to body, there is no restriction, since they depend upon human will: just as the word 'thief', though elsewhere (117) conventionally applied (*rūḍha*) to a stealer, is familiar to the people of the Deccan as meaning 'boiled rice'; and as the word *kumāra* (youth, prince) is in the East conventionally applied to the month Āśvina. And so the words 'cucumber', etc., are in respect of such and such regions to be known as denoting 'womb', etc. In respect to time again, just as for the Jains in regard to the regulations for penance, - consisting of firmness, faith, holding fast<sup>26</sup>) - in ancient times the word *śaḍ-guru*<sup>24</sup>) denoted more than 180 fasts, but at the present time on the contrary, by the same word *śaḍ-guru* merely 3 fasts are, in accordance with the usage of the *Jñā-kalpa*<sup>28</sup>), conventionally understood. With regard, again, to *śāstra* texts, as in the *Purāṇas* by the word 'twelfth' the eleventh is apprehended, (118) and in the *Tripurāraṇava*<sup>29</sup>) by the word *ali* (a friend) what is sprinkled with spirituous liquor<sup>30</sup>), by the word *maithuna* honey and butter, etc.'

Nor have we thus primacy of only linguistic convention in causing presentation of the object (meaning), since that works there only through an accompaniment by the natural

<sup>22</sup>) The *Chowkhambā* text adds: 'and in the *Bhīṣakītantra*'.

<sup>23</sup>) A term originally applied to kings, but subsequently used derisively as equivalent to 'fool'.

<sup>24</sup>) *Paraspara-abhāva* (A is not B) is one of the four negations recognized by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas (Yogas), the other three being 'pre-negation' (*prāg-abhāva*), 'post-negation' = destruction (*vināśa*), and absolute negation (*atyanta-abhāva*): other refinements also are known, see *Nyāya-kōśa*, s. v. *Abhāva*.

<sup>25</sup>) Have the form of pot.

<sup>26</sup>) The conventional nature of the connection between word and meaning, noted already by Patañjali in *Mahā-bhāṣya*, I. i. 1 (Introduction) was maintained by the Nyāya (*Ny.-sūtra*, II. i. 51-6). In the *Śloka-ṣṛṭtika* (trans. pp. 281 sq., 412 sq.) it is the topic of a long refutation.

<sup>27</sup>) *Samhanana* usually signifies a compact structure of frame, joints, etc.: see *Outlines of Jainism*, p. 34.

<sup>28</sup>) 'Six heavy'.

<sup>29</sup>) A Jain canonical text, by Jinabhadra Gaṇin Kṣemārha (M. L.).

<sup>30</sup>) See note XI 6).

(*svābhāvika*) meaningfulness (*sāmānyā*)<sup>37</sup>; since all words are possessed of the potency<sup>38</sup> of causing presentation of all objects. And in whatever place, time, etc., convention co-operates with the potency of demonstrating some particular object, there it demonstrates that object.

And to this effect says Śrī-Devasūri<sup>39</sup>, conqueror of hardly conquered pronouncements of opponents: "Sound (word) is the condition of awareness of objects through natural signification and convention". Here the explanation of the thing 'potency' is to be ascertained from other books<sup>40</sup>.

The second half ('hence in otherwise', etc.) is as before. But the **error of conception** is through default of justification of the usage, because of the existence, according to the stated argument, of error on their part to the denotand as solely existent or non-existent, and as to the denotant as referring to a particular determinate object. So the total meaning is as follows: 'Of an entity consisting of universal and differentia, and consisting of positivity and negativity, the statement is a sound (*dhvani*) consisting of universal and difference, and consisting of positivity and negativity. **Otherwise**, on other lines, on the contrary, on the part of disputants who set about expounding (otherwise) the relation of denotand and denotant, there is actually error of conception, and their pronouncements do not support even a touch of logic.'

If it is asked, what are those other formulations of opposing disputants regarding the relation of denotand and denotant? We say 'those': Some say, 'mere exclusion (*apoka*)<sup>41</sup> is the meaning of a term'; because of the text: "By word and mark exclusion, not a thing positively, is stated"<sup>42</sup>. And others (119) say that only the universal simply is the sphere of words; because that, in some cases admitted, is, as having everywhere a single form, accountable as object of convention. Not the differentiae; because from the impossibility, due to their infinity, of their being observed *in toto*, there is no justification for its (the sphere's) applying to them. But those who contend for precept (*vidhi*)<sup>43</sup> say: 'Precept alone is the meaning of the sentence; because it has the nature of setting into action what is not in action'. Precept also is of more than one mode, through difference of view among such and such disputants. As thus: Some say that only sound in the form of a sentence is precept, because of stimulating; others say the operation (*vyāpāra*) thereof<sup>44</sup>, otherwise designated suggestion (*bhāvanā*) is precept. Still others say it is 'command' (*niyoga*). Some say it is injunction (*praiśa*), and so on. And others say it is simply stimulation (*praratanā*)<sup>45</sup> by putting aside the thing's conditions. Likewise should be mentioned fruit and deeds, etc., in desane therefor. The refutation of these, with the *prima facie* views and replies, is to be ascertained from the *Nyāya-kumudacandra*<sup>46</sup>. This is the meaning of the verse.

<sup>37</sup> This may refer to a general feeling in regard to even unfamiliar expressions to the effect that they have a meaning in particular cases the caprice or convention of individuals or groups is frequently restrained by features in the phonetics, morphology or etymology of the terms.

<sup>38</sup> The power (*sāmānyā*, *śakti*) of a word, a common topic of Sanskrit Grammar and Logic: see e. g. *Śloka-vārttika*, XVI, vv. 28sq., trans. pp. 352-3.

<sup>39</sup> See his *Pramāṇa-naya-tatvāloka*, IV. 11 (M. I.).

<sup>40</sup> *Syādvāda-ratnākara-pariccheda* II. 1, etc. (M. I.).

<sup>41</sup> On *apoka* see note XIV, 28; the statement can be seen in the *Nyāya-vārttika* on II. u. 67 and in *Sammata-tika*, p. 200.

<sup>42</sup> Source untraced.

<sup>43</sup> The various nuances next mentioned belong to divisions of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and of the Naiyāyikas and grāmatarians.

<sup>44</sup> So of the sentence 'operation' is actual working. On *bhāvanā*, which can mean 'effecting' or 'realizing', Kumāra has a discussion in *Śloka-vārttika*, XXIV-VI, vv. 248sq., trans. pp. 531sq.

<sup>45</sup> Or 'prompting'.

<sup>46</sup> A commentary on three minor works of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅkadeva, by Prabhācandra, pupil of Māṇikyānandin (M. I.).

## XV. THE SĀMKHYA DOCTRINES

Now, proclaiming a contradiction barring the *Tattvas* (Reals), Prakṛti, Spirit, etc., approved by the Sāmkhyas<sup>1</sup>), he exhibits the unlimitedness of the caprices of their folly:

**XV. Thought void of object, and reason non-intelligent,  
sky (Ether) etc., born from the pure principles of sound, etc.;  
and no bondage or liberation of Spirit, -  
how much that is conflicting has not been indited by the stupid?**

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<sup>1</sup>) For a general account of the Sāmkhya philosophy reference may be made to Colebrooke's *Essays*, II, pp. 240 sqq., and the *Histories of Indian Philosophy* (by Radhakrishnan, Dasgupta and others) and Max Müller's *Six Systems*. Special memoirs in different languages are numerous: it may suffice to mention Professor A. Berriedale Keith's *The Sāmkhya System* (1919) as a fully modern treatment of the subject. See also *Nyāya-maṇḍari*, pp. 486-490, and *Saṃmatī-tarka*, pp. 280 sqq., 296 sqq.

The Sāmkhya, no doubt the earliest (mostly post-upanishadic) system has a name which perhaps at first signified only a general systematic view, so that it may have been loosely used (e.g. in the *Śvetāśvatara-upanishad* and the *Bhagavad-gītā*) in the sense of systematic philosophic thought, as distinct from religious (Vedic) contemplations and Yoga disciplines and strivings. Influences of its modes of thinking have been detected in Buddhism and Jainism. Its general conception of a cosmic evolution and a good part of its physical doctrines have been permanently adopted and assumed in Indian philosophy.

It is unnecessary here to state anything concerning the reputed founder of the system, Kapila, or his disciple, Āsuri, or concerning the 'popular Sāmkhya' of the *Mahā-bhārata* or the recorded fragments of early texts. For Mallisena evidently, as for modern study, the system has been represented by the *Sāmkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, a summary in Gāthā verse, and its commentaries: the literary finish, intellectual decision and concinnity and spiritual depth of the short poem constitute one of the gems of Sanskrit language and thought, fortunately, through the availability of translations, appreciable by non-specialist readers.

The predominance of the single text simplifies the verification of the doctrines cited by the Jain author and the understanding of his vigorous criticisms. It will be seen that Mallisena finds no difficulty in exposing absurdities in the system. The particulars may be left to speak for themselves.

The main tenets of the system are:-

1. A dualism of (a) an entirely inactive Spirit (*Puruṣa*) or Intelligence (*Cit*) and (b) a material, non-intelligent Nature (*Prakṛti*) of triple constitution, from which emerges, and into which is dissolved, the entire universe of things experienced.

2. An evolution of Prakṛti in the presence of Spirit by stages of which the first is an instrument of determinate awareness (*Buddhi*, Reason), and the second a simultaneous origination of Egoity (*Ahaṃkāra*, principle of individuality) and of Sense-faculties. Thence come the essences of the Five Elements and through their composition the gross material elements and the general physical universe.

3. An unreal connection of Spirit with Prakṛti and its evolutes in consequence of a failure on the part of Spirit to realize his actual detachment and of a false semblance of intelligence in the mechanism of Prakṛti through reflection from the light of Spirit.

4. Liberation of Spirit from the unreal connection and bondage when, having seen the work of Prakṛti through and through, he realizes his own absolute aloneness.

Considered in a historical and modern light, the Sāmkhya may not, it seems, have lost the interest which perhaps is the basis of its enduring fascination. An outcome of the Upanishad philosophizing, it exemplifies prominently the psychological approach characteristic (as has been appreciated by Miss Maryla Falk in her very original and important study, *Il mito psicologico nell'India Antica*) of early Indian speculation. It makes the intellectual faculties of determination and individuation, and again the sense-

**Thought**, potency of being intelligent (*caitanya*), as own-form of the self; **void of object**, deprived of the outlining of objects, the ascertainment of the object being operation of the Reason: So one supposition. And reason<sup>1)</sup>, called 'the great Tattva', **non-intelligent**, having an own-form of non-awareness (*anavabodha*): that is the second. **Sky, etc.**, pentad of elemental principles, firmament, etc.; **born from the pure principles<sup>2)</sup>**, the five 'pure principles' called 'fine', sound, etc.; from them 'born', sprung: **and of Spirit, (120)** of the self not composed of Prakṛti and its derivatives; **no bondage or liberation**, but only of Prakṛti. And thus the followers of Kapila<sup>3)</sup> -

"Therefore not bound nor freed, nor in mundane existence, is anyone;

In mundane existence, bondage and liberation is Prakṛti in various resorts (abodes)"<sup>4)</sup>.

Here 'bondage', that of Prakṛti, etc.; 'liberation', beatitude preceded by cognition of the 25 Reals is the fourth (sc. hypothesis). Since the word *iti* ('thus') has the meaning of a sort, other things also of the same sort. **Conflicting**, contradictory, - infected by the faults of contradiction between prior and posterior; **stupid**, fools; having minds wanting in discernment of reality, the followers of Kapila; **how much not indited**, how much not composed in their own treatises. The expression 'how much' implies disdain, because the contradictory matters set forth by them are through their infinitude not limited by being so and so many. This is the summary meaning.

But the detailed meaning is as follows: - On the Sāṃkhya-view, of course, there arises in the person attacked by the triad of pains a desire to know the Reals, which are a means for repelling them. The triad of pains is that arising from self, that arising from divinities, that arising from (external) natural forces. Of these, that arising from self is twofold, corporeal and mental: the corporeal is occasioned by lack of equilibrium of the humours, wind, bile and phlegm; the mental, dependent upon the non-seeing of the objects of desire, anger, greed, delusion, envy. And all this because of being manageable by internal expedients is pain in the self. Pain manageable by external expedients is in two ways, that due to natural forces, that due to divinities. Of these, that due to natural forces is that occasioned by men, cattle, birds, wild animals, creeping things and immobiles; that due to divinities is that caused by the influence of Yakṣas, Rākṣasas, planets, etc. With this triad of pains, existing in the Reason through a particular development of *rajas*<sup>5)</sup>, connection, by way of their being adverse to the potency of intelligence, is 'attack'.

The Reals are 25, as follows: - the Unmanifested<sup>6)</sup>, one; the Manifested, 24-fold by reason of the distinction of the 'great principle'<sup>7)</sup>, egoity<sup>8)</sup>, the 5 pure principles, the 11 sense-organs, and the 5 gross elements: and Spirit of the form of intelligence<sup>9)</sup>. And thus Iśvarakṛṣṇa:

faculties, prior to their manifestation in experience and to the constitution of the corresponding bodily organs and objects. Indian philosophy continued to discriminate the sense-faculties (as *vijñānas*, mentations) from the organs, eye, etc., and to endow the transmigrant soul with them. The conception of an originally undifferentiated material nature which by a *salto mortale*, as it were (a transition not wholly unparalleled in a modern space-time metaphysic), became next a mass of determinations seems akin to those studied meditations which advanced to continuously more rarified and objectless intuitions: and one may even wonder whether a historical psychology may not some day consider whether Indian Yoga exercises may not have retraced some stages in the actual evolution of mind.

The attempt to discriminate a pure intelligent principle (*Puruṣa*, *Cit*) from the actual mechanism of thought in concrete action may have broached a problem of the greatest complexity in regard to which modern psychology and biology may not be confident of complete enlightenment.

<sup>1)</sup> *Buddhi*.      <sup>2)</sup> Unmixed essences.

<sup>3)</sup> The reputed founder of the system.      <sup>4)</sup> *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, v. 62 (M. L.).

<sup>5)</sup> Passion-activity, one of the three *gunas*, 'constituents' of Prakṛti.

<sup>6)</sup> *Avyakta* = Prakṛti in its unevolved quiescence.

<sup>7)</sup> *Mahat* = *Buddhi*.      <sup>8)</sup> *Ahaṃkāra* (= individuality?).

<sup>9)</sup> The 5 senses, 5 organs of action and mind-organ (*manas*).



"The root-Prakṛti is not a product. Seven, 'the great principle', etc., are Prakṛti and products.

And productions (products) are sixteenfold. Neither Prakṛti nor product is Spirit"<sup>11</sup>).

Prakṛti is the equilibrium of the three complementary constituents<sup>12</sup>), clarity (*saltra*), activity (*rajas*) and darkness (*tāmas*), consisting of pleasure, displeasure, dejection, and with the attributes of lightness, support, and heaviness. 'Primary' and the 'Unmanifested' are its synonyms. And it is without beginning, middle and end, without parts, common<sup>13</sup>), without sound, tangibility, without colour, without odour, imperishable. From the primary arises Reason, otherwise termed 'the great Principle'. Reason is the judgment, the conceiving in regard to ox, etc., 'that is so, not otherwise'; 'this is an ox, not a horse'; 'this is a post, not a man'. And it has eight forms, in the form of merit, cognition, dispassion, mastery; four, belonging to clarity; and the opposites thereof, demerit, etc.: four belonging to darkness.

From Reason egoity. And that consists of conceit in the form of presentations such as 'I am in sound'; 'I am in touch'; 'I am in colour'; 'I am in odour'; 'I am in savour'; 'I am master'; 'I am Lord'; 'that person has been killed by me'; 'I have goodness', 'I will kill that man'. Therefrom the five pure principles, the sound-pure-principle, etc., without particular form<sup>14</sup>), to be termed the fine modifications. For from the pure principle of sound is observed simply sound, and not the distinctions of acute, grave, circumflex, tremulous, *śaḍja* note<sup>15</sup>), etc. The *śaḍja* note, etc., are observed from particularity of sound. The like is to apply to the case of touch, colour, savour, odour, as pure principles. And from that same egoity also the 11 organs. Of these, eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin are the five organs of Reason; voice, hand, foot, anus, penis are the five organs of action (*karma*). The eleventh is the 'mind-organ'.

And from the five pure principles arise the five elements. As follows: From the pure principle of sound (comes) ether, (122), with sound for quality, from the pure principle of touch, accompanied by the pure principle of sound (comes) air, with sound and touch for qualities; from the pure principle of colour, accompanied by the pure principles of sound and touch, (comes) fire, with sound, touch and colour as qualities; from the pure principle of savour, accompanied by the pure principles of sound, touch and colour (comes) water, with sound, touch, colour and savour for qualities; from the pure principle of odour, accompanied by the pure principles of sound, touch, colour and savour (comes) earth, with sound, colour, touch, savour and odour for qualities. But Spirit -

"Incorporeal, intelligent, experienter, eternal, omnipresent, inactive,

Non-doer, quality-less, subtle, is the self in the doctrine of Kapila"<sup>16</sup>).

Union of Prakṛti and Spirit is as of the blind and the lame<sup>17</sup>). And the thought-potency is void of outlining of an object, since by the door of the senses the objects, pleasure, pain, etc., are conveyed to the Reason. And the Reason is of the form of a mirror facing both ways. Hence in it the thought-potency is reflected. Thence comes the figure of speech 'I am happy', 'I am unhappy'; for the self presumes himself non-distinct from the Reason. And Patañjali says: "Though pure, the Spirit reviews the presentation in the Reason, and reviewing that, he, although not identical therewith, appears as if consisting of it"<sup>18</sup>). But primarily the

<sup>11</sup>) *S.-kārikā*, v. 8 (M. L.).

<sup>12</sup>) *Guṇa*.

<sup>13</sup>) The same everywhere to all.

<sup>14</sup>) Without species.

<sup>15</sup>) A particular note in music.

<sup>16</sup>) Source untraced.

<sup>17</sup>) *S.-kārikā*, v. 21: the simile is expounded in Col. Jacob's *A handful of popular Maxims*, I, p. 36.

<sup>18</sup>) From the *Vaśa-bhāṣya* on Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra*, 20.

outlining of objects belongs to the Reason only; and thus says Vācaspati<sup>19</sup>), "Every acting person, having reflected and presuming 'I am here empowered', decides 'this is to be done by me'. And therefore he acts. — this is established from common experience. Here the certitude 'I must do' belongs to the Reason, which from the proximity of the intelligence acquires intelligentness: this decision is the unshared operation of the Reason". And from the (123) proximity of the thought-potency the Reason, although unintelligent, appears as if possessed of intelligence. In the *Vāda-mahārṇava*<sup>20</sup>) also it is said: "The reflection of the object conveyed to the mirror of Reason ascends to the Spirit, as if to a second mirror. And this alone is his being an experimenter; to the self, on the other hand, no change (*vikāra*) befalls". And thus says Āsuri<sup>21</sup>) —

"When the Reason has this development apart from him, experience is said to be his; Like the rising of an image of the moon in clear water".

But Vindhyavasini<sup>22</sup>) expounds experience as follows —

"Spirit, himself unaffected, makes mind, though unintelligent, Illumined by himself through his proximity, like the adjunct the crystal"<sup>23</sup>).

Nor should it be said 'If Spirit is without qualities, and non-evolving, how has he Mokṣa? For the root *mur* means 'disjoining of bonds', and in the non evolving Spirit remains of defiled acts with their suffusions (*vāsanā*)<sup>24</sup>), which are called 'bonds', are impossible. For the same reason he has not mundane existence, otherwise named 'state after death', because he is without action. For only Prakṛti, as reposing on different Spirits is bound, is in mundane existence, and is freed; not Spirit; of Spirit bondage, freedom and mundane existence are said metonymously: as victory and defeat, although belonging to servants, are said metonymously of the master, because the fruit thereof, (124) treasure-gain, and so on, belongs to the master. Similarly experience and beatification, though belonging to Prakṛti, are connected with Spirit, because of non-apprehension of detachment'.

Now all this is idle talk: 'Thought potency', and 'void of outlining of objects' are mutually conflicting expressions. The verb *et*<sup>25</sup>) is used in the sense of consciousness, intelligence, or, because 'by it thinking is done', it is thought. If that is not regarded as consisting of outlining of self and others, then it would not be even potency of thought; like pot. Nor is a rising in the Reason of a reflection of the incorporeal thought-potency logical; since that (causing of a reflection) is an attribute of the corporeal. Nor again is a transference without a corresponding evolution logical; because in default of having a somehow or other active essence<sup>26</sup>) an alteration even in the substrate Prakṛti is unaccountable: and because in what is without loss

<sup>19</sup>) The quotation is from Vācaspati-mīra's commentary, *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī*, on the *S.-kārikā* (v. 23, M. L.)

<sup>20</sup>) A Vedānta (Sāṃkhya?) text, so-named, is not published. But a so-named work by the Jain Abhayadeva is cited, and it is recorded by Sukhahāla Beraḍāṣā, editor of Siddhasena's *Sammatt-tarka* with commentary by Abhayadeva, that that commentary is supposed by some to be secondarily entitled *Vāda-mahārṇava* (M. L.).

<sup>21</sup>) An early follower of Kapila: see *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, v. 70. The quotation is from Haribhadra's *Yoga-bindu*, v. 449.

<sup>22</sup>) Contemporary of Īśvarakreṣṇa

<sup>23</sup>) Quoted from Haribhadra's *Yoga-bindu*, v. 448

<sup>24</sup>) *Vāsanā*, which in common language signifies imparting of a scent, is much discussed in Buddhist writings: see Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, II (Index): it denotes a factor in a thought due to prior experience or activity, a bias. Its possibility upon Buddhist suppositions is contested by Kumāra in *Śloka-varttika*, V, vv. 118sq., trans. pp. 144sq. See further *infra* pp. 108, 110, 115, 121, 123sq.

<sup>25</sup>) The meanings are as given in Hemacandra's Grammar, *Dhātū-pārayaṇa, bhōdī*, no. 278 (M. L.).

<sup>26</sup>) This the Sāṃkhya denies to Spirit.

of its previous form 'experience' of pleasure, pain, etc., does not deserve the name. And, if that loss takes place, there is the consequence of having activity, because of being basis of a posterior form with abandonment of a prior (form). Only by such a mutation is the arising even of an image in a crystal and so on also explained. Otherwise how is there no image in an opaque stone, etc.? And, if a mutation in that way is accepted, the thought-potency must perform be an agent, and a direct experiencer.

Or, if it is said that 'From the text of Patañjali to the effect that "a non-evolving and non-transferring potency of the experiencer experiences in an object mutating and affected by transference the occurrences therein"<sup>27)</sup>, this transference is merely metaphorical'; then, because "metaphorical meaning has no application to the consideration of reality"<sup>28)</sup>, this is to the discerning simply unacceptable. Also in that way the consciousness of pleasure and pain, which is familiar to all animates, would be altogether without basis. Nor is it proper to the Reason, since that is taken as non-intelligent. On this very ground, 'and Reason non-intelligent', is also contradictory: for (125) with a Reason of non-intelligent own-form ascertainment of object does not, when being argued for, improve matters. 'Surely it has been stated that Reason, although non-intelligent, appears, through the proximity of the thought-potency, as if possessing intelligence': - true, it has been stated, but it has been stated illogically. For in a mirror intelligence does not result when an intelligent person, etc., has been introduced into it; since intelligence and non-intelligence, having an unpervertible own nature, cannot even by Indra<sup>29)</sup> be made otherwise. Moreover, by the expression 'as if' in 'although non-intelligent, appears as if possessing intelligence' superimposition (*āropa*)<sup>30)</sup> is implied. Nor is superimposition capable of practical efficacy. For, of course, a boy to whom, from being excessively liable to anger, etc., a fire-ness has been ascribed, is not at any time competent to perform the practical actions of burning and cooking effectible by the primary fire. And so only to the thought-potency is the ascertainment of objects appropriate, and not to a Reason of non-intelligent form. On this same ground its (Reason's) having the eight forms, ment, etc., is mere verbiage; because merit, etc., are attributes of the self. And on this same ground egoity also, as begotten from the Reason, is not logical: since that also, *being*, as in essence presumption, an attribute of the self, is unsuitable for origination from a non-intelligent (thing). And that sky, etc., are sprung from the pure principles of sound etc., is answered simply by the fact that it is brushed aside by [actual] presentation<sup>31)</sup>.

Moreover, by all disputants, of course, without dissent, the eternality of ether is accepted. And this person, propounding a manifestation of that also from the pure principle of sound, and [yet] setting his seat on the side of the maintainers of the unequivocally eternal, appears like a disconnected chatterer. Nor should an evolving cause be a quality of its own effect; so that "ether has sound for its quality". etc., is mere verbiage. And that voice, etc., are even organs, is not logical, because they have no causality of effects that could not be brought about by something else, since we observe that the effects of demonstrating other things, apprehending them, moving them about, evacuating pollutions, etc., are effectible by other members also. If, nevertheless, that is supposed, the number of organs does not hold good, since it follows that other limbs and sub-limbs are organs. (126)

<sup>27)</sup> In Vyāsa's *bhāṣya* on *Yoga-sūtra*, IV. 22 (M. L.) and II. 20, this is quoted from a text of Pāñcāsikha.

<sup>28)</sup> Source untraced.

<sup>29)</sup> The chief deity in the *Rg-veda*.

<sup>30)</sup> *Āropa* is ascription to X of a feature which it does not possess. See *Nūyaṅ-kāśa*, s. v.

<sup>31)</sup> What is actually experienced.

And as for it having been said, "To Prakṛti only in its various residences belong bondage and liberation, and mundane existence, and not to Spirit"<sup>23</sup>), - that also is unsound. If the Spirit's non-separateness, defined as non-apprehending of discrimination from Prakṛti, attached to him by a beginningless series of lives, is not of itself bondage, then what other bondage, pray, should there be? And by your esteemed self admitting that 'Prakṛti is the occasion of all things that have origination', it is *karma*<sup>24</sup>) that is admitted under another term; because that (*karma*) has such an own-form, and because it is non-intelligent.

As for bondage triple through the distinction of *prākṛtic*, evolutionary and *dākṣiṇic*<sup>25</sup>), as thus: those who worship Prakṛti from cognizing self in Prakṛti, theirs is the *prākṛtic* bondage; those who, with the notion of Spirit, worship mere evolvents, namely elements, sense-organs, egoity, awareness, theirs is the evolutionary; if sacrifice and well-doing, it is the *dākṣiṇic*: for he, who without recognizing the Spirit's reality engages in sacrifice and well-doing is bound, with a mind impaired by desire, because of the text -

"Those who, deeming sacrifice and well-doing the best,

In their folly do not welcome another better thing,

They, having through their good deeds lived on the summit of the firmament,

Enter this world or one still inferior"<sup>26</sup>)

this (bondage) in its whole triplicity is mere supposition; because as having an own-form in a way non-distinct from the influences of false outlook, non-renunciation, heedlessness and vice, it is included in the causes of bondage by *karma*. (127) And, when bondage is established, its (the Spirit's) mundane life is established undeniably: since bondage and *Mokṣa* have a single locus, 'the one who is bound, that same is released', it is Spirit that has release, because thus it presents itself down to children and herdsmen.

If it is said, 'when from his seeing a discrimination of Prakṛti and Spirit Prakṛti desists from working, the Spirit's abiding in its own-form is *Mokṣa*', - No! Because in Prakṛti, whose own-nature is to work, unconcern is illogical. Or, if it is said that 'her working depends on the interests of Spirit, and the seeing of discrimination is the interest of the Spirit: when that comes to pass, it stops, its purpose being fulfilled, because of the text -

"As the dancing girl, having made a display to the audience, desists from her dancing,

So Prakṛti, having exhibited herself to Spirit, withdraws"<sup>27</sup>)' -

Not so! Because she, being non-intelligent, has no reflective action; as, even when an observation of sound, etc., has taken place, she again works to the same effect, similarly, even when the seeing of discrimination has taken place, she will again work to that effect; because her own nature, marked by working, has not left her. And the example of the dancing girl is fatal to one's own doctrine; for, as a dancing girl, although, after exhibiting her dance to the company, she has desisted, works again because of their eagerness, why is not Prakṛti likewise, even when she has stopped after showing herself to Spirit, again to work? Therefore it must be agreed that on the extinction of all *karma* it is Spirit that is released.

Similarly, the other suppositions of theirs<sup>28</sup>): (1) by reason of the distinction of darkness, delusion, great delusion, murk, blind murk, the five-fold 'mistake' (*viparyaya*) - ignorance,

<sup>23</sup>) This corresponds to *Saṃkhya-kārika*, v. 62 (M. L.), et. p. 94 n. 5.

<sup>24</sup>) Sc. moral action and retribution, in the Indian sense

<sup>25</sup>) *Prākṛtic* bondage represents entanglement in general *prākṛti*, *vaikārik* entanglement in the evolutes (*vikṛti*) of *prākṛti*, and *dākṣiṇic* entanglement in religious works (*dakṣiṇa*, 'religious donation'). For these specifically *Saṃkhya* terms see *S-kārika*, v. 43.

<sup>26</sup>) *Mundaka-upaniṣad*, I. ii. 40 (M. L.).

<sup>27</sup>) *Saṃkhya-kārika*, v. 59 (M. L.).

<sup>28</sup>) These may be verified in *Saṃkhya-kārika*, vv. 46-51.

I-am-ness, passion, dislike, attachment; (2) by reason of the distinction of Brāhmic, Prajā-patic, Saumic, Indra-like, Gandharvic, Vākyic, Rakṣasic, and Paisācic, the eightfold creation of divinities; (128) (3) by reason of the distinction of domestic animals, wild animals, birds, creeping things, immobles, the fivefold (creation of) lower animals; (4) there being no intention of mentioning the subdivisions of Brāhmaṇa-hood, etc., mankind a single (creation), so that the creation of creatures is of 14 kinds; (5) by reason of the distinction of the 11 injuries to organs, deafness, maimedness, blindness, imbecility, lack of smell, dumbness, lameness of arms, lameness of leg, impotence, intestinal disorder, madness, – and the 17 mental injuries, namely, the reverse of the 9 'contentments' (*tuṣṭi*), and the reverse of the 8 'achievements' (*siddhi*), – 'Potency' (*śakti*) of 28 kinds; (6) and 'contentments' (*tuṣṭi*), – 4 belonging to the self, termed *Prakṛti*, material, time and enjoyment, also to be mentioned by the alternative terms 'water', 'fluid', 'flood' and 'rain'; five external, cessation of sound, etc. – objects, results of seeing the faultiness of gaining, keeping, loss, enjoyment, hurt, these to be designated by the words 'bank', 'good bank', 'further and nearer bank', 'non-supreme water', 'supreme water': so making nine kinds of 'contentment'; (7) with the 'three repellings of pain' as the three chief *siddhis*, called exhilaration, delight, happiness, likewise the five *siddhis*, secondary as being means of repelling of pain, namely study, sound (speech), investigation (*āha*), obtaining of friends, giving, called 'clear', 'very clear', 'clear-clear', 'delightful', 'ever-joyous' thus making the eightfold *siddhi*; (8) by reason of the distinction of steadfastness, faith, ease, desire to know, cognizing, – the five sources of *karma*, and so on; and (9) the self-control and the special self-controls, etc., well-known from the *Tattva-kaumudī* and *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya*<sup>25</sup>), etc., – the contradictoriness of these should be conceived. This is the meaning of the verse.

<sup>25</sup>) Commentaries by Vācaspati-miśra and Gauḍapāda respectively, on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*

## XVI. THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF COGNITION

Now as to those who speak of the product of the Demonstrant<sup>1)</sup> as unequivocally non-distinct from the Demonstrant, and those who with rejection of external objects say that there is simply a non-duality of cognition, — he states the collapse of their view upon consideration. (129)

**XVI. Not simultaneous is the existence of fruit and cause:**

**when the cause has lapsed, there is not a being of the fruit.**

**On the path of non-duality of consciousness there is not consciousness of objects — chopped away and fallen to pieces is the phantasmagoria of the Sugata-Lord<sup>2)</sup>.**

The Buddhists, of course, hold that from the Demonstrant its fruit is unequivocally non-distinct. And to this effect their tenet: "In both one same cognition is the fruit of the Demon-

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<sup>1)</sup> In verse XVI we encounter two main doctrines of dialectical Buddhism relating to the nature and validity of knowledge. The first of the two is the more general, asserting that the fruit, i. e. resultant cognition, of the cognizing process is not different from the process itself, that is, is entirely mental. This should, it seems, be taken in connection with the discussions concerning the form (*akāra*), or content, of the cognition. Is this form or content something belonging to the object in itself or is it a mental configuration assumed by the cognition in confronting it? The supposition that it is common to both, so that e. g. a blue object is reflected by a blue cognition, is clearly otiose. In regard to this ancient and perennial topic the Buddhists in question decidedly affirmed the view that the form or content is mental and that the validity or truth of the cognition did not consist in a similarity to the object, which they accepted as causing it, but in its reliability in practice. The more precise and subtler considerations coming into the matter will be made apparent in the Jain argumentation here following.

One feature in the Buddhist position discriminates it from what has been sometimes contemplated elsewhere: it is dominated by the main Buddhist doctrine of the momentary or instantaneous (*kṣaṇika*) nature of all existent things, whereas the problem as stated above seems to be not less reasonable in regard to supposedly durative entities. This feature brings into this discussion, as will be seen, questions concerning simultaneity and causality.

The second doctrine advances to an extreme idealist position, asserting that the momentary cognitions are the sole existents and that their supposed external objects are mere fictions.

The two schools of Buddhism are not here identified by name, but there is no difficulty in fixing upon them. In relatively late Sanskrit texts the schools of Buddhist doctrine are commonly reported as four in number, Mādhyamika, Yogācārya, Sautrāntika and Vibhāṣika, and their leading tenets are stated in a stereotyped manner; see for instance the *Sarva-darsana-saṃgraha* of Mādhava, c. II (*Bauddha-darśana*). The second doctrine particularized above is obviously the *Viśiṣṭa-mātra*, 'thought-only', view of the Yogācāryas, known from a mass of original literature and very elaborate studies by modern scholars. That the first doctrine is that of the Sautrāntikas is easily deduced from the fact that that alone of the other three schools figures prominently in the contemporary debates on the problem in question. Reference may be made to the very numerous citations of Sautrāntika views and arguments in Stecherbatsky's *Buddhist Logic*, II. (Index); but that on p. 360 'For this reason the Sautrāntikas teach that the (external) things are the objects of our cognition, but their (definite, constructed) form is immanent to knowledge', — may suffice for the present purpose. For Jain confutations see *Sammata-tarka*, pp. 458–463, *Prameya-kamala-matanda*, fol. 189.

<sup>2)</sup> Buddha — see also *infra*, p. 111

strant because it has the form of attaining" <sup>2</sup>). 'In both', in perception and inference; 'one same cognition', defined as perception and inference, is the 'fruit', the outcome. Wherefore? 'Because it has the form of attaining', the form of outlining. As thus: Cognition arises only in the form of outlining. Nor is there fruit of cognition other than outlining, because of non-distinction of locus <sup>3</sup>); and so altogether there is no fruit distinct from perception and inference.

And this is not correct. For: What is from anything unequivocally non-distinct, arises together therewith; as with pot pot-ness. And they admit a relation of effect and cause between Demonstrant and fruit, - saying that 'means of proof is cause, and fruit is effect' <sup>4</sup>). And in case of absolute non-distinction that does not fit. For between the two, as arising simultaneously, a relation of effect and cause, as between the left and right horn of a cow, is not logical; because the cause invariably occurs at a prior time and the effect invariably occurs at a subsequent time. It is thus that he says: 'Not simultaneous is the existence of fruit and cause'. Fruit is effect, cause is what makes it; their existence, own-form, existence as effect and cause; that; simultaneous, synchronous, is not logical. That is the meaning.

Now, anticipating a statement that 'As the two have an interval of a moment, there will be successiveness of them', (130) he says: "when the cause has lapsed, there is not a being of the fruit". The cause, i.e. what causes, defined as the Demonstrant; having lapsed, disappeared without residue, immediately after its origination, because of being momentary; there is not a being, existence, of the fruit, of the product of the Demonstrant; because it has no root. For it is while the cause of the fruit is existent that we have the presentation 'of that this fruit'; not otherwise, because that would go too far <sup>5</sup>).

Furthermore, the relation of cause and fruit is a connection; and this can only be in a pair. And Your Worship, intimated only into momentary perishing, does not tolerate a connection of the two. So how have we the severally determined presentation 'this is the cause, this is the fruit'; because, if even with apprehension of one thing there is no apprehension of another, that is impossible; because of the text

"Consciousness of connection as residing in a pair does not come from thinking of one form;

(Only) if there is an apprehension of the own-form of two things, is there knowledge of connection" <sup>6</sup>).

Although Dharmottara in commenting on the *Nyāya-bindu-sūtra* <sup>7</sup>) to the effect that "consimilarity <sup>8</sup>) of object is the proof thereof, because it is by virtue thereof that there is

<sup>2</sup>) The knowledge is mental, as being outcome of a mental knowing. M. L. refers to *Nyāya-bindu*, I. 18, where, however, the expression is not 'form of attaining' (*adhigama-rūpa*), but 'form of presentation of the thing'. But *adhigama-rūpa* can be seen in Dharmottara's commentary (ed. Peterson, p. 20 l. 3; Stcherbatsky, p. 16, l. 9), and in the commentary of Jñendrabuddhi rendered from Tibetan by Stcherbatsky in *Buddhist Logic*, II, pp. 378 sqq. (see p. 379 n. 2).

<sup>3</sup>) Both take place in one mind or cognitive process

<sup>4</sup>) A Buddhist statement in these terms is perhaps not producible, but the use of the word *phala*, 'fruit', 'outcome', may be sufficient. See also the discussions by Jñendrabuddhi and Dharmottara in loc., and the expression *kāraṇa-hetu*, 'cause-reason', and -*phala*, in Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic* (Index).

<sup>5</sup>) Any time when the cause is not existent would equally serve

<sup>6</sup>) The verse is quoted in Devasūtri's commentary on *Pramāṇa-naya-tatvāloka*, I. 19, and (line 1) in Abhayadeva's commentary on the *Sammatī-tarka* (ed. pp. 2, 265)

<sup>7</sup>) The *Nyāya-bindu* of Dharmakīrti is not usually termed *sūtra*. Malliṣeṇa perhaps used the expression as equivalent to *mūla*, distinguishing the text from Dharmottara's commentary. The passage is text I. 20 (M. L.). The following passage from the commentary may be seen on p. 19 of Peterson's edition, Stcherbatsky, p. 15, 11. 16 sqq.

<sup>8</sup>) This is not to be understood as an actual likeness of the blue as presented by a supposed external blue

establishment of presentation of the object", affirms as follows: – "For an appearance of blue is an act of thought, since therefrom is concluded a presentation of blue. For as for the things, i. e. eye, etc., wherefrom the cognition arises, not by virtue of these can the cognition thereof be correlated (made out) as a consciousness of blue, but what is being experienced as similar to blue is correlated as consciousness of blue. Nor is the relation of thing to be established and establisher here conditioned by a relation of produced and producer<sup>10</sup>; so that in one matter there should be a contradiction; but rather by the relation of correlated and correlate; hence that of a single matter one aspect should be the Demonstrant, and another the fruit of the Demonstrant, is not conflicting. For the reason of the correlation is identity of aspect in that cognition, and the thing to be correlated has the aspect of consciousness of blue", etc. (131) – this also is unsound; because in regard to one single partless cognition-moment a pair of own-natures defined as correlate and correlator is illogical; and because a relation of correlate and correlator also, being, as a connection, resident in a pair, cannot exist in what is single.

Moreover, similarity to the object is having the form of the object; is that (similarity) in the form of certitude (*niscaya*)<sup>11</sup>, or of non-certitude? If in the form of certitude, let it be itself the correlator; why suppose both? If not certified, then, how is it, being itself not correlated, competent for correlating the consciousness of blue, etc.? Further, what is this 'having the form of the object'? Is it a transformation in apprehending the object, or is it a wearing of the form of the object? Not the first, because that is an establishing of what is already established<sup>12</sup>. But the second, since the cognition imitates the form of the thing to be known, is infected by the fault of consequent non-intelligence<sup>13</sup> and so on. Thus an unequivocal non-distinction of the fruit from the Demonstrant is not very good. For in the case of total identity there is no correlation of knowledge and fruit, because of the contradiction in their being so. Nor in the case of the total identity is 'similarity is Demonstrant, attaining the fruit', well-founded. – because of over-extension.

If it is said, 'Surely in the Demonstrant the similarity is the exclusion of non-similarity<sup>14</sup>, while the attaining is the exclusion of non-attaining; so that through distinction in the exclusion there is in even a single thing a correlation as proof and fruit', – Not so; because without distinction in own-nature a distinction in exclusion of other (things) is not accounted for. And how should there not be, like correlation of Demonstrant and fruit through the exclusion by the Demonstrant of the non-means and non-fruit, correlation of 'being non-means' and 'being non-fruit' through exclusion also of other knowledge and other fruit? Because an entity has exclusion, as from the heterogeneous, also from the homogeneous. Therefore the fruit is to be accepted as in a way actually different from the Demonstrant, because (the two) are presented with the status of thing to be established and thing establishing. For two things which are presented with a relation of thing to be established and thing establishing are mutually distinguished, as axe and the action of cleaving. Likewise to be rejected is the

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existing in the object, but as a classificatory resemblance to other presentations of blue: see Stcherbatsky's translation and notes in *Buddhist Logic*, II, pp. 42a-q

<sup>10</sup> Dharmakīrti here disowns the conception of a relation between thought and content such that the latter has for cause the external object or the organs of perception: he substitutes a correlation internal to the presentation itself. This the Jain author proceeds to criticize.

<sup>11</sup> Dharmakīrti himself had gone on to speak of certitude, which implies a judgment.

<sup>12</sup> Everyone admits a psychical modification in perceiving.

<sup>13</sup> In copying the object the cognition would copy its unthinkingness.

<sup>14</sup> This, adduced by Dharmakīrti in the present context (see Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, p. 46 and n. 2), applies the *apoha* doctrine concerning the import of terms, on which see p. 90.



unequivocal distinction, approved by the Yaṅgās<sup>15</sup>), of the fruit from the Demonstrant; (132) because, through the identity of the one knower, it stands out as in a way not distinct from the Demonstrant; since only when evolved as Demonstrant is the self presented as an evolution as fruit. The person who knows is the same who accepts, abandons, and disregards, since so without fail is the experience of all practical persons. Otherwise there results for oneself and the opponent a confounding of the correlation of Demonstrant and fruit. Enough.

Or else, this first part is to be expounded otherwise: The Buddhists, forsooth, formulate a proof thus: 'Every existent is momentary'<sup>16</sup>); for every entity, of course, pot, etc., is seen to go to destruction in the proximity of a hammer, etc. Here, if that own form with which the pot, etc., perishes at the final stage exists in it as soon as it originated, then through that (own-form) it will have to perish immediately after its origination; so that its momentariness is manifest. Or, (if it is said) "It is born of its own\*" causes with just such an own-nature that (only) after lasting for some time does it perish": Similarly then even in the presence of the hammer, etc.; since it has just that same own-nature, it should once more also last for precisely the same time. Thus it would not perish at all. This is "the principle of the trader who does not wish to give and who every day in a letter speaks of 'to-morrow'"<sup>17</sup>). Therefore, if it arises with a power of lasting even for two moments, since in the second moment also it has just as in the first moment a power to last two moments, it would persist again for another pair of moments. And so in the third moment also, having that own-nature, it would not perish at all'.

'It may be; that it was born from its own causes actually as lasting, but that by a conflicting force, hammer, etc., it is destroyed, - that is not true. How again will this fit? "It both does not perish, because it is lasting, and yet destruction of it is effected by a conflicting force"? For it is not possible that 'Devadatta is both alive, and his death is taking place'. Or it does perish, then how was that entity born from its own causes as imperishable? (133) For it is not logical to say, "he both dies and has the attribute of immortality". Therefore, since, if imperishable, its destruction at any time is illogical, and yet we see its destruction, it must be agreed that that entity was actually destructible when it arose from its own causes. Therefore it perishes just as soon as originated. And thus momentary perishing is established. And the working-out is as follows: 'what has a perishable own-form, does not last after its origination, like the own-form of a pot when at its final moment. And colour, etc., are of perishable own-form at the moment of their origination'. Here the Middle Term is the own-nature<sup>18</sup>). If positive existences perish every moment, how then should there be the recognition "this is that same"? We say: it is due to the immediate origination of other and other similars, and to the effect of ignorance; at the very time of the destruction of a prior moment a similar next moment arises; therefore, as there is no difference of the form (*ākāra*) and no interval, even in the case of absolute annihilation the presentation affirming non-distinction, "this is that same", is begotten. Even in the case of things absolutely distinct, for instance things cut away and again originated, Kuśa-grass, hair, etc., - the presentation

\* ) *sva-hetuo ha Das, hetuo AMP.*

<sup>15</sup>) The Yaṅgās (Naiyāyikas), definitely realistic, uphold the existence of the object such as it is presented. The sense perceives and the mind-organ communicates the percept to the self.

<sup>16</sup>) We here introduce the famous *Aṅgikāya* tenet of Buddhism, which will be further considered *infra*, vv. XVIII and XXVI.

<sup>17</sup>) On this everywhere appreciated proverb of 'to-morrow' see Col. Jacob's *A third handful of popular Maxims*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>18</sup>) On the *svabhāva-hetu*, i.e. a reason which does not require any notion outside the entity itself, M. L. refers to *Nyāya-bindu*, pp. 65-73; see also Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, II, p. 122 and Index.

"this is that same" is actually exemplified; so why is it not so supposed in the present case also? Therefore that every existent is momentary is established. And in the present case the prior moment is the basis (*upādāna-kāraṇa*), the posterior moment is the construct (*upādeya*).

Having in this way adopted the opponent's view, he says: 'not simultaneous, etc.'. These prior moments which perish without residue, like a necklace (broken) in pieces, do they, in begetting the later moments, beget them actually at the time of their own origination, or at a later moment? Now, not the first, because between two things occurring simultaneously, as of the two bosoms of a young woman, there is not the relation of basis and construct. Hence it is well said <sup>19)</sup>: (134) 'Not simultaneous is the existence of fruit and cause'. Nor the second: as then destroyed without residue the prior moment has perished, how can it be even supposed to beget the posterior moment? And an origination without a basis has not been witnessed, because that goes too far. So it has been well stated: 'when the cause has lapsed, there is not the being of a fruit'. The word-meaning of these two quarter-stanzas has been stated earlier. However, here the meaning is: 'fruit', the construct, 'cause', the basis, then 'relation' (*bhāva*) is the relation of basis and construct.

As for what Mokṣākaragupta <sup>20)</sup> immediately afterwards babbles for the establishment of momentariness, that has no opening in the Quodammodo doctrine, because, except for the perishing without residue, it is in a way an establishment of what is already established, since the maintainers of 'equivocality' <sup>21)</sup> agree to destruction moment by moment of the States. And, as for the statement made, 'for it is not possible that Devadatta is both alive, and his death is taking place' (p. 103), that also, simply because of its possibility, brings no harm to the maintainers of the Quodammodo doctrine; seeing that life is maintenance of the vital airs, and death is a destruction of a splinter of life (*āyur-dalika-kṣaya*). Hence, even while Devadatta lives, his dying is quite agreed, because of the destruction every moment of the splinters of life, all in flight. Nor should it be said that "because of the destruction of all the splinters of life only at the final stage the designation 'death' is logical only in regard to that"; for even at that stage there is not destruction of it *in toto*. For even in that case there is destruction only of the remaining splinters and not, on the contrary, of them all together at that moment. Thus is established a dying, moment by moment, beginning with conception. So enough of disquisition.

Or else an exposition otherwise: For Buddhists, in fact, cognition is begotten by the object (*artha*). And that cognition apprehends the same object which begets it; because of the text: "a non-cause is not the object (*viśaya*)" <sup>22)</sup>; and therefore the object is cause, and the cognition effect. And that is not attractive: for then at the moment when there is existence of the object in its own-form, the cognition is not yet being originated; since it (the cognition) is at that time occupied merely with its own origination. And at that moment when the cognition has arisen, (135) then the object has gone. The relation of effect and cause requires a relation of prior and posterior time; and there is no lasting beyond a moment; so how is there origination of the cognition, the cause having lapsed? And, as that has lapsed, it follows that the cognition lacks an object; since in your view only the cause is its object. And a cognition without object is absolutely without proof, like the cognition of a hair in the sky. And an object-moment (merely) accompanying the cognition is not apprehensible; because it

<sup>19)</sup> I. e. in v. XVI.

<sup>20)</sup> Buddhist author of *o Tarka-bhāṣā*: see Vidyābhūṣaṇa, *A History of Indian Logic*, pp. 346-7.

<sup>21)</sup> The Jains.

<sup>22)</sup> Quoted in *Prameya-khaṇḍa-mārtanda*, fol. 148a, *Samman-toṣaka*, p. 658. M. L. notes a variant reading *jñāna-kāraṇam*, 'cause of cognition' (in place of *nakṣaraṇam*, 'a non-cause').

is not a cause. Hence he says: 'not simultaneous, etc.'. A relation of fruit and cause between cognition and object, that is a relation of effect and cause as simultaneous, does not suit, since an object-moment accompanying the cognition is not the originator of the cognition; because relation of effect and cause between simultaneous existents is not logical. Or say, an earlier object-moment may be originator of the cognition. That is not so, since he says (in verse XVI): 'when the cause, etc.'. When the cause, in the form of the object, that which causes the cognition, has lapsed, has perished, without residue, because of momentariness, there would not be, on the part of the fruit, the effect in the form of cognition, 'a being', a realization arising of the cognition without root, because the begetter, the object moment, has gone, would not take place. And, if just the begetter is apprehended, it follows that the sense-organs also should be apprehensible; because they also are begetters of the cognition. Nor is the object's causality of the cognition evidenced by concomitance and divergence; since in a mirage, etc., there is origination of the cognition of water even in the absence of water; because otherwise activity in regard to it (water) would not be possible. If it is said, 'cognition of it is illusory'; surely the consideration of illusory and non-illusory should be made by you when you become stationary; for the present admit, for a while, also cognition sprung from a non-object. If it is said, "By concomitance the object's causality of cognition is actually evidenced", - No! For concomitance, defined as existence when *x* exists, is not by itself occasion for certitude of the relation of cause and fruit; but rather divergence also, defined as non-existence when *x* exists; and, by the stated argument, this (non-existence) is not a fact. And in the case of apprehension of past and future objects on the part of Yogins, how is the object the occasioning cause, since both are non-existent, because of the text -

"Things broken up are not cause; in the future (thing) there is no mass.

Things annihilated do not abide, like a mustard seed on the top of a wheel spoke" <sup>22</sup>).  
(136)

And in case of being (merely) occasioning cause, there is ruin to being past and future, since existence is by way of practical efficacy. Nor does an illuminator illuminate only if it owes its being to the thing to be illuminated, since a lamp, etc., though not originated from pot, etc., illuminates them. And, if we adopt apprehendedness of begetter only, there follows a loss of authoritativeness on the part of memory, etc., which are Demonstrants; because that is not begotten by the object. Nor is memory not a Demonstrant <sup>23</sup>); for it is the life-breath of inference as Demonstrant; because that is preceded by recollection of the connection of Major and Middle terms.

Also, if only the begetter is apprehensible, then how is self-consciousness an apprehended? For that has an apprehended own-form. Nor is that (own-form) begotten by that (self-consciousness), because of contradiction in action on oneself <sup>24</sup>). Therefore <sup>25</sup>), since between object and cognition arising from their proper apparatus, as between pot and lamp, there can be relation of thing illuminated and illuminator, the object is not (merely) occasioning cause of the cognition.

'Surely then, if the cognition is not begotten by the object, how is there correlation of particular definite action? For that is justified by the origination from *x* and having the form

<sup>22</sup>) Source untraced.

<sup>23</sup>) In Indian philosophy generally memory is due to a trace (*samskāra*, 'engram') of prior experience, and therefore not a source (*pramāṇa*) of knowledge.

<sup>24</sup>) This whole passage, as far as 'no other cause of apprehension' (p. 106), is taken from Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I. i. 26.

<sup>25</sup>) This point in connection with cognition was envisaged by Dharmottara in his commentary on *Nyāya-bindu*, I. 21: see Stecherbatsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-2.

of  $x$ . Therefore, since a cognition not originated from  $x$  and not having the form of  $x$  is indifferent as regards all objects, an apprehension of everything would result'; – Not so; because even without a being begotten by  $x$ , appropriateness (*yogyatā*), defined as destruction and cessation of the veils<sup>27</sup>, justifies the illumination of particular definite objects. Also even with origination from it (the object) appropriateness must necessarily be agreed. Otherwise, there being proximity of all objects, whence in the world comes the differentiation so that even with non-proximity of such and such objects there is birth of a particular cognition only from a particular object?

As for its (i. e. the cognition's) having the form (*ākāra*) thereof (i. e. of the object), that, in the first place, is not accountable by a transference of the object-form; because of the consequence that the object would be without form, and the consequence that the cognition would be with-form. And what sort of likeness has the 'non-corporeal cognition to the corporeal object? Thus it (i. e. being with form) must be accepted only as a development<sup>28</sup>) in the apprehension of a particular object. Therefore

"With the object he does not associate it (the cognition), without its having the form of the object:

Since from it there is a reaching of the thing to be known, the Demonstrant is the having the form of thing to be known (*meva*)"<sup>29</sup>.

So much for that. (137)

Moreover, these two (sc. the arising of  $x$  and the having form of  $x$ ) should be cause of apprehension either separately or in aggregate; if separately, then we get the first moment of the potsherd apprehending (through succession) the past moment of the pot, and the moon in water (through similarity) the moon in the sky. Because they (pot and potsherd) originate in due succession, and have the form thereof. Or, if in aggregate, then it follows that the later moment of the pot apprehends the previous moment of the pot; since both of these (conditions) are actual. If it is said: "(Only) when there is the form of cognition are these two causes of apprehension", – then it would result that a cognition of the same class would be apprehensive of the immediately preceding cognition; because these two have actually the relation of begotten and begetter. And so, except suitability, we see no other cause of apprehension.

Now we proceed to expound the latter half. And here we refute those particular Buddhists<sup>30</sup>) who maintain a non-duality of cognition without reference to external objects. And their view is as follows: 'Mere cognition, unmarked by the blot of apprehended and apprehender, etc., and without an universe (*nirvapañca*) is the ultimate real. And an external object does not even bear consideration. As thus: What is this external object? Is it in the form of atoms, or in the form of large wholes? Not, to begin with, in the form of atoms, because of absence of a Demonstrant. For Demonstrant is either perception or inference. Now perception is not equipped for establishing that. For would it be on the part of the Yogins<sup>31</sup>) or of ourselves,

<sup>27</sup>) Sc. obstacles, psychical and physical, to the perception. *Āvaraṇa* is here used in a Jain sense, as denoting certain species of karma: see *Outlines of Jainism*, pp. 27, 30–1. 'Destruction' and 'cessation' also are the Jain *ḥayopasāma*, on which see *ibid.* The general sense is that the appropriateness results from the percipient's particular state and history.

<sup>28</sup>) Not as a resemblance between presentation and object

<sup>29</sup>) The verse is quoted in *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I 1. 26, and also in the Bauddha-chapter (11) of *Sarva-darsana-saṃgraha*, and in *Prameya-kamūla-mūrtanda*, fol. 127b.

<sup>30</sup>) Sc. the Vijñāna-mātrā school, on which see the note 1) to ch. XVI

<sup>31</sup>) On the power of Yogins to see atoms see *supra* p. 41. The Yogin's perception is discussed also by Dharmottara: see Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 30sqq.

etc. ? Not the first, because through absolute remoteness it can (by us) be reached only by faith. Not the second, because vetoed by experience. For not even in a dream have we the presentation "this atom, this atom"; because our self-consciousness arises always only in the form "this pillar", "this jar". Nor again is there establishment of it by inference; because in consequence of the supersensibleness of atoms a non-existence apart from them cannot be apprehended in respect of any mark<sup>21</sup>).

Moreover, would these (atoms) be eternal or non-eternal? If eternal, have they practical efficacy gradually, or all at once? Not gradually, because through difference of own-nature<sup>22</sup>) their non-eternality follows. Nor all at once; for, since in one single moment the atom effects all its practical efficacy, and that in the next moment is absent, its non-existence (then) follows. If non-eternal, are they momentary, or do they last to another time? If momentary, are they with a cause, or without a cause? If without a cause, their existence or non-existence (138) would be eternal, because non-dependent. For to belong to an occasion is through dependence. If with a cause, are they caused by something large, or by atoms? Not something large, because external objects are accepted only in the form of atoms. And not by atoms, for these would produce their effects either while existing, or while not-existing, or both existing and not-existing. If existing, is it at the very moment of their origination, or at a subsequent moment? Not at the moment of origination, because then they are busy merely with their origination. Or, if it is said, 'Because of the text:

"their bare being (*bhūti*) is called also their action (*kriyā*), and the same their being cause"<sup>23</sup>),

their very being (*bhavanam eva*) is what causes the origination of others', - thus then the atoms of colour would be the material cause of the atoms of savour, and the latter of the former; because in regard to both there is no difference in bare being (*bhavaṇna*). Nor at a subsequent moment, because they have perished. But, if while non-existing they originate those, then it follows that, except at a single moment of their own existence, there would always be originating thereof; because in their non-existence there is at all times no difference. And the alternative of both existing and non-existing is actually infected with contradiction in view of the text, -

"An objection that exists to each severally, how does it not apply in the case of both?"<sup>24</sup>)

So the atoms are not momentary: Nor again lasting into another time; because that shares the fortunes of the momentary alternative.

Moreover, even if these last for some time, are they averse to practical efficacy, or are they engaged in it? In the first case, it follows that they are like the sky-flower, non-existent. On the latter supposition, would they produce effects of non-existent form, or existent form, or of both forms? If of non-existent form, why do they not cause also the hare's horn, etc.? If in the form of an existent, we have, with a making of the (already) existent, *regressus ad infinitum*. But the third distinction has a bad odour of contradiction as above. Therefore an object in the form of atoms fits nowhere.

<sup>21</sup>) Sc. any mark to serve as a Middle Term in an inference on the ground of not occurring in anything else.

<sup>22</sup>) Because, if they act gradually, they change in the process.

<sup>23</sup>) Quoted in *Bhāmali* (Calcutta, 1891), p. 361, *Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā* (Calcutta, 1902), p. 376 (where see Poussin's note). Also in *Saṃmatī-tarka*, p. 455, and *Pramāna-naya*, I, 15 (Comm.).

<sup>24</sup>) Quoted also in *Pramāna-mimāṃsā*, I, i. 33.

'Nor again in the form of large wholes. If the single atom is unestablished, how is there establishment of a plurality of them? And, that being so, a large whole in the form of an accumulation of them is mere verbiage. Moreover, this (whole) is regarded as a support for plural parts: and, if those parts are in conflict, then there is not one single large whole, because of the imposing of conflicting attributes. But, if not in conflict, there is a veto of presentation; because in a single large whole are observed (139) parts in conflict, mobile and immobile, red and not-red, covered and uncovered, etc. Moreover, does that (whole) which occurs in them occur integrally or in part? If it occurs integrally, then, through being used up even in one single part, it would not have occurrence in a plurality of parts; and, if it occurs integrally in each part, there is the consequence of a multiplicity of wholes. And, if it occurs fractionally there is conflict with the acceptance of its being without parts. Or, if it (the whole) has parts, are these parts distinct from it, or non-distinct? If distinct, then again, through occurrence in plural parts, as the one does not transcend the alternative of integral and single part, we have *regressus ad infinitum*. If not distinct, there would be no parts at all. And thus there is no external object at all. But, in fact, all this (world) is merely cognition shining out in the form of blue, etc.; since an external object, being non-intelligent, is unsuitable for shining out. As it is said -

"begetting an awareness in their own-form the fields (sc. objects) of the sense-organs are not themselves visible"<sup>36</sup>).

'By the author of the *Ālamkāra*<sup>37</sup>) also it is said -

"If blue is present in consciousness, how is it called external?

If the blue is not present in consciousness, how is it called external?"<sup>38</sup>)

'If it is said, 'If the external object does not exist, to what then refers this appearance of pot, cloth, etc.?' - surely it is without objective basis, being excited by false suffusion (*vāsana*) without beginning; because it has no (external) range, like the cognition of a sky-hair, or like the cognition in a dream. This is why it is said<sup>39</sup>) -

"Nought other is to be experienced by awareness; thereof (i. e. awareness) there is no other experience.

Through the distraction (*vaidhurya*) of apprehended and apprehender it is itself only that appears

For there is no external object, as is supposed by the innocent;

Thought, wallowing in suffusions<sup>40</sup>), proceeds in illusions of objects"'.

All this is objectionable. For 'cognition' is a word of action (a verb); from 'by it is cognized' comes 'cognition'; or cognizing (*jñapti*) is cognition. And this must have an object (*karma*), because (140) a cognizing without object (*viśaya*) does not fit. Nor should it be said, 'Cognition even without object is exemplified in the case of sky-hair'; because that also is not unequivocally without an object. For to one who is altogether without apprehension of the cognition of real hair that does not present itself. And cognition in a dream also, because it has for

<sup>36</sup>) The argument is that the objects are merely represented by the perceptions.

<sup>37</sup>) The *Pramāṇa-vārtika-ālamkāra* of Prajñākara-gupta (M. L.): see Vidyābhūṣaṇa, *History of Indian Logic*, pp. 336, 344, and Stecherbalsky, *op. cit.*, Index.

<sup>38</sup>) The epigrammatic verse affirms that the blue, if present to consciousness, is mental, and, if not, is not known at all.

<sup>39</sup>) The first two lines are quoted also in *Nyāya-mañjarī*, p. 540, *Sammat-tarka*, p. 48a, and the *Bauddha-chapter* (II) of *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*.

<sup>40</sup>) Sc. impressions from prior experience (*vāsana*), on which see note XV 24).

range objects experienced as seen, etc., is not without objective basis. And to this effect the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*<sup>41)</sup> -

"Things experienced, seen, thought of, heard, disturbance of bodily factors, divinities, watery country,

Are the causes of dreams; also merit and sin; not non-existence".

And what is field (object) of cognition is external object. If it is said, 'This is illusion', - God bless you! For illusion is recognized in cases where, after somewhere seeing a primary object, there is through dullness of the organ mistaken apprehension of it elsewhere: as the illusion of silver in regard to mother of pearl. If one speaks of illusion in regard to an entity, though capable of practical efficacy, then the correlation of illusory and non-illusory is dissolved. And so this saying is true:

"Those who are satisfied with imagined sweatmeats, and those who have tasted sweatmeats,

Have equally, it follows, the savour, efficacy, digesting and so on"<sup>42)</sup>.

Nor do those refutations of external objects inconvenience the maintainers of the Quodammodo doctrine; because they have accepted objects in the form of atoms, and also in the form of large wholes. And what has been stated in the refutation of the atom-alternative, (namely) 'because of absence of proof', is untrue; since their (the atoms') products, the pots, etc., are perceptible, they also are in a way perceptible; and that by way of the Yogin's perception they are directly perceptible must be taken for certain: the non-observation is due to minuteness. From inference also there is establishment of them, as thus: There are atoms, because otherwise there is no accounting for the creation of large wholes, this being an 'interior comprehension' (*antar-vyāpti*)<sup>43)</sup>. Nor is it the whole truth that large things originate from atoms; (141) because we can conceive manifestation of cloth, etc., which are large, from heaps of thread, etc., which also are large; and because we have previously pocketed the fact that the self, ether, etc., are not material<sup>44)</sup>. Where again there is origination of them (wholes) from atoms, that origination dependent upon extreme conjunction<sup>45)</sup>, brought about by virtue of action requiring also the apparatus of such and such time, etc., is actually not false. As for the quotation, "moreover, this (is) support for plural parts" (p. 107), there also the term 'whole' is used of what occurs not entire in plural parts in some ways conflicting. As for the mention of imposition of contradictory attributes in case of being support of plural parts which are in conflict, that is in a way, in fact, agreed; because that also, as consisting of so many parts, is in a way of plural form. As for the suggestion that 'moreover, this, occurring in them, would occur integrally, or fractionally, etc.', the answer is simply non-acceptance of the two alternatives; because we adopt an occurrence of the whole, not in its entirety, in the parts. Moreover, if the external object does not exist, what is it that now presents itself with determinate form (*ākāra*) in 'this blue'. If it is said, 'This is a form (*ākāra*) of consciousness', - No! Because the consciousness is of a thing external to the cognition; while, if it were a form of cognition, the presentation would

<sup>41)</sup> Jinabhadra-gaṇin, in whose *Viśeṣopāyika* the quoted passage occurs as *Gāthā* 1703 (M. L.).

<sup>42)</sup> On this well-known maxim see Col. Jacob's *A second handful of popular Maxims*, p. 11.

<sup>43)</sup> I. e. a part of a wider inference, there being also other classes of things of which 'existence' could be proved by a parallel argument. For a more precise explanation by Haraprasāda Śhāstri see his *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, pp. v-vii, relating to the *Antar-vyāpti-samarthana*, by Ratnākaraśānti, included therein. see also Randle, *Indian Logic in the earlier schools*, p. 241, n. 1.

<sup>44)</sup> And therefore not in conflict with the argument concerning the atoms, although they have infinitesimal parts (*pradeśa*).

<sup>45)</sup> This would apply to the formation of molecules (*duyanuka*, etc.) from atoms.

be 'I am a blue thing'<sup>46</sup>), and not 'this is blue'. If it is said, 'Because of the distinction of form in cognition severally, to some person the appearance is 'I', to some person it is 'blue', - 'No! because the form 'I' is not, like the form 'blue', etc., fixed (*vyavasthita*); and so the same presentation which to one person is 'I', is presented to another as 'thou'; but the form 'blue', etc., is fixed, because by all it is apprehended as of one form. Although by people who have eaten their bellies full, blue, etc., are apprehended as yellow, etc., nevertheless this does not make an exception, because that is illusory. If it is said, 'The appearance 'I' is in the consciousness of self by self', - Surely, is there consciousness of another also? How otherwise is there the use of the word 'self' (142); for this is an antithetic word, applied only in view of another. If it is said that 'Through illusion we have the presentation of distinction even in own-form', Ho! How is a distinction presented by perception not real? If it is said, 'the perception is illusory', - surely why this? If it is said, 'Because by inference the non-distinction of cognition and object is established', we ask: 'what is that inference?' If it is said, 'That wherewith accompanied a thing is regularly observed is not distinct therefrom; as the unreal moon from the real moon; and the object is regularly observed jointly with the cognition. This is non-observation of a comprehensive; comprehensive of the denied distinction<sup>47</sup> of cognition and object would be non-regularity of joint observation thereof; thereof there is non-observation; because of two different, blue and yellow, there is no regular simultaneous observation. By this inference there is establishment of the non-distinction of the two,' - No! Because that is a fallacious inference, since it has a dubious ambiguity. For cognition is conscious of itself and other; this by mere consciousness of other apprehends the blue, and by mere consciousness of self apprehends the awareness of blue. And so through the simultaneous apprehension of the two there is regularity in the joint observation; and (yet) non-distinction there is not. And thus, because the absence of the Middle Term<sup>48</sup>, in the form of regularity of joint observation, from a counter-instance is dubious, there is dubious unequivocality.

And the regular joint observation is unestablished; because when with extravert attention an object 'this blue' is experienced then it is that there is non-experience of the internal experience of blue; so how is there illusoriness in the perception through establishment by inference of the non-distinction of cognition and object? Moreover, the inference<sup>49</sup> gets its being from the fact that the perception has not its object vetoed by illusoriness, and, when the inference has been realized, there is illusoriness of the perception; so a fault of mutual dependence also is unavoidable. And in the absence of an object whence comes the presentation (of it) with a definite place as locus? For a restricting reason to the effect that 'this has to be superimposed<sup>50</sup> on that intended place, and not elsewhere' does not exist. If it is said, 'the restriction in the superimposition thereof is through a restriction by suffusion (bias)', - No! Because that also is not a cause of this restriction of place. For, if there is actuality of the object, the experience has the place where the object is, and the thereby preceded suffusion has that place. But, if the external object is not actual, to what is its (the suffusion's) restriction of place due? Or else, if it is said, 'There is, of course, a restriction of the superimposition.

<sup>46</sup>) Rather perhaps 'I am a blue cognition'.

<sup>47</sup>) Non-regularity of joint observation would cover all cases of separate observation, and no such non-regularity is observed.

<sup>48</sup>) A counter-instance (sc. separation of object and consciousness), might occur, because in the actual occurrences a double character is observed; and, if so, the Middle Term would be equivocal; but, as the occurrence is unverified, the equivocality is dubious.

<sup>49</sup>) The very need for the inference arises from the fact that the perception is not otherwise found to be illusory.

<sup>50</sup>) By cognition, on *drapa* see note XV 301.



And a particular effect does not fit without a particular cause. (143) And the external object does not exist. Therefore the reason here is the variety of the suffusions themselves', — is that variety of the suffusions different from the form of the awareness, or not different? If not different, then since the form of the awareness is one, what mutual difference have they (the suffusions)? If different<sup>41</sup>), why the dislike for the object, so that a presentation common to all the world is denied?

So in this way is established a distinction between the cognition and the object. And the working out is as follows: The blur, etc., subjected to dispute is separate from cognition because they (the two) are subject of contradictory attributes. And the contradictory attributes of which they are subject (are) 'the cognition is inside the body, and the object outside', the cognition has occurrence at a posterior time, and the object at a prior time; the cognition originates from the self, and the object from its own causes; the cognition is in the form of illumination and the object in the form of the non-intelligent'. Hence on acceptance of the non-duality of cognition a presentation of an object as experienced externally does not invite agreement in any way at all. Nor can the seen be denied.

This is why the author of the Laudation says: 'on the path of non-duality of consciousness there is no consciousness of objects'. **Consciousness** (*samvit*): 'correctly' (*samyak*), without error, 'is known' (*vidyate*), is reached, i. e. the own-nature of an entity, by it, so 'consciousness'. But on the alternative of self-consciousness, 'being conscious', consciousness, cognition; thereof **non-duality**; duality, the being of two, simply two-ness is 'duality'. (The Suffix *an* is used in case of something with identical meaning, because of belonging to the group *prajñā*).<sup>42</sup> 'Non-duality' is 'not duality'; because of rejection of external object unity, non-duality; 'non-duality of consciousness', simply cognition as single, is real: there is admission of 'external objects'. That is the meaning. Of this **the path**, the route, 'the path of non duality of consciousness'; on that, on the alternative of the doctrine of the non-duality of cognition, that is what it comes to. What follows? In regard to this he says: **(there is) not consciousness of objects**; this presentation of an object through extraversion, which is manifestly experienced, does not fit — this is corollary and it has just been brought home. And this being so, what follows? He states: "Chopped away, fallen to pieces, is the phantasmagoria (*andrajāla*) of the Sugata-Lord": the **Sugata**, son of Māyā; the with him connected, by him invented, mass of entities momentarily perishing, etc., is phantasmagoria, like a phantasmagoria, because of creating confusion of mind. All this 'Sugata-phantasmagoria' is **chopped away, fallen to pieces**; (144) first cut away, and afterwards fallen to pieces. As something, a bunch of grass, etc., only after being cut away, rots away, perishes, so this illusion invented by him, like grass cut up by the edged knife of logic, falls to pieces. Or else, as an illusion created by a clever illusionist, having, by exhibiting as marvel such and such unreal entity, deceived such people rather conceited in intellect, afterwards, like a rainbow, totally passes into a state of being cut away and waning, so this Sugata's invention of acceptance of such and such Demonstrants, and their such and such non-distinction from fruit, momentary extinction, the cognition being the cause of the thing, non-duality of cognition, though deluding all people ignorant of the Demonstration, crumbles, when logically considered, to pieces. And here the word 'Sugata' has the sense of ridiculing; for the Buddhists wish to expel Sugata by 'fine in his way', i. e. his cognition. And so, Ho! his having fine cognition in setting forth such illogical logic. This is the meaning of the verse.

<sup>41</sup>) If the 'suffusion' is to be in each case a special element differing in the cognition, why substitute it for an 'object'?

<sup>42</sup>) Hemacandra's Grammar, VII. n. 136 (M. L.). The Suffix *an* signifies the -a in *śānta* (from *danta*), and the rule states that the signification is unchanged.

## XVII. THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF EMPTINESS

Then, ridiculing the maintainers of 'emptiness'<sup>1</sup>), a class of Buddhists, who deny the usual tetrad of<sup>2</sup>) Demonstrant, etc., which systematises reality, and prefacing on both the alternatives, *videlicet* acceptance and non-acceptance of a Demonstrant establishing the alternative pocketed by them, a statement of the non-establishment of the things approved by them, he says -

**XVII. Without a demonstrant the 'empty', like any other,  
would not get a foothold for the establishment of his own alternative.  
His tenet would be angry with him if he touched a demonstrant.  
Ho! Well viewed the view of our contemners!**

The 'empty', the maintainer of emptiness; without, lacking; a Demonstrant, perception, etc.; for the establishment of his own alternative, the making out of the 'emptiness' doctrine, which he accepts; a foothold, a base (*pratīṣṭhā*); would not get, would not obtain. (145) As how? Like any other, like others, exponents of Demonstrants. This is an example by way of difference: as others, exponents of Demonstrants, get establishment of their own alternatives by Demonstrants as most-effective; not so this one, since in his view the usage (*vyavahāra*) of Demonstrant and Demonstrand is not ultimate truth; because of such texts as, "This entire usage of inference and thing inferred being a thought (*buddhi*) - based on relation of attribute and thing qualified, does not refer to external existence and non-existence"<sup>3</sup>). And an admission of the 'emptiness' doctrine without Demonstration, how ever will it be acceptable to the discerning? Because of the consequence of a violation of their discerningness. Or, if for the complete establishment of his own alternative this person adopts some Demonstrant or other, in that case there is this criticism, 'would be angry, etc.'. If he touched, if he had recourse to, a Demonstrant, one or other of perception, etc.; from the context, with 'this

<sup>1</sup>) These are the Mādhyamika Buddhists of the school of Nāgārjuna, which holds the doctrine of *śūnyatā*, 'emptiness', repudiating all acceptance of substantiality, external or mental. By Professor Stecherbatsky the *śūnyatā* is regarded as a complete relativity (see *Buddhist Logic*, II, pp. 31-2, nn. 1-2, 33-4 n. 4, and ref.), and this is perhaps not out of harmony with the recognition of an ultimate 'suchness' (*tathatā*), an 'absolute', wherein all relativities and unrealities meet and expire.

The tenets of the Mādhyamika Buddhists should have excluded them from all discussion, and in fact they aver that they advance no proposition. But even this statement must be taken as belonging to the sphere of 'convention' (*samvṛti*), i.e. the fundamentally unreal world of practical life, speech and thought. Apparently the rules of debate allowed, as in the case of other philosophies irreconcilable with the fact of their own discussion, such, so to speak, derisive interposition on the part of the debaters for whom it was essentially only a game and who expatiated largely in linguistic sophistry.

From the mass of modern literature, concerning the Mādhyamika views it may be sufficient to cite Prof. T. R. V. Murti's *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (1955), which gives all the necessary references to the editions and translations of original texts.

<sup>2</sup>) Sc. means of knowing (*pramāṇa*), knower (*pramātṛ*), thing to be known (*prameya*), and act of knowing (*pramiti*), as in pp. 118-119.

<sup>3</sup>) The quotation is from Dignāga (see Randle, *Fragments from D.*, pp. 51-5), it is cited in various Nyāya works and also in *Saṃmatī-tarka* pp. 377, and Haribhadra's *Anekānta-jayapatākā*, p. 249.

maintainer of 'emptiness': his *tenet*, his own doctrine; *would be angry*, would show anger; there would be a vetoing of the doctrine, that is the meaning. As, of course, a king angered by perverse conduct on the part of a servant confiscates all his property, similarly even his doctrine takes away from the adopter of the usage of Demonstration, which is at variance with the 'emptiness' doctrine, the correctitude of statement which is his entire property.

Further, the emptiness doctrine is described by that disputant merely by expounding his own Scripture (orthodox view), so he accepts the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇyam*) of Scripture; so how is there establishment of his own alternative<sup>4</sup>), since he adopts a Demonstrant? Further, 'means of proof does not exist without thing to be proved (*prameya*)'; so that upon non-acceptance of Demonstration the things to be proved also are dissolved. And so for him muteness only is logical<sup>5</sup>), and not a display of jaw-dancing for presentation of the 'emptiness' doctrine; since the 'emptiness' doctrine also is subject of proof (*prameya*). And here, in using the root 'touch' and the word *krīānta* ('tenet'), the intent of the Saint is as follows: If he is a maintainer of emptiness, then, not to mention adoption in any way of means of proof, if he even ventures upon a mere touching of Demonstration, then with him *krīānta*, the god of death, would be angry; now his anger leads to death. And so he, using Demonstration in conflict with his own tenet, is, as reduced to a censure-situation<sup>6</sup>), verily dead. This being so, **Ho!**, used in denusive eulogy; **your contempters**, you they contempt, (146) they adduce faults in you; people of this kind, contempters of you, members of other schools; **their view**, that which they discern with the eye of want of mental cognition; - **Ho! well-viewed**, properly viewed; through derision by 'contrary indication' the meaning is 'not correctly viewed'. Here in the root *asūya*, although it should have the Suffix *nak*<sup>7</sup>) because of meaning 'having that habit', we have the Suffix *an*<sup>8</sup>), since there is optional variation. Your contempters, those who 'have contempt'; or those who 'are contemptuous of you': with Suffix having the sense of *matu* ('possessed'). If the reading is *trād-asūya-dīṣṭam*, there is nothing awkward, because the word *asūya* with the suffix *ad* has been used by Udayana and others in the *Nyāya-tātparyapariśuddhi*<sup>9</sup>) etc., of an envious person.

Here the intent of the maintainers of 'emptiness' is this. 'The tetrad of reals, knower, Demonstrand, Demonstrant, and act of knowing, is a non-entity invented by others; because it does not bear examination, like a horse's horn. Of them the knower, to begin with, is the self. And he is non-existent because of not being apprehensible by Demonstration. As thus: By perception there is no establishment of him, because he transcends the range of the senses. And, as for the establishment of him, with 'egotry' as accessory condition, by mental perception<sup>10</sup>), that also is equivocal, because in 'I am fair, or dark', etc., that is adopted also as based upon the body. Moreover, if this accessory condition of egotry should refer to the self, then it should not be occasional, because the self is always in proximity; for cognition is occasional, seen preceded by occasional causes; like the cognition of lightning. Nor, again, by inference, because there is non-apprehension of an invariable mark. And in traditions (Scriptures) which maintain mutually conflicting things, there is no Demonstrativeness. As thus: by one in some way or other some thing is set out, by a second, more expert, the same

<sup>4</sup>) See that there is no means of proof.

<sup>5</sup>) A conclusion actually adopted, and acted upon, by some Buddhists, e.g. Bodhidharma.

<sup>6</sup>) On *nigraha-sādhana* see note X 3).

<sup>7</sup>) I. e. the word should be *asūyako* not *asūyin*.

<sup>8</sup>) See note 7).

<sup>9</sup>) A sub-commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra*.

<sup>10</sup>) The notion of 'I', as perceived by the mind-organ (*manas*), the common perceptive.

is set out otherwise; and on the part of these (Scriptures) whose own Demonstrativeness is not settled, how is there competence for settling anything else? And so there is no knower.

'And the Demonstrand is external object; and that has just been quashed<sup>11)</sup> at the moment of the refuting of external objects. (147) A Demonstrant is a cognition revealing itself and other; and this, in the absence of a Demonstrand, what is it to apprehend? Since it has no object. Moreover, it must be supposed as either synchronous with the object, or as belonging to a different time, when it apprehends the same. On the first alternative, all things whatever found in the Triple Universe would appear in it, because there is no distinction in their being synchronous. On the second, however, it would be without form (*ākāra*), or with form. In the first case, there is no accounting for its outlining a definite object. In the second, again, would this form be distinct or non-distinct from the cognition? In case of non-distinction the form is the cognition itself; and there is also the fault of the alternative of formlessness. In case of distinction if this (form) has the aspect of thought (*cid-rūpa*), then the form (*ākāra*) also should be knower (*vedaka*); and so would this too, as formless, or as with form, be the knower of the thing? And so, as this recurs, there is *regressus ad infinitum*. Or, if not of the form of thought, would it be as non-cognized or as cognized cognizer of that? On the former supposition it would be a bringing of that to mind in Maitra as well as in Caitra<sup>12)</sup>. But, in the latter, would there be cognition of it also by a formless cognition, or by one with form? And so, as the point recurs, there is *regressus ad infinitum*.

'As thus there is no Demonstrant, whence can come the act of knowing (*pramiti*) which is in the form of result (fruit) thereof? So that simply universal emptiness is the ultimate reality. And so they quote –

"The more, the more they are considered, the more, the more do they dissolve.

If this itself appears from objects themselves, where do we stand in regard to it?"<sup>13)</sup>

So much for the preliminary alternative.

But the refutation at large of Demonstration is to be discovered from the *Tattvapaplavasiṅgha*<sup>14)</sup>.

Here we attain in reply: Surely this statement proffered by the god-beloved for the demonstration of the emptiness-doctrine, – is it empty, or not empty? If empty, then, since it is void of every trait (*apākhyā*), nothing is by it, as by a sky-flower, established, (148) or negated. And therefore the system of the Tetrad of reals, Demonstrant, etc., meets with no opposition. And, if not empty, then the wretched 'emptiness' doctrine is dissolved. Since by Your Worship's actual statement there would be exception to the emptiness of everything. There also that Blessed thing<sup>15)</sup> is untroubled.

Nevertheless, with a view to maintaining the convention of the logicians, some endeavour to establish it is refuted. So, as for it having been said, 'By perception there is no establish-

<sup>11)</sup> The expression seems to indicate that the substance, at least, of the present Buddhist argument has been taken from some particular text.

<sup>12)</sup> It would be a cause of thought in B as well as in A, because, being not cognized by A, it is not confined to A.

<sup>13)</sup> The first line of the verse occurs (with a variant) in the *Sarva-darsana-saṅgraha* (II, Raudhaka-chapter).

<sup>14)</sup> A work of unknown authorship (M. L.). But in *Pratyak-kamala-mātāṅga* (ed. fol. 195b) is a mention of *śāntarāśmī* as a student of *śāntarāśmī* (evidently a Mādhyamika disputant), whose object was to put forward reasons out of contentation (*anumukhi-kāraṇa*).

<sup>15)</sup> That Blessed Thing – Probably the above mentioned Tetrad (*catusṭayi*).

ment of a knower, because he transcends the range of the senses', that is establishment of something established. But, as to the statement that 'his being mentally perceptible by the presentation 'I' is equivocal', that is unestablished: because of the appropriateness of the introvert presentation 'I am in pleasure. I am in pain' only as reposing upon the self. And to that effect they say -

"Pleasure, etc., when thought, is not experienced as independent;

Rather, since it is penetrated by the sense of 'having', it proves apprehension on the part of the self.

The cognition 'this is pleasant' is not beheld like pot, etc.;

Rather the thought 'I am in pleasure' is illuminative also of the self"<sup>15</sup>).

As for extravert presentation such as 'I am fair', 'I am dark', that, of course, is applied metonymously (*lakṣaṇayā*) to the body because it is of service to the self; as in the expression 'I' in regard to a dear servant.

And as for the occasionality of the presentation 'I', here we have a suffusion<sup>17</sup>) as follows: The self, to begin with, has attention (*upayoga*)<sup>18</sup>) for mark; and that is regularly applied to either attention with form (*ākāra*), or to attention without form. The presentation 'I' also is simply a special instance of attention. And because of its variety, due to the extinction and appeasement of *karma*, its occasionality is verily appropriate, as it proceeds in dependence upon occasioning causes, namely sense-organ, non-sense-organ, light, object, etc. As the seed, even though it has the potency of begetting the shoot, does beget the shoot only when accompanied by the group of co-operant causes, namely earth, water, etc., and not otherwise. But not for that, despite the occasionality of its producing the shoot, is its power also of producing that occasional; since that (149) is in a way eternal. Similarly, although the self is always proximate, there is occasionality of the presentation 'I'.

Moreover, as for the statement, 'no invariable mark of it is observed', that also is unsound; because many marks, not existing without the Major Term, are observed of it. As thus: The observation of colour, etc., has an agent, because it is an action, like the action of craving; and the doer of it is the self\*). And we have not here on the part of the eye, etc., a being doer, because these, being, like axe, etc., instruments, are not independent; and they are instruments\*), because, as being material, they are without intelligence, because they are set in motion by another, and because they have no functioning independent of the operation of the user. For, if the agency should be on part of the sense-organs only, then, when they have been destroyed, how could there be origination of recollection of things previously experienced, and of the belief that there is one agent of the presentation 'by me seen, touched, smelled, tasted, heard'? Moreover, as the sense-organs are restricted to their several spheres they have no capacity for the presentation of colour and taste together. And immediately after apprehending the colour of such and such a fruit, etc., there is a recollection of the taste accompanying it, because the flowing of the mouth-water is otherwise unaccountable. And so is inferred a single witness, like a spectator between two windows, of the colour and taste from two sense-organs. Therefore they are instruments, and the one who operates with them is the self. Again, movement capable of attaining or avoiding what is beneficial or non-beneficial, by way of taking up or avoiding the means, is preceded by effort; because it is a specific action, like

\*) omitted by AMP.

<sup>15</sup>) Quoted in *Nyāya-mañjarī* (ed. p. 433) (M. L.): see also *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka*, commentary, VII. 55.

<sup>17</sup>) On *vīṣaṇa* see note XV \*).

<sup>18</sup>) On *upayoga* see note VIII \*).

the action of making a chariot. And the body is ruled by something that has effort, because it is the abode of the specific action, like a chariot; and its ruler is the self, like the charioteer. Likewise, on this same alternative, because of being the abode of air modified in accordance with will, like a bellows, air also, the outgoing and in-going breath, etc.; and the ruler thereof is the self, like the person inflating the bellows. Furthermore, on the same alternative, because of being possessed of parts which have eye-closing and -opening dependent on will, like a wooden toy. Furthermore, the body's growth, and the regeneration of wounds and fractures, are effected by something which has effort; because they are growth, and regeneration of wounds and fractures; like the additions to a house and repair of harm and breakages (in it). If it is said, 'The growth, etc., occurring in a tree, etc., make an exception', - No! Because they also, as one-sense-organ-creatures<sup>19</sup>, do possess a self. (150) And agent of those actions is the self, like the master of the house. And that trees, etc., have selves is to be ascertained from the *Ācārāṅga*<sup>20</sup>, etc., and something will be said<sup>21</sup>).

Moreover, the mind-organ<sup>22</sup> can be moved, because it is the abode of an action for the sake of conjunction with an approved object; like a ball in the hands of a child; and the mover thereof is the self. Furthermore, the variants, self, intelligence, soul, living principle, person, are not without an object, because they are variants; like the variants 'pot', 'pitcher', 'vessel', etc.; as a negative instance the sixth element<sup>23</sup>, etc. And the object of them is the self. And, again, there is a self because it is denoted by some non-compound terms; whatever is denoted by simple non-conventional terms, is not without existence, as pot, etc.; contrary instances, ass's horn, sky-lotus, etc. Further, pleasure, pain, etc. abide in a substance, because they are qualities; like colour; and the possessor of the qualities is the self. There are these and like marks; therefore from inference also a self is established.

And of Scriptures, those which have a meaning with contradiction between prior and posterior are quite without Demonstrativeness. But a Scripture composed by an authority is really Demonstrant; because it is purified by the three qualifications defined as 'scraping', 'cutting', and 'heating'. And the own-form of 'scraping', etc., will be stated below<sup>24</sup>).

Nor should it be said, 'An authority is one in whom every fault has waned; and such authoritativeness is not found in anyone'. For passion, etc., are on someone's part absolutely cut off, because in our self and others is observed a superior and inferior degree of their cutting off, like masses of clouds covering the sun, etc. And so they say - (151)

"Positives which perish in part are seen to be perishable in whole;

Like lines of clouds, etc.: just so are passion, etc., held to be"<sup>25</sup>).

And one in whom these have vanished without residue, is verily authority, Holy, Omniscient. Or, if it is said, 'Of passion, etc., because without beginning, how can there be complete extinction?', - No! Because it takes place through expedients. Because impurity in gold, etc., though beginningless, is observed to be totally removed by alkaline earth, and by heating in a retort, etc.; for quite similarly the faults of passion, etc., though beginningless, may be totally

<sup>19</sup> On these see *Outlines of Jainism*, pp. 2, 82.

<sup>20</sup> A Jain canonical *sūtra* (*Śruta-skandha*, I. i. 5 (M. L.).

<sup>21</sup> See *infra*, v. XXIX.

<sup>22</sup> *Manas*, besides functioning as a common sensory for all the senses, is also the seat of the will. The Jains more often prefer the terms *man* and *no-indriya* (quasi-sense-organ).

<sup>23</sup> This is perhaps a misreading (for 'Yaksas and Spirits') in the text.

<sup>24</sup> On v. XXXII, p. 169.

<sup>25</sup> Source untraced.

removed by the practice of their adversaries, the three jewels<sup>28</sup>). And, as in one whose faults are extinct absolute cognition (*kevala-jñāna*) is unfailing<sup>27</sup>), there is omniscience. And the establishment of this is that 'gradation in cognition has some terminus, because it is gradation: like the gradation of sizes in space': also 'minute, covered, and distant objects are perceptible to someone, because they are objects of inference; like the fire located in a mountain cave'. Similarly may be stated as reasons the otherwise unaccountable non-falsification of astronomical cognitions prognosticating eclipse of sun and moon. So likewise the Scripture composed by an omniscient authoritative person is verily Demonstrant. For want of authority in them (scriptures) is dependent upon faults in the composers; because of the text -

"Either from passion, or from aversion, or from delusion is an untrue speech spoken; But whoso has not these failings, on his part what should cause want of truth?"<sup>28</sup>)

And the composer's freedom from failings has been actually justified. So from Scripture also a self is established, because of texts such as "One self"<sup>29</sup>), etc. Thus accordingly by perception, inference and Scripture a knower is established.

A Demonstrant has been just previously established, in the establishment of external objects. And, that being established, that 'the Demonstrant is cognition, and in the absence of a Demonstrant what is that to apprehend, because it has no object?'<sup>30</sup>), is mere babble. For without an instrument the accomplishment of an action is not logical; because it is so seen in the case of cutting, etc. (152) And, as for it having been said 'Synchronous with the object, etc.' (p. 114), in regard to that both alternatives are actually adopted. For in the case of ourselves, etc., perception is skilled in considering synchronous objects; recollection is apprehensive of past objects; and communication (*śabda*) and inference are delimitant even of objects belonging to all three times, and these are both without form (*ākāra*). Nor is there over-extension of the argument; because it goes on regularly by virtue of the differences in the extinction and appeasement of the obstacles to energy<sup>31</sup>), veiling one's thought. Of the remaining suggestions non-adoption is refutation.

But the act of knowing, as fruit of the Demonstrant, is actually established by one's own self-consciousness; for, where there is experience, there is no need for instruction. And fruit is twofold, because of the distinction into immediate and mediate. Among these, the immediate fruit, in the case of all the Demonstrants, lies in the stopping of want of cognition. With mediacy the fruit in the case of absolute knowledge is, first of all, indifference, and in the case of the remaining Demonstrants relinquishment, acceptance and disregard. Thus the tetrad of knower, etc., is well founded. And therefore that -

"Not non-existent, not existent, not existent and non-existent, nor even distinct from those, -

Freed from the four alternatives is reality known by the spiritual"<sup>32</sup>), - is insane talk.

<sup>28</sup>) Right outlook (faith), Right cognition and Right conduct: see *Outlines of Jainism* (Index).

<sup>27</sup>) On *kevala-jñāna* see *Outlines of Jainism*, pp. 60, 65, 109-116. *Prasaccana-sāra* (trans. Faddegon, pp. 39-40), I. v. 60.

<sup>28</sup>) Source untraced.

<sup>29</sup>) *Sihānāga* of the Jain Canon, I. 1 (M. L.).

<sup>30</sup>) See *supra*, p. 114.

<sup>31</sup>) On the 'obstacles' (*antaryā-karma*) and on 'extinction' (*kṣaya*, 'waning') and 'appeasement' (*upaśama*) see *Outlines of Jainism*, pp. 31, 48, 50.

<sup>32</sup>) A partly similar verse is given by Candrakīrti, *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, I. 8 (ed. p. 31).

Moreover, this non-actuality of knower, etc., must, of course, by the maintainer of emptiness be taken as an entity (a fact, *vastu*). And this he presumes from Demonstration, or from non-Demonstration. Not from non-Demonstration, to begin with, because that effects nothing. Or from Demonstration: that is not so. A Demonstrant causing apprehension of a non-entity would be conventional<sup>23</sup>), or non-conventional. If conventional, how is there from that, a non-real, establishment of the emptiness doctrine as real. And, that being thus unestablished<sup>24</sup>), we get an actual reality of the entire usage concerning the knower, etc. Or, if (153) the Demonstrant causing apprehension thereof is itself non-conventional, then there is an end to the claim for non-reality of the usage concerning the knower, etc., because that (proof) itself is an exception. So this on both alternatives, on the principle of "on the one side the tiger, on the other the precipice"<sup>25</sup>), in ultimate truth the contradiction with the establishment of their own views is patent. This is the meaning of the verse.

<sup>23</sup>) *tadasiddhau ka ha Daḥ; tathā AMP.*

<sup>24</sup>) On *saṃvṛti*, 'convention', and *sāmvṛta*, 'conventional', see page 112 n. 1, and de la Vallée-Poussin, *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, p. 492, n. 2.

<sup>25</sup>) See Col. Jacob, *A third handful of popular Maxims*, p. 26.



## XVIII. THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF MOMENTARINESS

Now, showing that on the part of the maintainer of momentariness<sup>1)</sup> a justification of things not accordant with the usage here and hereafter has been enacted without reflection<sup>2)</sup>, he says -

**XVIII. In patent disregard of the faults, - loss of deeds, enjoyment of deeds not done,  
of ruin of becoming, liberation and memory -  
accepting momentary destruction,  
Ho! greatly venturesome Thy opponent!**

The fault of loss of deeds, the fault of enjoyment of deeds not done, the fault of ruin of becoming, the fault of ruin of liberation, the fault of ruin of memory, - these faults, obvious (*sākṣād ity*) as established by experience; in patent disregard, not considering; though doing patently yet having recourse to an elephant's eye-closing<sup>3)</sup>. Of all existents, momentary destruction, a momentary perishing in the form of destruction immediately after origination; accepting, agreeing to; Thy, Your, opponent, adversary, upholder of the destruction, meaning the Buddhist.

Ho! greatly venturesome, - with violence, force in essence non-reflection, - he, the venturesome, acts. One who, not having conceived the resulting disadvantage, acts, is so called; and he (164), as both great and venturesome, is a great venturer, one who takes steps with absolute want of reflection. Thus the compressed meaning.

But the expanded meaning is as follows: The Buddhists hold the self to be merely a succession of moments of awareness; and not like a single thread running through a collection of pearl drops, one permeating them all. On their view the moment of cognition whereby the carrying out of good or the carrying out of evil has been effected, has not, because it perishes without residue, the enjoyment of the fruit thereof; and that which has the enjoyment of the fruit was not the doer of that deed. Thus on the part of the former moment of cognition there is 'loss of deed', because it does not experience the fruit of the deed done by itself, and on the part of the latter moment of cognition there is 'enjoyment of a deed not done', because of enjoyment of fruit of deed not done by itself, but by another. And here the word 'deed' must be construed in both places; therefore of 'loss of deed' the sense must be understood as 'loss of deeds done'. And its so setting out is because of convenience of composition<sup>4)</sup>.

Furthermore, the fault of 'ruin to becoming': 'becoming' being defined as being straight-forward (*ārjavi*) mundane existence; thereof 'ruin', abolition; this is a fault which results on the doctrine of momentariness, the consequence of the non-existence of another world is the

<sup>1)</sup> *Avimēśyakārūṭhāritam ka kha; Avimēśyakārūṭam AMP.*

<sup>2)</sup> In verse XVIII (quoted in *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* III, as by Siddhasūtra), the fundamental Buddhist conception of *ḥanikāina* is separately considered. See long discussions in *Nyāya-mañjarī*, pp. 444-467, *Sammata-tarka* pp. 218-249.

<sup>3)</sup> A wilful ignoring: cited again in p. 153.

<sup>4)</sup> See here the metre of the verse.

meaning; because there is no one belonging to a future world. For the future world is in accordance with deeds done in a previous birth; and by whom, pray, is that to be enjoyed in another birth, since the previous moments of cognition have perished without residue? As for the proof stated by Mokṣākara Gupta<sup>4)</sup> for the establishment of series of lives -

"What is a thought another thought replaces, as to-day's thought and the thought which will exist at the time of death"<sup>5)</sup>, - that is useless; because thought-moments which perish without residue are unfitted to replace (give place to?) (*pratiṣaṃdhāna*) other thoughts. For between two actual things replacement is effected by some connecting factor (*anugāmin*); and the replacing factor between these two is not (155) accepted by him; for that is a recurring self. For the sense of 'replacing' is not 'begetting', because of the consequence of its being a cause of an effect; for by that disputant cause was mentioned as being own-nature-cause (*svabhāva-hetu*)<sup>6)</sup>, and own-nature-cause occurs when there is identity, and of a thought and another thought taking place at different times, how can there be identity? Because in the case of two things occurring together there is the objection of a failure of the relation of replaced and replacer; and as the occurrence together is not different (in the two), what is here the restrictive circumstance, so that the replacer is one and the replaced another? Or let the meaning of 'replacing' be 'begetting'; that also is unaccountable; because with coincidence of time there is no relation of cause and fruit. But, with difference of time, how is the latter thought-moment, since the former thought-moment has perished, to come into existence without a basis? So that is just something.

Further, the fault of 'run to complete liberation'; - 'complete' without recurrence, 'liberation' from the bond of *karma*, - is 'complete liberation', of that also run results. On their view, of course, the very self does not exist; who will strive for a happy life after death? How will even the thought-moment, as belonging to mundane existence, qualify for the happy life of another thought-moment? For a Devadatta in pain is not seen to be active for the happiness of Yajñadatta. Of a moment, again, the pain, being spontaneously perishable, has vanished along with it; and a series (*santāna*)<sup>7)</sup> is not in any case real; while, if it is real, there results an acceptance of self.

Moreover, the Buddhists say that "Mokṣa is origination"<sup>8)</sup> of a cognition purified from the inundation of the forms of objects which have passed away upon the annihilation of all suffusions"<sup>9)</sup>. And that does not fit, since simply from the absence of a cause that is unaccountable. For as cause is put forward an accumulation of realizations (*bhāvanā*)<sup>10)</sup>; and that, from lack of a single permanent base, not receiving any intensification, produced every moment as if without antecedent, perishing without residue, not effecting any progress, like practice of leaping over the sky, is unavailing for the begetting of a clear overthought; so that there is no justification in that; for (156) because of the natural potency of polluted thought-moments for setting in motion their similars and impotence for effecting the dissimilar, there is not a sudden annihilation. Furthermore, the previous polluted thought-moments having spontaneously attained full Nirvāṇa, this one has been born without ante-

<sup>4)</sup> On Mokṣākara Gupta see note XVI <sup>38)</sup>.

<sup>5)</sup> Source untraced.

<sup>6)</sup> On *svabhāva-hetu* see note XVI <sup>18)</sup>.

<sup>7)</sup> The term 'series' (*santāna*) was used by the Buddhist maintainers of momentariness to account for the continuity constituting the individual: the *Santānāntaro-viddhi* of Dharmakīrti, whereof the Tibetan version has been edited by Stcherbatsky (Bibliotheca Buddhica, XIX [1916]), deals with the problem, on the 'thought-only' hypothesis, of the existence of 'other series'.

<sup>8)</sup> Source untraced.

<sup>9)</sup> On *vāsanā* see note XV <sup>31)</sup>, and *infra* v. XIX.

<sup>10)</sup> I.e. repeated envisaging or cultivation of a thought.

cedents; and there is no single series, and bondage and liberation have one single locus, and do not take place with difference of field. Then to whom belongs this liberation, so that he makes effort for it? For this term 'liberation' is a synonym for 'severance of bonds': and liberation holds good only of the person who was bound, while on the contention of momentary extinction one moment is bound, and the liberation belongs to another moment; so that there results a negation of liberation.

Further, the fault of 'ruin of memory'. As thus: in regard to an object experienced by a prior awareness a memory on the part of later awareness is not possible, because they are other than it; like awareness on the part of another series<sup>11)</sup>. For a thing seen by one is not remembered by another; otherwise a thing seen by one person would be remembered by all. And, if there is no recollection, whence in the world comes the begetting of recognition? Since that arises from both recollection and (original) experience; for this, with the form 'this is that same', arises in a knower in whom a former impression (*saṃskāra*)<sup>12)</sup> has been awakened by beholding an object. Or, if it is said that 'This fault might exist if without distinction it is said that what has been seen by one is remembered by another; but, even given the otherness, there is memory simply from the relation of effect and cause; and between the awarenesses of different series there is not a relation of effect and cause. Therefore on the part of other series there is not memory. But it is not the fact that also between awarenesses belonging to a single series there is not a relation of effect and cause, so that in regard to a thing experienced by a previous awareness there should not be recollection on the part of later awareness' – that also is not transparent; because even so the otherness is as before. For it does not depart simply on mention of the relation of effect and cause; because all (awarenesses) are, as momentary, different. Nor have we here as regards memory due to the relation of effect and cause an example recognized by both sides. Or, if it is said, 'according to –

"For into whatever series there has been deposited a suffusion of *karma*,  
There only does the fruit present itself, like redness in a cotton cloth"<sup>13)</sup> – (157)

there is the example of the redness in a cotton cloth'. That is not very good; because there can be no establishing and no refuting. As thus: because of the impossibility of constant association (*anvaya*), etc., there is no Middle Term; for a constant association to the effect that 'where there is a relation of cause and effect, there there is memory, like the redness in a cotton cloth', is not possible; nor is there a divergence to the effect that, 'where there is not memory, there there is not a relation of cause and effect'. And from there being no suggestion of being unestablished, etc.<sup>14)</sup>, there is not refutation; for in the Middle Term, 'being other than that' no fault is demonstrated by 'like the redness in a cotton cloth'.

Furthermore, if, despite otherness, an origination of memory through the relation of effect and cause is approved, then also between the awareness of a pupil and teacher, since there a relation of effect and cause is actual, there would be memory, etc. Or, if it is said, 'This does not follow, because of the specification' given a belonging to one series'', that also is illogical, since it is used up by the alternative of difference and non-difference. For, if that (series) is

<sup>11)</sup> Another person.

<sup>12)</sup> On *saṃskāra* see note VIII 47).

<sup>13)</sup> Quoted *Nyāya-mañjarī*, p.443, also in comm. to *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvaloka*, VII. 55, in *Mañibhadra's* comm. on *Haribhadra's Śaṅkara-darsana-samuccaya*, and in the *Sarva-darsana-saṃgraha*, III (Jain chapter).

<sup>14)</sup> Due to smearing the cotton seeds with lac: see Col. Jacob's, *A second handful of popular Maxims*, pp. 20-1.

<sup>15)</sup> A Middle Term is 'unestablished' if it does not occur in the Minor or does not occur at all. Here the Middle Term is 'case other than where there is a relation of cause and effect'.

to be non-different from the succession of moments, there is simply the succession of moments; and so nothing different would be mentioned by 'series'. But, if different, would that be ultimately real, or not ultimately real? If it is not ultimately real, there is the same refutation, because it is utterly ineffective. If ultimately real, it would either be lasting, or momentary. If momentary, it is entirely non-different from the members of the series; so what of this imitator of one afraid of a thief 'who seeks refuge with another thief'?<sup>14</sup>) If lasting, a self is accepted, disguised under a different term. And so for the maintainers of momentary destruction memory does not fit in. And that, failing that, there is no opportunity for inference has been previously stated. Moreover in the absence of memory, the usages as to seeking back and giving back things deposited would be dissipated.

And what becomes of the text:

"In the ninety-first aeon from this a person was slain by my power;

Through that maturation of *karma* I have been wounded in the foot, O Bhikṣu"<sup>15</sup>).

Similarly, those also who advocate an entity of four moments, 'origin originates, lasting makes last, decay makes decay, destruction destroys', are to be refuted;\*) because we see the the practice of asking and giving back things deposited even after four instants\*). So, whoever even with such incidence of plural faults approves of momentary annihilation displays great venturesomeness. This is the meaning of the verse.

\*) Omitted by AMP.

<sup>14</sup>) Not traced elsewhere.

<sup>15</sup>) The verse is quoted also in Mañibhadra's comm. on Haribhadra's *śaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*, v. 5.

## XIX. THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF SUFFUSION

Now the followers of the Tathāgata, after hearing proved by others the unaccountability of all practical life on the alternative of momentary destruction, (158) demonstrate, as follows, that even with momentariness of all things\*) the faults of loss of deeds, etc., are entirely without opening, because through the certitude of unity which derives its origin from the force of suffusion<sup>1)</sup>, the practical life of this world and the other can go on. Desiring to cut away their idea, and proving the inappropriateness of the suffusion supposed by them on all the three alternatives, defined as difference from the succession of moments, non-difference, and non-both, he, in order to make them even against their will adopt the Quodammodo doctrine of difference and non-difference as accepted by him, says -

**XIX. That suffusion and that seriality of moments,**

**do not fit with non-difference, difference, or non-both.**

**Therefore, on the principle of the birdling not seeing the shore,**

**let the opponents take refuge in Thy pronouncements.**

That, supposed by the Śākya suffusion; which, begetting a presentation running through from one to another of the moments, mutually isolated, like a broken necklace, takes the place of a single thread, and is otherwise termed series (*santāna*). 'Suffusion' they call a potency in a later cognition generated by a previous cognition; and that, in their view well-established, **seriality of moments**; series of moments, like the series of ever renewed flame of a lamp; these two also **do not fit with non-difference, difference, and non-both**. Not, first of all, 'with non-difference', with identity, do these 'fit'; for, if the two were non-different, there would be either suffusion, or succession of moments, not both; for what is non-different from anything is not observed apart therefrom; as from pot the own-form of a pot. If only in suffusion is a continuant adopted, then, as there is nothing to be infected, what is to be infected by it? So that even of it the own-form does not stand fast. If only the succession of moments is accepted, there are simply the previous faults. (159)

Nor as different are the two logical. For as different that suffusion would be either momentary, or non-momentary. If momentary, then the supposition of it apart from the moment is purposeless. If non-momentary, then through the admission of a continuous thing there is vetoing of their Tradition; and so the exertion of supposing a momentariness of other things is mere waste.

Also on the alternative of 'not both' the two do not fit. For he might on some occasion say as follows: 'I do not adopt a non-distinction of the suffusion from the line of moments, nor again distinction, but a negation of both'. That also is improper; for between difference and non-difference, which are in the form of affirmation and negation, there is adoption of one or the other alternative, because upon denial of either one there is a necessity of affirming one or the other, and in this matter the fault has already been actually stated. Or else, if there is

\*) *sarva-paḍarśhanam ka* Das; AMP omits *sarva-*.

<sup>1)</sup> This specially is the topic of v. XIX.

the form of being non-both, there is the consequence of being non-entity, because of the non-actuality of another way distinct from the dual alternatives defined as difference and non-difference. For to non-Jains an entity must necessarily be either different or non-different; because what transcends both is like a barren woman's suckling. Therefore, as on all three suppositions there is no accounting for succession of moments and suffusion, by residual inference<sup>2)</sup> the alternative of difference and non-difference must be embraced. Nor should it be said that 'Because of the text "the fault which would be in each case severally, how should it not exist in the case of both?"<sup>3)</sup>, here also there is the identical fault'; because the 'equivocality' alternative is, like the cock-serpent and the man-lion<sup>4)</sup>, of a different genus.

If it is said, 'Surely the Jains do not even admit suffusion and succession of moments; so how does a consideration of difference and non-difference in regard to these work?', - Not so! The maintainers of the Quodammodo doctrine also actually approve of an origination of a succession moment by moment of ever new states; (160) and so of momentariness. And also a continuant substance combining the series of past, future and present states; and this, even though it get the synonym 'suffusion', is actually approved. Surely no contention of competent persons is from verbal distinctions. And this series of states arising moment by moment is in a way different from a continuant substance, in a way not different. Likewise that (continuant) also may be (as quodammodo) different from it (sc. the series), or it may be non-different. And so there is a difference, because of being object of separate presentations and designations; and only on the part of the substance is there non-difference because it evolves in such and such ways. And this will be worked out *infra*<sup>5)</sup> in the exposition of complete and incomplete expression.

Moreover, in the Buddhist doctrine even suffusion, to begin with, does not fit. And so in regard to it a consideration of the alternatives of difference, etc., is groundless. For its definition is 'suffusedness of a later moment by a previous moment'. And for these, impermanent and, as occurring at different times, not mutually connected, a relation of suffused and suffuser is not logical: it is in a lasting and conjoined robe, etc., that suffusion by musk, etc., is seen. Or else 'From a particular act of thinking 'born along with' a former thought, arises a thought qualified by a prior potency, and this origination of that thought qualified by its potency is suffusion. As thus: a prior thought having for object colour, etc., is a consciousness in action (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*) which is of six kinds, - five consciousness of colour, etc., unquestioning, and the sixth, questioning consciousness<sup>6)</sup>; and, born along with it, a contemporary particular act, thought, is the store-consciousness<sup>7)</sup>, which is basis of egoity. Therefore origination of thought qualified by a prior potency is suffusion'. That also is not the case; because of non-lastingness, and because of non-connection with the suffuser. And, as for that particular act of thinking, accompanying the former thought, that is of no assistance to the present thought; because what is present, as it cannot be either averted or encouraged, is unmodifiable; for with what nature it is born, with that nature it perishes. Nor does it help a future (thought); because it is not connected therewith, and it is said that 'what is unconnected does not bring into being'. Therefore in the Sūgata-doctrine suffusion also does not fit. And here it must be supposed (161) that the author of the Laudation (Hemacandra),

<sup>2)</sup> The *pariṣeṇa-anumāna* is expounded in *Nyāya-sūtra*, III, 11, 41.

<sup>3)</sup> Quoted also in *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 1, 33.

<sup>4)</sup> The 'cock-serpent' is said to be a particular species of serpent: the 'man-lion' is one of Viṣṇu's incarnations. On the maxim see Col. Jacob, *A second handful* . . . p. 41.

<sup>5)</sup> See v. XXIII.

<sup>6)</sup> On *nirvikalpa* and *savikalpa* see note XIII 19.

<sup>7)</sup> Store-consciousness. On *ālaya-vijñāna* see Stecherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, II, p. 173, n. 4; 328-9, n. 7.

though admitting it (suffusion), has elaborated the discussion of (its) difference and non-difference with a view to demonstrating a continuant substance.

Now the exposition of the second half: **Therefore**, because of the existence of faults in all three alternatives; **Thy pronouncements**, Your Worship's statements, purified by agreement with the Quodammodo doctrine of difference and non-difference; **the opponents**, those who belong to bad sects; from the context those who follow the son of Māyā<sup>9</sup>); **let them take refuge, etc.**, let them regard. Here he gives an analogy, **not seeing the shore, etc.**<sup>10</sup>), does not behold the shore; so 'shore-not-seeing'; **the birdling**, bird-chick, regarding it, **on the principle**, - example; 'therefrom'. As, at times, somehow **fallen** into the boundless ocean, a young bird, crow or the like, innocently through desire to **get out**, flies up from the mast of a ship, in order to reach the shore, and, beholding all round only the single ocean of waters, and not even seeing the shore, from despair turns back, and takes refuge in the same position on the mast of the ship, because of having no other resource; so may those followers of bad sects also, failing on all the three previously mentioned alternatives to reach establishment of reality (*vastu*), and embracing even involuntarily the fourth alternative stated by you of difference and non-difference, adopt your teaching. For, after considering one's own lack of strength, to take refuge with a more powerful lord is in the eyes of people expert in policy not faulty. The plural 'Thy pronouncements' is to signify that to all adherents of other systems only the acceptance, step by step, of the non-unequivocal doctrine and not anything else, is serviceable for the demonstration of things as they are. For all entities, composed of endless attributes cannot without the Quodammodo doctrine, composed of all the Methods<sup>10</sup>), be apprehended. (162) Otherwise, on the maxim of the blind men and the elephant<sup>11</sup>), there is the consequence of grabbing at superficialities<sup>12</sup>). Some read 'take refuge' in the Present Tense. In that also there is no fault.

And here instead of the ocean is mundane existence; equivalent to a boat is Thy doctrine, and like the mast of the ship is the Quodammodo doctrine. And comparable to the young bird are the disputants: and these, although by the flight of describing the alternatives of which they approve they make an effort to reach the shore called liberation, if from that turning back when they do not see the accomplishment of their desired purpose, they find refuge simply in approaching the ship of Thy teaching, adorned with a mast in the form of the Quodammodo doctrine, fructify then, not otherwise, their desire to escape outside the ocean of becoming. This is the meaning of the verse.

<sup>9</sup>) Buddha

<sup>10</sup>) Like the dove in Noah's ark, a story based on the ancient practice of mariners, exemplified in India by tales and by the term *diśā-hāka* ('direction-[showing]-crow'), which evidently was in *Māliṅga*'s mind when he wrote 'a young bird, crow or the like'.

<sup>11</sup>) On these see *infra*, vv. XXIV, pp. 142sq., and XXVIII, pp. 152sqq.

<sup>12</sup>) See note XIV <sup>12</sup>).

<sup>13</sup>) The expression *paṭava-grāhin*, 'twig-grabbing', has not the same implication as English 'grasping at straws'.

## XX. CRITICISM OF THE LOKĀYATAS

Having thus checked a few wrong starts on the part of the exponents who champion action, now, adducing at the end, because the lowest of all, the view of the Lokāyatas<sup>1</sup>), who maintain non-action, he, by showing the futility of their root-doctrine, perception as Demonstrant, for refusal to adopt inference, etc., as Demonstrant, exhibits the error of their wisdom –

### XX. But of (for) the Nāstika, who without inference

is not aware of the intent of others,

It is not apposite even to speak: What of a movement,

what of a mere look! Alas! error!

That perception alone is Demonstrant is the view of the Cārvāka. For that he girds himself: *anu-*, 'alter', following upon, apprehension and memory of the mark and the connection; *-mīyate*, 'is measured', 'is outlined', a thing remote in place, time and own-nature by this species of cognition, accordingly *anu-māna*. From the context it is inference for self<sup>2</sup>). That, inference, proof with a Middle Term: without, lacking; intent of others, view of others; is not aware of, not correctly cognizing. The word **but** is for the purpose of pointing out the difference from the previous disputants, of those previous disputants, as they are affirmativist (*āstika*)<sup>3</sup>), he has made discussion on the points of disagreement. But of (for) the Negativist it is not even proper to speak: how is discussion with him possible? So the meaning of the word 'but'. Or else, his view being that there is no future world, merit and sin, (because of the exception noted in the grammatical rule<sup>4</sup>) concerning the formation of the three words "*nāstika-āstika-daiṣṭika*" he is called Nāstika), for that Negativist, the Lokāyatika, to speak

<sup>1</sup>) Similarly in Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* the Lokāyata doctrine is placed last, as a sort of appendix to the six, and for the same reason it is first, as most elementary, in the order adopted in the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*.

Concerning the Lokāyata, definitely identified with the Cārvāka, disputants, who reach back to the period of the earliest Buddhism, it may be sufficient to refer to *Cārvāka-saṃśi*, by Dakṣanaranjan Shastri (Calcutta), where the material available in different sources is collected. For confutations see *Nyāya-mañjarī*, pp. 467-9, *Sammata-tarka*, pp. 554-9, *Prameya-kamala-martanda*, fol. 46.

The Cārvāka crude materialism, accompanied by criticism of religion and society and cynicism in regard to ethics, was expressed in blunt and often amusingly hybriatic comments, some of which have been preserved in the texts named.

<sup>2</sup>) On the distinction of 'inference for self' (*svārthanumāna*), which is a 'process of thought in one's own mind', and 'inference for others' (*parārthanumāna*), 'the process expressed in words for communication to others', see Randle, *Indian Logic in the early Schools*, pp. 160-1, and Index. The distinction is not stated in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, but subsequently it was generally adopted: as regards the Buddhists see e. g. *Nyāya-bindu*, II, 1, and as regards the Jains, e. g. *Pramāṇa-naya-introḍḍhā*, III, 10 and 23 (M. L.), where 'inference for others' is qualified as being only metonymously (*upacāra*) 'inference'.

<sup>3</sup>) *Āstika*, 'those who say "is"', are differently defined according to the point of view. The negative term *nāstika* sometimes denotes those who reject the Veda and its *dharma*, in which case it includes the Buddhists; more generally it is those who deny moral responsibility and a future life: which seems to be the sense here, as the Buddhists and the Jains themselves, escape.

<sup>4</sup>) A reference to Hemacandra's Grammar, VI, iv. 66 (M. L.), expounding the form of the word *nāstika*.



even is not apposite, even to utter a word is not proper; hence only to remain silent is preferable for him; to say nothing of entering into a company of authorities on logic and debating on propounding a means of proof.

For speaking is proffered (*pratiṣṭhāyate*) for the convincing of another. And in proffering a matter where there is no chance of agreement by another, his statements are not be regarded by worthy people; like a madman's. 'Surely, (164) however is simply being silent preferable for him, inasmuch as, having by a kind of movement, etc., inferred the intent of the thing to be proffered, it is easy for him to utter speech?', - in view of this doubt he says: **What of a movement? What of a mere look?** 'What of' (*kva*) is used in the case of a wide difference; 'a movement', a gesture, a sign of a thing to be inferred in the form of the opponent's intent. Seeing is 'look'; *kta* in the sense of a Noun<sup>1)</sup>; 'a mere look' even a look; mere perception, because that proceeds without dependence upon a mark. For this very reason wide is the difference between the two: for not by perception can the imperceptible movements of another's thought be known; because that belongs to the sense-organs. But through the actions of repose of countenance, etc., as mark this even to one who does not approve of inference as a means of proof does in regard to ascertainment of the opponent's intent, perforce occur. As thus: This person has the intent of hearing my statement; because otherwise his movements, such as such composure of countenance, etc. are unaccountable. And hence **Alas! error!** - 'Alas!' is used in regret. Ho! his error, his mistakenness; that by his acceptance of perception alone he denies inference while actually experiencing it. The root *nid*, preceded by *sam-*<sup>2)</sup> has Middle Voice only when there is no Accusative; but here there is an Accusative; so why is there here the termination *ānaś*<sup>3)</sup>? As to this we say: here we must take 'conscious' as 'one who is able to be conscious of', because of the rule for *śāna-* in the sense of 'potency' "after *vayaś śakti* and *śīla*"<sup>4)</sup>. And so the meaning is this: 'incompetent to know correctly without inference the intent of another'. And so, because of the impossibility otherwise of knowing the mind of another, perforce he was made to accept inference. Also in another way he must be made to accept it; as thus: The Cārvāka, having observed certain instances of cognition as non-divergent (not erroneous) because of accordance (with fact), and others as divergent because of discord, again at another time would certainly lay down the provedness and otherwise of the like and other such instances of cognition. Nor can a perception, arising through force of a thing in proximity and without consideration of prior and posterior, serve to sub-define (165) a sign establishing the provedness or non-provedness of instances of cognition belonging to prior and posterior time. Nor has the man power to settle against an opponent the provedness or non-provedness even of the instances of cognition which are in the field of his own presentation. Therefore let him await another means of proof in the form of inference, settling the provedness or non-provedness of the present instances of cognition by way of their similarity to the instances of cognition as (previously) observed by him, and convincing to others. And denial of the future world, etc., cannot be effected by mere perception, because this has for object only what is proximate. And without denying a future world, etc., this person does not rest content, and yet he does not desire another Demonstrant; and that is childish pretence.

Moreover, perception also derives its authority merely from non-divergence from practice. How otherwise is there not provedness in a cognition of water applied to a mirage mass, as possessed of practical efficacy for bathing, drinking and plunging? And why is it not simply

<sup>1)</sup> H's Grammar, V. i. 174 (M. L.) explains the use of Participial forms (cf. Latin *factum*, 'deed') as Nouns.

<sup>2)</sup> H's Grammar, III. iii. 84 (M. L.).

<sup>3)</sup> Sc. in *samvidhānāya* in line 2 of the verse.

<sup>4)</sup> H's Grammar, V. ii. 24 (M. L.), justifying the *-āna*, in the sense of 'able to', with Transitive sense.

on the ground of the non-divergence from practice approved in regard to inference and scripture also, which are evoked by way of words for marks connected with objects? If it is said, 'They are without provedness because they are seen to be also divergent (sc. mistaken)'; - since on the part of perception also we see failure of authority when through the defect of faulty vision, etc., it attaches to a pair of moons, there follows an universal want of authority. If it is said, 'That is an illusion of perception', the same can be said in the other cases also, except for partiality. And, as thus a systematizing of entities by mere perception is unaccountable, the contentions thereon based, negating soul, merit and demerit, a future world, etc., are simply without provedness. Likewise must be rejected also the contention, approved by the Nāstikas, concerning thought as physical. And to this effect the author of the *Dravya-ālamkāra*<sup>9)</sup> in the description of attention (*upayoga*) says<sup>10)</sup>: "Nor is this an attribute of the physical, like strength and hardness, etc., or like the power in the parts of intoxicants of causing dizziness, etc.; because it is not observed in each separately<sup>11)</sup>. And, if it is not manifested, there is establishment of a self. If it is said that 'It (attention) arises from them when evolved in the form of (living) bodies', the evolution as body also, if it is merely in those (physical) elements (166), is not occasional; but, if other, it would be simply the self. If it had not cause, there would be no restriction of place, etc., and it would take place even from a dead man. The accessory condition of blood, etc., is present also in a sleeper, etc.; nor is there origination of that, if it is existent<sup>12)</sup>, because of the consequence of again and again; and, if not actualised, there is contradiction of the recognized 'practical efficiency'<sup>13)</sup>. And, if it does not exist, being void of all potency, how can it be the agent of its origination, because of the consequence of another also (doing the same)<sup>14)</sup>? Therefore attention is not a product of the physical. 'Whence then is its arising when one rises from sleep? Because on account of non-self-consciousness there is (in sleep) no intelligence'. Not because of recollection of what has been experienced in the waking state, while the non-consciousness is through the impediment of sleep. - 'How then is there injury to the intelligence upon injury to the body?' - That is not unequivocal, because there is purity of intelligence even on the part of one who has a body infected by leprosy, etc., and with absence of injury there is variety of mental state, since we see differences of pleasure, etc.; and in case of mental injury by sorrow, etc., we do not see bodily injury. And without an evolving thing there is not the origination of the effect. Nor is it merely the physical elements that so evolve, because they belong to a different species, since we do not observe hardness, etc. (in the soul). Only atoms are liable to a gross state, in the form of being apprehensible by the sense-organs; and genus, etc., of such are observed. Therefore attention is not an attribute of the physical, or a fruit of it. Also that Your Worship criticises is a mark of it<sup>15)</sup>; and this self is self-conscious. If physical things were so, 'I am fair, etc.' would be extravert, but not introvert, because of being begotten by external organs. And on the part of one who does not admit the validity of inference even a negation of the self is unattainable.

If attention should be an attribute and a fruit of physical things,

There would be observation (of it) in every case; or else origination from a dissimilar".

This is the meaning of the verse. (167)

<sup>9)</sup> Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, disciples of Hemacandra: an (unpublished) Jain work on philosophy.

<sup>10)</sup> On *upayoga* see note VIII <sup>4)</sup>.

<sup>11)</sup> Sc. each physical element.

<sup>12)</sup> It cannot then be created again.

<sup>13)</sup> So long as it is doing nothing it is non-existent.

<sup>14)</sup> Any other non-existent could do the like.

<sup>15)</sup> The fact of your own criticism is proof of mind.

## XXI. THE MAIN METAPHYSICAL TENET OF JAINISM

Having by the arguments thus stated set forth a refutation of the 'unequivocal' doctrines, now, bringing to light the madness of those who, with intelligence thoroughly permeated by the suffusion of beginningless ignorance, look down upon the 'equivocal' doctrine, though perceptibly beheld, he says –

**XXI<sup>1)</sup> Whoso, through seeing before his eyes one lasting thing,  
equipped with momentary origination and destruction,  
looks, down, O Jina! upon Thy precepts.  
he is a madman, O Lord, or demon-possessed.**

**Momentary**, every instant; **origination**, in the form of assuming a later aspect; **and destruction**, defined as the abandonment of a former aspect; **is equipped with**, is of this type, equipped with momentary origination and destruction. What is that? **One lasting thing**, Accusative: 'lasting', that (single substance) which by accompanying the origination and destruction exists in the three times is 'one lasting'. Here the word 'one' signifies 'one common'; and it is common to origination and destruction, because of being a continuant substance: as to Caitra and Maitra one single mother is in common – that is the meaning. For only so have the two a single locality; because, despite plurality in a way of states, it is in a way one. **Though seeing thus a triple real; before his eyes**, beholding perceptibly. **O Jina!** victor over passion, etc.. **Thy precepts** (*ājñā*): *ā*, integrally, in one whole; with qualification by infinite attributes, 'are known', are discerned; things, soul, non-soul, etc.; that whereby so is 'precept', scripture, command; of Thee the precept, 'Thy precept'; that, Thy precept, worked out by Your Worship with the seal of the Quodammodo doctrine; **whoso**, whatever undiscriminating person; **looks down upon**, contemns; the singular of the person is in a way of a class, or in sign of contempt; **he**, this human animal; **is a madman** (*vātaki*), or **demon-possessed**. Wind (*vāta*), a kind of disease, is in him; and so he is 'windman'; like a madman, 'windman'; 'inflated' (*vātūla*) is the meaning. Likewise, like one demon-possessed, 'demon-possessed'; 'entered by a disembodied spirit' is the meaning. Here (168) the word 'or' has the sense of addition, or the sense of analogy. This outcast person is equivalent to a madman or one demon-possessed. By virtue of the *sūtra* "From *vāta* and *atīśāra* and *piśāca* the termination *ka*"<sup>2)</sup>. The ending has the sense of 'having'. Similarly with 'demon-possessed' also. Just as one whose body is occupied by wind or by a demon, though directly perceiving the real entity, through the force of that possession believes otherwise, so this person also is beside himself through the epilepsy of the 'unequivocal' doctrine.

<sup>1)</sup> In verse XXI we come to the main metaphysical tenet of Jainism, to the effect that every real is a complex of origination (*utpada*), duration (*dhrauvya*) and destruction (*vināśa*), or of substance (*dravya*), state (*paryaya*) and quality (*guna*). In the *Pravacana-sūtra* (trans. Faddeson, pp. 60sq.) the matter is expounded meticulously and at length.

<sup>2)</sup> Hemacandra's Grammar, VII. ii. 61 (M. L.), explains the formation of the words *vātakin* and *piśācakin*.

And here the expression 'Jina' is with intent: for it is from being victorious over passion, etc., that he is Jina; and therefore whoso looks down on Your Worship's precept, though your words call for attention, as exempt from the turbidity of defects, how is there not in him madness? — that is the sense. **O Lord!** O master! And he is Lord through having, as bestower of what has not been obtained, the true insight, etc., and, as giver of instruction for maintenance without transgression of that same when obtained, the faculty of effecting complete well-being. To him invocation.

And real entity consists of origination, perishing, and stability. As thus: Every entity, as substance, is not subject to origination or falling away; because we patently see continuity. It should not be said, 'There is exception, because we see continuity in the case of cut nails, etc., which have grown again'; because a continuity vetoed by Demonstration<sup>3</sup>) is not patent. Nor is the continuity here in question contradicted by Demonstration; since it is established by true recognition: because of the text —

"In all the particulars regular, or, if there is moment by moment otherness, no difference;

Because, despite increase and decrease, there is a settled shape and genus"<sup>4</sup>).

And so of every entity as substance there is stability only, but as states every entity is subject to origination and falling away; because unhalting experience of states is actual. Nor is there exception (169) because of the like experience of yellow, etc., states in a white shell; for that is of a halting form. That (experience) is not of unhalting form, so that there should be inseparability of origination of later aspect maintained without failure of destruction of former aspect. And in regard to an entity, soul, etc., the experience of a succession of states, joy, displeasure, indifference, etc., is not in a halting form, because there is not vetoing circumstance.

If it is said, 'Origination, etc., are mutually distinct, or not. If they are distinct, how is there one entity triple? If they are not distinct, just so, how is the one triple? And to this effect —

"If origination, etc., are different, how is there one thing triple?

Or, if origination, etc., are not different, how is there one thing triple?"<sup>5</sup>)

That is unlogical; because it is as having marks in a way distinct that they are admitted to be in a way distinct. As thus: origination, destruction and stability are quodammodo distinct, because of having distinct marks, like colour, etc. Nor is their having distinct marks unestablished. Of the non-existent a becoming real, of the existent a separation from existence, and recurrence in the form of substance are certainly, as mutually un-commingled marks of origination, etc., attested by all the world.

Nor are these, though of distinct marks, mutually irrespective; because of the consequence of non-existence, as in the case of the sky-flower. As thus: Mere origination does not exist; because that is without stability and departure; like the hair of a tortoise. Likewise, mere destruction does not exist; because it is without stability and origination, like the same. Likewise, mere stability does not exist, because it is void of destruction and origination; like just the same. So an existence in the entity of mutually respective origination, etc., must be conceded. And to this effect it is said — (170)

<sup>3</sup>) The non-continuity of the cut nails, etc., is manifestly seen.

<sup>4</sup>) Source untraced: quoted in Haribhadra's comm. on *Tattvārthasūtra*, V. 29 (Dhruva).

<sup>5</sup>) Quoted also in the comm. to *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka*, V. 8.

"This person who desires pot, crown, and gold incurs in regard to the loss, origination and stability

Grief, joy and indifference with their causes.

One vowed to milk does not eat curds; one vowed to curds does not eat milk;

One vowed to abstinence from cow products avoids both. Therefore the entity is triple"<sup>6</sup>).

This is the meaning of the verse.

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<sup>6</sup>) The two verses are nos. 59 and 60 in the *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra-svamin. They occur also in Haribhadra's *Nāstavrūṭi-samuccaya*, VII 2-3, and in the comm. to his *Sad-darśana-samuccaya*, v. 57. The first verse conceives of a gold pot made into a crown, and the second relates to the different transformations of milk.

## XXII. THE JAIN DOCTRINE OF THE INFINITE COMPLEXITY OF ALL EXISTENTS

Now, the subject being the cutting away of other systems, to say nothing of Your Worship in person, even the parts of Your Worship's teaching are armed for the refutation of members of other sects, - with this idea the author of the Laudation, propounding a procedure for the demonstration of the Quodammodo doctrine, pronounces the Laudation -

**XXII. That the real simply is composed of infinite attributes,  
that existence otherwise than so is not easily justified;  
such Demonstrations also of Thine are lion-roars  
for the terrifying of the bad-contention-deer.<sup>1)</sup>**

The real, entity ultimately existing, defined as soul and nonsoul; simply composed of 'infinite attributes': 'infinite', limitless because of being sphere of the three times; these attributes', states synchronous and successive. That of which these only are the self, the own-form, is composed of infinite attributes. The word 'simply' has the meaning of cutting away other aspects. This is why he says: 'oth wise than so', etc. **Otherwise than so**, i. e. with the contrariness to the stated way; **existence**, the reality of an entity; **is not easily justified**: 'with ease is justified', raised to the level (*saṃtāṇkam*) of the scale of aptness; so 'easily justified'; not so, 'not easily justified', 'hard to fit' is the meaning. Thereby an establishing is exhibited. As thus: 'A real' as a subject of attributes; a 'consisting of infinite attributes is the attribute to be established', 'because of the unaccountability of existence otherwise<sup>2)</sup>', is the Middle Term; for unaccountability otherwise is the one mark of a Middle Term. Since the Major is already by an interior comprehension<sup>3)</sup> established, (171) an example etc., are without purpose. What is not composed of infinite attributes, that is also not existent, as a sky-lotus. So that we have a Middle Term which is totally everywhere absent<sup>4)</sup>; examples of similarity, as being included within the Minor Term<sup>5)</sup>, are unsuitable for proving (a constant) recurrence.

And being composed of infinite attributes: The self, first of all, has synchronous attributes, attention with form and formless<sup>6)</sup>, agency, experiencing; the not moving in the eight directions; non-materiality, a being composed of countless particles, a being soul, etc.; whereas joy, dejection, sorrow, pleasure, pain, god, man, infernal being, lower animal, etc., are successive. In the "magnitudes" (*astī-kāya*)<sup>7)</sup>, *dharma*, etc., there is a being composed of in-

<sup>1)</sup> This verse introduces the main Jain (*anekānta*) doctrine of the infinite complexity of the existents.

<sup>2)</sup> This *anyathā-anupapatti* is the Jain definition of the validity of a Middle Term: see p. 160

<sup>3)</sup> On *antar-vyāpti* see note XVI 42).

<sup>4)</sup> Sc. what is composed of infinite attributes or what is non-existent.

<sup>5)</sup> Sc. a 'real'.

<sup>6)</sup> I.e. *jñāna* and *darśana* see *Pravacana-sūtra* (trans.), Introduction, p. xxii, and 'Psychic attention' in Index

<sup>7)</sup> On the five *astī-kāyas*, matter, soul, space, *dharma* and *adharma* see *Outlines of Jainism*, pp. 15-6. 24-5, 37-8.

numerable particles, (172) assisting of motion, etc.<sup>9)</sup>, a being object of mind-cognition, etc., a being delimited by such and such delimitants, a being determinate, being without colour, being single substance, being without action, etc. In a pot<sup>10)</sup>, again, unbakedness, possession of a colour due to baking, possession of a wide bottom and belly, possession of a tortoise neck, capacity for holding and conveying water, etc., knowability by mental, etc., cognition, newness, oldness, and so on. Similarly in regard even to all things should it be stated by a person acquainted with the varying Methods<sup>11)</sup> and views, envisaging States in name and thing.

And here by the word 'self', although the attributes are infinite, there is implication of a continuant substance, in the form of a recurrent; and therefore that "what is equipped with origination, falling off and permanence is existent"<sup>12)</sup> is well set forth. Thus, to begin with, in the things. In the names also are to be recognized the acute, grave, circumflex, open, closed, media, tenuis, lightly breathed, strongly breathed, etc., and such and such potencies of bringing objects to mind, etc. Removal of the difficulties of this Middle Term, namely unreality, contrariness, undecisiveness, etc., (173) one can think out by oneself. Such, - represented by those cited; of Thine, Thy: **Demonstrations also**, systematically correct statements of demonstration. To say nothing of Your Worship, who has visualised the mass of substances and States, these also are lion-roars for the terrifying of the bad - **contention-deer**: 'bad disputants', despised disputants, members of other sects who follow Methods which apprehend one part (only): these, through their weakness for dwelling in the thickets of the forest of mundane existence, are 'deer', antelopes; for the complete 'terrifying' of them your 'lion-roars', as it were lion-roars; as upon hearing even the mere roar of a lion the deer develop terror, similarly on hearing even the statements of proofs of this kind composed by Your Worship, the contemptible disputants fall into a state of alarm, they have a timidity in giving a reply, - that is what it comes to. Each one of the proofs, with Thee as author, cuts away other systems. That is the meaning.

Here the plural 'Demonstrations' is to hint at the infinity of Demonstrations of this kind in Your Holiness' teaching; since each several *sūtra* has the value of the infinite qualities of the sands of all the rivers of all the waters of the ocean; and because they all, having the omniscient for their root, are conclusive. Or else, on the principle that "(Expressions) ending with *iti*, *ādi* and a plural are indicative of a class"<sup>13)</sup>, - as by the word *iti* ('such') a plurality of Demonstrations is indicated, a plural is correct, although in the first half of the verse a single Demonstration is adduced. This is the meaning of the verse.

<sup>9)</sup> The function of *dharma*: see note XIV <sup>10)</sup>.

<sup>10)</sup> A particular material object.

<sup>11)</sup> On these *Nayas* see *infra*, vv. XXIV, XXVIII.

<sup>12)</sup> From *Umāsvāti's Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra*, V. 29 (M. L.).

<sup>13)</sup> Source untraced.

### XXIII. THE 'SEVEN-NUANCE-VIEW'

So far the fact that an entity is composed of infinite attributes has been stated concisely as the thing to be established; developing the same by way of describing the seven-nuance-view<sup>1)</sup>, and lauding His Holiness' unsurpassable superiority of statement, he says -

**XXIII. Entity, without states, lumped together,**

**and the same, if divided up, again not substance,  
with its seven nuances arisen from distinction of expression,  
Thou didst bring to light, knowable by the typically wise.**

**Lumped together**, stated summarily: entity, **without states**, without states meant; **entity**, because in it the qualities and States 'reside'<sup>2)</sup>; the sextad of substances, defined as *dharma*, *adharma*, ether, matter, time and soul. The intent is as follows: When it is desired to speak of one single entity, self, pot, etc., intelligent or non-intelligent, only in the form of a substance, without intent of mentioning the States, though they exist, then it is exhibited as 'without States', because it is designated summarily, that is with the whole body of states included, merely in the form of substance - that is the meaning. As 'this self', 'this pot', etc.; because the States do not outgo the substance: this is why the Methods which recognize substance, the 'pure universal', etc., choose only the mere substance because the States are not apart from it. **States**, *paryaya*, *paryava*, *paryāya* have no difference in sense. **Not substance**, etc.; the **and** is in the sense of 'on the other hand'; and that is for the purpose of indicating a difference from what precedes, and is out of order; **divided up, again**, 'stated' 'with dividing up', with separation-form, on the other hand; **the same** entity, is really no substance' having the form of a mere State without intending a continuant substance. That is the meaning.

For when the self, with reference to States of cognition, outlook, etc., is considered in its States, then only the States shine out, and not, on the other hand, any substance termed 'self'. Likewise 'pot' also, when divided up with respect to round lip, broad bottom and belly, and prior and posterior parts, is simply States, and not, on the other hand, an entity beyond them, designated 'pot'. This is why those who follow the Method which recognizes States cite - (175)

"Only parts shine out disposed thus and thus;

But any partless owner of them is not at all therewith presented"<sup>3)</sup>.

And thus, despite a consisting of both substance and States, an entity has through application of the substance-Method and non-application of the State-Method substance-form; and through application of the State-Method and non-application of the substance-Method State-form; and through application of the joint Method it has the form of both. It is there-

<sup>1)</sup> On this *sapta-bhaṅgī* see *Outlines of Jainism*, pp. 116-7, and *infra*, v. XXV. The 'nuances' are matter of aspect and expression.

<sup>2)</sup> An etymology of the word *vanu*, 'entity', as derived from *vas*, 'dwell'.

<sup>3)</sup> Source untraced.



fore that the Chief of Expositors<sup>4)</sup> says: "Because of the establishment of the not-given by the given"<sup>5)</sup>. Such an entity composed of substance and States **Thou alone didst bring to light**, you only showed, not another; so we understand the restriction by the emphasis.

'Surely, the substance is adaptable to some terms and presentations, and the States are fields for other terms and presentations; so how is there a single entity composed of both?' - anticipating such an objection, he gets rid of it by means of a specification: 'from distinction of expression,' etc. With **distinction of expression**, defined and complete expression and incomplete expression, a pair of expressions; **arising**, demonstrated entity in regard to which there are numerically seven 'nuances', forms of statement: is so. 'Surely, if by His Holiness, friend of the Triple Universe, to all without distinction a reality of entities on such lines was exhibited, then why do those belonging to other sects take objection thereto?' - in reply he says: **knowable by the typically wise**. Those who, by reflecting upon the division of objects, valid and other, are awake to the reality of entities as they are, they are the 'wise'. The supremely wise are 'the typically wise', beings, apt for cognition, natural or acquired, one or other, clarified by correct outlook; thereby alone 'knowable', possible to be known, to be outlined; and not on the other hand also by others whose intelligence has not been whetted by the whetstone of maturity in the study of their several own treatises. For these, through having minds spoiled by beginningless suffusions of false outlook, (176) are, owing to non-recognition of the reality of entities as it is, not types of wisdom. And to this effect the Scripture -

"From non-distinction of the existent and non-existent, through casual entertainment of the causes of their being;

Through lack of the fruit of cognition, there is on the part of the false viewer non-cognition"<sup>6)</sup>.

This is why they record the whole therein (in the Scripture) included 'Twelve-membered'<sup>7)</sup> as false Scripture (177): through their anxiety to apprehend the reality of entity as they please without consideration of the justifications. Whereas, comprised in the correct view even false Scripture turns out to be correctly inspired: since by procedure of persons of correct view in compliance with the teaching of the omniscient even a matter stated in a falsely inspired work is elucidated as having for object affirmation and denial according to fact. As thus: In the Veda for example in statements such as "Sacrifices should be made with goats"<sup>8)</sup>, persons of false views expound the word 'goat' as designating an animal; (178) but those of correct views conclude<sup>9)</sup> that 'not to be used for procreation', - barley, rice, etc., three years old, sesamum and lentil, five years old, panicum and mustard seven years old, etc., is used as a synonym for grains. This is why by the holy Sri-Vardhamāna-svāmin the Vedic verses -

"Having arisen as simply compact of thought, from those physical elements, into them it afterwards perishes; there is not consciousness after death", etc.<sup>10)</sup>.

<sup>4)</sup> Umāsvāti in *Tattoārthādhigama-sūtra*, V. 31 (M. L.).

<sup>5)</sup> Sc. when what is not stated is obvious from what is stated.

<sup>6)</sup> From *Vīśeṣādvāyaka*, v. 115 (M. L.).

<sup>7)</sup> On the 'Twelve Angas' of the Jain Canon see *Outlines of Jainism*, Appendix V.

<sup>8)</sup> Quoted in *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka-upaniṣad*, II. iv. 12 (Dhruva).

<sup>9)</sup> The device of explaining away, as here, by etymologies, but also sometimes by emendations, etc., in texts, what is inconvenient in 'Scriptures', was adopted not less frequently by Indian, than it has been by other, exegesis. 'Not to be used for procreation' substitutes for *aṇa*, 'goat', an *a-ṇa*, here interpreted as 'not-beget'.

<sup>10)</sup> From *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka-upaniṣad*, II. iv. 12 (M. L.).

which appeared to Śrīmad Indrabhūti and others, the divinities of the class leaders (*gaṇa-dhara*)<sup>11</sup>) of substances, to deny soul, etc., were expounded<sup>12</sup>) as proving that same.

So also the *Smṛti*-authorities cite a verse (187) –

“Not in flesh-eating is there fault, not in wine and not in sexual intercourse.

This is the proceeding of living creatures; but abstention is greatly fruitful”<sup>13</sup>).

And in this, if the sense is expounded as recorded, there is simply disconnected babble. For from that within which, if acted upon, there is no fault at all, how ever will abstention be greatly fruitful? Because of the consequence of abstention from sacrifice, study, giving, etc., also. Therefore there is another signification of this verse; as thus: Not in flesh-eating, if done, is there non-fault, but on the contrary actual fault; likewise in wine and sexual intercourse, etc. How is there not absence of fault? On this it says “because this is the proceeding of living creatures”: ‘proceeding’ is ‘place of origination’; therein they proceed, that is, are born; ‘of living creatures’, of embodied souls; it is the cause of attachment in such and such souls. This is the meaning. And that flesh, wine, sexual intercourse are root cause of the attachment of souls, is familiar in the Scripture<sup>14</sup>) –

“In maturing lumps of flesh, both raw and cooked.

Origination, without limit, of (infinitesimal, *nigoya*) creatures is affirmed.

In wine, and spirits, in flesh and in fresh butter as a fourth

Are born limitless beings of that class.

Habituated to the notion of sexual intercourse, one kills nine lakhs of minute souls; Brought to knowledge by the all-knowing, they must be believed in ever”. (188)

“Those two-organed living beings which take birth in a woman's womb,

Are one lakh, or two lakhs, or three lakhs, or exceeding the severality of lakhs.

When she has been joined with the man, there is an outpouring of those living beings,

After the example of a bamboo known by a heated iron peg”.

When the womb is in union, those are two-organed creatures, but five-organed when womb-born sprung from semen and blood<sup>15</sup>), are these –

“Men five-organed in the womb of a woman enjoyed by one man,

Are born, at the most nine lakhs in number, at one time.

Among the nine lakhs takes place on the part of one or two completion;

The remainder again even so pass to non-existence there and then”.

And the application is that ‘because of being cause of the destruction of souls, flesh-eating, etc., are not ‘unfaulty’’. Or else this is the proceeding of *bhūtas*, i. e. of fiends mostly; those only here practise flesh-eating, etc., and not discriminating people – that is the sense. As for what is to be taught after so making plain the faultiness of flesh-eating, etc., that he states, “but abstention is greatly fruitful”. The ‘but’ has the meaning of the word ‘only’, because of the text: “*tu* should be used in distinction and in limitation”<sup>16</sup>). And so simply abstention from

<sup>11</sup>) On the eleven ‘Gaṇa-dharas’, leaders in Mahāvīra's early community, the chief being Indrabhūti, see *Outlines of Jainism*, pp. xxxv, xxxvii, and von Glasenapp, *Der Jainismus*, pp. 32, 302.

<sup>12</sup>) The occasion is expounded by M. L. in a long note, citing the comm. of Maṇyanigiri on *Videśpūṣai yaka* II, and some other texts.

<sup>13</sup>) The quotation is from *Manu-smṛti*, V. 56 (M. L.).

<sup>14</sup>) From *Sambodha-saptatikā*, by Ratnasekhara, 66, 65, 63, etc. (M. L.).

<sup>15</sup>) On these classes of living beings see *Outlines of Jainism*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>16</sup>) From the *Amara-kosa* lexicon, III. 329

these, flesh-eating, etc., is greatly fruitful, bearing the fruit of heaven and beatification: and not also practise of them. That is the meaning. This is why in another place it is read -

"Whoso for 100 years should offer year by year a Horse Sacrifice,  
And whoso should not eat flesh, equal would be the fruit of the two".  
"The destiny of one who has passed a single night in chastity  
Cannot be attained, O Yudhiṣṭhira, by a thousand sacrifices".<sup>17)</sup>

(189) But as regards wine-drinking it is useless to quote *sūtras* because that is denounced by all. The other matters of this sort how ever do the sham-wise heretics deserve to know? So a truce to excess-disquisition.

Now what are these 'seven nuances'?<sup>18)</sup> And what is this distinction of expression? It is stated: When in regard to a single entity, soul, etc., in virtue of an enquiry relating to attributes, existence, etc., severally without contradiction, with avoidance of violence to perception, etc., and made with all-round examination of affirmation and negation, separate and in combination, there is a disposition of statement in the seven modes to be mentioned, and adorned with the term *quodammodo*, (it) is proclaimed 'the seven-nuance-system'. As follows: 1. 'Quodammodo everything simply is'; this is the first 'nuance', with the notion of affirmation; 2. 'Quodammodo everything simply is not' is the second, with the notion of negation; 3. 'Quodammodo it simply is, quodammodo it simply is not', with the notion of successive affirmation and negation is the third; 4. Quodammodo it is simply unutterable', with the notion of simultaneous affirmation and negation, is the fourth; 5. 'Quodammodo it simply is, quodammodo it is simply unutterable', with the notion of affirmation and the notion of simultaneous affirmation and negation, is the fifth; 6. 'Quodammodo it simply is not, quodammodo it is unutterable', with the notion of negation, and the notion of simultaneous affirmation and negation, is the sixth; 7. 'Quodammodo it simply is, quodammodo it simply is not, quodammodo it is simply unutterable', with the successive notions of affirmation and negation, and the notion of simultaneous affirmation and negation, is the seventh.

Here, *quodammodo*, 'in a way', with the form of its own substance, place, time and being (*bhāva*) everything, vessel, etc., simply is, not with the form of other substance, place, time and being. As thus: the vessel, as in substance earthen, is, - not with an aqueous form, etc.; in respect of place, as being of Pātālīputra, not as being of Kānyakubja etc.; in respect of time, as being of the hot season, not as being of the spring, etc., season; in respect of being, as being black, not as being red, etc. - otherwise, through incidence of having another colour there is the consequence of loss of own colour. And the 'simply' has here been inserted for the purpose of excluding a sense not approved in the 'nuance'; otherwise there would result in this expression an equivalence to what is not stated: from non-mention of its own meaning as determinate. As has been said - (190)

"In a statement 'simply' is to be put just for avoidance of a meaning not intended;  
Because otherwise it (the statement) is in some cases equivalent to what is not said"<sup>19)</sup>.

Nevertheless, if only so much as 'the vessel simply is' were adopted, since with the vessel existent also as a pillar, etc., an existence under every aspect results, there would be no

<sup>17)</sup> *Manu-smṛti*, V. 53 (M. L.).

<sup>18)</sup> Expounded in what follows. Professor Dhruva points out (notes, p. 243) that the first passage, as far as "seven-nuance-system", is based on Ratnākara's comm. on *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka*, IV. 14, and the remainder of ch. XXIII is mostly from IV 15-16, and III 43-45 of the same.

<sup>19)</sup> From *Tatvārtha-śloka-vārtika*, I. 6. 53 (M. L.).

accounting for a determinate own-form: for the apprehension of that the word 'quodammodo' is used; quodammodo, in a way, this only with its own substance, etc., exists, and not also with the substance, etc., of other things – that is the meaning. And even where that (word) is not used, there also, like the word *eva* effecting exclusion, it is conceived by intelligent people. As has been said:<sup>80)</sup>

"This, even when not employed, is conceived by knowers of it in all cases from the sense.

Just as the word *eva*, having the purpose of cutting off the non-application, etc."<sup>81)</sup>.

So the first 'nuance'.

Quodammodo, in a way, the vessel, etc., simply is not. For, if a non-existence of an entity, as with its own substance, etc., so also with the substance, etc., of other things is not intended, then from the absence of a determinate own-form there would not be determinateness of the entity. Nor should it here be said by maintainers of unequivocal (one-sided) existence that non-existence is unestablished: because in a way it is logically established in regard to the entity, like a Middle Term<sup>82)</sup>. For in the case of no Major Term, non-entity, etc., is the actuality of the Middle Term, existence, etc., appropriate without its non-actuality in a counter-instance: because of the consequence of its not being (effectually) a Middle-Term. Therefore to the existence of an entity non-existence is indispensable; and to its non-existence the former. And the primariness and subsidiariness of the two depends upon the intent. So one must understand in the case of the other 'nuances' also by reason of the saying of the expounders "because of the establishment of the not – given by the given"<sup>83)</sup>. So the second. The third is quite obvious.

When by the two attributes, existence and non-existence, applied simultaneously as primary, a single entity is to be designated, from the impossibility of such a word, an entity, soul, etc., (191) is unutterable<sup>84)</sup>. As thus: the pair of qualities, existence and non-existence cannot be stated together in regard to one thing by the term 'existent'; because that is incompetent for the expression of non-existence; nor similarly by 'non-existent', because that has no competence for causing presentation of existence. Nor can a single conventional term, like Puṣpadanta<sup>85)</sup>, etc., express that; since for that also capacity for causing presentation of things in succession is appropriate; like the conventional word *sat* in the case of *śat* and *sāna*<sup>86)</sup>. For this reason *Ivandva* and *Karmadhāraya*<sup>87)</sup> forms and the sentence are not expressive thereof; so that from lack of all forms of expression the entity is unutterable, stands out overpowered by simultaneous existence and non-existence applied as primary. But it is not in every way unutterable, because of the consequence that it would be undeno-

<sup>80)</sup> *Ibid.*, I 6. 56 (M. L.).

<sup>81)</sup> This may mean an usage like that of *sic* in European texts to show that the preceding word is definitely precise.

<sup>82)</sup> The Middle Term would be equivocal, as found in both positive and negative instances.

<sup>83)</sup> See *supra*, p. 135.

<sup>84)</sup> The fact that this is always interpreted as arising from combination of positive and negative may account for non-insertion of 'not-unutterable' in the scheme of 'nuances'.

<sup>85)</sup> 'Flower-teeth' (a name) does not imply a simultaneous presentation of the same objects as flowers and teeth; it means '(having) teeth resembling flowers'. In the Dual Hemacandra's *Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi* II. 124, cites it as denoting 'moon and sun' (Dhruva, p. 371).

<sup>86)</sup> Pāṇini's Grammar, III. ii. 127 (M. L.). The two terms, signifying respectively the Participles in -ant and -ana, are cited jointly as *sat*, which does not, however, identify them.

<sup>87)</sup> A *Ivandva* Compound signifies A and B together, a *Karmadhāraya* 'A + Attribute', not identification of A and B, or A and Attribute.

table even by the word 'unutterable'. So the fourth. The remaining three are easily understood.

Nor should it be said that 'By reason of the consequence of infinite 'nuances', through admission in regard to an entity of infinite attributes affirmed and denied, the 'seven-nuance-doctrine' is inappropriate', - because of the possibility, in consideration of the modes of affirmation and negation, of infinite seven-nuances in regard to a single entity for each state. For, as in respect of existence and non-existence, likewise also in respect of universality and particularity there might be a seven-nuance-system. As thus: quodammodo universal, quodammodo particular, quodammodo both, quodammodo unutterable, quodammodo unutterable and universal, quodammodo unutterable and particular, quodammodo universal, particular and unutterable. Nor should it be said that here there are not the two modes, affirmation and negation, because the universal is of the form of affirmation, and particularity, being of the form of exclusion, consists in negation. Or else, because of being a correlative word, when there is primacy of the universality, then that has the form of affirmation; and particularity has the form of negation; when the particularity is put in front, then that has the form of affirmation, and the other the form of negation. (192) So construe in all cases. Hence it is well said that actually even infinite seven-nuance-groups may arise; since in regard to each state there are actually seven further questionings of the thing to be made out. Of these (questionings) also there are seven, because inquiry as to them is fixed to seven kinds. Thereof also there is sevenfoldness, because of the origination of doubts concerning it in exactly seven ways. And of that also there is determinateness to seven ways, because of the appropriateness of sevenfoldness of the entity-attributes to which it (the doubt) refers. And this seven-nuance-system has in each nuance the own-nature of complete expression (*sakalādeśa*), and the own-nature of incomplete expression (*vikalādeśa*). Of these, complete expression is statement of Demonstration, and its definition is this: a statement making out, with simultaneity, an entity composed of endless attributes adopted for Demonstration, with primacy of occurrence with non-distinction by time, etc., or with implication of (such) non-distinction, is 'complete expression'. Of this the meaning is: with primacy of non-separateness of the attributes and the bearer of attributes occurring without distinction, and stated with the eight, time, etc., by reason thereof, or of superimposition<sup>25</sup>) of non-distinction of attributes and subject of attributes, though different by time, etc., a statement referring to them simultaneously is 'complete expression', and opposed to that is incomplete expression, meaning a statement with Method. This is the sense: By complete expression is made out an entity composed of all its attributes with simultaneity, or with implication of non-distinction by the use of primacy of non-distinction by time, etc., because that is amenable to Demonstration. But incomplete expression through implication of distinction, or through primacy of distinction, states the same with succession; because it is essentially a Method.

Now what is the succession, and what is the simultaneity? When the attributes existence, etc., are meant with distinction by time, etc., then, since a single word is without power to convey plural meanings, there is succession; but, when of those same attributes the own-form is stated as occurring, with non-distinction by time, etc., then, because of the possibility of stating, by means of a single word directed to conveying even a single attribute, an entity which, in the form of having the plurality of the remaining attributes, is taken as having for essence that one, there is simultaneity.

<sup>25</sup>) On *śropana* see note XV <sup>26</sup>).

What again are 'time, etc.'? Time, self-form, thing, connection, service (*upakāra*)<sup>29</sup>, place of the thing with qualities, coexistence, word. Of these: (193) 1. in 'quodammodo the entity, soul, etc., simply is', to the time to which the actuality (*astitva*)<sup>30</sup> belongs belong the remaining infinite attributes in the one substance, so that they occur with non-distinction by time; 2. The self-form of the actuality, (i. e.) its being a quality of the thing, is taken as the self-form also of the other, infinite, qualities, so that they occur without distinction in self-form; 3. Again, what is the basis (substratum), called the thing, of the actuality, the same is taken as basis also of the other States, so that they occur with non-distinction as to the thing; 4. And the connection of the actuality, i. e. its non-occurrence separately, defined as in a way identity, appertains also to the remaining particularisations, so that they occur with non-distinction as to connection; 5. And the service of the actuality, i. e. its making a devotion of itself, that same is taken as the service of the remaining qualities, so that they occur with non-distinction in service; 6. The place belonging to the thing with quality, defined as the situation of the actuality, that same is taken as place of the thing qualified, so that they occur with non-distinction in place of the thing qualified; 7. The coexistence (*samsarga*)<sup>31</sup> of the actuality with the self of the single entity, that same is taken as the coexistence on the part of the remaining attributes, so that they occur with non-distinction in coexistence. In the case of inseparability non-distinction is the primary, distinction is secondary; but in coexistence distinction is the primary, non-distinction is secondary. So that there is a difference; 8. The word 'exists', stating the entity as composed of the attribute of actuality, the same is taken in the case of the thing as composed of the remaining infinite attributes, so that they occur with non-distinction in word: since, while the State-meaning Method is secondary, this is justified through the primacy of the substance-meaning-Method. But with the primacy of the State-meaning<sup>32</sup> Method, while the substance-Method is secondary, a taking of the qualities with non-distinction is not possible; because of the impossibility of diverse qualities simultaneously in one thing, or, if that were possible, because of the consequence of the difference of the basis of them or to that extent; and because of the difference in a self-form connected with diverse qualities, since there is contradiction in their being different while there is non-difference of the self-form; also because of diversity in the thing which is the basis, since otherwise there is contradiction in being basis of diverse qualities; and because we see difference of connection through difference of the things in connection, since a connection of one thing with diverse connected things does not fit; and because the service rendered by them, being of severally determinate form, is plural, since there is contradiction in one service rendered by a plurality of usefuls; and because of the difference of place of the thing with qualities according to the several qualities (194), since with non-distinction of that there is the consequence of non-distinction of the place of the qualified in case of qualities belonging to distinct things; and because of the difference of the coexistence according to the (different) coexistents, since with non-difference of that (the coexistence) there is contradiction in distinction of the coexistents; and because of difference of word according to the object, since, if all qualities are to be stated by one word, all things have to be stated by one word, so that there is failure of other words. There being really impossibility of such non-distinction of occurrence of actuality, etc., in a single entity, a metonymous non-distinction of things in

<sup>29</sup> *Upakāra* seems to denote the contribution made by the item in question, its point or relevance.

<sup>30</sup> On *astitva* see note VIII 19

<sup>31</sup> *Samsarga* means actual belonging to the same sphere of creation or of discourse, as distinct from logical non-separateness.

<sup>32</sup> I. e. if what is being said to be actual is a State, e. g. a bracelet, it cannot be credited with all the qualities belonging to the general substance, gold.

themselves different by time, etc., is made. Thus a statement made with these two, non-distinction occurrence and metonymous non-distinction, naming at one time an entity composed of infinite attributes, which is adopted for Demonstration, is complete expression, otherwise termed statement of Demonstration. A statement naming with succession an attribute of an entity, contemplated by a (particular) Method, with occurrence of distinction as primary, or distinction as metonymous, is incomplete expression, otherwise termed statement of a (particular) Method. Thus it stands. Hence it has been well said<sup>32)</sup>: "With the seven-nuance-view arising from distinction of expression". This is the meaning of the verse.

<sup>32)</sup> Sc. in verse XXIII.

## XXIV. THE COMBINATION OF OPPOSITES INVOLVES NO CONTRADICTION

It has just been said that entity essentially equivocal, as shown by His Holiness, is to be known by the typically wise; and as essential equivocality may through description of the seven-nuance-view be easily deduced, that also has been defined; and seeing therein the entity made residence of contradictory attributes, the maintainers of the unequivocal view, the typically unwise, raise contradictions: their straying from the path of logic, he states -

**XXIV. Not contradictory, when conditioned by differences of conditions,**

**in things is non-existence, and existence and unutterability.**

**Simply from not having awoke to this, afraid of contradiction,  
the stupid fall slain by that 'unequivocal' view. (195)**

In things, in things denoted, intelligent and non-intelligent; **non-existence**, inexistence; **not contradictory**, not affected by contradiction; the meaning is: it does not undergo contradiction to actuality (*astiva*). Not merely is non-existence not contradictory, but also **existence and unutterability**; existent and unutterable are 'existent-unutterable<sup>1)</sup>': the status of these two is existence-and-unutterability; 'actuality and unutterableness' is the meaning. Those two also are non-contradictory.

As thus: existence is not contradictory to non-existence; unutterability also, consisting of affirmation and negation, has not mutual contradiction. Or else, unutterability does not carry contradiction of utterability. And by this is implied a non-contradiction of the whole seven-nuance view to the triad of nuances defined as non-existence, existence and unutterability; because these three are the chief, and the remaining nuances are, as due to combination, simply included in these.

'Surely these attributes are mutually contradictory; so how is the association of them in one entity possible?' - As to this he states by means of an epithet a reason: **when conditioned by differences of conditions**. 'Conditions', delimitants; part-aspects. Their 'difference', diversity; thereby 'conditioned', imparted. This is an epithet of 'non-existence': 'conditioned by differences of conditions', non-existence in existent things is not contradictory; and it is to be joined also with 'existence and unutterability' dividing the compound; when conditioned by differences of conditions, **existence and unutterability also are not contradictory**.

The intent is this: where two things occur with mutual avoidance, like cold and hot, there is contradiction, defined as non-abiding together. And here it is not so; because existence and non-existence occur without mutual separation. For in a pot, etc., existence does not occur with avoidance of non-existence; because of the consequence of being existent even in the form of another<sup>2)</sup>; and thus other things different from it are purposeless, since through it alone is establishment of the practical efficacies to be yielded by (all) the things in the Triple Universe. Nor does non-existence occur with avoidance of existence, because of non-existence

<sup>1)</sup> This remark is inserted simply in view of the Sanskrit expression (*sad-avicyate*), which is a grammatical Compound.

<sup>2)</sup> If A never 'is not', then it cannot 'not be' B, and so would 'be' any B.



qua its own-form<sup>3</sup>) resulting; and so because of being uncitable (*nirupāhṛya*), (196) there is universal emptiness. For contradiction would be if the existence and non-existence should be with one (same) condition; and it is not so, since (we can say) 'For not with that same part wherewith there is existence is there also non-existence; but the existence has one condition, the non-existence, on the other hand, has another condition: for the existence is with own form, and the non-existence with the form of another.'

For even in a single whole variegated cloth but with a different condition, is seen blueness, and with different conditions other colours. For the blueness is conditioned by the colour of indigo, etc., and the other colours are conditioned by such and such colorific substances. Similarly in a Mecaka<sup>4</sup>) jewel also must be recognized a variety conditioned by matter of such and such colours. Nor through such examples does there ensue a difference of place between the existence and non-existence; because of the unity of the variegated cloth, etc., as a whole, since in that case too a difference of place is unestablished. However in regard to the example and the thing exemplified a Minor Term<sup>5</sup>), one way or another, is not difficult for the Quodammodo disputants to get.

If even so the blessed person is not content, then, since in a single man, through difference of such and such conditions, even mutually contradictory attributes, father-ness, son-ness, maternal-uncle-ness, maternal-nephew-ness, paternal nephew-ness, brother-ness, cousin-ness, etc., are familiar, what is to be said? 'The same should be said of unutterability, etc.'. Simply from not having awoke to, simply not having cognized; -- the word 'simply' is restriction, -- on the stated lines, with difference of conditions, the real absence of contradictions. And this is simply the absence of right cognition on their part, and not, on the contrary, its existence even in a fraction; this is what he hints. Therefore they, afraid of contradiction; contradiction, non-residence-together of attributes, existence and non-existence, etc., or imagined by extravert thought; of that 'afraid', alarmed in mind, and for this very reason, stupid. Even in the absence of a cause for real fear, through timidity like animals in that state, fools, opposing disputants, and slain by that non-equivocal view, certitude in the settlement (197) of attributes approved by them with negation of other attributes, the non-equivocal view of the attributes existence, etc.; thereby 'slain', as it were slain, fall, stumble; and, being fallen, they are incapable of treading the path of reason, and they come to be trodden upon by even all travellers on the road of reason. That is the sense.

Or else, 'they fall', drop from the path of logic; for in the world fallen from the right path is styled 'fallen'. Or else, as one killed by the stroke of a thunderbolt, etc., fallen, and come into blank unconsciousness, has his utterance of speech stopped; similarly, these disputants also, being struck down by their approved 'non-equivocal' view, which does not follow the road of logic, as by a thunderbolt, are in the presence of the Quodammodo disputants helplessly unable to utter even a word.

And here, as implied in contradiction, are to be understood also the faults of difference of locus, *regressus ad infinitum*, confusion, interchange, doubt, failure of understanding, failure to set out the subject, -- suggested by the opponents. As thus: when an entity has been propounded as composed of universality and particularity, the opponents criticise to the effect that there is a contradiction because of the impossibility, in one undivided entity, of universality and particularity, which are attributes contradictory in the form of affirmation and negation. For what is the locus of the affirmation need not be exactly the locus of the nega-

<sup>3</sup>) An A which 'is not' B would have also to 'be-not' A.

<sup>4</sup>) This shows various colours.

<sup>5</sup>) Sc. an instance of something being at once A (subject to condition X) and not-A (subject to condition Y).

tion; because of the consequence of their being of one form. Therefore there is also difference of locus. Again, the self whereby it is locus of the universal and that whereby (it is locus) of the particular, does it accomodate both these selves with a single own-nature, or with two own-natures? If with only one, then there is contradiction as before. Or with two own-natures it accomodates a pair of own-natures called universality and particularity; then there is *regressus ad infinitum*. (198) 'Those two with two other own-natures and those with two other further own-natures'. The fault of confusion is that with what self there is accomodation of the universality, with that there is also of the universal and the particular; and that wherewith there is accomodation of the particular, thereby also of the particular and universal. With what own-nature there is universality, with the same particularity; that where with there is particularity, with the same universality; - this is 'interchange'. And thence there is doubt, because of incompetence to decide, the entity having no form common to both.

And thence there is failure of understanding; and thence failure to set out the subject of the proof. And, on the part of the Quodammodo doctrine, because it is in another class, these faults are without opening. And so by those who know the vital points of the Quodammodo doctrine they are to be removed by such and such adjustments; because only through independence of mutually irrespective universality and particularity, having the form of affirmation and negation, is there an opening for them.

Or else, the term 'contradiction' here means fault, as in 'he acts contrarily', meaning 'blameworthy'. And so we must interpret as afraid of 'contradictions', the faults of contradiction, difference of locus and so forth. And similarly by the term 'universality' even all the instances of fault become included. This is the meaning of the verse.

## XXV. THE 'SEVEN-NUANCE-VIEW' APPLIED TO FOUR PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

Now, describing, – by citing a fourfoldness of the 'equivocal' doctrine in respect of a root-distinction through comprising all States of all substances – His Holiness's facility in relishing the ambrosial sap of truth, he says –

**XXV. Quodammodo perishable, eternal, similar, of diverse form, utterable, not utterable, existent and non-existent, one same thing:**  
**O Lord of the discerning! This is a succession of belchings<sup>1)</sup>**  
**coming up from the nectar of deep-drunk truth.**

**Quodammodo**, the adverb signifying the 'equivocal' view is to be construed with all the eight words. **One same thing**, one entity to which they belong. **Quodammodo**, in a way, **perishable**; of a nature to perish, (199) that is non-eternal; **quodammodo eternal**, having the attribute of non-perishing is the meaning. This suffices for one affirmation, *videlicet* 'eternal and non-eternal'. Likewise **quodammodo similar**, having the form of universality as cause of recurrence; **quodammodo of diverse form**, of different form, consisting of dissimilar evolution, in the form of a particularity, as cause of separateness, is the meaning. Hereby we have a second aspect in the form of universality and particularity.

Likewise, **quodammodo utterable**, statable; **quodammodo, not utterable**, not statable, is the meaning. And here 'un-utterable', as a compound, would have been logical. Nevertheless, the word 'utterable' being current in regard to womb, etc., in order to avoid impropriety 'not utterable' has been employed by the author of the *Laudation uncompounded*. Hereby we have the third distinction, in the own-form of expressible and inexpressible. Likewise, **quodammodo existent**, actual, in the form of being, is the meaning; **quodammodo non-existent**, different therefrom. Hereby the fourth affirmation, termed existence and non-existence.

**O Lord of the discerning!** Chief of those who count! **This**, 'the just mentioned', 'succession of belchings coming up from the nectar of deep-drunk truth'; from the context, or from the general sense, 'Thy' is understood. **Truth**, outhning of the own-form of reality as it stands. That same, because giving riddance of old age and death, because of being enjoyable by the enlightened, because of abolishing the poison-flood of falsehood, and because of creating internal delight, is **nectar**, ambrosia, nectar of truth; when **deeply**, not on the level of others, **drunk**, quaffed, nectar of truth; therefrom **come up**, manifested, thereby caused, **succession of belchings**, 'series of belchings' is the meaning. For, just as someone having gulped up to the neck an ambrosial sap, emits, in consequence of it, a succession of belchings, so Your Holiness also, having quaffed at will ambrosia of truth, removing old age and death, in consequence of its taste belched up, by way of teaching, a succession of belchings, defined as the tetrad of distinctions in the 'equivocal' doctrine which is our topic.

Or else, the disputants for the non-equivocal view, who fed to satiety upon poisonous food of falsehood, their forms of belchings in the shape of such and such statement have already been exhibited. But those who, favoured by abundance of matured ancient merit, have drunk

<sup>1)</sup> As has often been remarked, this idea and expression have in some countries no impropriety.

(200) to an extent beyond belief ambrosia of truth, flowing from the moon face of the Guru of the world, of these 'discerning ones', 'knowers of statement according to the truth', Lord! 'This (with heads of definition exhibited in the first half) succession of belchings', – thus it should be expounded.

And these doctrines, all four, have already been discussed in such and such places. As thus: In the passage 'down to the lamp, down to ether is of the same nature'<sup>2)</sup> the doctrine of eternal and non-eternal has been set forth; in the verse: 'the denotand is plural, in essence verily one'<sup>3)</sup> the doctrine of universality and particularity was indicated. And in the seven-nuance-scheme<sup>4)</sup> the doctrine of utterable and unutterable, and the doctrine of existence and non-existence were discussed. And so there is no further trouble. This is the meaning of the verse.

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<sup>2)</sup> Verse V, pp. 22sq.

<sup>3)</sup> Verse XIV, pp. 84sq.

<sup>4)</sup> Verse XXIII, pp. 134sq.

## XXVI. NEITHER ETERNALITY NOR NON-ETERNALITY CAN BE MAINTAINED

Now, whereas the two parties of eternal and non-eternal, at strife through being girt up for bringing to light of mutual refutation, incur ruin through the onslaught of weapons of various reasonings uplifted on one side or the other, he states the universal superiority of the Holy One's impartiality in teaching, which without effort attains the defeat of its opponents -

**XXVI. Whatsoever faults truly are in the eternality doctrine,**

**the like in the perishableness doctrine also there are, the very same.**

**While the thorns drive out each other mutually,**

**victorious unassailably, O Victor! is Thy teaching.**

Truly, is used in certainty; **whatsoever in the eternality doctrine**, in the 'non-equivocal' eternality doctrine; **faults**, deduced by the disputants for the 'non-equivocal' non-eternality doctrine, the inappropriateness of practical efficacy in the two ways of succession and simultaneity, etc.; **the very same, in the perishableness doctrine also**, in the doctrine of 'non-equivocal' momentariness also; **the like, equal, (201)** deduced by the disputants for 'non-equivocal' eternality, without deficiency or excess. As thus: 'The disputant for eternality states a proof, 'everything is eternal because of existence; in the momentary by reason of the contradiction of practical efficacy at the two times of its being existent and non-existent existence as so defined') does not find an abiding-place (*avasthā*), so that, turning back from that, it makes its abode (*avasthate*) in eternality, because there is no other refuge. As thus: a momentary thing would produce its effect either as existent or as non-existent; because there is no other course. Now not the first alternative, because of the illogicality of operation upon what belongs to the same time, and because of over-extension through the result of mutual relation of effect and cause on the part of all positive existents. Nor again does the second alternative bear discussion; because the non-existent is without power to produce an effect; otherwise the hare's horn, etc., also would have energy for producing effects, because of the absence of difference'.

The disputant for non-eternality, again, urges against the disputant for eternality an argument as follows: 'everything is momentary because of existence; by reason of the contradiction of practical efficacy in the non-momentary, whether in succession or all at once, and because, as 'being effective of practical efficacy' is the mark of a positive thing, practical efficacy on withdrawal therefrom (from the non-momentary) would withdraw the existence which it embosoms; so that there is establishment of the momentary: For an eternal thing has no energy for setting on foot, in succession, a practical efficacy; because it is with impairing of its own-nature, which was the effecting of its former practical efficacy, that it engages, in succession, in later practical efficacy. For otherwise there would be the consequence of its non-cessation from its former efficacy; and with its falling from that own-nature its eternality departs; since non-identity of state is the mark of non-eternality. Or, if it is said, 'Even an eternal might for a time abide awaiting a successively occurring co-operant, and afterwards,

<sup>2)</sup> Sc. as 'practical efficacy'.

having obtained that, might in succession produce the result'. – Not because in regard to an eternal thing a co-operant cause is unavailing, by reason of the consequence of *regressus ad infinitum*, if it waits for even what is unavailing. Nor all at once does an eternal thing produce its practical efficacy, by reason of contradiction of what is manifest: for no one is observed to start all actions at one time; or let him do so; all the same, since in the very first moment he completes all the actions (202), and in the second and so forth moments does nothing, non-eternality perforce befalls him; from the contradiction of action and non-action in one single thing'.

So thus the reasons on both the 'non-equivocal' views, through similarity of argument, do not diverge from their opposites (*viruddha*); and as, gratifying only when not pondered, they generate mental blindness in naive people, they are non-divergent from their contradictories, and not 'non-equivocal'. And here has been stated only the rebutting of the 'non-equivocal' eternity and non-eternity view. And by implication it can be clearly realized that the 'non-equivocal' doctrines of universality and particularity, etc., also in handling reasons are, through mutually equal faultiness, non-divergent from their contradictories.

Now the second half is expounded: 'while the thorns, etc.'. And while thus the **thorns**, the inferior enemies, disputants for 'non-equivocal' views; **driving out each other mutually**, of such a character that through each other they disappear, fall into destruction; as in the case of Sunda and Upasunda<sup>1</sup>), disappear mutually. **O Victor! Thy, Thine, teaching**, preaching in the form of the Twelve-*Āṅga*-Canon, expert in describing the Quodammodo doctrine; through absence of opponent- overpowering thorns, as themselves annihilated, **unassailable**, undefeatable. – From the *sūtra*, "And of the *kṛtyas* in denoting the capable, and the deserving"<sup>2</sup>), by reason of this rule for the *kṛtyas* the meaning is 'incapable of being assailed, or unworthy of being assailed'. – is **Victorious**, exists with universal pre-eminence; as some Mahārāja, having maturity of fat merit, when his enemies have in mutual conflict gone of themselves to destruction, has universal pre-eminence, enjoying a prosperous sovereignty with effortlessly accomplished freedom from thorns: similarly Thy teaching also. This is the meaning of the verse. (203)

<sup>1</sup>) Two brother demons who were induced to kill each other. See Col. Jacob's, *A second handful of popular Maxims*, p. 85, and *Mahā-Bharata*, *Ādi-parvan*, CCIX–XII.

<sup>2</sup>) Hemacandra's Grammar, V. iv. 35 (M. L.), explains the use of Participles of the form exemplified by the word *adhr̥ṣyam* in verse XXVI.

## XXVII. THE ASSUMPTION OF EITHER ETERNALITY OR NON-ETERNALITY DESTRUCTIVE OF RELIGION

In the immediately preceding verse a community of fault in the 'non-equivocal' doctrine of eternity and non-eternity etc. has been stated; now, exhibiting by name some varieties thereof, he brings to light first the service to the Three Worlds on the part of the Lord of the Three Worlds, the Lord of the earth, the Saviour from an invasion, as it were, due to such enemy people emboldened by unreal imaginings on the part of those setting them forth, and he says -

**XXVII. With the 'non-equivocal' doctrine there are not experiences of pleasure and pain;  
not merit and sin, also not bondage and liberation.  
thus through others by the sword of the vice of contentions of bad reasonings  
is abolished even the world without residue.**

With the 'non-equivocal' doctrine, with acceptance of the alternatives of 'non-equivocal' eternal and non-eternal; **experiences of pleasure and pain** do not fit; and merit and sin do not fit; and bondage and liberation do not fit. The employment of the negative repeatedly is for sake of showing absolute unfitness. As thus: For a self, to begin with, which is 'non-equivocally' eternal the two experiences of pleasure and pain are not appropriate; for the mark of the eternal is 'having a single permanent form without loss and without origination'. Therefore, when the self, having experienced pleasure, feels pain through the force of the apparatus of the mass of its causes, then, since from the difference in its own-nature non-eternality follows, there is the consequence of loss of its having a single permanent form; the same is to be said of it when, having experienced pain, it enjoys pleasure.

Or, if it is said that 'This speech-usage is through difference of states, but, even with states differing, there is not difference in their possessor; just as with a snake, in the states of coil, straightness, etc.'<sup>1)</sup>, - No! Are those different from it, or non-different? If different, there is not the connection 'it has these', because that goes too far<sup>2)</sup>. But, if non-different, there is loss of their being one single permanent form, 'only like that', 'only in that state'. And how, if it has 'non-equivocally' that one form, could there be even difference of state? (204)

Furthermore, experiences of pleasure and pain are to be brought about by merit and sin; and the bringing about of them is practical efficacy; and that that on the part of an eternal isolated is not appropriate, either successively or not successively, has been more or less stated. For this reason is said **not merit and sin**: merit is good *karma*, to be obtained by the actions of giving and so forth; sin is bad *karma*, effectable by the action of hurting, etc. These also do not fit, because of the above stated deduction. Likewise **not bondage and liberation**: bondage is mutual interlacing of the self in its several infinitesimal parts (*pradesa*)<sup>3)</sup> with atoms of *karma*, like a mass of metal and fire; liberation is waning of all *karma*. In the non-equivocally eternal these two also would not be. For bondage is a particular conjunction.

<sup>1)</sup> In using this simile, common in such discussion, the author had in mind the *ahī kundaḥ-nyaya*, on which see Col. Jacob's *A handful of popular Maxims*, p. 11.

<sup>2)</sup> If, being different, they are 'his', what of other things equally different?

<sup>3)</sup> On *pradesas* of soul see *Outlines of Jainism*, pp. 16, 30, 88, 90, 95

and it is defined as "the meeting of things which had not met"<sup>4</sup>); non-meeting, belonging to a prior time, is one state, and meeting, belonging to a later time, is another. Thus in the case of these two also the fault of difference of state is hard to get over. And how, having one-formness, has it impromptu conjunction with bondage? And before conjunction with bondage, why was it not liberated? Moreover, by that bondage does it experience alteration, or not? If it experiences, it is non-eternal, like its skin, etc. If it does not experience, thereby, as it is without alteration, whether that exists or does not exist, there is to it, as to ether, no difference; so that because of the fruitlessness of the bondage it would be simply eternally liberated. And thus the system of bondage and liberation in the world disappears. And to that effect they quote:

"What matter to the sky rain and sunshine? The result of those two is in the skin.

If he is like the skin, he is non-eternal; if he is like the Void, there is no real result"<sup>5</sup>).

In case of non-appropriateness of bondage there is also non-appropriateness of liberation; because the word 'liberation' is a synonym for the cleaving apart of bonds.

Likewise also, in the doctrine of non-equivocal non-eternal there is no appropriateness of pleasure and pain, etc.: For what is non-eternal has the attribute of absolute annihilation; and, if the self is such, since the performer of the action of acquiring merit has perished without continuance, to whom, pray, belongs the experience of the pleasure which is the fruit thereof? Likewise, upon the total destruction also of the performer of action for acquiring sin, to whom is to belong the consciousness of pain? And thus one is the performer of the action, and another the enjoyer of the fruit thereof; so that inconsistency results. Or else, because of the text - (205)

"In whatever series there has been deposited a suffusion of *karma*,

In the same does the fruit replace it, like the redness in a cotton cloth"<sup>6</sup>), -

to say that there is no inconsistency is also mere verbiage. Since series and suffusion<sup>7</sup>) have previously been quashed as unreal. Likewise merit and sin also do not fit; for of these two the practical efficacy is the experiencing of pleasure and pain. And the inappropriateness of that has just been stated. Hence from the absence of producing practical efficacy there is inappropriateness of those two also.

Moreover, the non-eternal lasts for one moment only; and, since in that moment it is occupied merely with origination, how has it attainment of the action of acquiring merit and sin? And in the second, etc., moments it does not succeed even in abiding; and in the absence of the action of acquiring merit and demerit, whence come merit and demerit, since they are without root? And, given non-existence of those, whence is there experience of pleasure and pain? Or let that somehow be: nevertheless, the subsequent moment must be similar to the prior moment, because of the homogeneity of the acquiring to the thing to be acquired. Hence, from a prior moment which was in pain, how could there arise a subsequent moment which is in pleasure? And how from that as in pleasure could it be in pain? Because of the consequence of having dissimilar parts. Likewise also as regards merit and sin, etc.; so there is not much in this.

Likewise of bondage and liberation there is no possibility. For in the world the same who is bound is the one liberated; and, since upon acceptance of destruction without continuance

<sup>4</sup>) Quotation not traced.

<sup>5</sup>) Quoted also in *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka*, VII. 55 (romm.), *Nyāya-mañjarī* (ed. p. 413), *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I. i. 15, and *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, II (Buddha-chapter). The Void is ether, sky.

<sup>6</sup>) See *supra*, p. 121.

<sup>7</sup>) See *supra*, v. XIX, pp. 123 sqq.



there is no collocality<sup>9)</sup> and because of the non-reality of the series, how can there be even imagination of these two? And, if an evolving self is adopted, everything is unobjectionably appropriate: because of the text –

“Evolution is passing into another state; for neither as abiding in every respect,  
Nor as destruction in every respect is evolution accepted on the part of those who understand it”<sup>10)</sup>.

The commentator on the Patañjali doctrine also states: (206) “Evolution is origination, in a substance which abides, of a different attribute, with cessation of a prior attribute”<sup>10)</sup>. Similarly also with the ‘non-equivocal’ doctrines of universal and particular, existent and non-existent, utterable and unutterable, a non-existence of pleasure and pain may by attentive people be inferred for themselves.

Now the exposition of the second half (of the verse). Though thus the (linguistic) usage as to the experience of pleasure and pain is not justified; **others**, those belonging to other sects, and accordingly in very truth enemies; for the word ‘other’ is also a synonym for enemy. **By the sword of the vice of contentions (vāda) of bad reasonings:** reasonings (*nīti*), because by them a thing particularised in part is led (*niyate*) to be object of presentation; *Nayas* (Methods); ‘bad reasonings’ are faulty reasonings, wrong Methods; of these a speaking (*vaḍana*), a demonstration to others, is ‘contention of bad reasonings’; therein ‘the vice’, excessive addiction: engaging without reference to propriety, is what it comes to: is ‘vice of contention of bad reasonings’. This itself, because of possessing the power of cleaving the body of true enlightenment, is a **sword**, like a sword, a **saṅgre**; so ‘the sword of the vice of contentions of bad reasoning’. Thereby, ‘by the sword of the vice of contentions of bad reasoning’, as instrument, by the sword of bombastic descriptions of bad Methods; **thus**: he states a fashion as well known by experience. The word ‘even’ being out of order, **even without residue: the world**, even the entire Triple World; meaning, “because of being situated in A, termed A”<sup>11)</sup>, the mass of creatures in the Triple Universe; **is abolished**, slain by cutting off the inner life of correct cognition, etc.: ‘save it!’ is the intent. For by the preachers correct cognition, etc., are celebrated as the inner life: and this is why in regard even to the perfected there is the designation ‘life’. For otherwise the root *jīr* is used in the sense of maintaining the vital airs; and, as they are without maintenance of the tenfold vital airs, lifelessness of them follows; and this (result) is contradictory; and thus it is established that there are transmigrant souls (207), through maintenance of the tenfold substance *prāṇas*<sup>12)</sup>; and perfected, through maintenance of the inner life-breath, cognition, etc. And the own-form of these bad Methods we shall expound in a later (the next) verse. This is the meaning of the verse.

<sup>9)</sup> No common experience.

<sup>10)</sup> Quotation not traced.

<sup>11)</sup> From *Yāsa-bhāṣya* (see also the *vr̥tti* of Bhoja) on Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra* (M. L.'s statement here is not correct), III. 13.

<sup>12)</sup> Source untraced.

<sup>13)</sup> Viz. the 5, sense-organs, expiration and inspiration, vitality, mind-organ-force, speech-force, bodily powers (M. L., citing Śāntisūri's *Jīva-vicāra*, v. 42).

## XXVIII. THE JAIN DOCTRINE OF THE *NAYAS* (METHODS)

Now, by way of describing the wrong-Methods, the Methods and Demonstration, in consequence of the saying that "getting at it is by Demonstration and Methods"<sup>1</sup>), he, lauding the superiority in statement, not shared by others, and refutative of the path of wrong-Method, at variance with the Quodammodo doctrine, on the part of the Lord, the propounder of Demonstration and Methods, which are conditions of the attainment of truth in regard to soul, non-soul, etc., - says -

**XXVIII<sup>2</sup>). Simply existent, existent, quodammodo existent - thus in three ways.**

**the thing should be measured by wrong-procedure, Methods and Demonstration.**

**But Thou alone, beholder as the thing is, didst by the path of method and demonstration get rid of the path of bad procedure.**

**Thing (artha):** (what) 'is dealt with' (*arthate*), 'is outlined', is word-content; **in three ways**, by three procedures; **should be measured**, should be outlined: Seventh form (Optative) used in an injunction. By what three procedures? On this he says: **wrong-procedure, Methods, Demonstration.** 'Procedures' (*nīti*) are that whereby is led, outlined, a thing particularised in one part; *Nayas* (Methods): 'bad procedures', 'faulty procedures', 'wrong Methods' is the meaning, 'Methods', the Naigama, etc. 'Demonstration' (*pramāṇa*), because by it is judged (*pramīyate*), outlined, a thing, with 'equivocal' particularization, - defined as direct and indirect perception<sup>3</sup>) consisting in the Quodammodo doctrine. Wrong-procedures, and Methods, and the two Demonstrants are 'wrong procedure, Methods, Demonstration'; by them. With what outlining should be measured? On this he says, **Simply existent, existent,**

<sup>1</sup>) *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra*, I. 6 (M. I.)

<sup>2</sup>) In developed Indian Logic *pramāṇa*, here translated 'Demonstration', 'Demonstrant', etc., is the fundamental, and usually (e.g. in *Nyāya-sūtra*, I. 1, and the commentaries, and the Buddhist *Nyāya-hindu*, etc., the Jain *Saṃmatī-tarka*, etc.) the opening topic. The word, derived from *pra-mā* - 'right knowing', 'final truth', denotes (1) the process of proving, (2) objectively, 'proof' or 'evidence', or the evidential thing, e.g. perception; and correspondingly *pramāṇya*, 'pramāṇa-ness', means validity of (1) a proving, (2) of an evidential thing, e.g. perception. *Pramiti* is the act of judging, and *pramātṛ* the judging person or faculty; *prameya* is 'subject envisaged' in *pramāṇa*. There are many special treatises, Hindu, Jain and Buddhist, devoted to *pramāṇas* in general, their numbers, etc., or to particular *pramāṇas* and their *pramāṇya*, validity; and many definitions of these may be seen in the *Nyāya-kōśa* under these headings. On this matter see Dr. Randle's *Indian Logic in the early Schools*, Index, s. vv.

The Jains restricted the term *pramāṇa* to ultimate proof or truth in accordance with their main doctrine of many-sided (*anekānta*, here rendered 'equivocal') existents. From this they distinguished the *nayas*, 'trends', 'lines of approach' (here rendered 'Methods'), under which they classified, as 'one-sided' (*ekānta*) or erroneous, the several other systems.

In the *Saṃmatī-tarka* the *nayas* fill an enormous space (pp. 271-456): they are also fully expounded in the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvātoka* of Devasūri and its commentary, and incidentally in works on *pramāṇa*, among which may be mentioned, beside Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, a *Pramāṇa-paribhāṣā*, by the late sainted Śrī-Vijayadharmasūri and his disciple Śrī-Nyāvavijaya.

<sup>3</sup>) On *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* in Jainism see *Outlines of Jainism*, p. 113: original texts *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra*, I. 11-12, *Saṃmatī-tarka*, pp. 573-595, *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*, foli. 45-96.

**quodammodo existent.** 'Existent' in the neuter because of unutterableness, as in 'what has been borne in her womb?'. 'Simply existent' is the wrong-Method, 'existent' is a Method; 'quodammodo existent' is Demonstration. (208) As thus: A wrong-Method, to begin with, says 'simply existent'; 'the pot simply is'. This (Method) admitting in regard to an entity only non-equivocal actuality, with repudiation of other attributes, sets forth only the attribute approved by itself. And its status as wrong-Method is through having the form of falsity, and the falsity of form is through denial of the other attributes therein, though they exist.

Likewise, from outlining as 'existent' we have a Method; for in 'the pot is', emphasizing in regard to the pot the attribute of actuality esteemed by itself, it adopts in regard to the remaining attributes "an elephant's eye-closure"<sup>4</sup>). (209) And it is not a wrong-Method, because it has not abolished other attributes; nor is it a Demonstration (*pramāṇatva*), because it is not decorated with the word 'quodammodo'.

'Quodammodo existent' – that is Demonstration: 'quodammodo', in some way, the entity is 'existent'. And it is Demonstrative because it is not vetoed by what is seen or approved, and because in the other alternatives there is actuality of vetoing circumstances. For every entity is with its own – form existent, and with the form of other non-existent. This has been more than once stated. 'Existent' is merely for orientation; on the same lines should be conceived also non-existence, eternality, non-eternality, utterability, unutterability, universality and particularity and so on.

Having thus stated the own – form of an entity, he makes a Laudation: 'But beholder of the thing', etc. **The path of bad Procedure**, the road of bad-Method; the word 'but' (*tu*), which signifies restriction, being out of order, 'Thou alone'; – **Thou alone, didst get rid of**, didst refute; not the 'divinities' of other sects. By doing what? By way of Methods and Demonstration; Methods and Demonstration with the stated own-forms: by their road, by their course. Inasmuch as Thou, **beholder of the thing as it is**: one whose way is to see just as the thing is, is 'beholder of the thing as it is', beholder, by a pure unmixed light, of the entity as it stands; but the founders of other sects, as not having such cognition, because of being marked by the defilement of faults, such as passion, etc., are not beholders of the thing as it is; so how possibly do those unhappy wretches dare to make havoc of the ways of bad-Methods? For one himself engaged in a non-Method has not confidence to forbid the non-Method of others. What is said is this: as a person acquainted with the right road, fond of serving others, having caused avoidance of a path swarming with thieves, wild beasts, troubles (thorns), etc., shows to travellers a path without conjoint advantages and defects, untouched by defects and equipped with advantages, so the Lord of the world also, by refutation of the bad-Methods, marks out for the fortunate the path of Methods and Demonstration. 'Didst get rid of', in this Present of the root *As*<sup>5</sup>) we have *Adi* in (210) consequence of the *sūtra* 3.4.60, and in that we have the substitution of *astha* in consequence of *sūtra* 4.3.103, and in consequence of 4.4.31 we have a long *Ā* in the present-tense used for the past.

In the primary sense only Demonstration has Demonstrativeness. And the statement here of the equality of rank of the Methods to Demonstration is for the sake of making known their being members of the process of proving as being openings to further inquiry. For the great city of the verification of the teaching has four gates: introduction, propounding<sup>6</sup>), following up, and Method; and the own – form of these is to be discerned from the commentary on the *Āvaśyaka*<sup>7</sup>), etc.: but here it is not stated for fear of overloading the book. And here

<sup>4</sup>) See note XVIII 2.

<sup>5</sup>) The *sūtras* cited in justification of the form *astha* are from Hemacandra's Grammar (M. L.).

<sup>6</sup>) *Nikṣepa* (Prākṛt *nikkheva*) is explained as 'setting forth', Schubring, *op. cit.* p. 80 'Schematisierung'.

<sup>7</sup>) See *Videśavāśyaka-bhāṣya*, 911–4, and 1505sq. (M. L.).

the use of the word *patha* ('path')<sup>8</sup> twice, in one case *pathin*, with the ending of a Compound, and in the other case the unanalysed word 'path' ending with a, is no fault.

Now for some description of the own-form of bad-Method, Method and Demonstration. Of these, again, first the own-form of the Methods; because with non-understanding of that the own-form of the bad-Methods can hardly be comprehended. And here the mention by the Teacher of the bad-Methods in the first place has been for the sake of suggesting superiority in order of succession. Of them *Method* is the partial (*eka-deśa*) reflection upon the thing taken for proving. From 'leading' (*nayati*), making reach, lifting to the point of consciousness', as distinguished by a single quality chosen by oneself, an entity which is the abode of infinite attributes, it is Method (a 'lead'). The meaning is, a reflection taking place later than the procedure of Demonstration. (211)

And the Methods are infinite, because an entity has infinite attributes; and because a Method-character belongs to the speaker's intents, which are satisfied with one of the attributes. And to this effect the ancients, "As many as are the ways of statement, just so many are the Method-statements"<sup>9</sup>. Nevertheless, the ancients by working out a purport of seven as all-embracing formulated only seven: As follows: Naigama (market place), the comprehensive (*samgraha*), the conventional (*vyavahāra*), the straightforward (*rjusūtra*), the verbal (*śabda*), the etymological (*samabhirūḍha*) and the 'just so' (*evambhūta*). If it is said, 'How are all comprehended in these?', we say that intent works, of course, by way of thing or by way of word, because there is no other course. Of these whatever intents of the knower tend to the describing of the thing are all included in the first tetrad of Methods; but those which are apt for the examination of the expression are in the triad of the verbal, etc., Methods.

Of these the Naigama understands a great universal, defined as 'existence'; and intermediate universals, substance-ness, quality-ness, action-ness and so forth; also ultimate differences, defined as having the form of being totally unshared; and intermediate differences relatively proper for the exclusion of the form of others, and having an own-form absolutely detached from generality. And this, having been thrashed out in the discussion of independent universals and particulars (cf. v. IV), requires no separate effort. And this is understandable from the two examples, familiar in the teaching, of 'staying at home' and 'going forth'<sup>10</sup>.

But the 'comprehensive', by way of neglecting all particularities, takes the whole under the form of universal. And this has been already detailed in the discussion of the non-equivocal universal (cf. vv. IV-V).

But the 'conventional' states as follows: Let there be entity only as popularly apprehended; what is the use of this trouble (*kaṣṭhapṛīkā*) of imagining entities unseen and unrecognized (by ordinary language)? Whatever falls within the way of popular usage, only in favour of that does it accept of Demonstration; not of anything else. (212) For an universal, without beginning and end, single, viewed as comprehensive, is not a field of Demonstration, because of the absence of experience to that effect, and because of the consequence of everyone seeing everything. Nor are the differentiae, defined as atoms, momentarily perishing, accessible to Demonstration; because there is no proceeding on that line. Therefore only this entity-form, pot, etc., for the whole world unvetoes, familiar through Demonstration, abiding for a certain time, possessing largeness, capable of effecting the practical actions of bringing water, etc., is ultimately real. The further examination of its states, belonging to prior and later time, is,

<sup>8</sup>) Sc. in the verse.

<sup>9</sup>) *Sammata-tarka*, III. v. 47, p. 655.

<sup>10</sup>) See *Anuyoga-dvāda-sūtra*, 145 (Mālayagiri's *vyākhyā*, pp. 223-5 (M. L.).

on the other hand, not very vital, because Demonstration does not apply to them, and because without Demonstration consideration cannot be made. And, as they are non-real, what is the use of further examination in regard to them? As thus: Changes of substances taking place at prior and posterior time, or differentials defined as momentarily perishing atoms, do not in any way help to conduct the business of the world. Therefore they have not the form of real entities, since only things that subserve the business of the world are entities. And this is why such usages as 'the path goes', 'the pitcher flows', 'the mountain is on fire', 'the benches cry out', have validity. And to this effect the Chief of Expositors<sup>11)</sup>, "Equivalent to the popular, with much metonymy, and with wide-scattered meaning is usage".

The 'straightforward' again has this view: Only that which appears in the present moment has the form of an entity, not the past or the future. Because the past, as having perished, and because the future, as not having attained to its own-being, are of a form void of all potency, without distinction from asses' horns, etc.; they have no capacity for exerting practical efficacy, and from absence of that have no reality; because of the saying: "only what is effective of practical efficacy is ultimately real"<sup>12)</sup>. And, on the other hand, an entity-form embraced by the present moment is (actually) used in all practical efficacies, so that only that is ultimately real. And that is also to be taken as partless, because a comprehension of parts is void of logic; since a single thing, without plurality of own-natures, is incapable of comprehending plural parts of its own. If it is said, 'Let there be a plurality of own-natures', - No!, because it is breathed upon by the tiger of contradiction. (213) As thus: If the own-nature is one, how is it plural? If it is plural, how is it one? Since one and plural stand only with mutual avoidance. Therefore only the atoms, submerged in their own-form, taking, in a way, by way of mutual approach, the form of accumulation, have operation in all productions; so that only they are the self-marked (*sva-lakṣaṇa*)<sup>13)</sup>, not largeness carrying, ultimately real. So on the understanding of this (*naya*, method) only what is its own is real; entity; not what belongs to anything else, because of not being of any service.

As for the Verbal: As many sounds as from usage are current for any object, for instance Indra, Sakra, and Purandara for the Lord of the gods, of all those it understands (in each case) a single object, by virtue, of course, of the presentation. Just as the object's non-divergence by word is made out, likewise also is its unity or plurality to be made out. Nor are the synonymous words 'Indra', 'Sakra', and 'Purandara', etc., ever presented as denoting different objects; since always we see usage in the one same way with unfailing occurrence of origination of an uniform reflection from them. Therefore there is a single denotation of synonymous terms. Because of the etymology, 'with that intent the object is put into sound (*śabdya*), called up', there is use of synonymous sounds only with intent of evoking one object. And just as this Mode understands a single object belonging to synonymous terms, likewise in *taṣas taṣi taṣam*, because of additional connection with an attribute defined as contrary Genders, it affirms also<sup>14)</sup> a difference of entity. For in an entity which undergoes difference due to different attributes non-application of contrary attributes is not appropriate. Likewise also from difference of number, time, Case relation, Person, etc., a difference

<sup>11)</sup> Umāsvāti in *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra*, I. 35 (*bhāṣya*) (M. L.), pp. 15, 223.

<sup>12)</sup> The familiar Buddhist tenet. Exact source of quotation untraced: the doctrine is discussed in *Sammatī-tarka*, p. 399.

<sup>13)</sup> On the Buddhist *sva-lakṣaṇa*, denoting the absolutely individual and real, see Stecherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, II, pp. 7, 304, etc.

<sup>14)</sup> So, just as it identifies 'synonyms', so it distinguishes according to differences of denotation the variants of each single word. The cited instance, *taṣas, taṣi, taṣam*, where the difference of Grammatical Gender accompanies shades of meaning, seems to have been used as an illustration of this.

is to be admitted. Of these, number is unity, etc., time is past, etc., Case-relation is Nominative, etc., Person is first Person, etc.

And the 'etymological'<sup>15</sup> holds that synonymous terms have an actually distributed denotation. As follows: from being powerful he is Indra; supreme lordliness, to be stated by the word 'Indra' applies essentially to a thing which has that; and by metonymy to what has not that – or else there is not anyone who has it (metonymically so): because, as all terms are made out with mutually distributed denotation, an usage with the relation of basis and thing based<sup>16</sup> is unestablished. So from being capable 'Sakra'; from fort-cleaving 'Purandara', etc. – in this way it shows a distinction of denotation in all terms. (214) And it formulates a proof: Even synonymous terms have distinct denotations; because they are occasioned by distinct etymologies: in this world whatever (words) are occasioned by distinct etymologies have distinct denotations, like the words 'Indra', 'cattle', 'man'; and synonymous words also are occasioned by distinct etymologies, and hence have distinct denotations.

But the 'just so', again, says thus: With whatever denotation a word is interpreted, only when that denotation, the occasion for its correct use, is in action, does it understand the word as applying, and not with universality. As: only when mounted on the head of a woman, etc., at a time of bringing water, and in a special movement, is the 'pot' so called; not in other cases, because it is without the occasion for the correct use of the term 'pot': like 'cloth', etc. If it is said that 'embracing the past and future movement'<sup>17</sup>, it is in fact used with generality', – No!, since those two, having perished or not originated, are equivalent to hare's horn, etc. If nevertheless there is in that way application of the terms, it is to be applied to everything, since there is no difference. Moreover, if with reference to movement past or to come, the word 'pot' should be used also of what has not the movement, then its use in regard to potsherd, lump of earth, etc., would be unavoidable, because there is no difference. Therefore only in the moment when the occasion for the etymological use is intact is the particular thing to be stated by the particular word.

Here we have the summarizing verses<sup>18</sup>:

"That the universal is one thing undivided, cause of the cognition.

And the difference is only other, is the view of the market place. 1.

That which comprehends under the form of existence this whole world with its own own-nature

And not passing beyond the existence-form, is the comprehensive view. 2.

But 'convention', comprehending that same as actually distributed in different things, Because in that way they are seen, sets the living beings to work. 3.

Here the 'straightforward' view would be resting upon pure states

Because of there being only perishable existence with separation from permanence. 4.

(215)

Holding in consequence of difference of contrary marks, number, etc., a difference in own-nature of the same thing,

<sup>15</sup> Since *rūḍha* in ordinary Sanskrit denotes 'conventional', 'current', as opposed to etymological (*yaugika*), meaning, this Jain term is somewhat surprising, as signifying the opposite; but the verb-form *samabhirohan* occurs *infra*, p. 158, v. 36.

<sup>16</sup> 'Relation of basis and thing based': Sc. Subject and Attribute, etc. The sense seems to be that a term can denote primarily only what its etymology indicates and not anything merely related thereto, all other employment of it being metonymous.

<sup>17</sup> Exemplifying the 'lengthwise universal' (i.e. a thing as more than momentary), recognized by Jain Logic (see *Pravacana-sāra*, trans. Faddegon, Introduction, p. xxii, *Prameya-kamala*°, fol. 143.) Or is it rather the durativeness of motion?

<sup>18</sup> By the author, Mallisena?

The 'verbal' takes its separate position. 5.

Even of such entity of momentary occurrence

The 'etymological' states a difference according to difference of current term (*saṃ-jāḥ*). 6.

What is to be stated by even a single sound (word) is not always appropriate,

Because of distinction of action, – is the presumption of the 'just so'. 7."

And all these reflections, since, consisting of restriction to their chosen attributes, they proceed with ignoring of the remaining attributes, earn the designation 'bad (wrong)-Methods'. For these assertions of 'others' owe their existence to stimulation by the force thereof<sup>19)</sup>. As thus: The followers of the view according to the Naigama-Method are the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika; committed to the 'comprehension' idea are the Advaita contentions, one and all, and the Sāṃkhya-view; mainly compliant to the 'convention'-Method is the Cārvāka-view; with minds committed to the 'straightforward' idea are the followers of the Tathāgata<sup>20)</sup>; the adherents of the 'verbal', etc., Methods are the grammarians, etc.

And a description of the Methods and bad-Methods, with illustrations, has been stated by Śrī-devasūri<sup>21)</sup>: and thus his book

1. "That whereby a part of a thing denoted which has been made the subject of the Demonstrant called scripture, is treated (*nīyate*) with indifference to its other parts, that particular intent on the part of someone (so) understanding is a Method. (217)

2. But that which, on the other hand, denies parts other than the part of which it approves is a semblance of a Method (*nyābhāsa*).

3. This is in two ways, by way of distribution and combination.

4. With distribution it is of several kinds.

5. But with combination it is in two divisions, with substance as topic, or with modification as topic. (218)

6. The former is triple, because of the distinction of the Naigama, the 'comprehensive', and the 'conventional'.

7. An intent to mention with relation of primary and subordinate two attributes, two subjects of attributes, or an attribute and subject of attributes, this, 'not going in one way'<sup>22)</sup>, is the Naigama.

8. Of two attributes in, 'in the self are existence and intelligence'.

9. Of two subjects of attributes in, 'an entity having modifications is a substance'.

10. Of subject and attribute in, 'only one moment happy is a soul attached to objects'. (219)

11. Assumption of non-equivocal separateness of two attributes etc., is semblance of Naigama.

12. As in, 'in the self are existence and intelligence, absolutely separate from one another', and so on.

13. A reflection apprehending merely the universal is the 'comprehensive'.

14. This is of two alternatives, the primary and the secondary.

15. Adopting indifference to all differences, and holding to all existence as pure substance, is the primary comprehensiveness.

<sup>19)</sup> By being 'bad-Methods'.

<sup>20)</sup> Buddha.

<sup>21)</sup> The author of the commentary on the *Pramāṇa-tatvāloka*, from whose chapter VII the following passage as far as 'affirmation and negation' (p. 159) is taken verbatim.

<sup>22)</sup> This is merely an etymologising of the word 'Naigama'.

16. As in, 'everything is one existent, because of there being no difference'. (220)
17. That which, accepting a non-duality of existence which denies all differences, is the semblance of that.
18. As, 'existence alone is real, because differences separate therefrom are not seen'.
19. Holding to the intermediate universals, substance-ness, etc., and in regard to their differences (varieties?) having recourse to an 'elephant's eye-closure', is, on the other hand, the secondary comprehensiveness.
20. As for instance in, 'of *dharma*-, *adharma*-, ether-, time-, matter-, soul-substances there is unity, because of non-difference in their substance-ness,' and so on. (221)
21. Acknowledging substance-ness, etc., while denying their sub-species, is semblance thereof.
22. As in, 'substance-ness alone is reality, because substances which are different things from it are not observed', and so on.
23. The assumption whereby there is affirmative<sup>23)</sup> manipulating (*avaharaṇam*) of things contemplated with comprehensiveness is 'convention'.
24. As in, 'what is existent is substance, or state', and so on. (222)
25. That which understands, on the other hand, an ultimately unreal division of substance and state is 'semblance of convention'.
26. As the Cārvāka-view.
27. The state-meaning-Method is in four ways, the 'straightforward', the 'verbal', the 'etymological', the 'just so'.
28. The intent which formulates (*sūtrāyaṇ*) as primary the straightforward mere state, occupying the present moment, is the 'straightforward'.
29. As in, 'an appearance of happiness now exists', and so on. (223)
30. That which in every way denies substance is semblance thereof.
31. That is the Buddhist view.
32. That which adopts a distinction of meaning in the sound (word *dhvani*) according to distinctions of time, etc. is the verbal.
33. As in, 'Sumeru was, is, will be', and so on.
34. That which through distinction therein (in the time, etc.) justifies the same in the sense of the word is the semblance thereof. (224)
35. As, 'the words with different times in, 'Sumeru was, is, will be', designate an actually different thing, because it has words of different times, as in the case of other words similarly established': and so on.
36. That which through difference of etymology imposes upon (*samabhirohan*) words for states difference of denotation is the 'etymological'.
37. As in, 'from ruling Indra, from being capable *Sakra*, from fort-cleaving *Purandara*', and so on.
38. That which adopts on the part of sounds for states a difference of things denoted, is the semblance thereof.
39. As in, 'the words 'Indra', 'Sakra', 'Purandara', etc., have distinct denoted things, because of being distinct words, as in the case of the words 'elephant', 'deer', 'horse', and so on. (225)
40. That which admits as the thing designated by words an object invested with an act (*kriyā*) which has the occasion for their (the words') use, is the 'just so'.

<sup>23)</sup> *Vidhi-pāruka*, taking no account of negations: see p. 154



41. As 'when experiencing ruling, he is called Indra; when developed in the act of being capable, he is Śakra; when engaged in fort-cleaving, he is Purandara'.

42. That which rejects an entity uninvested with action as designated by a word is the semblance thereof. (226)

43. As in, 'an entity called pot, when void of special movement, is not to be designated by the word 'pot'; because it is void of the action which is the occasion for the use of the word 'pot'; like cloth' and so on.

44. Of these the first four, since they are directed to the describing of the object are object-Methods.

45. The remaining three, on the other hand, since they apply to things to be denoted by words, are word-Methods.

46. Each preceding Method has larger application, and each succeeding one a limited sphere.

47. Compared with the 'comprehensive', which applies to the existent simply, the Naigama, as having for ground the existing and non-existing, has an extensive sphere.

48. Compared with the 'conventional', which brings to light differences of the existent, the 'comprehensive', as exhibiting the entire mass of the existent, has a great sphere. (227)

49. In comparison with the 'straightforward', which has the present for sphere, the 'conventional', because of holding to what has the three times for its sphere, is of no small sphere.

50. Compared with the 'verbal', which exhibits different objects, according to differences of time, etc., the 'straightforward', as making known what is different therefrom, has an ample meaning.

51. Compared with the 'etymological', which desires a difference of object according to the word for the states, the 'verbal', which follows the opposite thereof, has an immense sphere.

52. Compared with the 'just so', which professes an object different according to the action, the 'etymological', which posits things otherwise, has a large application. (228)

53. The Method statement also, working in its own sphere, accommodates itself to the seven-nuance-view with affirmation and negation."

But the consideration of the removal of objections to the definition of the particular purports of the Methods corresponding to their names can by one who wishes for details be discerned from the *Bhāṣya-mahodadhi*<sup>24</sup>), *Gandhahasti-ṭīkā*<sup>25</sup>), *Nyāyavatāra*<sup>26</sup>) and other books. But Demonstration defined as correct ascertainment (*nirṇaya*) of the object, is composed of all the Methods; since only Methods, decorated with the word Quodammodo, enjoy the designation 'Demonstrant'. And to this effect Śrī-Samantabhadra in the hymn to Śrī-Vimalanātha<sup>27</sup>): (229)

"Inasmuch as these Thy Methods decorated with the word Quodammodo,  
Like metallic ores when broken up by fluids,  
Become of desired fruit, therefore  
The Āryas who desire good bow before Your Worship."

<sup>24</sup>) Identified by M. L. in his note here, with the *Gandha-hasti-ṭīkā*.

<sup>25</sup>) By Samantabhadra (M. L.): see note IX 16).

<sup>26</sup>) By Siddhasena-Divākara (M. L., who states that it is one of S.-D.'s 32 'Thirty-twas', on which see *supra* p. 10.

<sup>27</sup>) Contained in the *Bṛhat-svayambhū-stotrāvalī*, where the verse is no. 65 (M. L.).

And that (Demonstration) is twofold, direct and indirect. Of these the direct is twofold, the conventional, and the ultimately real. The conventional is twofold, because of the distinction of the senses and quasi-sense<sup>20</sup>) as the occasions. "This pair, through the distinction of attention (*avagraha*), interest (*iḥā*), inspection (*avāya*), and retention (*dhāraṇā*) has four alternatives for each"<sup>21</sup>). The own-form of attention, etc., being very familiar, is not enlarged upon. "But the ultimately real (perception), on the other hand, has in its origination regard only to the self"<sup>22</sup>). This is twofold: due to waning and cessation (*kṣayopasama*)<sup>23</sup>), and due to waning. The first is twofold, through the distinction of knowledge of what is remote (*avadhi-jñāna*), and of knowledge of the thoughts and feelings of others (*manah-paryāya-jñāna*); but that due to waning is absolute cognition.

And the indirect, through the distinction of memory (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhi-jñāna*), reasoning (*ūha*), inference (*anumāna*) and scripture (*āgama*), is of five kinds. "Of<sup>24</sup>) these a knowing in the form of 'that', relating to a thing experienced, and arising from the awakening of a trace (*saṃskāra*), is memory (3). It is as 'that image of a Tirthaṅkara' (4). A cognition consisting of a putting together, having for field a crosswise or lengthwise generality<sup>25</sup>), etc., and caused by experience and memory is recognition (5). As: 'this cow-body belongs to that species, what is like a cow is a gayal'; 'this is that same Jinadatta', etc.' (6). A consciousness in the form 'this takes place only when that is', etc., and relating to a connection of Middle Term and Major Term, taken as of the three times, and arisen from observation and (230) non-observation, is reasoning, otherwise named deduction (7). As, 'as far as there is any smoke, it all occurs only when fire exists'; or, 'if that does not exist, this does not occur' (8). Inference is of two kinds, for self and for other (9). Of these, definite cognition of a Major Term, having for cause the apprehension of a Middle Term, solely defined as 'unaccountability otherwise'<sup>26</sup>), and recollection of the connection, is (inference) for self (10). That which consists in statement of a Minor Term and a Middle Term for the sake of another is metonymously inference (23). Consciousness of a thing elicited through the statement of an authority is scripture (-knowledge) (1). By metonymy also the statement of the authority (2)". And the special own-form of memory, etc., can be known, along with the clearing of objections, from the *Syādvāda-raśnākarā*<sup>27</sup>).

The other means of proof, again, practical consequence (*arthāpatti*), analogy (*upamāna*), possibility (*sambhava*), ideas (*pratibhā*), report (*aitihya*), etc., are included in these. But contact (*sannikarṣa*), etc., as being non-intelligent (*jaḍa*), simply are not means of proof. So by such provision of Methods and proofs the road of wrong-Methods was by you laid waste. This is the meaning of the verse.

<sup>20</sup>) *Anindriya* seems to be the *no-indriya* of note XVII 22), corresponding more or less to the mind-organ (*manas*) of Hindu philosophy: cf. *Sammati-tarka*, p. 519.

<sup>21</sup>) *Pramāṇa-naya-tatvāloka*, I. 6 (M. L.).

<sup>22</sup>) *Ibid.*, II. 18 (M. L.).

<sup>23</sup>) On these terms see *Outlines of Jainism*, Index.

<sup>24</sup>) The long quotation is from the *Pramāṇa-naya-tatvāloka*, III. 2-10, 23, IV. 1-2 (M. L.) (who notes in 10 the absence of 'solely . . . otherwise' = 11 of the edition).

<sup>25</sup>) See note XXVIII 17).

<sup>26</sup>) On *anyathā-anupapatti*, see p. 132.

<sup>27</sup>) By Vādi-Devasūtri, XIIth to XIIIth century.

## XXIX. THE VARIETIES OF SOULS, AND THEIR NUMBER

Now, by way of showing the fault of those who, reiterating that the world is limited to the seven continents and oceans, because of the possibility of only a limited number of beings in a world of those dimensions, maintain a limited number of selves, he, lauding as free from fault the doctrine of an infinity of souls worked out by the Holy One, says (231)

**XXIX. On the doctrine of limited selves either even one liberated should come into the world, or the world should be void of dwellers in it.**

**The corporation of six kinds of soul thou didst state  
as of infinite number; so, O Lord! that there is not fault.**

In the doctrine of limited selves, upon acceptance of selves of countable number, a pair of refutations presents itself; these in order he exhibits. 'Either even one liberated should come into the world': **One liberated**, one who has reached Nirvāṇa; **even** he: *api* is used to express astonishment; **either** has the sense of addition with reference to the subsequent fault, as in 'either deity or demon': **should come into the world**: should return to mundane existence. This is one faulty consequence. 'Or the world should be void of dwellers in it': **the world**, mundane existence; **or that**; **void of dwellers in it**, deprived of souls in mundane existence; **should be**, should become. This is the second faulty consequence.

Here the notion is this: If the selves are supposed to be just limited in number, then, as they in succession according to their advance in their practice of cognition of reality pass into beatification, we can imagine, of course, some time or other when all have Nirvāṇa: and in consequence of the beginninglessness and endlessness of time, and the limitation of the selves, what is to prevent the occurrence of emptiness of mundane existence? For in the case of a pond filled with a definitely limited mass of water one concludes an emptiness at another time through wind, sun's heat, peoples' water-vessels, etc. Nor is this a matter recognized by any authority, because of the consequence of mundane existence losing its own-form. For its own-form is this: that in which, under the control of *karma*, living creatures pass through lives (*samsaranti*), did pass and will pass. And with Nirvāṇa of all one must either perforce admit emptiness of mundane existence, or the liberated must again come into the world. But those whose *karma* is exhausted are not qualified for worldly life; because of the text - (232)

"As, when the seed is completely burnt, a shoot does not come forth,  
So, when the seed of *karma* is burnt, there grows not the blade of worldly life"<sup>1</sup>).

And Patañjali says: "Given the root, its maturation, birth, life force and enjoyment"<sup>2</sup>). And the commentary thereon: "Given defilements, a store of *karma* is initiative of maturation; but not if the root of defilements is annihilated. Just as rice grains encased in their husks, with their status as seeds unburnt, are capable of growth, but not when the husk has been taken away, or their seed-status burnt, so a store of *karma* encased in defilements, grows to

<sup>1</sup>) Source untraced.

<sup>2</sup>) Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra*, II. 13, and the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* thereon (M. L.).

maturation, but not when the defilements have been taken away, nor when the seed-status of the defilements has been burnt by discrimination. And this maturation is in three ways: birth, life-force, enjoyment"<sup>3</sup>). Akṣapāda also says: Activity does not tend to renewal on the part of one whose defilements have lapsed"<sup>4</sup>). Having thus confuted the followers of the view of the mentally crippled<sup>5</sup>) Śiva-rājarṣi, in the second half he celebrates as faultless the doctrine of unlimited souls, of which the Holy One was author, in, 'The corporation of six', etc. But thou, O Lord! in that manner; of infinite number, furnished with a special number<sup>6</sup>), termed infinite; the corporation of six kinds of soul: called living souls, because they lived, do live, and will live; furnished with senses, etc., cognition, etc., the state of substance, maintenance of life-breath. Of these 'the corporation', the mass; by the *sūtra* "In regard to collection which has nothing above it"<sup>7</sup>), from root *ci* the suffix *ghaṇi*, and instead of the initial *ka* is used: is the corporation of living souls, earthen, etc. The sum total of the six corporations of living souls<sup>8</sup>) is the 'six-souled-corporation'; neuter, because we see '*pātra*, etc.'<sup>9</sup>). Or else, of six kinds of living souls 'the corporations', the collections of each, is the 'six corporations of souls', that assemblage of the six (kinds of) souls defined as earth, water, fire, air, trees, mobile creatures. So, in that manner; *didst state*, described with limits; (233): *as*, in what way there is no fault, refutation; the Singular (fault) is used in view of the genus. So that other faults of the class of the previously stated pair of faults should not be manifest, so didst Thou teach infinity of souls, - that is the meaning. 'Didst state', the form with *a* is justified in the root *khyā* preceded by the preposition *ān*<sup>10</sup>). And the 'Thou'<sup>11</sup>), singular, indicates that to the world-guru alone, singular, belongs the capacity for describing such, and not to the doctors of other sects.

Of earth, etc., again a being souls is to be thus established: As earth in the form of coral rocks, etc., has selves, because on breakage there is a rising up of similar matter, like the scales of piles, etc.; water in earth also has souls; because of the possibility of an own-nature of the same class as the things which regenerate after injury, as in the case of a frog; the sky also has souls, because of what falls self-created in the case of disturbances to clouds, like fishes, etc.; fire also has souls, because we see changes, such as growth, etc., through supply of sustenance, like the members of a man; air also has souls, because, when moved by something else, it has a motion sideways, like an ox; the tree also has a soul, because we see its withering through cutting, etc., like a man's limb; and in the case of some of them because of change through sleep, the embrace of a woman etc.<sup>12</sup>). Or from intelligence, as having diminution<sup>13</sup>), is proved the possession of souls by all of them; and from the statement of authorities. And in regard to the mobile, worms, ants, bees, men, etc., there is not, on the part of any, dispute of their having souls. And how upon the Holy One's initiative there is no

<sup>3</sup>) See note <sup>2</sup>).

<sup>4</sup>) *Nyāya-sūtra*, IV. i. 64 (M. L.).

<sup>5</sup>) Or 'annihilation-conceiving'? Śiva-rājarṣi does not seem to be known.

<sup>6</sup>) On the Jain distinction between 'innumerable' (*asamkhyeya*) and 'infinite' (*ananta*) number see *Pracarana-sāra*, trans. Faddogon, Index.

<sup>7</sup>) Hemacandra's Grammar, I. iii. 80 (M. L.), explains the formation of the word *kāya*, 'corporation', from root *ci*.

<sup>8</sup>) See *Outlines of Jainism*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>9</sup>) A reference to a grammatical *vārtika* of Kātyāyana (M. L.), Pāṇini, II. i. 48 (?).

<sup>10</sup>) Hemacandra's Grammar, III. iv. 60 (M. L.), explains the formation of the word *ākhyas* from *ā* (Preposition) + Verb-root *khyā*.

<sup>11</sup>) A Plural of 'Majesty' might have been used.

<sup>12</sup>) Supposed to induce fructification in certain trees.

<sup>13</sup>) Gradation implies evanescent stages.

fault in infinity of living creatures, to that effect an orientation can be conceived: In His Holiness' view there is in the six corporations of living beings difference of little and much as follows: the least numerous are those of the mobile class; countable-fold more numerous than these are the fire-class; surpassing these in kinds are the earth-class; surpassing these in kinds are the water-class; surpassing these in kinds are the air-class; (234) than these infinite-fold (more numerous) are those of the tree-class: and these are normal (*vyāvaharikā*) or abnormal, because of the statement –

“*Golas* are innumerable<sup>14)</sup>; what has countless *Nigodas* is called *Golaka*;  
In each single *Nigoda* infinite souls should be recognized.  
As many as out of the mass of normal (*saṃvavahāra*) souls here are perfected,  
So many from the beginningless mass of trees arrive therein.”

And as many souls as from anywhere go to liberation, so many from the beginningless mass of trees of *Nigodas* arrive there.

Nor is there for that any diminution thereof (of the mass), because of the inexhaustableness of the infinity of *Nigoda* souls. And the own-form of the *Nigodas* is to be learnt from the *Samaya-sāgara*<sup>15)</sup>. And those who even in beginningless, endless, time have attained, attain, or will attain Nirvāṇa do not constitute even an infinitesimal fraction of the *Nigodas*, nor did constitute, nor will constitute. And therefore how is there the consequence of the coming of the liberated into worldly life, and how is there the drawing the consequence of emptiness of mundane existence? And this is approved on the part of those of other flocks also: and, as was said by the author of the *Vārttika*<sup>16)</sup> –

“Therefore also, though the wise are being constantly liberated,  
There is because of the infinity of souls in the Brahmāṇḍa world not emptiness.  
That which has size is associated with termination, deficiency and excess,  
But in a thing without limit surely there is no possibility of these.”

This is the meaning of the verse.

<sup>14)</sup> On *golas* and *nigodas* see note XI <sup>13)</sup>.

<sup>15)</sup> An unknown work.

<sup>16)</sup> On Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra*?

### XXX. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SYĀDVĀDA, ALL-COMPREHENSIVE AND IMPARTIAL

And now, proclaiming the jealousy (spite?, (*maṣarīdam*)) of other systems, as emphasizing mutually contradictory things, (235) he brings to light the absence of jealousy on the part of the Siddhānta<sup>1</sup>), which has the omniscient for author, as consisting of all the Modes in agreement with one another:

**XXX. As, because of being alternatives and counter-alternatives one to another, the other prime doctrines are jealous; not so is Thy religion, in desiring the Methods in totality without distinction, given to partiality.**

That whereby is preferentially (*pra-karṣeṇa*) stated, is made out, the thing approved by oneself, **prime doctrine** (*pravāda*); **as**, in what manner; **the other**, alien to Thy teaching, preferential doctrines, views, are **jealous**: because of the rule for use of form with the sense of *matu* ('possessing') in case of exceeding<sup>2</sup>), they are characterized by intolerance in excess, having their minds made turbid by infusion of anger. **Given to partiality** bent upon establishing the alternatives appropriated by them, with putting aside of the other alternatives. For what reason are they jealous? In reply to this he says, 'because of being alternatives and counter-alternatives to one another': **Alternative** (*pakṣa*), that which is ripened (*pacyate*), is made patent, by reasons, etc., as distinguished by an attribute to be established: the propounding of a Middle Term as basis for an adopted attribute. An alternative opposed thereto is a **counter-alternative**, an alternative contrary to an alternative is a 'counter-alternative'; being a counter-alternative opposed to an alternative is 'being alternative counter-alternative'. **To one another**, mutually; the being (mutually) counter-alternative to alternative is being alternative and counter-alternative, is 'being alternative and counter-alternative to one another'; 'because of' that. As thus: The same which is the Mīmāṃsaka-alternative, 'sound is eternal', is to the Buddhists a counter-alternative; because in their view sound is non-eternal. The same which is the Buddhist alternative, 'sound is non-eternal', is to the Mīmāṃsakas a counter-alternative. The same applies to all the procedures (*prayoga*). **So**, in that manner; **Thy, Taine; religion** (*samaya*) (236): correctly (*samyak*) through it moves (*eti*), goes, the word to the object; "In a masculine name *gha*"<sup>3</sup>); convention (*saṃketa*). Or else, 'religion', because by it are correctly, without error, gone to (*ayyante*), known, the objects, soul, non-soul, etc.: thus 'religion' is tenet (*siddhānta*). Or else 'religion', because in it the things denoted, soul, etc. correctly move (*ayante*), go, attain to firm ground in their own own-nature: thus 'religion' is scripture (*āgama*). **Not given to partiality**, not attached to a single alternative. For as cause of partiality jealousy has been stated in regard to the other prime doctrines; and in Thy religion, from absence of jealousy, there is no partiality. For

<sup>1</sup>) The Jain Canon.

<sup>2</sup>) This explains the sense of the Suffix -in in *maṣarīn*, derived from *maṣara*.

<sup>3</sup>) This (Hemacandra's Grammar, V. iii. 130 [M. L.]) accounts for the grammatical form of the word *samaya*, 'convention', 'religion', as derived from *samyak*, 'correctly', + *i*, 'go'.

partiality is comprised in jealousy, 'and the compriser, when stopped, stops also the comprised'; so that, jealousy being stopped, partiality also stops — that is the sense. 'Thy religion', — the Genetive of connection, *videlicet* relation of denotand and denotant. Although as regards the *sūtra* the authorship is on the part of the Gaṇadharas<sup>4)</sup>, the religion being, as regards the sense, of the Holy One's authorship, there is no contradiction in the relation of denotand and denotant, because of the text: "The sense is stated by the Arhat, the *sūtra* is skilfully composed by the Gaṇadharas"<sup>5)</sup>. Or else the 'religion' is the system (*prapañca*) of origination, destruction and stability; and because those have by His Holiness been patently stated in the form of key terms (*mātrkā*). And thus the scriptural text, "It is either being produced, or is departing, or is stable"<sup>6)</sup> — so there is no fault. The absence of jealousy is what he justified by means of an epithet, 'which desires the Methods in totality without distinction'. In totality, in entirety; the Methods, the Naigama, etc.; without distinction, so that there is no distinction; desiring, wishing, because the 'equivocal' doctrine consists of all the Methods. Just as to pearl jewels in separate fractions, when sewn on a single thread, the term 'necklace' belong, so to the Methods, with their separate purposes, when attached with a single thread called the Quodammodo doctrine, belongs the designation 'Demonstrant called inspired scripture'. (237) — 'Surely, as the Methods separately are contradictory, how is there absence of contradiction in their combination?' — We say: Just as on finding a right impartial settler of a question even mutually disagreeing disputants stop their dispute, so the Methods, though mutually hostile, on approaching the teaching of the omniscient, have their disagreements appeased by the use of the word Quodammodo, and stand in the state of absolute mutual friendship. And thus the religion of the Holy One, as composed of all the Methods, has without contradiction a consisting of all the outlooks; because the outlooks are in the form of Methods. Nor should it be said, 'Then why is the religion of the Holy One not observed in them?'; because the ocean, although composed of all the rivers, is not observed in them when divided. And accordingly, concluding an unity of utterer and uttered, the honoured Śrī-Siddhasena-divākara says —

"Like all the rivers in the ocean

Thy views, O Lord! are in motion together towards Thee;

Nor in them is Your Worship clearly discerned,

Like the ocean in the wholly separate rivers"<sup>7)</sup>.

But others expound as follows: As through their status as alternatives and counter-alternatives the other prime doctrines are jealous, in that way Thy religion, adopting with impartiality all the Methods, is not jealous. Being how? Given to partiality (*pakṣapātī*); an alternative (*pakṣa*), that is, addiction to a single alternative; he overthrows (*pātayati*), that is 'abolishes': (so) 'given to partiality'; because passion has been completely destroyed. And in this exposition 'jealous' is the Predicate, and in the previous one 'given to partiality' was so — that is the difference. And here the discrimination between forced and unforced exposition is to be made by the discriminant himself. This is the meaning of the verse.

<sup>4)</sup> On these see note XXIII<sup>11)</sup>.

<sup>5)</sup> *Vīṣeḍvāsya*, 1119 (M. L.).

<sup>6)</sup> Quoted also in *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I. i. 31, where it is styled *pāramarṣa* = *ārṣa* here.

<sup>7)</sup> From Siddhasena's *Thirty-twoes, Dvātriṃśad-dvātriṃśadhikā*, IV. 15 (M. L.): quoted also in Bhayad-va's comm. on *Saṃmatī-tarka* (ed. Ahmedabad, p. 29).

## XXXI. PRAISE OF THE LORD MAHĀVĪRA

Having to such purpose, by way of discriminating certain matters, lauded the Lord's quality called statement according to fact, (238) (now) letting appear along with a simile his own incapacity for describing in detail all these superiorities of statement, and publishing his own name, concealed, in order to avoid conceit, under a different turn of words, he states in conclusion –

**XXXI. If we hope to discriminate Thy statement-mastery**

**In its entirety, O prime of the venerable!**

**we might with agility overleap the ocean,**

**might support a thirst for drinking the moonbeams.**

**Mastery** (*vaibhava*) is simply power (*viśhva*); Suffix *aṇ* giving the same meaning, because it (the word) belongs to the group *prajñā*, etc.<sup>1)</sup> or else, 'mastery', the status of a master (*viśhu*), and his action, **statement-mastery** is 'mastery of statements', the highest accomplishment in stating. Or else, on the alternative of 'the status of an omnipresent (*viśhu*)', a comprising of all the Methods, since the word 'omnipresent' is conventionally established as a synonym for 'compriser'. **Thy**, with **Thou** connected; **In its entirety**, total; **to discriminate**, to consider; **if**, supposing; **we hope**, we desire; **O prime of the venerable**, 'venerable', to be honoured, that is the Five Supreme ones<sup>2)</sup>; among them the 'prime', principal, because of being the first; to him belonging. 'Surely, as the Arhats<sup>3)</sup> are of quality inferior to the Siddhas, how does primacy belong to them, although characterised by superiority of statement? Nor is inferiority of quality unestablished, because we hear of obeisance on their part to the Siddhas, at the time of their taking orders; from the statement of a Śruta-kevalin<sup>4)</sup>: "After making obeisance to the Siddhas he obtains acceptance". – Say not so: (239) since only by the instruction of the Arhats are even the Siddhas made known. And to this effect the inspired text (*ārśa*)<sup>5)</sup>: "By the instruction of the Arhats the Siddhas are known; therefore the Arhats are the beginning"<sup>6)</sup>. Thus is established a primacy on the part of the Holy One only. 'If we hope to discriminate Thy statement mastery in its entirety', then what? He states: 'We might overleap, etc.' 'Then' is to be supplied. Then **with agility**, with nimbleness of leg, with possession of speed; **we might overleap** (*laṅghema*) **the ocean**, so to speak; we might cross the ocean. Likewise, **we might support**, we might maintain; **a drinking of the moonbeams**, the moon's rays: 'the drinking of the moonbeams'; for that **a thirst**, a thirsting, desire, that is what it comes to, 'a thirst for drinking the moonbeams'; that. In both instances the Optative in the sense of supposition. Just as someone, because of having speed in his going about on foot,

<sup>1)</sup> Hemacandra's Grammar, VII. ii. 165 (M. L.), accounts for the grammatical form of the word *vaibhava*, derived from *viśhva*.

<sup>2)</sup> Sc. Siddhas, Arhats, Ācāryas, Upādhyāyas and Śādhus: see *Outlines of Jainism*, pp. 2–3.

<sup>3)</sup> Mahāvīra, while alive, was Arhat, not Siddha: see *Outlines*, pp. 2, 78, 129–31.

<sup>4)</sup> See note I<sup>1)</sup>.

<sup>5)</sup> On *ārśa* see note I<sup>1)</sup>.

<sup>6)</sup> *Viśeṣāvaśya-bhāṣya*, 3213 (M. L.).



desires even without a vessel to overleap the ocean, and as one having heard of the moon's rays as consisting of ambrosia desires to drink them with a cup, etc., and both these things cannot possibly be effected; so also a wish to depict in entirety Your Worship's mastery of statements is similar to an engagement upon an impossible attempt; to say nothing of making a discrimination in entirety of Thy powers of statement, even a desire with reference thereto is great rashness. That is the sense-meaning.

Or else, 'from the root *lagh* in the sense of 'drying up''), is 'we might dry up' (*laṅghema*), the ocean, by agility, meaning great speed; while, if *laṅghi* is used in the sense of 'crossing', the Active form is rare; and the Middle termination is not regular'. – And here that, in 'we hope', although the subject is avoidance of conceit, the teacher has used of himself the plural, signifies as follows: 'there are in the world many laudators, like me of weak intelligence', so that by the mere plural no egoism truly on the part of the laudator, a leader, is to be suspected. On the contrary, an erecting of a flag on the temple of his absence of presumption should be the conclusion. This is meaning of the verse.

In these 31 verses the metre is Upajāti. (240)

<sup>1</sup>) Hemacandra's *Dhātu-pāryāyaṇa*, bhāṣā: 98 (M. L.); but, despite this evidence from H's own grammatical work, this alternative meaning is rendered improbable by the 'with agility' in the verse.

In the expression *vahema candradayus* the last line of this verse XXXI alludes by a pun to the name of the author, Hemacandra. In his other 'Thirty-two', the *Ayoga-vyavacchedikā*, at a corresponding point, a similar 'seal-signature' may be seen.

### XXXII. THE LORD MAHĀVĪRA IS THE ONLY SAVIOUR

Thus, - showing the Holy One's unique capacity by the cutting away of other systems, to be effected by unfailing power of statement in uplifting the world sunk in darkness consisting of delusion through the deceptive members of other sects, - he demonstrates a proficiency in propriety of persons whose minds are disposed to pay attention to him -

**XXXII. This world, set alas! by the worthless opponents, as by illusionists,  
in blind gloom frightful through intermixture of truth-untruth,  
Thou alone with unerring statement art definitely able to uplift.  
Hence, O Saviour! to Thee the thoughtful render service.**

This, visibly observed; **world**, universe; metonymously, people in the world; **by the worthless opponents**: those 'opponents' who are 'worthless', lowest; members of other sects; 'worthless opponents'; by them: **as by illusionists**, as by jugglers, as by people skilled in the practice of Sāmbhari-art; that is what it comes to. **In blind gloom**, in thick darkness; **alas!** is used in grief; **set**, deeply set, placed, let fall - that is the meaning. 'Blind' because it makes blind, blinds; and that is so, and also 'gloom', so it is 'blind gloom'. - *Tamasa* has the suffix *a* in virtue of the *sūtra*: "After *sa*, *ara* and *andha* in *tamasa*"<sup>1</sup>). In that 'blind gloom'. What sort of 'blind gloom'? In order to exclude material darkness he says: 'frightful through intermixture of truth-untruth': Both truth and untruth are **truth-untruth**; of those two the **intermixture**, state of being intermixed, mixedness, interchange of own - natures, 'intermixture of truth and untruth'. Therethrough **frightful**, terrible. A blind gloom wherein arises an intermixture, such that there is insertion (*abhinireśa*) of non-truth in truth, and insertion of truth in non-truth. - That is the meaning. And in virtue of this epithet only what is delusive through falsity is in very truth 'blind gloom', because that only has such a definition. And to that effect in another book says the respected author of the present Laudation: (241)

"Awareness of a divinity in regard to a non-divinity, idea of a guru in regard to a non-guru.

And awareness of merit in regard to non-merit are falsity through contradiction therein"<sup>2</sup>).

Hence the meaning is as follows: As truly jugglers, having such well taught system of arts of deluding others, by setting in motion something of such kind, consisting mainly of drugs, *mantras*, dexterity, etc., sink the people of the company in a gloom consisting of illusion, so also those of other sects, exhibiting in the same manner argumentation of bad deductions, badly studied, cast this world into a great darkness of delusion. That, the world, to uplift, to draw from the inundation of the great darkness of delusion; **definitely**, certainly; **Thou alone**, not another; **art able**, capable. Why thus is the capacity of His Holiness alone described? The cause he states by way of an epithet: **with unerring statement**, because being made clear

<sup>1</sup>) Hemacandra's Grammar, VII. iii. 80 (M. L.).

<sup>2</sup>) Hemacandra's *Yoga-sāstra*, II. 3 (M. L.).

by the three tests called 'scraping', 'cutting' and 'heating', it never fails of attaining the fruit. What is of this character is unerring'. Whoso's statement, teaching, is such, he is 'of unerring statement', - of unfailing utterance. This is the meaning. And how the utterance of the supreme Lord never incurs error has been shown in various places in the establishment of the Quodammodo doctrine. And the own - form of 'scraping', etc., is thus proclaimed by divines -

"What is stoppage of sinful conditions, taking life, etc.,  
And what is rule of meditation, study, etc., is religious (*dharma*-) 'scraping' (*kṣa*).  
And that external occupation whereby no harm is done and through restriction wherein  
One can become purified; that again is in *dharma* 'cutting' (*cheda*). (242)  
Doctrine of status of soul, etc., which calorifies bondage, etc., is here 'heat' (*tāpa*).  
By these purified, *dharma* attains to the state of *dharma*"<sup>3</sup>).

For the authorities of other sects have not doctrines purified by the triad of tests before us; so that they are capable of making the world fall into the blind gloom of the great delusion, not, on the other hand, of uplifting it. Hence, for reason; for what reason? Because of the mark of an unshared capacity for uplifting the world fallen within the gloom - ocean of bad views. O Saviour! skilled in rescuing the three worlds! To Thee, because by accent a restriction is understood, 'only to Thee', as recipient, not to another divinity. The thoughtful (*kṛta-dhī*): the root *kar* is here used in the sense of cleansing (*parikarma*), as in 'do hands, do feet'; 'is done' (*kṛta*), meaning 'cleansed' (*parikarmita*). Those whose thought (*dhī*, intelligence) has been perfected (*samskṛta*) by advancement in the study of such and such treatises, apt for the teaching of truth, are 'thoughtful', become intelligence (*cīd-rūpā*). Render service (*kṛta-saparya*): since even without *pra-*, etc., the initial doing (*ādi-karman*) is understood, 'render' is 'begun to render' (*kāriṇ-ārabdhā*); 'service', attendance, those who have rendered thus service, they practise towards only Thee, with abandonment of others to be conciliated, a being professors of attendance. So the meaning of the verse adorned by the *Sikharinī* metre<sup>4</sup>).

Here ends the commentary on the Laudation '32 verses of abolition (rescission) of other systems'.

<sup>3</sup>) From Haribhadra's *Pañca-astaka*, IV. 1-3 (M. L.).

<sup>4</sup>) Named because different from the metre of the rest of the Hymn: change of metre in a terminal verse is a familiar expedient in Sanskrit, as in other literature.

## BENEDICTION ON THE PART OF THE AUTHOR OF THE COMMENTARY

1. Those in contact with the road of logical proof, to whom, bright with the weapons of brilliant reasons,  
The explained meaning, rising from the Laudation created by the teacher Hema, is dear:  
To them, having selves untouched by fear arising from the demons of bad Methods,  
Is possible, without fatigue, the attainment of the city of the Jain Scripture<sup>1)</sup>, which gives an auspicious glory.
2. That, in survey of the profound meaning of the sayings of the Holy Śrī-Hemasūri,  
Ocean of the Fourfold Knowledge<sup>2)</sup>, my vision has been advanced,  
With my considerable lowness overcome by very long persistence in honouring the religion,  
Surely is a growth of the miraculous collyrium of the particles of dust of my guru's feet<sup>3)</sup>.  
(243)
3. By me composed, with a few select topics, comparable to heart-delighting flowers, arisen on the trees of other and other treatises<sup>4)</sup>,  
This commentary on the Laudation of the last Jina may the pure-hearted carry like a garland at their hearts.
4. Whatever here through the fault of intellectual dullness has been stated in contradiction of logical proof and the Canon,  
That may men of noble minds, putting aside spite and applying benevolence, correct.
5. He in regard to whom, from his Three-world-wide fulness of ideas, the inference  
'On earth he is the guru of the ambrosia-enjoyers'<sup>5)</sup> arises without pretence,  
And joyously praising whose belchings of sayings as ambrosia those gods  
Celebrate the same (inference), as most surpassingly pithy with consistency,
6. May that breast-ornament Kaustubha of the Govinda<sup>6)</sup>, who is the Nāgendra school,  
That all-worshipful Śūri Udayaprabha have joy!
7. By Śrī-Mallīṣeṇa-sūri, the sun of the sky of that sect,  
Was composed in the Śaka year measured by the Manus and the sun (1214)<sup>7)</sup>, on the Dīpa festival, on a Saturday, this commentary.

<sup>1)</sup> A justified intimation that the treatise serves as a sure guide to Jain doctrine.

<sup>2)</sup> Hemacandra's *quasi*-Omniscience embraced the four departments of Grammar, Scripture, Poetics and Logic. see note 8) *supra* to Preface.

<sup>3)</sup> Acknowledgment of indebtedness to the Udayaprabha of p. 9 *supra*.

<sup>4)</sup> Prior literature abundantly used and cited by Mallīṣeṇa.

<sup>5)</sup> Sc. the gods, whose guru is Ṛṣhaspati or Nārada; cf. Preface, v. 2. \

<sup>6)</sup> Breast-ornament of Viṣṇu.

<sup>7)</sup> A. D. 1292 (Manu = 14, Suns = 12).

8. Exuding the fragrance of collaboration by comradeship of Śrī-Jinaprabha-sūri<sup>\*)</sup>.  
May the commentary *Syād-vāda-mañjarī* garland the ears of good people. (244)
9. To Lord Śrī-Hemācandra who from conquest of (the) Kali (Age) is on the Jina scale,  
By me devotion has been published in the guise of composition of a commentary on the  
Laudation composed by him.  
So I do not beseech good people to elucidate merits and refutations of my own sayings;  
Seeing that honouring, the unfeigning essence of that (devotion), is here perfect<sup>\*)</sup>.

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<sup>\*)</sup> Apparently a friend of Malliṣeṇa: Jinaprabha is a name well known in Jaina literature.

<sup>\*)</sup> In this verse Malliṣeṇa, having already, in v. 4, formulated the usual invitation of correction of any errors in his work, renounces all claim to appreciation of his labours.

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